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This thesis examines the adequacy of the current regime of parental rights in the 
workplace in Great Britain.  This is done by first considering the rationale for protecting 
the status of parents and why it is important to enable parents to combine both family 
and work responsibilities and considers feminist theory in relation to this subject.  
Having done so, the thesis moves on to consider the existing legislative framework that 
is supposed to achieve work-life balance focussing on the following legislative 
provisions: 
• Maternity and paternity leave 
• Parental leave 
• Emergency Dependant’s leave 
• Right to request flexible working 
• Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 
• Working Time Regulations 
• Sex discrimination 
The thesis then considers the way in which “family-friendly” rights are enforced 
through the Employment Tribunal system, including some of the hurdles faced by 
potential claimants, such as tribunal fees.   
Finally, the thesis looks to the future, considering whether the Shared Parental Leave 
provisions, which apply for children expected on or after 5 April 2015 will address the 
problems identified earlier in the thesis with the current legislative regime and suggests 
a new, more holistic approach to the need to combine work and family, based on the 
duty to make reasonable adjustments, which currently exists only in respect of 
disability.   
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CHAPTER 1 : The problems confronting working parents and why these are of 
importance to society as a whole 
1.1 Scope of thesis 
1.1.1 The purpose of my thesis is to consider the adequacy of workplace parental rights 
in Great Britain (“GB”).  I will argue that the rights that the law in GB currently provides 
to allow parents to combine both their work and family responsibilities fail to produce 
the desired outcome (i.e. to allow parents to combine work and family) and will then 
propose changes to the current law.   It should be noted at the outset that some of the 
statistics that are gathered in relation to this area relate to the UK, rather than GB 
specifically as only UK statistics were available in some cases.  The law, figures and 
statistics set out herein are accurate as at 1 March 2015. 
1.1.2 Why is the workplace important?  As Caracciolo Di Torella and Masselot have 
noted “[e]mployment is not only important because it contributes to the maintenance of 
society’s overall economy, but also because it gives individuals their main source of 
income and wealth; by means of employment individuals achieve social security and 
financial independence which allow them to make choices.  In turn, the possibility of 
making choices brings freedom.”1 
1.1.3 There is also another aspect to work; we spend a vast amount of time in the 
workplace and therefore it is also the site of a large number of our social interactions and 
where we form social connections.    As such any barriers to work, or particular types of 
work, can have a huge impact on the individuals concerned, both from a financial and 
social perspective.  GB employment law is based on the law of contract and, as such, the 
general principle is that the parties are free to negotiate such terms as they wish.  There 
are some limitations set out in the legislation, such as the fact that, from a statutory 
perspective, an employee who has the relevant qualifying service2 cannot be unfairly 
dismissed3.   However, such legislation does not prevent an employer from terminating 
                                                          
1 Eugene Caracciolo Di Torella. and Annick Masselot (2010) “Reconciling Work and Family Life in EU Law and 
Policy”, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 17 
2 Two years for those whose employment commenced on or after 6 April 2012, one year for those whose 
employment commenced before this date. 
3 An employer can only “fairly dismiss” an employee where the dismissal is on one of four specified grounds 
set out in s98(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (redundancy, capability, conduct, illegality) or where the 
dismissal was for some other substantial reason, and, even then the dismissal must be fair considering 
whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) 
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the employment relationship; it simply provides the employee with a remedy (usually 
financial) after the termination.   
1.1.4 It is important to note at the outset of this thesis that rights in employment are 
just part of the solution for enabling parents to combine work and family; good quality, 
affordable childcare is also vital and there is an obvious and recognised4 lack of this in 
GB.  The average cost of childcare is 28% of household income5 – this is the highest in 
Europe, other than Switzerland and can be contrasted with, for example, Sweden where 
the level is just 6%.  A parent buying 50 hours per week of childcare (which equates to a 
full-time nursery place) would face an average bill of approximately £11,0006.   By contrast 
median gross annual earnings are £27,000 (which equates to net earnings of around 
£22,000).  As such, childcare costs are a significant expenditure for most parents.  This has 
an impact on whether some parents can afford to work.  As Crompton has noted “…the 
cost of ‘good’ childcare service, and the low quality of less expensive childcare provision, 
means that for many working-class families, good quality childcare can only be assured 
if it is provided by the mother…”7.  This is problematic for several reasons: (i) the ability 
to participate in paid employment is important for women because it has the capacity to 
provide them with economic independence; (ii) as discussed later in this thesis, 
increasingly, men want to actively participate in childcare responsibilities.  Where parents 
want (or for economic reasons, need) to adopt a dual carer structure, the current 
workplace norms and the rights designed to assist them to reconcile work and family 
responsibilities, do not allow them to do so. Changing the working patterns of workers, 
as well as expectations in relation to the normative worker (discussed in Chapter 2) would 
assist parents in better being able to reconcile work and family responsibilities, 
particularly those with school-age children.      
                                                          
the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the 
employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. 
4 For example, this issue was debated in both the House of Commons (19 November 2013) and the House of 
Lords (9 January 2014). 
5 OECD (2011) “Doing Better for Families”, 27 April 2011. 
6 These costs are even higher in London, where a parent will pay, on average, £14,000 for 50 hours of childcare.  
Briefing from the Family and Childcare Trust, “Increasing access to affordable childcare debate”, House of 
Lords, 9 January 2014 (available from www.daycaretrust.org.uk) 
7 Rosemary Crompton (2006), Employment and the Family: The Reconfiguration of Work and Family Life in 
Contemporary Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p182 
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1.1.5 I would also highlight that in my thesis I am examining those rights that are 
provided to parents; adoptive parents will also have similar or equivalent rights, and 
whilst I note where there are equivalents (or where rights extend to adoptive parents) I 
do not examine whether such rights are sufficient to deal with the particular issues which 
may arise through adoption due to the relatively small number of parents affected by 
these issues. 
1.1.6 Throughout the thesis, I argue that the current employment rights afforded to 
parents are not sufficient to enable them to reconcile work and family responsibilities.  As 
I demonstrate in Chapter 2, this is because there is a lack of a theoretical framework 
underpinning the current rights regime and the theories underpinning the individual 
rights are not appropriate to meet the needs of parents.  In Chapters 3 through to 5, I 
consider the current rights and demonstrate in detail how these fail to meet the needs of 
parents.  Chapter 6 presents the argument that the current enforcement mechanisms, with 
their emphasis on individual enforcement and the adversarial (as opposed to 
inquisitorial) nature of the Employment Tribunal system makes it extremely difficult for 
many individuals to seek redress when their rights are violated.  Having shown that the 
current rights are not sufficient to allow parents to reconcile work and family 
responsibilities, I develop an alternative approach based on the new theoretical 
framework I advocate in Chapter 2.  This includes a duty to accommodate parental 
responsibilities.   
1.2 Parenting as a gender issue? 
1.2.1 The question of whether parents are able to combine work and family also gives 
rise to gender issues.  Whilst both parents are equally capable of caring for a child, it seems 
to be accepted in GB that women are the primary carers for children8; as such, any 
difficulties in combining work and family are, generally, likely to be felt most severely by 
                                                          
8 It is, however, interesting to note that there are no official statistics on the numbers of women in the UK that 
have (or consider that they have) primary carer responsibilities for a child.  Such details could previously be 
derived from time-use surveys that were undertaken by the Office for National Statistics (“ONS”).  The most 
recent of these was conducted in 2005.  It seems unlikely that there will be a further time use survey in the 
immediate future as in a statement issued by the ONS, it has said that it “…has not committed to spending 
any money on running a further time use survey…” (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/media-
centre/statements/time-use-surveys.html).   
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women.  As Crompton has noted “[a]s individuals, women may be seen as equal in the 
sphere of employment, but normative constructs still allocate the major responsibility for 
care to women…”9  For this reason the difficulty with reconciling work and family 
responsibilities is an issue of gender.   
1.2.2 Care responsibilities for children are predominantly undertaken by women due 
to the ideology of motherhood (discussed in Chapter 2).  As James has noted, the 
ideologies of motherhood and fatherhood “…are powerful influences about ‘proper 
behaviour’ in relation to decisions about who will provide unpaid childcare and who will 
participate in paid employment…”10  Smart has considered the history of motherhood, 
noting that the institution of motherhood has emerged “…with the rise of late 
modernity…”11 and that historically “…everything a child was granted was treated as 
coming from the father.”  Essentially, in law, at least, the mother was irrelevant or 
invisible and mothers had no rights.12  The emergence of the legal institution of 
motherhood “…was in part a result of political struggle by early feminists who were able 
to use the ideology of motherhood to try to gain more rights in the nascent family law of 
the day.”13  This meant that motherhood was portrayed as being “… a source of women’s 
strength and uniqueness, a site that is entirely feminine and that draws upon women's 
special qualities and knowledge.” 14  Whilst the aim of securing rights for mothers was 
admirable, the way in which the change to the law in one area had a negative impact on 
others is one of Smart’s concerns about the recourse to the law.  This is discussed below.  
In particular, the ideology of motherhood has resulted in mothering being viewed as a 
natural state for women.  A consequence of this is the idea that the care of children should 
fall to them because they are naturally suited for this task.   
                                                          
9 Crompton (n7), p85  
10 Grace James (2009) ‘Mothers and fathers as parents and workers: family-friendly employment policies in an 
era of shifting identities’ Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 31 (3). pp. 271-283, 272 
11 Carol Smart (1996) ‘Deconstructing motherhood’, in E. Silva (ed.) Good Enough Mothering? Feminist 
Perspectives on Lone Motherhood, London: Routledge, p44 
12 Smart and Brophy (1985) ‘Locating law: a discussion of the place of law in feminist politics’, in Brophy J and 
Smart C (eds), Women in Law, London: Routledge 
13 Smart (n11), p45 
14 Smart (n11), p38  
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1.2.3 In contrast, fathers have been held to a very different standard in relation to their 
responsibilities for their children.   As James has noted “[t]he dominant ideology of 
fatherhood focuses on his role as provider and protector…and often excludes or finds him 
inadequate in a care-giver role…”15  Because of the emphasis on the breadwinning role of 
the father, anything that detracts from this, for example, taking time off work to care for 
a child, may negatively impact on the perception of whether a father is meeting his 
obligations (as determined by the ideology of fatherhood).  The EHRC’s “Working 
Better”16 report notes that “...the promotion of active fatherhood may well be crucial in 
removing the obstacles that prevent women achieving their full potential at work.”  
However, until the imbalance in who is responsible for caring for children is corrected 
any disadvantage connected to these responsibilities will inevitably have a greater effect 
on women than on men.  
1.2.4 A mother’s caring role affects how much time she has to spend in employment.  
As I set out below, this affects the type of roles that mothers are able to perform in the 
workplace (in part due to the normative standards expected of workers, discussed in 
Chapter 2) with those roles requiring long working hours being inaccessible.  Caracciola 
di Torella and Masselot have noted that “[o]nce mothers start undertaking the main share 
of childcare, they also start competing on an unequal footing in the employment market, 
thus reinforcing gender segregation and pay gaps.”17  This can be seen in relation to how 
much time mothers have available to work after the time spent caring for their children 
has been taken into account as compared to how much time men have available.  A time 
use study carried out in 200518 showed that women, on average, spend 32 minutes per 
day caring for their own children with 21% of women participating in childcare, whereas 
men spend less than half of this (15 minutes per day) with only 11% of men participating 
in childcare.   Although these figures seem low, this is because they are averaged across 
all adults including those who have no dependent children; those with dependent 
children spend far longer than this each day caring for their children.  This can be seen 
                                                          
15 Grace James, (2009) The legal regulation of pregnancy and parenting in the labour market. London: Routledge, p16 
16 “Meeting the Changing Needs of Families, Workers and Employees in the 21st Century”, EHRC, March 2009 
17 Caracciola di Torella and Masselot (n1), 79  
18 “The Time Use Survey: 2005”, Deborah Lader, Sandra Short, Jonathan Gershuny, ONS, 31 August 2006 
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from the figures on caring, which show that those (both men and women) with dependent 
children aged up to four spend on average 136 minutes per day caring for their children 
(as the primary task), with 76% participating in this childcare.  These figures do not, assist 
with showing the gender division in caring, but we can estimate the division of childcare 
from the first set of data.  By extrapolating the data, we can estimate that amongst those 
with children aged up to four, women will spend 185.1 minutes (over three hours) per 
day on childcare, whilst men will spend 86.9 minutes (under an hour and a half) per day 
on this19.   When we consider these demands in the context of the length of the working 
day, the conflict between work and family, particularly for women, becomes apparent. 
1.2.5 Full time workers work on average 42.7 hours per week, though hours vary 
according to the role done by the employee.  The 2005 time use study also shows that 
managers and senior officials work the most hours (46.2 hours per week). These roles are 
more likely to be occupied by men (ONS statistics show that the proportion of managers 
who are women is 34.8%20). By comparison, those in personal service and administrative 
and secretarial roles work the least hours on average (38.4 and 38.5 per week respectively).  
These are roles that are dominated by women (77% of administrative and secretarial roles 
82% of personal service are held by women21).  This gender division between roles cannot 
be accounted for by qualifications: 44% of women in work are graduates who have 
achieved a qualification higher than A levels, compared to 38% of men22.   As de Silva de 
Alwis has noted, “[w]omen tend to self-select work that allows them to balance [their] 
dual roles [of childcare and work]“23.  Combining a role which requires an average of 46.2 
hours per week with childcare which, based on an average of three hours per day, equates 
to fifteen hours in a five day working week, is self-evidently far more difficult than 
combining a role requiring 38.5 hours per week with fifteen additional hours.   
1.2.6 Cunningham-Parmeter suggests that "[w]omen will not achieve full workplace 
equality until men do more at home, and men will not enter the domestic sphere if they 
                                                          
19 Annex 2 sets out the underlying calculations. 
20 “Women in the Labour Market”, ONS 2013 Release, 25 September 2013 
21 ibid 
22 ONS (n20) 
23 Rangita de Silva de Alwis “Examining Gender Stereotypes in New Work/Family Reconciliation Policies: 
The Creation of a New Paradigm for Egalitarian Legislation”, 18 Duke J Gender L & Pol’y 305 (2010-2011) 
 26 
continue to face employment retaliation for doing so." 24  This is true.  Until the issues that 
deter men from being more involved in domestic tasks, including childcare, are resolved, 
men are unlikely to choose to do more.  Yet at the same time it is vital for gender equality 
that men do spend more time caring for their children so that the burden of childcare can 
be more equally shared25.    
1.2.7 Given the unequal division of childcare responsibilities, if we are to secure gender 
equality, we need to ensure that the work sphere is supportive of childcare responsibilities 
for both women and men.  This means that simply providing access to employment for 
working parents, without other measures, is not sufficient.  The current situation, which 
can be summed up by the quote “...working mothers are welcome to remain in the 
workforce but so long as they keep their caring from interfering too much”26, is entirely 
unsatisfactory.  Changes need to be made so that those who may, on occasion, need time 
off to care for their children, or who wish to adopt non-typical working arrangements (e.g. 
flexible working, home working, etc), are not unjustifiably disadvantaged.  As I argue in 
Chapter 2, this would require a change to the normative standards of a worker.   
1.2.8 Longer-term, the aim should be for both parents to equally bear responsibility for 
the care of their children.  Caracciolo Di Torella is correct that  the current “family-
friendly” policies do not assist.  This is because these policies “…de facto continue to 
promote the idea of the mother as main carer: they are not geared towards promoting 
equal parenting or gender equality but simply at ‘valuing’ mothers’ work…”27  This is the 
case even where policies are expressed to be gender-neutral.  (I consider this issue in 
greater detail when I analyse the current gender neutral rights designed to reconcile work 
and family responsibilities in Chapter 4.) Unless such policies or rights address the 
                                                          
24 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, “Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine Face of Caregiver 
Discrimination”, 24 Colum. J. Gender & L. 253 (2012-2013), 257 
25 There is also the issue of other domestic work which seems to fall disproportionately on women, see for 
example Man Yee Kan, Oriel Sullivan and Jonathan Gershuny “Gender Convergence in Domestic Work: 
Discerning the Effects of Interactional and Institutional Barriers from Large-scale Data” Sociology, April 2011: 
234-251 which suggests that women still undertake the bulk of routine housework and spend 280 minutes per 
day on this (including care) compared to 148 minutes per day for men.  These issues are outside the scope of 
my thesis.   
26 Laura Oren, “Honor Thy Mother? The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Motherhood”, 17 Hastings Women’s 
LJ 187 (2006), 219 
27 Eugene Caracciolo Di Torella (2007) ‘New Labour, new dads - the impact of family friendly legislation on 
fathers’, Industrial Law Journal 36: 316-326, 328 
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structural barriers to men using them (in terms of pay and concern about detriment), then 
they are likely to continue to be used predominantly by women.  As Collins has noted 
“…granting parents equal shares in parental leave, for example, means little choice for a 
couple with big differences in earning and career potential.  Until men can take an equal 
share in the work of child-care and home life without financial or employment prejudice 
to either partner, they will not do it and women will be scorned for expecting them to.”28  
It is therefore vital that we remove any unreasonable disadvantage that parents incur as 
a result of their caring responsibilities.  As I argue in the rest of this thesis, the current 
rights that parents have in the workplace are not sufficient to achieve this.   
1.3 Difficulties facing those combining work and family responsibilities 
1.3.1 In this section, I will argue that caring for a child has an impact on whether 
mothers are able to undertake senior management roles and affects the amount that they 
are paid for the work that they do.  Whilst fathers as well as mothers, can undertake the 
care of children, currently, this responsibility is generally borne by mothers and thus 
when I am considering difficulties of reconciling work and family, I will use the term 
‘mothers’ rather than parents, because this reflects the reality of who actually provides 
care for children.  That is not to say that there are not some fathers who do spend 
significant amounts of time caring for their children, or who are the primary carers, but 
they are in the minority.   
Senior management  
1.3.2 The low levels of women in senior management roles provides some evidence of 
women’s disadvantage in the workplace.  A significant cause of this relates to their 
childcare role because, as discussed in Chapter 2, childcare responsibilities are 
incompatible with the worker norm.  Further, certain roles, such as those frequently found 
in senior management, require such long hours that they are incompatible with childcare 
responsibilities.   
                                                          
28 Hugh Collins, (1994) The EU Pregnancy Directive: A Guide for Human Resource Managers, Blackwell: Oxford 
(UK) and Cambridge (USA)   
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1.3.3 Whilst women comprise approximately 49.4% of the workforce of the UK29, they 
are significantly under-represented at the highest levels of management: of the directors 
of FTSE 100 boards only 12.5% are women.  The Davies Report30 was commissioned to 
look into the reasons behind this and found that there was a fundamental "pipeline" issue: 
not enough women are reaching senior management levels (and thereby that there is an 
insufficient pool of women with the requisite experience to undertake director level 
duties).  The Report acknowledges that the reasons for this include factors such as "lack 
of access to flexible working arrangements" and "difficulties in achieving work-life 
balance".31  There are no statistics available on how many hours on average a typical CEO 
or executive director works, but a Guardian article published in 2013 suggests that many 
CEO’s work significantly in excess of 60 hours per week32.  A role requiring this amount 
of hours is impossible to reconcile with responsibility for childcare.  This affects women 
more severely because of the number of hours they spend on this as discussed previously.  
Taking into account the discussion above at 1.2.4 regarding the amount of time mothers 
spend caring, it is unsurprising that there are so few women in these roles.  Where women 
do undertake senior management roles there is evidence that suggests that they do so 
only by relinquishing their primary care roles.  Zweigenhaf and Domhoff have noted that 
some33 of the few women who have made it to become CEOs of Fortune 500 companies 
“…indicate that they have only been able to be successful in their careers because they 
have had husbands who have been willing to…provide primary care for their children.”34 
If mothers are not able to combine work and family responsibilities in senior roles, then 
they are effectively forced out of these roles unless there is another parent willing to take 
on the role of primary carer for the children.  If, however, there was effective legislation 
enabling the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities, the number of women in 
                                                          
29 GMB Research, “More Women in Jobs”, 9 February 2011 
30 Lord Davies "Women on Boards", Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, February 2011 
31 ibid, p16 
32 Tim Dowling, Laura Barnett and Patrick Kingsley, “What time do top CEOs wake up?” 1 April 2013 
33 The number of women who indicated this is not stated, however there were only 16 women in the sample 
who had children (out of 28 female CEOs).  From the language used (“a few”), it follows that at least two must 
have indicated this (which would be 12.5%)  
34 “The New CEOs: Women, African American, Latino and Asian American Leaders of Fortune 500 Companies”, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 16 July 2011, p29 
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these senior management positions would seem likely to increase (although, because of 
the pipeline issue, it might still take some time for the impact of this to be seen).   
Women's presence in the boardroom has been shown to have an impact on the 
performance of a company with studies by both Catalyst35 and McKinsey36 showing a 
correlation between an increased number of women on the board of directors and 
increased company performance.  However, this is not just about ensuring that we have 
women on boards; in order for women to have the requisite skills to undertake these roles, 
they must have progressed through management.  Therefore there needs to be a lower 
rate of female attrition from the UK workforce.  As the Davies report notes, male and 
female graduate entry into the workforce is relatively equal, with the male/female gender 
split continuing to be equal at junior management positions, only for a marked divide to 
occur at senior management levels37.  One of the reasons for the current high rate of female 
attrition from the workforce is the problems that women face when they assume caring 
responsibilities, such as a lack of flexible working arrangements and issues around work-
life balance.   The response to the call for evidence by the Davies report38 supports this, 
showing that 20% of respondents felt that the reason for under-representation of women 
at board level was issues with maintaining work/life balance, and 12% around maternity 
issues/maternity leave; this shows a third of respondents attributed low levels of female 
board representation as due to problems which only occur when women assume caring 
responsibilities39.   
Equal Pay 
1.3.4 As I argue below, pay inequality between the sexes is, in part, as a result of 
mothers’ childcare responsibilities.  Equal pay legislation has been around for over 40 
years, yet there still exists a gender pay gap (based on hourly pay rates) of just over 10% 
for full time female workers40 (as compared to male full time workers) and just over 38% 
                                                          
35 “The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2004–2008)”, Catalyst, 1 March 
2011  
36 Desvaux, Devillard-Hoellinger, Baumgarten, “Women Matter: Gender Diversity a corporate performance driver”, 
McKinsey & Company, 2007 
37 Davies (n30) 
38 Davies (n30) 
39 Davies (n30) 
40 According to Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (2014 Provisional Results) from the ONS (“2014 
ASHE”), women working full-time earn, on average, £12.31 per hour, compared to men who earn £13.72.  
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for part-time female workers41 (as compared to male full time workers).  The latter rate 
reflects the fact that, as discussed later in this thesis, part-time work (for both male and 
female workers) tends to be low-paid, low-value work.   This issue and the extent to which 
the relevant legislation in this area is able to tackle this issue is considered in Chapter 4.   
Pay inequality between the sexes is both a reason why women tend to bear the greater 
responsibility for childcare and a result of women bearing this responsibility.  Women 
bear responsibility for childcare because where time off is poorly paid or unpaid (as most 
of the current rights, discussed in Chapter 3, are) in a 2 parent household, the parent 
earning the lower wage, typically the mother, is more likely (for economic reasons) to take 
time off than the higher (male) earner.   Women are penalised for their  caring 
responsibilities because these often mean that they cannot conform to the (male) worker 
norm, discussed in Chapter 2. As a result, their contributions to the workplace are viewed 
as less valuable.  Pay inequality is then exacerbated because some women are forced in 
part-time work, which tends to be low paid and low value.   
1.3.5 Research into the gender pay gap has shown that there are a number of factors 
responsible, not only the so called “motherhood penalty”.  However many argue that one 
of the most significant factors contributing to the gender pay gap is “women’s 
traditionally greater involvement in child-rearing”.42  Research by Walby and Olsen43 has 
shown that the three most significant factors (in terms of the percentage to which they 
contribute to the pay gap) are: being female (38%), lack of full-time work experience (18%) 
and interruptions to employment for childcare or other family care (14%).  Of particular 
note in relation to the latter was the finding that interruptions to employment “...had a 
substantial negative association with wages over and above their effect on reducing years 
                                                          
41 According to 2014 ASHE, women working part-time earn, on average, £8.46, compared to men working full-
time, who earn, on average, £13.72 per hour (£8.46/£13.72 = 0.6166) 
42 Patricia McDowell “The Gender Pay Gap in Context: Causes, consequences and international perspectives”, March 
2010, Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland); similarly the TUC 
acknowledges that the “...interconnectedness of part-time work, occupational gender segregation and the 
onset of family responsibilities hits women in the UK particularly hard...” (“Closing the Gender Pay Gap: An 
update report for the TUC Women’s Conference 2008”) and the Fawcett Society attributes one of the reasons 
for the gender pay gap as being the lack of flexible working, long hours culture and negative attitudes and 
discrimination as a result of women’s caring responsibilities 
(http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/index.asp/PayeID=321) 
43 Olsen, Walby, 2004, “Modelling Gender Pay Gaps”, EOC Working Paper Series No.17. 
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of full-time employment experience...”44, that is, that there was a penalty associated with 
these interruptions that was in excess of the amount of time out of the workplace.  Lack 
of full-time work experience may not immediately seem to be related to childcare 
responsibilities; however, women may be forced to work part-time where either their 
roles provide no flexibility to allow them to combine work and family responsibilities or 
where there is no suitable childcare to enable them to work on a full-time basis.    Where 
this occurs, as discussed further below at 1.5.20, often the part-time roles that women are 
forced into by virtue of their childcare responsibilities are roles with lower status and 
lower pay than they had enjoyed whilst employed in a full-time role.  If the law were to 
properly enable parents (and not just mothers) to be able to reconcile work and family 
responsibilities, this could have a significant impact on the gender pay gap.  As mentioned 
above, one of the problems facing women with care responsibilities is their inability to 
conform with the male worker norm (which results in them being categorised as less 
valuable to an employer and consequently justifies them receiving lower levels of pay).  
One way to change this norm would be for childcare responsibilities to be more evenly 
divided between men and women.  Whilst there remain penalties for participating in 
childcare, men are unlikely to choose to more evenly divide these responsibilities; 
removing these penalties might convince more men to do so.  Men would then have 
responsibilities that would affect their ability to conform with the current norm, so the 
norm could no longer represent what was considered to be “normal” in the workplace.  If 
the norm was then to be recreated, with caring responsibilities taken into account, 
women’s contribution in the workplace would conform with this and there would be no 
basis on which their contributions could be seen as less valuable.  However, this would 
require a change in the way in which men and women divide their domestic 
responsibilities, which involves societal change.  This leads us to the question of what the 
role of law is in this issue.   
  
                                                          
44 ibid, p29 
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1.4 The role of law 
1.4.1 This thesis considers the issue of whether the legislation in GB is sufficient to 
enable parents to combine work and family responsibilities.  Yet, as will be seen in 
Chapter 2, part of the issue is about how society views parenting and how much value is 
placed on this.  This does not appear then, to be an issue for law alone, so what is the role 
of law here?  Smart has expressed doubt about the usefulness of a resort to law.  Her 
worry is that "...the law is so deaf to core concerns of feminism that feminists should be 
extremely cautious of how and whether they resort to law."45  Although these concerns 
were expressed 25 years ago, there is no reason to think that they are completely obsolete.  
Legal institutions remain predominantly male (74.8% of the judiciary are male46), as is the 
legislature (in Parliament: of 650 MPs, only 143 are female)47. Legislation that was passed 
decades ago to address gender inequality in the workplace (the Equal Pay Act 1970 
(“EqPA”) and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) has not fully addressed the problem, 
although there has been some progress.  Law has been able to secure some wins for 
feminism: as discussed in Chapter 5, direct sex discrimination is now unusual (and is 
socially unacceptable) and the gender pay gap has reduced from 28.7% when the EqPA 
came into force in 197548 to just over 10% in 2015.  But, the worker norm does not appear 
to have been affected by any of the legislative measures: it remains a full-time (male) 
employee unencumbered by any responsibilities.  This fundamental aspect of 
employment law needs to change if there is to be further progress.  The fact that it has not, 
to date, despite a raft of legislative interventions, may be because of the law’s deafness to 
the central concerns of feminism.   The deafness that Smart speaks of may also be seen in 
some of the unintended consequences of legislation intended to assist women.  Legislation 
discussed in Chapter 2 designed to protect women from unsafe work environments has 
been used to justify keeping them out of certain roles and workplaces.  We need, therefore, 
to be careful about the impact that possible legal reforms may have.  However, just 
                                                          
45 Carol Smart, (1989) Feminism and the Power of Law, London: Routledge, p2 
46 “Judicial Diversity Statistics 2015”, Judicial Office Statistics Bulletin, 30 July 2015 
47 Following the 2015 election, there were 191 female MPs (Richard Keen, “Women in Parliament and 
Government”, 19 June 2015, House of Commons Library) 
48 “Economic & Labour Market Review”, Vol 2, No.4, April 2008, ONS, Debra Leaker 
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because the law does not always appreciate feminism’s central concerns does not mean 
that we should not try to use it as a tool.  MacKinnon has argued that we do not have to 
trust that law will behave in a feminist way to use it as “[i]f women are to restrict our 
demands for change to spheres we can trust, spheres we already control, there will not be 
any.”49  This is true; we need to use a range of tools to try to advance women’s position in 
the workplace and law is one of these tools.  However, a wealth of legislation is in place 
already to resolve the difficulties in reconciling work and family responsibilities.  This 
legislation though, as I aim to demonstrate throughout this thesis, is failing to meet the 
needs of parents.  The problem with the laws that we currently have that are designed to 
facilitate combining work and family responsibilities is that they are premised on one 
particular conception of how a family is run: with women taking the predominant share 
of childcare, which reflects the ideology of motherhood (discussed in Chapter 2).  Families 
need to be free to determine how to care for their children.  James has recognised that 
legal intervention alone  will not change the division of family responsibilities.  However, 
as she also recognises  “…law can improve the choices on offer…”50 for both mothers and 
fathers. There appears, therefore, to be a role for law to play in assisting parents to be able 
to reconcile their work and family responsibilities. 
1.5 Justification for protection of pregnancy and childcare 
1.5.1 So far I have argued that childcare is an issue that is important for gender 
equality.  In this section I consider the other reasons why pregnancy and childcare should 
be accommodated and protected in the workplace.  In doing so, I first wish to address one 
issue which is often cited in support of there being no special protection or 
accommodation of parental responsibilities: the idea that having a child and caring for it 
is a lifestyle choice.    
  
                                                          
49 Catharine MacKinnon (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, p228 
50 James (n10), 278  
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The idea of choice 
1.5.2 Pregnancy is often acknowledged to be a social good. This is because, in order for 
society to continue to function, we need children who will grow up to be doctors, nurses, 
teachers, or work in the fire, police or ambulance services and so forth.  If we stopped 
having children, the world would eventually grind to a halt because there would be no-
one to look after things when we all get old and are incapable of doing so ourselves.  
Further, our benefits and tax systems rely on those of working age to contribute so that 
services, such as health, police, can be provided by the State.  As such, it is vital that people 
continue to have children. 
1.5.3  If a woman has a child, there is then a need for someone (or a group of people) 
to bring up that child;  "[a]t its most basic level, care is crucial for perpetuation of the 
species through the nurturing of infants and beyond..."51.  As I argue below at 1.5.16, there 
is evidence that parents have a significant impact on the way that their children develop 
and, in particular, on their behaviour.  Further, for the reasons set out below, society as a 
whole benefits from parents being able to spend time with their children.   As such, 
parents have a responsibility to care for their children and provide them with appropriate 
levels of attention.  It is also not desirable or possible to outsource the care of a child to a 
third party (for example, a nanny); there will almost always be a need for parental care in 
relation to certain tasks.  I agree with Crompton that “…it does matter who reads a 
bedtime story to a child, or shares in the activities of day-to-day life…Caring, in short, 
conflates labour and love…these unique and particular aspects of caring work mean that 
it is impossible to commodify in any usually understood sense of the term.”52  This is why 
“[p]eople are unwilling to outsource care relationships because ...to do so would deny 
them and their loved one the reciprocal rewards of a caring relationship."53    
1.5.4   If we classify having a child as a lifestyle choice, we fail torecognise the wider 
importance to society of having a child or caring for it.  Herring has expressed concern 
about the idea of caring as a lifestyle choice, believing it to be more important than this.  
                                                          
51 Nicola Busby, “A Right to care?: unpaid care work in European employment law”, Oxford University Press, 2011, 
p48 
52 Crompton (n7), p191 
53, Busby (n51), p42 
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His view, that  “… it is work that carries considerable social value, meets society’s 
obligations to those in need and fulfils a justified moral obligation”54, justifies it having a 
higher status and gives weight to the argument that it should be protected.   
1.5.5 For the purposes of the rest of this section I will consider pregnancy and the care 
of children separately as they each have unique features.  In Chapter 2 I will argue that 
the law should also recognise their separate nature, rather than conflating the two.  The 
reasons for this are set out at 2.5.4. 
Why pregnancy deserves protection 
1.5.6 Pregnancy is an issue that is seen as being exclusively female, because only 
women can be pregnant.  Yet pregnancy is an  issue that affects society as an entirety55:  if 
women do not become pregnant and do not have children then, as set out at 1.5.2, the 
effects on society will be catastrophic.  Society should, therefore, view any detriment that 
is imposed by it on pregnant women and which deters them from becoming pregnant 
(whether at a particular time (for example, early in their careers) or at all) as a harm to 
society and not just to the pregnant woman..   Further, because only women can become 
pregnant, any detriment as a result of pregnancy is invariably linked to gender.  It is 
fundamentally unfair that a women carrying out a socially useful role (i.e. being pregnant) 
should herself suffer detriment simply as a result of that useful role.  It is also inequitable 
that women should be disadvantaged for carrying out a role that only women can 
undertake.  The capacity to become pregnant is something that most women are born 
with, and importantly, something that no man is born with.  It is an entirely female 
characteristic.   
1.5.7 Before considering the difficulties facing those that elect to have children, itis 
important to note that even those women who do not have children may be 
disadvantaged by the fact that women have the capacity to become pregnant.  MacKinnon 
has found that “[w]hether or not women have children, they are disadvantaged by social 
norms that limit their options because of women’s enforced role in childbearing and 
                                                          
54 Jonathan Herring (2013) “Caring and the law”. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p96 
55 This point has been made by many commentators, for example, Sandra Fredman, “A Difference with 
Distinction: Pregnancy and Parenthood Reassessed”, LQR 1994, 110 (Jan), 16-123 “...pregnancy is not only a 
common experience but performs an indispensible social function.”, 106 
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childrearing.”56  Essentially, there seems to be an assumption by employers that any 
woman may become a mother at any time (up until this is no longer a biological 
possibility).  The fact that a man can become a father at any time (and, arguably, has less 
control over this possibility) does not, however, seem to hamper men’s career prospects.   
1.5.8 Where women are not able to combine work and family, they may feel obligated 
to postpone having children.   There is evidence to suggest that this is more likely to be 
the case for highly educated women57.  Wolf has noted that childbearing may be a rational 
career choice for those women who are not academically minded, but is less likely to be 
so for a woman who has chosen a professional career following study at university58.  The 
implication from this comment is that those with academic and professional achievements 
are most worthy of having children but are the most likely to be deterred from doing so.  
I do not agree with this assumption; being academic or having a professional career does 
not make you a good parent or someone who is capable of raising children who will be 
productive members of society.  However, the issue that this comment does raise, which 
is of concern, is that having a professional career may be seen as being incompatible with 
motherhood.  If this is the case, women who want to be mothers may simply opt out of 
academia, given that there is no long-term prospect of them being able to combine this 
with motherhood.  This would be bad for society as a whole, and particularly for 
employers, because it would mean that the pool of potential talent would be smaller than 
it would be were such women included. 
1.5.9 Women that choose to pursue academic or professional careers may perceive59 
that they will pay a far higher cost if they decide to have a child at the beginning of their 
career.  There is some evidence to suggest that this is not true (although, for reasons 
discussed below, this evidence may not stand up to scrutiny).  A report to the Women’s 
Unit of the Cabinet Office60 stated that when considering women’s lifetime earnings, 
                                                          
56 Catharine MacKinnon “Reflections on Sex Equality under Law”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol.500, No.5, 
Centennial Issue (Mar 1991), pp1281-1328, 1312 
57 Cecile Wetzels “Squeezing Birth into Working Life: household panel data analysis comparing Germany, Great 
Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands”, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001 
58 Alison Wolf, “Working Girls”, Prospect, April 2006, Issue 121 
59 I would note that this is about perception, rather than what would necessarily occur.  There does not appear 
to be any research into what effect having a child has on a woman’s career progression and whether this varies 
according to the age at which a woman has a child.   
60 “Women’s Incomes over the Lifetime  -  a report to the Women’s Unit, Cabinet Office”, TSO, 2000 
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women with high educational attainment showed little shortfall when compared to a 
childless woman.  This report was based on two assumptions which I wish to challenge.   
1.5.10 The report assumes that a mother with two children would remain continuously 
employed after having both children, except for a period of paid maternity leave and a 
period of one year working part-time.  Interestingly, there are no statistics on how long 
mothers work part-time for after having a child.  There seems to be no particular reason 
why this would be limited to a year, particularly given that children only start school in 
the academic year that they turn five.  Further, as discussed in Chapter 4, the right to 
request flexible working is a right to request a permanent, not a temporary, change to an 
employee’s working pattern.  Indeed, one of the criticisms that has been levelled at the 
current right is that there is no requirement for an employer to consider a request for an 
employee to cease working flexibly.   
1.5.11 The report also assumes that a mother would remain employed in the same role 
as she had done prior to maternity leave.  This does not factor in the situation where 
women do not return to work after maternity leave, which is the case for 30% of women61.  
It also does not factor in what happens if a mother is not able to work part-time and thus 
not able to reconcile her work and family responsibilities.  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
whilst there is a right to request flexible working, there is no absolute right for such a 
request to be granted.  This means that a mother might not be able to continue in the role 
that she had done prior to maternity leave if she wanted to combine both work and 
childcare responsibilities and might have to move into a (lower paid and lower status) 
part-time role.  There is some evidence to suggest that this type of downsizing (i.e. moving 
from a more senior post to a more junior to allow a woman to combine work and family 
responsibilities) occurs in some sectors.  A 2009 inquiry undertaken by the EHRC into sex 
discrimination in the financial services sector62 found that, in that sector at least, there is 
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62 “Financial Services Inquiry: Sex discrimination and gender pay gap report of the Equality and Human Rights 
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evidence of downshifting) following the birth of a child.  This seems to occur on the basis 
that certain jobs seem to require an employee to work extremely long hours.    
1.5.12 For the reasons above, therefore, the figures detailed in the report ‘Women’s 
Incomes over the Lifetime’ which suggest that women with high educational attainment 
suffer less loss of income as a result of having children than those with less educational 
attainment may not provide an accurate assessment of the situation.   The fact that 
professional women continue to believe that they may be subjected to detriment if they 
have a child at the beginning of their career (and thus that some choose to delay 
motherhood) also suggests that this report may misrepresent the situation.   
1.5.13    The statistics demonstrate that there are many women who have children later 
than, for example, twenty years ago.  ONS data shows an increase over time in the 
numbers of women having children aged 40 or above63.  Whilst it is impossible to attribute 
this change in behaviour to the perceived detrimental impact that having a child may 
have on a woman’s early career development, this may be a factor in this change.   A 
recent survey by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (“BIS”) found that 
one of the top three concerns of pregnant women before they went on maternity leave 
was that pregnancy would affect their career64.  This should be of concern to society as a 
whole (as well as the individual concerned) because a delay in having children may mean 
that a woman finds its more difficult or is unable to become pregnant65, and, for those that 
do fall pregnant, it may have consequences for the wellbeing and/or health of the future 
children.   
1.5.14 There is also a cost to society if women who have children are unable to combine 
their childcare responsibilities with their careers.  If these women are forced to choose 
between work and children and choose the latter, the workplace loses out on a pool of 
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talented women.  Further, the economy also loses out in terms of loss of productivity from 
these women no longer working66.   
1.5.15 The individual employer also suffers a detriment in terms of the costs of 
recruiting a replacement for the mother.  These costs can be significant.  Research by the 
CIPD estimates that the median cost of recruiting a replacement is £5,000 for senior 
managers and £2,000 for other employees67.   In addition to these recruitment costs, there 
may be other costs in terms of, for example, training the employee.  Given the fact that 
employers incur costs when an employee does not return from maternity leave, it might 
appear strange that employers do not do more to accommodate women’s childcare 
responsibilities.  One reason for this may be that employers do not connect the costs that 
they bear as a result of a woman not returning to work after maternity leave with the fact 
that they may have been able to avoid these costs by accommodating the woman’s 
childcare responsibilities.  In some cases this may be because of the employer’s 
assumption that women will want to give up work after the birth of a child, which 
interestingly they do not assume about new fathers.   
Why parenting and childcare deserve protection 
1.5.16 As set out at 1.5.2, once a child has been born, there is a need for someone to care 
for that child.  In this section I set out why it is important for parents to be able to spend 
time caring for their child.  As already set out at 1.5.3, care involves two intertwined 
aspects, the physical tasks and an emotional element.  The latter is the reason that the 
identity of the person providing the care is key.  Parents have an impact on how their 
children function and upon their development, including their self-esteem, academic 
achievement and behaviour68.  Parenting is crucial to the development of a child.  It is 
therefore in society’s interests for parents to be able to spend time with their children in 
                                                          
66 Sylvia Walby and Wendy Olsen ‘The impact of women’s position in the labour market on pay and implications for 
UK productivity’, DTI, November 2002  
67 “Resourcing and Talent Planning – Annual Survey Report 2013”, CIPD in partnership with Hays 
68 Flouri and Buchanan (2003), “The role of father involvement and mother involvement in adolescents’ 
psychological well-being”, British Journal of Social Work, 33, 399-406, low involvement by fathers in upbringing 
of children is linked with negative outcomes for children.  
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order to ensure that they develop as individuals.  This is about ensuring that we make 
“…a sufficient investment in the next generation.”69    
1.5.17 The quality of parenting has an impact throughout a child’s life and can affect the 
child’s behaviour.  In the UK in recent years, there have been concerns over poor youth 
behaviour.  According to a Demos report, “The Home Front70” there are some indicators 
which would suggest that youth behaviour is worsening.  These include "...the prevalence 
of conduct problems in 15-year-olds more than doubling from 6.8 per cent in 1974 to 14.9 
per cent in 1999..."71, the UK having the highest rate of youth offending in Europe, and, as 
Margo has noted72, individuals in the UK being more scared of young people than those 
in other European countries.  Given the linkage between behaviour and parenting, it 
would seem arguable that there should be greater emphasis on the role of parents and the 
importance of this for society as a whole.  It is notable that the Demos report states that 
"...there is a strong feeling that parenting is in crisis, that mums and dads are not fulfilling 
their duty to their children and to society, and that we are all suffering as a consequence.  
I would argue that one of the reasons that some parents are unable to fulfil their duties to 
their children is because of the fact that they are forced to prioritise work over family 
responsibilities in order to comply with the normative standard of a worker (and to 
remain employed).   
1.5.18 The other part of this issue is the fact that childcare and parenting need to be seen 
as the crucial roles that they are for society as a whole.   Arguably two of the main political 
parties in Britain are beginning to realise the centrality of these roles73, as both the 
Labour74 and Conservative manifestos75 in the 2010 national elections76 recognised the 
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74 Chapter 6 of the Labour Manifesto 2010 (“A future fair for all”) considers how to support families 
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importance of the role of the family and both stated that strong families are the bedrock 
of society.77  It is essential that society recognises why childcare and parenting are 
significant.  One of the reasons that childcare has not been valued may be because this has 
predominantly been a role undertaken by women.   Crompton’s view, with which I agree, 
is that “…because caring has been seen as ‘natural’ to women, requiring few skills, care 
work is often poorly paid.”78  Other roles predominantly undertaken by women are also 
undervalued, such as caring for others (including the elderly or disabled) and housework.      
1.5.19 It is also important to ensure that we do not fall into the trap of simply valuing 
mothering  because those that (currently) predominantly care for children are women..  If 
we place too much value on mothering, rather than parenting, we leave open the 
possibility of people arguing that mothering should be valued above all else and thus 
work should not interfere with this function.  Fredman79 has considered this issue.  Her 
research has found that this was the historical position as espoused by Beveridge, the 
architect of the Welfare State.  She makes the point that   “...it is necessary to make a 
conscious and explicit decision on the social value of parenthood and to formulate legal 
rules to reflect this.”80 This approach has the advantage of valuing the contribution of both 
mothers and fathers.  This is important because greater male involvement in childcare 
could have the effect of changing the normative worker, which in turn could remove some 
of the barriers that women face in the workplace.      
1.5.20 There are also economic reasons to enable parents to combine work and parenting 
responsibilities.  If we make people choose between their family responsibilities and 
working, then some may choose to prioritise their parenting responsibilities over their 
careers or jobs.  This does not necessarily mean that they will opt out of the workplace but 
they may look for a job which allows them to combine both.  Unfortunately, much of the 
evidence suggests that many of the roles that would allow workers to combine their jobs 
and their family responsibilities, particularly part-time roles, are lower paid jobs with low 
status.  This means that we may be losing talented people from roles that they are very 
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capable of doing but which are not thought to be compatible with family responsibilities 
to work in roles for which they are over-qualified.  This latter point is perfectly illustrated 
by anecdotal evidence provided to Kingsmill by employers whilst she was preparing her 
2003 review into women’s employment and pay, which suggested that there were some 
women with doctorates who were working as part-time shelf stackers in a supermarket81.   
As Kingsmill has noted, “...this is not simply of a waste of valuable education and skills 
but a misallocation of scarce human capital resources that has potentially serious 
implications for Britain’s economic performance.”82  This may not just affect individual 
employers or Britain’s short-term economic performance, it may also have longer-term 
consequences for the State.  Those on low incomes are less likely to be able to save and 
therefore less likely to have sufficient savings to draw upon either when they encounter 
unemployment (or some other financial issue) or during retirement.  Consequently, they 
are more likely to need to claim benefits.  As such, forcing women into lower paid work 
has a greater financial cost for society in terms of provision of state benefits.   There is also 
another issue here.  There is evidence to suggest that the quality of paid work undertaken 
by a parent has an impact on parenting.  Research shows that parents who have more 
control over their paid employment are more likely to encourage independence and self-
control in their children83. 
1.5.21  As an alternative to working part-time, parents who are unable to achieve a 
desirable work-life balance may choose to take an extended absence from the workplace 
(for example until their children go to school).  The evidence suggests that, where workers 
take such extended breaks from work, they find it difficult to find subsequent 
employment and/or the employment that they do eventually find is at a lower wage than 
their previous employment. 84  This again may have an economic impact on the State in 
terms of the worker claiming benefits in relation to the period when they are searching 
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for work and also, if they are on a lower wage when they return, this may impact on their 
ability to save for retirement, thereby meaning that they rely on State benefits later in life.   
Similarly, it may impact on the amount of tax paid to the State.   
1.5.22 If there is a value to being a parent and to parents spending time with their 
children, then we need to begin to communicate this to everyone.  If we do not (or we are 
not clear on what the value is to the individual, the community and society as a whole) 
then any treatment that is provided only to parents is likely to be viewed with resentment 
by those who do not have children.   
1.5.23 Research undertaken by Houston and Marks showed that “[t]hose [women] who 
had no children rated mothers as workers more negatively than any of the groups of 
workers”85 and Young’s research86 has found that those workers without children may be 
excluded from certain rights (such as rights to leave) and may therefore have a sense of 
injustice, which can create resentment.    This reiterates the point that those without 
children do not always understand or accept the value of parenting for society as a whole.  
We need to be able clearly to enunciate why parenting/childcare are valuable to society 
and to explain the rationale for any adjustments to working practices and/or conditions 
which are provided only to parents.  In order for businesses to support any parent-specific 
rights or changes to existing legislation, we also need to be able to demonstrate the 
benefits for them.   As set out above, one of the key benefits would be the retention of 
staff, thereby reducing recruitment costs.  A further benefit would be a wider pool of 
potential employees.  There is also the issue that currently the skills that parents acquire 
at home are not viewed by employers as being relevant or valuable in the workplace.  In 
Chapter 2, I argue that this is because of the idea of separate spheres (work/home) that 
are entirely independent.  However, the skills that parents learn or deploy at home may 
be of benefit to employers.  We therefore need to encourage employers to view things in 
this way.   
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1.5.24 It is also vital that managers (rather than just the senior management of 
organisations) are aware of the benefits of allowing workers to combine their work and 
home responsibilities.  Research suggests that those workers who have a powerful 
manager who can protect the worker from any negative career impact as a result of using 
work-life balance policies, which in turn can increase worker’s uptake of such policies87.   
HR managers in particular may have an impact on the implementation of work-life 
balance policies as research suggests that these particular professionals can have an 
impact on how an organisation’s policies on work-life balance develop; i.e. if the HR 
director believes strongly in the benefits of work-life balance, then the organisation will 
have better policies on work-life balance.88 
1.6 Justification for State intervention  
1.6.1 Having argued above that law can be of assistance to parents seeking to reconcile 
work and family responsibilities, below I set out the justification for intervention by the 
State.  The issue of whether parents can combine work and childcare is of importance, not 
only to parents, but also to society as a whole, for a number of reasons, which can be 
divided into the following topics: economic, social and political/legal.  I examine each of 
these in turn from 1.6.2 to 1.6.11.  However, as well as (domestic) state intervention, there 
is also intervention by the European Union (“EU”), for example, through the anti-
discrimination directives that have been passed.  I consider the reasons for EU 
intervention in tandem with the reasons for State intervention at the domestic level.   
Economic 
1.6.2 One of the aims of the EU is to create a single market and so the reason for 
regulation between member states is to ensure fair competition.  If there were no 
minimum standards imposed by the EU, then competitors operating in those member 
states with protections for their workers in terms of regulation of working time, family 
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friendly protections and the like would be at a disadvantage as compared to those 
member states with no such protections.     
1.6.3 From the State’s perspective, there is a waste of talent if a significant proportion 
of the population ceases to engage in paid labour or engages in work for which it is over 
qualified as a result of their caring responsibilities.  In countries such as Britain, where the 
State funds the education system, there is an investment in each individual and if that 
individual stops participating in the labour market and using the skills that s/he has 
acquired at the State’s cost, this is undesirable and does not make sense from an economic 
perspective.   
1.6.4 There is research to suggest that increasing women’s participation in the labour 
market would be worth between £15bn and £23bn to the economy89.  A report by the 
Fawcett Society similarly suggests that the UK stands to gain the equivalent to 2% of GDP 
by better harnessing women's skills (which, at the time of the report, was also estimated 
to be £23bn)90 At a time when the UK has a large deficit and is recovering from a period 
of recession, it is important that we utilize all of our resources effectively.  If parents 
cannot work because they cannot combine their work and family lives, the UK’s economy 
is the loser.    
1.6.5 The UK’s failure to allow parents to combine work and family responsibilities 
could also be having an impact upon the composition of the UK’s population, which could 
have long-term effects on the UK’s economic outlook91.  The UK has an ageing population: 
in 1971 the average age was 34.1, in 2012 this had risen to 39.792.  One of the factors 
attributed to this is the declining birth rate, with women opting to have less children93.  
An ageing population causes economic problems.  There is an increase in the number of 
people receiving retirement benefits and medical/social care, all of which need to be paid 
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for by a decreasing number of taxpayers.  In the UK age-related public expenditure is 
anticipated to rise from 18.9 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 24 per cent of GDP in 206094.   
Social 
1.6.6 As discussed above at 1.2, this issue is also crucial from a gender equality 
perspective.  Whilst GB has made great strides towards securing gender equality, there is 
still much to do in the sphere of employment; whilst in terms of overall gender equality 
the UK is ranked 26th in the world by the World Economic Forum, it is ranked 46th in terms 
of economic participation and opportunity95.  Dowd has stated that “[t]he reconciliation 
of employment responsibilities with the demands of childbirth and child-rearing remains 
a critical issue in the achievement of true equal employment opportunity for women"96.  
Further, the Women and Work Commission97 has suggested that one of the major 
contributing factors to the UK’s gender pay gap is the impact of family responsibilities on 
women’s career opportunities.  As identified at 1.3.5, more evenly distributing childcare 
responsibilities across the sexes could reduce the gender pay gap.  As such, it is arguable 
that one of the reasons for the UK’s failure to secure gender equality is the fact that GB 
employment law still does not provide adequate rights for working parents.  Given the 
adverse impact of care responsibilities on individuals, Busby argues that "...society has a 
moral duty to recognise and reduce the heavy social burden imposed on those engaged 
in such relationships through shared responsibility."98  As I argue later in this these, caring 
for a child needs to be valued and the costs associated with this care should be borne, not 
by the individual, but across society as a whole. 
1.6.7 However, the difficulty in combining family and work responsibilities is not just 
an issue for women; men are also denied the opportunity to play more active roles in the 
upbringing of their children.  Men “...have been pushed by societal values and workplace 
structures into being relatively uninvolved with the rearing of their children.”99  As 
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discussed at 1.2.3, the ideology of fatherhood values the financial contribution that fathers 
make to their households, rather than the time they spend actually caring.  We need 
effective gender-neutral rights to allow parents the time and space to care for their 
children.   
1.6.8 There is a further social issue: if single parents are either unable to work because 
of their childcare responsibilities, or if they are only able to work in low-paid occupations 
because these are the only roles that will accommodate parental responsibilities, then 
there will be large numbers of children being raised in poverty.  As has been noted, “[t]he 
consequences for these children, and for the society they will inherit, will be severe.  A 
society stratified by a rigid and deep class structure, with a poor and unskilled underclass, 
is in jeopardy both for its political stability and its economic prosperity."100   Equally as, 
Trevor Phillips101 suggests “...if jobs and prosperity return for everybody except women, 
ethnic minorities, the young, the old or disabled people then we will still be paying the 
welfare bill for people who are kept out of work by discrimination...”. 
Political/Legal 
1.6.9 As a member state of the EU, the UK has certain obligations to apply European 
law.  European intervention in this arena occurs because the EU is “...is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.”102  As 
such, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU includes articles on non-
discrimination103, equality between men and women104 and reconciliation between family 
and professional life105. 
1.6.10 In addition to European obligations, the UK is also bound by other standards, 
such as those set by the International Labour Organisation (“ILO”), of which the UK is a 
member.  The ILO has clearly recognised the importance of ensuring equal treatment for 
those with family responsibilities as demonstrated by Convention 156106  which 
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recognises that “...the problems of workers with family responsibilities are aspects of 
wider issues regarding the family and society which should be taken into account in 
national policies” and that “...many of the problems facing all workers are aggravated in 
the cases of workers with family responsibilities and that [there is a]....need to improve 
the conditions of the latter both by measures responding to their special needs and by 
measures designed to improve the conditions of workers in general”107.   (It is of note that 
Convention 156 has not been ratified by the UK.)   
1.6.11 In addition to ILO obligations, the UK has also ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”).  CEDAW recognises that the 
contribution of women to the welfare of the family and to the development has not been 
fully recognised, that there is a social significance to maternity, that the role of women in 
procreation should not be a basis for discrimination and that the upbringing of children 
requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole108.    
1.7 Valuing caring or just childcare?   
1.7.1 Above I have been arguing that, essentially, parenting is a social good that 
benefits society as a whole.  As parenting is a form of caring, to the extent that it should 
be a given a protected status (or additional rights) in the workplace, should caring more 
generally also enjoy this status or is there some basis for differentiating parenting as a 
form of caring?   
1.7.2 As outlined below, caring for others is also such a social good, and, has economic 
benefits for society in the same way that parenting does.  According to a report prepared 
for Carers UK, the economic value of the contribution, made by carers to the economy of 
the UK is £87 billion per year109.  Before considering these issues in more detail though, 
we need to consider what we mean by caring.  I would note that consistent with Herring’s 
view that the definition of care “…depends on the context within which the term is being 
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used.”110  Here I am considering the definition of care solely in the employment rights 
context.  I am not, therefore, advocating that the definition should be applied anywhere 
other than the employment sphere.  Engster111 has suggested that caring can be defined 
as “…everything we do directly to help individuals to meet their basic needs, develop or 
maintain their basic capabilities, and live as much as possible free from suffering, so that 
they can survive and function at least at a minimally decent level.”112  However, he also 
suggests that “…caring means not only achieving certain aims but also doing so in a 
caring manner”113. For the purposes of discussion of the rights of carers in the workplace, 
I do not believe it is necessary to include this within the definition of caring as it would 
import a subjective test into the consideration of whether someone is a carer, which is 
likely to reduce the number of people that fall within any protection that it is appropriate 
to offer rather than being all encompassing (however, I appreciate that in other contexts 
the manner in which care is undertaken is crucial).   
1.7.3 Notwithstanding the above, does it matter how carers are treated and what 
difficulties they may face in the workplace by virtue of their caring responsibilities?  As 
with parenting, there is an underlying gender element to caring.  Caring was historically 
done in the home, the private sphere, by women.  I agree with Nakano Green’s 
observation that this seems to have resulted in the devaluing of care work114.  This affects 
not only unpaid carers but also paid ones: research suggests that there is a pay penalty 
attached for paid care relative to other jobs115.  The way in which caring is valued or 
devalued, and thus the way in which carers are treated, is a gender equality issue because, 
as England has noted “…women do such a high proportion of paid and unpaid care 
work…that how well a society rewards care work impacts gender inequality.”116   
1.7.4 Whilst caring is still done by a greater number of women than men, the statistics 
suggest that the difference in the numbers of men and women caring is relatively small.  
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According to Carers UK, the chance of becoming a carer in any one year is 7.25% for 
women and 5.8% for men117 However, what these statistics do not demonstrate is how 
much time each of the sexes actually spend caring.  In the context of childcare, despite the 
fact that both parents have the same care responsibilities, women take a greater role in 
providing care.  The time use surveys that identify this trend do not have a separate 
category for care (other than childcare) – care is included within domestic responsibilities 
(women, on average, spend 240 minutes compared with the 148 minutes spent by men) 
and it is therefore difficult to identify whether there are disparities in the amount of time 
spent by women caring (rather than carrying out other domestic responsibilities, such as 
cleaning).  US statistics show that female caregivers spend 50% more time providing care 
than male caregivers118.  As with parenting then, there appears to be a gender equality 
aspect to providing appropriate rights for carers.   
1.7.5 Further, just like parenting, caring can have an impact on the carer’s ability to 
fully participate in the workplace.  This, in part, will depend on how much care the carer 
is required to give.  However, some research119 has found that, unlike mothers who opt to 
work on a part-time basis in order to try to combine work and family responsibilities, 
there is no indication that it is easier to combine part-time work with caring than it is to 
do so with full-time work.  The key aspect of whether a role can be combined with caring 
appears to be more to do with the flexibility that the role offers and it may be that the 
types of part-time role that allow parents to combine work and family (for example, 
working during school hours) are not as helpful for carers of, for example, elderly 
relatives (who may not have assistance during these hours).    
1.7.6 Care is important for society as a whole; Nakano Green’s statement that “[i]t 
seems inherent in the definition of a good society that those who cannot care for 
themselves are cared for”120 demonstrates this.  There is clearly a need for people to 
undertake care for others and Engster has suggested that this dependence on each other 
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“…obligates each and every member of society to help support caring activities.”121  
Essentially, as we may all need care at some point in our lives, we have an obligation to 
provide care for others.  On this basis, caregiving benefits not only those that directly 
receive the care, but society as a whole.   
1.7.7 In light of all the similarities explored above, to the extent that rights for parents 
can be justified on the basis of allowing and enabling them to care, similar rights should 
be available for other carers where they need these to carry out their caring 
responsibilities.  For the purposes of considering whether the current regime of parental 
rights enables parents to combine work and family (in Chapters 3 to 5) though, I shall 
focus on parents, rather than carers more generally.    
1.8 Who should bear the cost of time off for parental related issues?    
1.8.1 The question of who should bear the costs of family friendly measures is crucial.  
First though, it is important to acknowledge that there is a cost attached to some measures 
necessary to allow parents to reconcile their work and family responsibilities, for example, 
periods of leave.  There may be other measures, such as restructuring the hours that a 
worker needs to work to accommodate his/her parental responsibilities, which would not 
necessarily involve any additional cost.  The current regime in GB means that, effectively, 
parents have to bear the majority of the costs if they are absent from work exercising one 
of the parental leave rights (the "Leave Costs"), unless their employer voluntarily 
provides fully paid leave.  This is because the types of parental leave are either unpaid or 
are paid at very low rates.  This is unfair.  I agree with James that there is a need “…to 
ensure that, as far as is possible, parents are not financially penalised for the care-giving 
they undertake.”122  Where there are financial penalties for care-giving for the reasons set 
out earlier this affects women more severely.  As argued above, society benefits from 
mothers taking leave to have children (i.e. maternity leave) and from parents taking leave 
to care for their children (e.g. parental leave).  It would therefore be unfair for workers 
alone to bear the costs of actions which ultimately benefit society.  Further, where workers 
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bear the costs of leave themselves (by such leave being unpaid or paid at low levels) the 
evidence (which is examined further in Chapter 4 suggests that men will be less likely to 
take this leave.  This has a significant effect on women’s role within society and their 
ability to fully participate in the workplace.  For reasons of social justice and because 
increasing women’s participation in the workplace could have a significant positive 
economic impact, we need to encourage men to take a greater share of the responsibility 
for childcare.  This means that these rights need to be paid at a higher rate than they 
currently are.   
1.8.2 Where the individual worker does not bear the cost of leave, there are three other 
possibilities: employers (whether that is the particular worker’s employer or employers 
as a group collectively), workers (as a group collectively) or the State.   
Employers (whether the worker’s employer or employers as a collective group) 
1.8.3 As acknowledged by a White House paper a key argument against employers 
providing paid leave is that “…such practices are costly and place an unfair burden on 
employers.”123  As the same paper finds though, employers may actually, in the long-term 
financially benefit from offering workers paid leave.  There is a “…body of research that 
finds that these practices [paid family leave and flexible workplace policies] can benefit 
employers by improving their ability to recruit and retain talent, lowering costly worker 
turnover and minimizing loss of firm-specific skills and human capital, as well as boosting 
morale and worker productivity.”124  In particular, paid periods of maternity leave have 
been demonstrated to increase the likelihood of a new mother returning to her previous 
role with her employer125.  As discussed above at 1.5.15, there is a cost to individual 
employers if they fail to retain women on maternity leave in terms of losing skilled 
workers, who might have knowledge of the organisation but also in terms of recruitment 
costs.  Research from 2000 suggests that just under a third (30%) of women that give birth 
do not return to work.126  This would equate to a significant cost to the employers of those 
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women.  Similar issues would be anticipated if there were longer periods of leave 
available for fathers.  This means that there is a cost associated with not offering pay for 
periods of family-friendly leave (in terms of the possibility of not retaining those workers).   
1.8.4 Requiring the particular employer of the worker taking leave to bear the Leave 
Costs of its own employees would be problematic as this might act as a disincentive for 
employers to employ women with children or women of childbearing age.  Although both 
men and women may exercise one of the rights to Parental Leave, at the moment women 
are more likely than men to exercise these rights and therefore, from the employer's 
perspective, there is a greater risk of that particular employer having to bear the Leave 
Costs if it chooses to employ a woman with children or a woman of childbearing age.   
Fredman argues that "...employment rights need to be divorced from the individual 
employment relationship... Duties fall on employers, not because of their immediate 
control over the time and commitment of an individual worker, but because of the civic 
responsibility which attaches to those with power."127  This is quite an appealing 
argument as it would suggest that all employers should equally bear the Leave Costs 
rather than the particular employer who employs the employee who exercises one of the 
parental leave rights.  This would considerably reduce the unexpected burden on an 
employer if one of its employees wished to take some form of Parental Leave, as the cost 
would be spread amongst all employers in the pool.  It could also cancel out the 
disincentive of employing women with children or of childbearing age, since employers 
would have to bear the costs of Parental Leave even if they chose not to employ these 
women.   
1.8.5 However, we have to acknowledge that even where employers do not bear the 
costs of paying a worker for leave, they may incur some costs as a result of a worker being 
absent.  This might be, for example, because the cost of engaging a temporary worker to 
cover the worker’s role or making overtime payments to other workers in respect of 
additional hours that they need to work as a result of their colleague being absent exceeds 
the cost of the salary that the woman on maternity leave would otherwise have received. 
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Even if there are no direct costs associated with the various forms of leave, employers also 
bear some costs in respect of these (whether the rights are paid or unpaid) in terms of the 
administration of them and the potential inconvenience of a worker being absent from the 
business.     
Workers (collectively) 
1.8.6 An alternative approach would be for workers as a collective group to bear the 
Leave Costs, for example, through employees’ national insurance contributions.  A similar 
position has been adopted in California in relation to Paid Family Leave.  Under that 
scheme, as reported in the Harvard Business Review128, paid leave is funded by worker 
contributions with no direct costs to employers.  According to this article, workers 
“…have willingly paid the full, direct costs of …programs via a payroll deduction.”  
However, the Californian model works so well because Paid Family Leave provides leave 
not just for, for example, maternity leave, but also for sick leave.  This means that all 
workers have the opportunity to benefit from the scheme, not just those with children.  
The position in GB would be different because the only workers that would benefit would 
be those with children.  This might lead to increasing levels of resentment by those 
without children, which is unlikely to be helpful in the long-term.  It also does not help 
with the matter of demonstrating that parenting/childcare has a value to society as a 
whole (and not just those in the workplace).   
The State 
1.8.7 Reiter has suggested that “...since the public as a whole benefits from women’s 
assumption of these dual roles, the costs should be shared by society (e.g. tax deductions 
or credits for family-friendly employers) rather than imposed solely on employers.”129   
There seems to be merit in this suggestion.  There is a benefit to society in parents 
spending time with their children.  The Marmot Review found a raft of positive effects of 
attachment between a young child and their primary care-giver (which the Review noted 
did not necessarily have to be the mother) including it contributing “…to the growth of a 
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broad range of competencies, including the self-esteem, self-efficacy and positive social 
skills that are associated with better educational, social and labour market outcomes in 
later life” resulting in “…stronger cognitive skills in young children and enhanced social 
competence and work skills later in school”, as well as “…better maternal and child 
health…”130.  These outcomes are all likely to have an input on the society’s expenditure.  
By way of example, better labour market outcomes means that those children are less 
likely to rely on state benefits and are more likely to be self-supporting.  Similarly, better 
child health means less expenditure on healthcare.  Society, therefore, benefits financially 
from parents spending time with their children.  It is therefore appropriate that the costs 
associated with this are borne by society.   
1.8.8 The easiest way to disperse the costs of the Parental Leave Rights across society 
would be for the State to bear the costs of these and for the money to be recouped through 
taxation.  It is fairest for the Parental Leave Costs to be shared in this was because, as 
James has noted, “…as childrearing (and other caring) provides benefits to society as a 
whole, then the costs should be borne by the wider society, and not simply loaded onto 
parents, carers, and the organisations that employ them.  If spread widely, these costs are 
not excessive.”131 
1.8.9 Currently, although the majority of the cost burden of taking Parental Leave falls 
on the individual, the State does bear some of the Leave Costs as it provides pay for some 
types of leave, albeit at very low levels132.  It also bears some of the Leave Costs by 
providing additional benefits for those with children such as child benefit and Working 
Families Tax Credit.  The State also subsidises the cost of childcare by providing 570 hours 
of free nursery education for 3 to 4 year olds and the same for some 2 year olds if the 
employee is in receipt of certain benefits.   
1.8.10 Alpern133 suggests that the State should bear a proportion of the costs of family 
friendly policies through offering tax incentives to companies based on per capita use of 
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the organisation's family friendly programmes.   Her rationale for doing so is that she 
believes it is better to engage employers, for example by providing financial incentives to 
provide family friendly policies, rather than by implementing a law requiring the 
implementation of such policies.  I disagree with her suggested approach for practical 
reasons rather than disagreeing with it on a theoretical basis.  The problem with providing 
incentives in this way is the administrative burden that this entails, both for the employer 
and for the State – the employer will need to demonstrate (and the State will need to 
verify) that a particular policy has been implemented, and then the State will need to 
apply the particular tax benefit to that particular employer.  However, whilst I agree with 
Alpern’s assertion that that employers need to be engaged with these issues, the need for 
engagement seems to be wider than just employees and employers – society as a whole 
needs to be engaged with these issues.  Society must understand the benefits that family 
friendly policies provide and this seems most likely to be the case where the issue has the 
full force of the law to require the implementation of a particular right.  The suggestion 
above, that employers should equally bear the costs of providing parental leave would 
effectively require State intervention (as the State would need to administer payments 
from the employers).  However, it is different from the approach that Alpern suggests 
insofar as it would only be employers (rather than individuals making additional 
payments, or the State being required to divert funds from other areas) that would 
contribute.   
1.8.11 If the State is to bear the costs of the Parental Leave Rights it would seem only 
just if the levels of pay for maternity, paternity and parental leave were capped to prevent 
high earners from using the leave, for example, to go on an exotic holiday, and their time 
away from work being fully paid.  If there were a cap, what should it be?  The aim would 
be to compensate workers at a level which does not deter them from exercising their rights 
to leave because they cannot afford to do so.  Any cap would need to take into account 
regional variations in salary, and, rather than setting different caps for different regions, 
it would seem simplest to set one which took into account the earnings of the highest paid 
region (rather than the lowest).  In 2014 median annual earnings were approximately 
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£27,200134.  As these are median earnings, approximately half the population would earn 
more than this.  It may therefore be fairer to look at the national distribution of wages.  
These figures show that 10% of population earn more than £1,024 per week135.  This figure 
annualised would be approximately £53,248.  As such, if the cap was set at this level, the 
vast majority of workers would suffer no drop in earnings through taking leave.  I 
acknowledge that a cap of £1,050 per week is an arbitrary figure.  However, there is a need 
to avoid to strike a balance between not unduly disadvantaging those who need to take 
leave connected with their family responsibilities (which would help to encourage the 
majority of workers with children to use these rights, irrespective of their sex) and not 
paying very significant amounts to a few individuals.  Further, those on higher wages are 
likely to have (and may be able to contribute going forwards) a greater amount in respect 
of tax and national insurance contributions than those on a lower salary.  
1.8.12 Having argued that it is important that we value parenting and that parents’ 
family responsibilities need to be accommodated, in the next Chapter I consider some of 
the theories underpinning the current rights and argue that we need to adopt a new 
theoretical framework.      
                                                          
134 According to 2014 ASHE – average annual earnings were approximately £27,200; median gross weekly 
earnings for full-time employees were £518, although there were significant regional variations, with London 
employees’ median gross weekly earnings being £660.   
135  ibid 
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CHAPTER 2 : The theory behind the rights regime 
 
2.1 Theoretical backdrop 
2.1.1 Prior to embarking on an analysis of the current legislation which may aid parents 
in combining work and family responsibilities, I first wish to consider some of the 
disparate theories underlying the parental rights regime and the conflict between some of 
these, in particular those embodying equal treatment and those embodying special 
treatment. I  argue that each of these approaches is fundamentally flawed, such that they 
can never meet the needs of working parents, particularly as there is not a coherent 
approach to these issues, with different theories underpinning different rights..  I will then 
move on to propose a cohesive theoretical framework which, I argue, would better meet 
the needs of parents (and carers more generally) and should underpin a new regime of 
rights.   
2.2 The Current Theoretical Framework 
Equal Treatment vs Special Treatment 
There has been, and still is, a lot of debate between legal scholars136 and more widely137 
about whether women and men are essentially the same or different.  These different 
approaches have been reflected in the different legal rights that are designed to facilitate 
the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities.  Some of the legal concepts reflect 
the idea of equal treatment (for example, direct sex discrimination), whilst others reflect 
the idea of different treatment (for example, maternity leave).  Each of the equal and 
different treatment approaches has different drawbacks for parents in the workplace, such 
that they mean the legislative provisions reflecting such theories do not (and can never) 
meet the needs of parents. 
Equal treatment  
2.2.1 In the 1960’s, feminist legal theory began to develop arguments that women 
should be treated no differently than men.  Many of these arguments focussed on securing 
rights and issues relating to, for example, pay.  At the time, it was common for women to 
                                                          
136 For example: Wendy Williams and Linda Krieger 
137 See for example, the work of John Suckling on sex differences in brain size and structure (Suckling, “A 
meta-analysis of sex differences in human brain structure”, Neuroscience & Biobehavioural Reviews, Volume 39, 
February 2014, 34 – 50) 
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be paid less than men, even when they were doing similar work.  By way of example, the 
1968 strike by sewing machinists at Ford highlighted the fact that women were receiving 
a significantly lower wage than men who were doing equivalent duties.  Similarly, 
women could be dismissed simply for getting married.  (By way of example, the marriage 
bar continued in place in Foreign Service civil service positions until 1971138.)  As such, 
there was significant merit in trying to secure the same rights for women as for men.  Later 
equal treatment feminists, such as Williams, have argued for the same treatment as men 
for several reasons, including the fact that special treatment “…divides us in ways that 
[are]…destructive…”139, that any recourse to special treatment allows both favourable 
and unfavourable treatment of women and that special treatment reinforces the 
assumptions about stereotypical roles of both men and women.  Taking each of these in 
turn, equal treatment feminists are concerned that focussing on the differences between 
men and women divides us and seems to pit the interests of each group against the other.  
Similarly, if different treatment is permitted in the workplace and that different treatment 
involves greater cost or inconvenience to employers, they feel that there is a risk that 
employers will try to circumvent those costs and inconveniences by finding reasons not 
to employ women (which ultimately will disadvantage women as a whole).  Williams’ 
concern is that this issue is about how we “…define women’s and men’s places and roles 
in society…” and therefore any special/different treatment affects what we are suggesting 
those places and roles should be.  By way of example, if we look to provide special 
treatment to mothers who have childcare responsibilities, then we are effectively 
excluding men from those responsibilities because we are not creating similar rights for 
them and so they will push those responsibilities to women.   
2.2.2 The equal treatment approach poses particular problems for pregnant workers 
and it is the equal treatment that has often been pervasive in British law.  As Guerrina has 
noted “…in British law the principle of equality implies a comparison between like 
entities (i.e. sameness) and thus struggles to deal with the concept of equality in 
                                                          
138 http://www.civilservant.org.uk/women-history.html 
139 Wendy Williams “The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections On Culture, Courts and Feminism”, 14 Women’s Rts 
L Rep 1992, 151 
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difference.  The British legal system has struggled to find the ‘proper’ place or the 
appropriate terms of reference to deal with ‘conditions’, such as maternity, that affect only 
the female workforce.”140 
2.2.3 First, it is important to note that even those who advocate the “equal treatment” 
approach do not assert that pregnancy is not a biological difference between women and 
men – the issue is about how we deal with pregnancy in the workplace and whether it 
requires accommodation.  The difficulty for advocates of the equal treatment approach is 
that, as an absolute minimum, pregnant workers will require time away from the 
workplace to give birth and to recover physically from this process.  The only other 
category of worker who may also need time off is that of workers who are ill.  As such, 
the equal treatment approach often results in pregnant workers being compared with 
those with an illness. 
2.2.4 By way of example, proponents of the "equal treatment" approach suggest that, 
where an employer operates a scheme which provides income replacement in the event 
of inability to work for sick workers, such a scheme should also extend to pregnant 
workers.  Their basis for doing so is that  “...if both childbirth and a heart attack cause an 
inability to work and income loss, it makes sense to encompass both within a disability 
program designed to cushion the economic effects of temporarily inability to work.”141     
There are some difficulties with this approach:  it does not provide any protection for 
pregnancy, it guarantees women only rights that men already have, the position appears 
to adopt a negative view of pregnancy that, and there are inherent problems in the 
requirement for women to be compared to men as this creates a male reference point.  I 
shall consider each of these in turn.   
No protection for pregnancy 
2.2.5 Under the equal treatment approach, pregnancy as such receives no protection.  
This is because, as a female specific condition, there is no equivalent male condition.  As 
has been explained previously in Chapter 1, pregnancy is a social good and therefore 
                                                          
140 Roberta Guerrina, R. (2005) Mothering the union. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p144 
141 Stephanie Wildman, “The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence”, 63 Or L Rev 265 at 357 
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women who are pregnant should not be subjected to unjustified detriment arising from 
external factors.  This would include not being penalised as a result of   needing time off 
for ante-natal appointments or time to give birth and recover from this.  Pregnancy is a 
uniquely female condition and one which does require some 
accommodation/recognition in the context of the workplace.   
2.2.6 The issue of childcare seems quite different though in this regard.  Both parents 
are equally capable of caring for a child and so, each should have similar entitlements in 
respect of that child.  The equal treatment approach does not, therefore, seem to cause any 
problems in this regard. 
Guarantees only rights that men already have 
2.2.7 A problem with a comparison against a male norm is that it only guarantees 
women the rights that men already have.   If men have limited, or no, rights in one area, 
and women need rights in this area, then the equal treatment approach will not secure 
women the rights that they need.  As explained below at 2.2.19, because of the way in 
which the workplace has evolved, the normative standard that workers are held to is that 
of an unencumbered person (that is, an unencumbered man with someone to carry out all 
domestic tasks that might distract him from his work duties).  Rights designed to reconcile 
work and family responsibilities were not necessary for this unencumbered worker and 
therefore do not exist.  
2.2.8 In respect of pregnancy, the equal treatment approach is flawed because under it 
”...men and women are viewed essentially as interchangeable employees, and all causes 
of inability to work are treated in a uniform and sex-neutral manner.”142  This does not 
reflect reality; men and women are not interchangeable in the pregnancy context because 
men cannot be pregnant.  Further, pregnancy is different from other causes of inability to 
work: (i) as explained in Chapter 1, it benefits society and is essential; (ii) unlike other 
causes of absence, for example sickness, the employee will know (in most cases) in 
advance when she will need to take time off, and therefore can inform the employer of 
this so that arrangements for cover can be put in place, if necessary, in advance; and (iii) 
                                                          
142 Andrew Weissmann, “Sexual Equality under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act”, 83 Colum L Rev 690 1983 
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the amount of time off that an employee can take as maternity leave is limited, unlike sick 
leave where the employee could be unable to work indefinitely, and so the employer can 
make arrangements for appropriate cover and also ensure that the employee has a job to 
return to.   
Negative view of pregnancy 
2.2.9 Pregnancy may be a positive experience for women, whereas a temporary 
disability is “...often considered to be a negative, sometimes even life-threatening, 
circumstance ...”143.   As such, equating pregnancy with disability may have negative 
connotations.  Further, it makes pregnancy seem unusual and a deviation from the normal 
pattern of human behaviour, when in fact pregnancy is "...a predictable, foreseeable 
condition that will occur among a substantial portion of working women."144     Statistics 
in the UK show that the very large majority of women will have children145.  In addition, 
it seems strange to consider women’s unique role in procreation as disability.  As 
Gutierrez and Hernandez-Truyol have noted “…[t]his unique ability to create life is 
transmogrified into a disability simply because men cannot do it.”146   
2.2.10 Cox argues that the arguments against equal treatment in this regard are negated 
if we adopt the social model of disability, under which disability is not “an impairment 
located within an individual’s body but …the interaction between the individual’s body 
and her social environment”147.  She equates the struggle to include pregnancy within the 
workplace, whereby pregnant women are only excluded because the workplace has been 
designed around a male norm who cannot become pregnant, with the struggle to include 
those with disabilities within the workplace.  On this basis, she asserts that we need to 
look to change perceptions of the norm “…to achieve the inclusiveness that would have 
naturally occurred had human culture historically viewed physically variant persons as 
legitimate workforce participants.”148  Pregnancy can be seen to be similar to disability 
                                                          
143 Mary Jane Mossman, “Feminism and the Law: Challenges and Choices” 10 Can J Women & L 1 1998, 9 
144 Dowd (n96), 702 
145 In 2012, 18% of women who were 45 were childless (“Cohort Fertility, 2012”, ONS, 5 December 2013) 
146 Vivian Gutierrez, Berta Hernandez-Truyol, “Unsexing Pregnancy?” in Darren Rosenblum et al “Pregnant 
Man: A Conversation” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, Vol 22, Issue 2, 2010 207-278, 230  
147 Jeanette Cox, “Pregnancy as “disability” and the amended Americans with Disabilities Act”, 53 BCL Rev 443 
(2012), 443 
148 ibid, 450  
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when a social model of disability is adopted.  The way that the workplace has been 
constructed, ignoring the issue of pregnancy and making this invisible and a private 
matter means that pregnant women are unable to fully participate in the workplace in 
many instances, just as, under the social model of disability, it is not a person’s 
impairment that causes them difficulties in the workplace, but the way the workplace has 
been created.  As such, the social model recognises that an impairment is disabling 
because of the interaction between that impairment and the social world. I agree with Cox 
that the norm needs to be changed to incorporate pregnancy and to change from an 
unencumbered worker to one who has responsibilities outside the workplace.  However, 
I disagree that pregnancy should be equated with disability.  The two are very different.    
Pregnancy is significant not just for the woman carrying the child, but also the father of 
the unborn child.   It is also, as argued in Chapter 1, a socially useful task.  Characterising 
pregnancy as disability when pregnancy is also characterised as a choice for the 
individual makes it "...a private, negative, temporary deviation from a female employee’s 
public, productive role – a personal indulgence in derogation of her responsibilities as a 
functioning worker.”149      
2.2.11 In conclusion, the equal treatment approach does not appear to be useful or 
helpful in the pregnancy context, nor is it particularly useful in relation to childcare 
(because no-one else has rights that properly accommodate caring).  That is not to say that 
it has not or that it will not be appropriate in other contexts, for example, securing access 
to employment.  As Law has noted “...it is not possible to give a single answer to the 
question whether men and women are essentially similar.”150  Similarly, Adiba Sohrab 
has suggested that "[r]ather than having as our primary focus a rather abstract situation 
of 'equality in law', we should start from specific social problems that affect women, or 
different groups of women, and evaluate legal approaches, and anti-discrimination 
legislation, in terms of their usefulness in attacking these problems."151. I agree; the 
purpose of evaluating the equal treatment and different treatment approaches here is to 
                                                          
149 Reiter (n69), 15 
150 Sylvia Law “Rethinking Sex and the Constitution”, U Pa.L.Rev 955 (1984) 
151 Julia Sohrab (1993) ‘Avoiding the “exquisite trap”: a critical look at the equal treatment / special treatment 
debate in law’, Feminist Legal Studies, 1(2)-141-162, 143 
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enable us to understand whether either is appropriate for securing the rights that are 
needed for the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities, rather than seeking to 
argue that one particular approach is best to secure every right needed for women to be 
treated fairly in general. 
Special Treatment 
2.2.12 In the late 1970’s, a different approach was adopted by some academics and 
commentators to the issue of gender equality.  These academics and commentators 
essentially argued that men focus on personal achievement and their autonomy (or as 
referred to by Chodorow152 they define themselves by their “denial of relation to others”) 
whereas women focus on an ethic of care and similarly they define themselves by 
reference to their relationships.  What is arguably the leading text setting out this 
approach was written by Gilligan (In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development153) and was published in 1982.  The “different voice” feminists, 
such as Gilligan, argue that women’s contribution, for example in terms of caring, should 
be recognised as being different (rather than less valuable) than the contribution of men.   
“Different voice” feminism is not the only approach to special treatment though and the 
special treatment approach does not inevitably accept that women think differently to 
men or that men do not share an ethic of care.  Both Hill Kay and Law have argued that 
women should be treated differently from men where the need for such treatment arises 
because of a biological difference between the sexes (rather than because they speak in a 
“different voice”.).   
2.2.13 Special treatment has the advantage of recognising the importance of issues, such 
as caring.  As highlighted in Chapter 1, caring is not valued as the socially important task 
that is.   
2.2.14 The “different voice” approach suggests that perhaps rights should be given to 
mothers only to allow them to care, since according to this approach, they share an ethic 
of care, which men do not.  This type of argument suggests that women are better at caring 
                                                          
152 Carol Gilligan ‘In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development’ 1982, Harvard University 
Press 
153 Nancy Chodorow ‘The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender’ (1978), Yale 
University Press 
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than men and therefore that those types of task should naturally fall to women.  Yet what 
the argument does not address is whether women are “naturally” better at care, or 
whether we have just been socialised to believe that this is the case.  In response to “In a 
Different Voice”, Kerber asserted a view that the difference in the way that women reacted 
to situations was likely to be as  a result of “…the distinctive socialization of young girls 
in a culture…which has long ascribed some social tasks to men and others to 
women…”154.  In other words, the reason that girls aspire, for example, to be housewives, 
rather than masters of industry is because those are the parameters that are seemingly set 
by society for their sex.  Further, as Williams has noted, when it comes to care, women 
and men are judged very differently for their contributions155.  To conform to the ideal 
mother stereotype, a woman must be selflessly devoted to her children’s needs.  A father 
need not meet this bar, indeed as described later in this chapter, men’s status is derived 
from their financial contributions to the family and thus if they care too much (such that 
this is a distraction from paid work) this can undermine their ability to meet the ideal 
father norm.   
2.2.15 The “different voice” approach presents gender as absolute and the genders as 
opposites.  As such, care is a gendered characteristic, one that only women possess.  Yet, 
there are plenty of fathers who care for their children and the statistical evidence suggests 
that fathers want to spend more time doing so.  This is inconsistent with the idea that 
women naturally care (which equally suggests that men do not).   As I have argued in 
Chapter 1, special treatment, if only given to women, would be inappropriate because 
both parents are equally capable of undertaking the care of a child.  Special treatment, 
whereby parents (rather than just mothers) are given additional rights and/or protections 
might be of some use.  However, there would be significant drawbacks to any special 
treatment given to mothers in relation to childcare.  This would merely perpetuate the 
privileging of the mother-child relationship, which is discussed below at 2.4. 
                                                          
154 Linda Kerber “Some Cautionary Words for Historians”, Signs , Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), pp. 304-310 
155 Wendy Williams “Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to do About it”, Oxford 
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2.2.16 The approach adopted by Law and Kay focuses on biological difference, so does 
not have the difficulties highlighted above in relation to the “different voice” approach.  
Unlike childcare, pregnancy is a clear difference between women and men.  It is also 
something that has an impact on a pregnant women’s ability to participate in the 
workplace (as constructed currently) as a result of her needing time off for childbirth and 
for recovery.  As such, does the special treatment approach better accommodate 
pregnancy than the equal treatment approach?   
2.2.17 Considering special treatment more generally (and not just “different voice” 
theories) there have been historic issues with special treatment being used to justify 
women being excluded from the workplace in protectionist measures that went far 
beyond what was genuinely necessary.   Vogel has highlighted difficulties relating to 
protectionist measures to prevent reproductive damage, noting that “…some [women] 
found themselves excluded from jobs they wanted”156 and that the concerns around 
reproductive harm “…not only reinforced sex segregation in the labor market, but it also 
increasingly became the basis for policies and practices that harmed women workers.”157  
Historically discussions relating to pre-pregnancy reproductive hazards have focused 
solely on the damage caused to female reproduction; this has resulted in women’s unique 
role in procreation being used to exclude women from certain workplaces. For example, 
in the case of Page v Freight Hire158, the female claimant had not been permitted to drive 
vehicles containing the chemical DMF because she was a 23 year old woman.  The 
manufacturer of this chemical had warned the employee's employer that the chemical was 
dangerous to women of child-bearing age, however exposure to it also could cause, 
amongst other things, liver and kidney problems, for both sexes, yet men were not 
excluded from transporting it..   Fredman has observed that "...the option of insisting on 
improving health and safety standards for all was simply not considered.  The 
implausibility of the alternative option, that of excluding men from the work-place 
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because of such hazards, simply underlines the ease with which women can be 
marginalised”159. 
2.2.18 However, there is a further fundamental issue with “special” treatment; it still 
requires a comparative approach, whereby the reference point is the male norm (the 
difficulties that this poses for pregnancy and childcare are discussed below).  Pregnancy 
and childcare remain something that is strange or different, thereby justifying the special 
treatment. 
The reference point 
2.2.19 A fundamental problem with both the equal treatment and special treatment 
approaches is the reference point that is used.  When considering whether a woman 
should be treated in the same way as another worker, we are implicitly using a male 
standard.  This hypothetical worker " ...is an able-bodied person who should rarely get 
sick and who has someone else who can devote full time to taking care of children, food, 
laundry, repairs, errands and family illnesses”160 .   
2.2.20 For women who are pregnant, it is impossible to meet this male standard of 
worker as they will need time away from work at the very least to give birth, and probably 
also during the pregnancy in order to attend ante-natal appointments.  Under the male 
norm, pregnancy is seen as an "…inconvenient deviation from a male or androgynous 
norm...”161.  As discussed earlier, however, pregnancy is not an unusual event; it is a 
“...normal moment in the human reproductive process specific to women”162.  As men 
have been set as the standard against which all workers must be measured, and men 
cannot become pregnant, the only way that pregnancy can be characterised under this 
system is as a deviation, because it is not normal male behaviour to become pregnant.  If 
women were the standard against which workers were measured, pregnancy, as a 
condition which affects a substantial proportion of women, would not be seen as a 
deviation; it would be seen as normal behaviour and workplaces would have developed 
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to accommodate it.  We need to “...stop accepting men’s needs as determining all desirable 
‘rights’ for both women and men and thus as constituting the standard for equality 
analysis...” as when we do so “... we will cease being so concerned about whether 
maternity leave is a ‘special right’ because it is not male oriented”163.   For parents who 
need to reconcile their family and work responsibilities, the difficulty is the idea that the 
norm is an unencumbered worker who has someone else to take “…care of children, food, 
laundry, repairs, errands and family illnesses”164. 
2.2.21 In relation to both pregnancy and childcare, the issue is the fact that the norm that 
has developed embodied traditional male values, that is someone who is unencumbered 
by responsibilities from the private sphere.   
2.2.22 As many have noted, including MacKinnon165, James166 and Adiba Sohrab167, the 
special treatment approach (just like the equal treatment approach) “…assumes that male 
needs establish the norm"168.    I argue below that the issue should not be about whether 
we adopt an equal treatment or special treatment approach to the difficulties facing 
parents in reconciling work and family responsibilities, but that we look to value 
pregnancy/childcare (and caring more generally) and that we should move away from 
the current “male” norm.   
2.3 Issues for pregnancy and childcare in the current theoretical framework 
2.3.1 There are certain ideas underpinning the current workplace parental rights  that 
cause particular difficulty for pregnant workers and parents wishing to reconcile work 
and family responsibilities.  These are examined in detail below, but essentially relate to 
the current norm and the idea of a private (domestic) sphere and a public sphere, which 
are entirely independent.   In relation to the former, as Busby has noted "[m]easurement 
against a male norm and the resulting classification on women's physical characteristics 
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and physiological functions as ‘different’ colours the development and interpretation of 
related provisions”169.  This is arguably why the legislative provisions that are in place do 
not meet the needs of parents; because they are based on a false premise, that of women 
(being of the gender that is predominantly responsible for carrying out the task of caring) 
being viewed as “different” as a result of those caring responsibilities, when in fact, as 
argued in Chapter 1, the reality is that caring is a fundamental part of society (and one 
that has an impact on every (interconnected) individual). 
The current norm 
2.3.2 The current norm for a worker has developed over time and is based on a model 
of a worker who has no childcare (or other caring) responsibilities and who is not 
pregnant.  As such, the features of the norm are that the worker works on a full-time basis 
and is able to dedicate himself to his work to the exclusion of all else.  Busby suggests that: 
the main difficulty faced by those trying to reconcile work and care responsibilities "… is 
the inability of those engaged in the non-negotiable work of caring to conform to the 
practices ascribed by established and apparently unyielding structures surrounding paid 
work which dictate how, where and when it should take place"170.  Challenging the 
current norm, and in particular the requirement to work on a full-time basis and a 
worker’s ability to dedicate himself to his work to the exclusion of all else, would have 
the effect of changing the expectations of how and when work should take place (but 
would not necessarily have any impact on where the work takes place).   Both these 
features seem to cause the most difficulties for those who have childcare responsibilities 
and for pregnant workers.   
Full-time worker 
2.3.3 The meaning of the term “full-time” varies from industry and sector, and even 
between different jobs for the same employer171.   The assumption that a “typical” worker 
will be able to work full-time hours has an impact on those who, as a result of childcare 
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responsibilities, are unable to do so. This disadvantages women because of the fact that 
they tend to have primary responsibility for childcare, and therefore are more likely than 
men to need, or want, to work part-time.   The issue for parents who wish to reconcile 
work and family responsibilities is not though just the number of hours that employers 
require workers to work, but also when and where those hours have to be worked.    
Dedication to the exclusion of all else 
2.3.4 The current norm requires that workers demonstrate that they can dedicate 
themselves to the workplace to the exclusion of all else.  I agree with Crompton that, “…in 
many if not most organisations, the ‘ideal’ career worker will still be an individual who is 
prepared to demonstrate their commitment to the employer by meeting organisational 
demands (for example, by meeting personal or group targets), even if this means working 
long hours”172. As argued in Chapter 1, long working hours cause particular difficulties 
for parents trying to reconcile their work and family responsibilities and, given the fact 
that women currently bear a greater burden in respect of the time spent caring, means 
that many women are viewed, in the workplace, as being less valuable or dedicated to 
their careers. 
2.3.5 One of the particular problems that face those with childcare responsibilities is 
that, unlike some (but not all) other characteristics protected from discrimination under 
the Equality Act 2010 (for example race173, sex, sexual orientation), childcare 
responsibilities may have an impact on a worker in the workplace174.    This might be 
because the worker chooses to work part-time or to follow non-traditional working 
patterns (ie working from home or working hours other than 9am to 5pm), or it might be 
because the worker occasionally needs time off to care for his/her child, for example, if 
the child is unwell.  It might also mean that, because of the norm, the worker is seen as 
being less flexible.  For professional workers this might be because, for example, the 
                                                          
172 Crompton (n7), p87 
173 Race alone is unlikely to have an impact on an employee’s ability to participate in the workplace, although I 
acknowledge that ethnicity may be associated with religious or cultural obligations which impinge at work.   
174 Arguably the protected characteristics of religion or belief, and even disability may actually impact on a 
worker in the workplace.  For example, a worker who is required to observe a particular prayer-time or not to 
work at a particular time of day may require an accommodation by the employer.  Similarly, a worker who is 
disabled may require time off work in order to attend medical appointments.   
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worker is not always be able to answer a query or work on a document on their day off.  
For blue collar workers, this might be because the worker is unable to operate a flexible 
schedule and come in to work on a weekend when their childcare (whether formal or 
informal including: school, nursery, care by relatives) is not available.   
2.3.6 MacKinnon suggests this is part of the invisible gendering of the workplace.  It 
indeed appears to be so: most employers require their workers to conform to the norm 
(that is someone who does not have childcare responsibilities that impinge on their ability 
to provide maximum flexibility (including being available whenever the employer 
chooses)).  As such the way in which a job is structured is “…with the expectation that its 
occupant would have no child care responsibilities”175 which is inherently gendered.  As 
a result of the gendered nature of the workplace  “...at least in some instances, women are 
hampered by caregiving in ways that non-caregivers (male and female) are not in 
fulfilling common work obligations”176.  This is true because the norm requires the worker 
to dedicate themselves to work to the exclusion of everything else, irrespective of how 
reasonable or unreasonable the demands of the workplace might be.  Those that cannot 
satisfy this norm, for example because of childcare responsibilities, are seen by their 
employers as less valuable workers than their colleagues who can.  We need to challenge 
the assumption that, to be a model employee, a person has to dedicate himself/herself to 
work to the exclusion of everything else.  Travis suggests that we need to require 
“…employers to redesign workplaces that have been built around unstated norms of 
workers (typically men) who lack significant caregiving responsibilities”177 and also that 
we need to “…restructure the entire workplace around a caregiving worker norm”178.  In 
order to do so, we need to overcome some of the issues set out in this section; I consider 
below at 2.5, how this could be achieved. 
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2.3.7 Abrams has expressed concern that changing the norm “… will be financially 
costly as well as disorienting”179. It is true that there may be costs associated with these 
measures, however it is important to note that there is also a cost associated with not 
introducing them.  This is because, as set out in Chapter 1, if parents are unable to combine 
work and childcare, then they may be forced either to opt out of the labour market, or to 
change to lower-paid work which allows them to work flexibly.  As such, the crucial 
question is not whether there are costs associated with changing the assumption that one 
worker will prioritise work whilst the other cares for the children, but whether such costs 
are reasonable.    
2.3.8 If, because of the current norm and the structuring of the workplace around this 
norm, the impact of caring is that mothers (and fathers who choose to undertake care) are 
not valued by employers, we need to acknowledge the impact of caring, yet we do not do 
so.  This appears to be why there is so little progress in achieving work/family 
reconciliation, a point that is made by Busby180.     
2.3.9 The concept of the normative worker – someone who can dedicate himself to 
work to the exclusion of the home sphere - not only hurts women in the workplace but it 
also hurts men in relation to their home/parenting responsibilities.  Men are effectively 
side-lined and excluded from playing the role in their children’s lives that many would 
like to play.  Research by the EHRC showed that 62% of fathers thought that fathers 
should spend more time with their children181.  Williams suggests that, addressing work-
life balance issues is not just about transforming women’s roles, but also about 
transforming men’s roles too182.   This is true for a number of reasons: men are often 
effectively excluded from rights to leave through the low levels (or lack) of pay in respect 
of these rights;and there are pervasive assumptions about the role of women in parenting 
(discussed further below at 2.4), and these assumptions so far have not been dispelled by 
the measures taken to try to facilitate a more equal sharing of parental responsibilities, 
                                                          
179 Kathryn Abrams, “Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms”,  42 V and L Rev 1989, 
1183-1248, 1225 
180 Busby (n51) 
181 “Working Better: Fathers, family and work – contemporary perspectives.”  Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, Research summary 41, October 2009 
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such as through the introduction of Additional Paternity Leave (“APL”) (discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3).   
Separate spheres 
 
2.3.10 The first thing to note is that "[t]he ideology of the separate spheres is a social 
construct: there are no natural fixed spheres"183.  This is important because it means that 
there is no reason that work and home have to be separate spheres, it just so happens to 
be this way because of the way that society has developed.  Men have not, historically, 
needed rights to allow them to reconcile work and family because family responsibilities, 
such as childcare, and domestic tasks, such as cooking, fell within the private sphere and 
were the responsibility of their wives (who did not work outside the home).  
Consequently, the male worker norm has developed as a person who has someone else 
to undertake familial and domestic responsibilities allowing him to concentrate his 
energies on work.   It is also important to note that the problem of the separate spheres 
may affect both men and women but women are likely to be more disadvantaged by it in 
the workplace because, as set out in Chapter 1, they tend to have primary responsibility 
for childcare.  Men may be disadvantaged by the concept in the home because they may 
have less opportunity to actively participate in the care of their children.     
2.3.11 There are many problems for childcare with the concept of two separate spheres.  
Firstly, if the spheres of home and work are seen as separate, then each is seen as imposing 
competing demands on the time of the employee.  Consequently, any time that a parent 
spends away from the workplace (whether this is time off in the form of leave or a 
reduction in their working hours) is viewed, at worst as having a negative effect on the 
employer, or at best as not benefitting the employer in any way.  Because the spheres are 
viewed as separate, it is possible to exclude “...the values, needs and perspectives of one 
from recognition in the other”184.  Employers can ignore the additional skills, or the 
different perspective, that a worker might bring to a job as a result of caring for a child.   
The fact that the two spheres are seen as separate also means that neither needs to take 
account of the other (for example, the fact that parents might need some adjustments to 
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their working patterns as a result of their childcare responsibilities can simply be ignored 
by the employer), and so the work sphere has been structured in a way which does not 
take account of the needs of parents or of pregnant workers.    Despite the fact that nearly 
half of employees in the UK are now women185, this position has not changed. “The very 
sense of the workplace has been defined, not by women, and not in our terms. To be in 
the workplace is to enter a male-privileged world. Even the notion of the workplace which 
exists outside the home privileges maleness, associating work with male values and 
culture”186.  
2.3.12 Further, as the two spheres are viewed as separate (rather than being 
interconnected), it is possible to prioritise one over the other.  In the work sphere workers 
are expected, in order to demonstrate “commitment” to their careers, to dedicate 
themselves to work above all else.   As discussed above, this can cause difficulties for 
those with childcare responsibilities.  There also appears to be a view that one sphere (the 
public) is superior to the other (the private).  As James has noted a “…related implication 
of the dichotomy is the inherent way that it fails to recognise or value, or create a space 
for the recognition and value of, the private sphere in general and women’s unpaid 
domestic work in relation to childbearing, childcare and nurturing in particular.”187 This 
again is, I would argue, in part as a result of a failure to value parenting.  If we do not see 
the value in such tasks, then it is unsurprising that the work/public sphere is seen as 
superior to the private/domestic sphere.  
2.4 Privileging of mother-child relationship 
2.4.1 As set out in Chapter 1, whilst only women can be pregnant, both men and 
women can be parents and both have the capacity to care.  Currently the care of children 
is predominantly undertaken by women.  If we are to allow mothers to properly reconcile 
work and family responsibilities, this needs to change.  However, the current legal 
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framework, with its privileging of the mother-child relationship (rather than parent-child) 
and perpetuation of ideologies of motherhood, makes this task almost impossible.   
2.4.2 What do we mean by the ideologies of motherhood?  Essentially this is the idea 
that all women are naturally capable of being carers of children, that there is a special 
relationship between mother and child and that mothers provide the best care for their 
children. As many, including McGlynn188 and Fredman189, have noted, the ideologies of 
motherhood are deep-rooted and were supported by psychological studies carried out in 
the post-war period, which found that separation from mothers resulted in emotional 
damage190.  These studies reaffirmed society’s thinking at the time and appear to have 
been accepted unquestioningly.  However, the studies related to children who had been 
separated from both parents as a result of having been evacuated to parts of the country 
that were deemed to be at less risk of bombing.  It is difficult, therefore, to assess the 
degree of emotional damage that these children suffered simply as a result of being 
separated from their mothers, as opposed to the stress of being moved to an unfamiliar 
place with unfamiliar people and general anxieties about the war and its consequences.  
Whilst there is now evidence to disprove the ideologies of motherhood and evidence 
which supports the crucial role that both parents play, these ideologies are difficult to 
dispel, not least because they are perpetuated by the legislation that is designed to 
facilitate work/family reconciliation, as well as the case law that has arisen from this. 
2.4.3 I consider in greater detail how the current gender-specific rights reinforce the 
ideologies of motherhood when I critique each right, but, in short, the legislation provides 
for long periods of leave for mothers (in the form of maternity leave), whilst entitling 
father to significantly shorter periods (in the form of paternity leave).  Whilst fathers may 
now be eligible for longer periods of leave (in the form of Additional Paternity Leave or, 
where a child is born after 5 April 2015, in the form of Shared Parental Leave), this is 
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contingent (in most cases191) on the mother surrendering part of her entitlement and is a 
relatively recent development (particularly when taken in the context of the long-standing 
assumption that a mother can provide the best care for her child).  Making this contingent 
in this way still has the effect of emphasising the alleged “special relationship” between 
mother and child.  This language is also found in the case law relating to these issues, 
particularly in cases determined by the CJEU.  In Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse192, a 
father was seeking to argue that a failure to pay him for a period of leave that he had taken 
to care for his new child whilst the mother of the child returned to work amounted to a 
breach of equal treatment.  However, the CJEU held that there was no breach of equal 
treatment because the purpose of maternity leave (and not parental leave) was to "protect 
the special relationship between a woman and her child".  Similarly, in Abdoulaye v Regie 
Nationale des Usines Renault SA193 the plaintiff, Mr Abdoulaye, tried to argue that a 
payment made by Renault to its female employees after they took maternity leave 
amounted to sex discrimination.  (This payment was in addition to pay that they received 
during the leave).  Mr Abdoulaye argued that the birth of a child was a “…social event, 
which concerns the whole family, including the father” and, as such, the payment should 
be given to employees who had had a child, irrespective of the employees’ sex.   The 
language of “special relationship” has been repeated in numerous cases194.  However, as 
McGlynn has observed “[i]n each case, no explanation was given of this statement, why 
it was deemed necessary, nor why the "special relationship" was relevant to the 
justification of the grant of maternity leave or why the need for child bonding was 
exclusive only to mothers"195.   This repeated use of the term “special relationship” in the 
decisions of the CJEU shows just how dominant this ideology is.    
2.4.4 Not only can the ideologies of motherhood be found in the case law of the CJEU, 
but it can also be found in documents from another European Institution: the European 
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Commission and, specifically, its proposals to amend the Pregnant Workers Directive.  
Whilst these proposals have now been withdrawn196, the approach taken by the European 
Commission is one of the privileging of the mother-child relationship and a bias towards 
mothers, rather than fathers (or parents), caring for their children..  In the Explanatory 
Memorandum on these proposal197, it appears that the view taken is one in which women 
take primary responsibility for childcare, with men's role being seen as peripheral.  This 
is because the proposals include an increase in the minimum amount of maternity leave 
(which is available to mothers only) from 14 to 18 weeks, whilst ignoring the impact of 
this proposal on fathers.  In addition, because there is no requirement for this period of 
maternity leave to be paid (the proposals contained a recommendation that there be full 
pay, but the requirement would only have been that maternity pay be at no less than the 
rate of sick pay), having an extended period of leave available only to the mother could 
result in the father needing to work additional hours during the maternity leave period 
in order to  make up for the drop in household income as a result of the decrease in the 
mother's wages.  As such, the proposals do not seem to help men to achieve a better 
reconciliation between work and private life, and in fact may result in a reduction in the 
amount of time that men are able to spend with their children.  This is the wrong 
approach; we should be enabling both parents, rather than simply mothers, to actively 
participate in the care of their children. 
2.4.5 Whilst I accept that in relation to pregnancy, women do have a unique ability, 
there is no reason for the language of “special relationship” to be used in this context.  In 
this regard, I agree with McGlynn that “…pregnancy-related rights should not be justified 
by reference to ideologies about motherhood"198. The purpose of protecting pregnant 
workers (both in relation to health and safety considerations and to allow them time off 
to recover from birth) should be by reference to their biological uniqueness.   
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2.5 What should the theoretical framework be? 
2.5.1 Neither the equal treatment nor the different treatment approach seem to fully 
resolve the issues faced by pregnant women in dealing with issues relating to pregnancy; 
is there an alternative approach?  Scott has suggested that “[w]hat is required…is a new 
way of thinking about difference, and this involves rejecting the idea that equality-versus-
difference constitutes an opposition.”199  She argues that by dividing matters down gender 
lines, we obstruct differences within these groups and that we should think about people 
as individuals with individual characteristics.  Rosenblum has made similar arguments, 
noting that “[a] clear divide between “men” and “women” does not exist.  Although most 
people accept that there are two sexes “male” and “female”, these categories actually 
contain a myriad of genders, formed genetically, biologically and culturally.”200  As with 
the arguments of Scott, the idea is that each individual may have “male” and “female” 
attributes and therefore defining people down lines of sex does not take account of their 
full range of needs.  Gender has been constructed in a binary fashion, when it is more akin 
to a continuum.  In respect of pregnancy, the issue is about securing rights for pregnant 
women, who are a subset of “women”; not all women want to be, or will become, 
pregnant.  However, these arguments do not seem to be able to address the reason that 
pregnant women or those who wish to actively participate in child-rearing are 
disadvantaged in the first place.    This seems to be caused primarily by having men as 
the reference point for the treatment of women in the workplace and, specifically, the 
norm used, which is essentially an unencumbered (male) worker with someone (female) 
at home in the private sphere, who takes care of all the domestic tasks, including care of 
any dependants.  We need then, to change the norm and to deconstruct the divisions 
between the public and private spheres.  
Changing the Norm 
 
2.5.2 There are two particular difficulties with the norm: (i) it is a non-pregnant worker 
and (ii) it is an unencumbered worker.  
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Pregnant workers 
2.5.3 Equality means treating men and women the same, however, as Joan Williams 
has noted this can only take place after we have deconstructed “…the existing norms 
defined by and around men and masculinity, and reconstruct[ed] existing institutions in 
ways that include the bodies and traditional life patterns of women”201.  This is what I am 
attempting to do by changing the norm to incorporate the experiences and needs of 
pregnant workers in the workplace.  Incorporating pregnancy into the worker norm 
might arguably be more easily achievable if, rather than having a long leave of absence 
(as is the current model under GB law), time off by way of maternity leave was for the 
short period of time that is necessary solely to allow a mother to recover from childbirth.  
As I argue below, there could then be a longer period of leave to allow both parents to 
spend time with their new child.    This model would require a separation between 
pregnancy and childcare.  Given this is a departure from the current model where women 
have a period of maternity leave that allows them both to recover from childbirth and to 
care for their child, it seems pertinent to deal with the issue of separating these two things 
here.   
Separation of Pregnancy and Childcare 
2.5.4 As is described more fully in Chapter 3, under the current regime in GB, mothers 
are automatically entitled to maternity leave of up to a year following the birth of a child. 
Fathers, on the other hand, are usually (subject to meeting certain qualifying 
requirements) entitled to a maximum period of six weeks leave (being a maximum of two 
weeks’ paternity leave, and four weeks’ parental leave202).  Only if the mother surrenders 
some of her leave are fathers entitled to any leave over and above this amount (six months 
in the form of Additional Parental Leave (“APL”) where the expected week of childbirth 
for the relevant child started before 5 April 2015 or 50 weeks of Shared Parental Leave 
(“SPL”) where the expected week of childbirth for the relevant child started on or after 5 
April 2015).  As discussed earlier, this is due to the privileging of the mother-child 
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relationship, rather than valuing of the social function of parents.  The current approach 
reflects stereotypes about the roles of women and men under which women’s role is to 
care.  This view “...holds the mother inevitably responsible, and the father exempt from 
responsibility, for the nurturing of young children”203.  As maternity leave is for a period 
of up to a year, it clearly is not in place just to allow women to recover physically from 
the birth of a child.  The rationale for having an extended period of leave is to allow a 
mother the opportunity to care for, and bond with, her new child.  There is no reason that 
a mother should be given the opportunity to bond with her new child, but the father 
should not.  Not only does this approach perpetuate these cultural stereotypes, but it also 
means that women are seen as more costly to employ because they entitled to take such 
long periods of leave204.  If both parents were able to take this period of leave (by which I 
mean that both have the right to the leave and that there are no significant financial or 
other barriers to taking this), and if they did so in practice, then it might make women 
more employable as employers could expect that both male and female employees might 
take leave to care for a new child.  Although in theory both male and female employees 
can take up to 6 months’ leave, as a result of the low uptake of APL (the reasons for which 
are examined in Chapter 3) and the low anticipated uptake of SPL by fathers (examined 
in Chapter 4), employers are currently likely to expect that only women will take long 
periods of leave to care for a child.   
2.5.5 Pregnancy is a condition which is unique to women.  There is, therefore “a need 
to be sex specific when considering pregnancy..."205.  However, as many have advocated, 
there should be a “a bright line between pregnancy and child care that requires the 
provision of any available childrearing leave to both parents."206  When pregnancy and 
child-rearing are conflated, the result seems to be that responsibility for both falls to 
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women because only women have the capacity to bear children.  Therefore, separating 
the two seems to have some advantages. 
2.5.6 Before moving on though, we need to consider one other thing: breastfeeding.  
This is the only fundamental difference between the ability of a man and a woman to care 
for a new child.  It could, therefore, be used to construct an argument that women should 
be given longer leave than men since only they can breastfeed their child. I would argue 
that it is not necessary to have an extended period of maternity leave that can only be 
used by the mother to allow her to breastfeed.  Breastfeeding is a matter of choice207 and 
not all women will be able or will choose to breastfeed their child.  Currently whilst 78% 
of mothers breastfeed to begin with, by six weeks this number has fallen to 22%, by four 
months it has fallen to 8% and by six months it is negligible208. 
2.5.7   Parents who choose not to breastfeed for extended periods of time are in the 
majority.  They should not be disadvantaged by leave which is reserved exclusively for 
the mother for no other reason than to allow her to breastfeed.  It should be a matter of 
personal choice for the parents over who cares for a baby; this should not be dictated by 
allowing only one parent a period of leave.  Also it is important to note that it is possible 
to work and breastfeed, subject to appropriate adjustments being made to the workplace 
to facilitate this.  A short period of maternity leave would not adversely affect those that 
wish to breastfeed their children so long as this was accompanied by a longer period of 
leave that can be used by either parent.   
2.5.8 Having justified my approach to separating pregnancy from childcare, I now 
wish to turn back to the question of how we incorporate the experience of pregnancy into 
the norm. One commentator, Abrams,209 has suggested that we should seek to incorporate 
female experience and specifically pregnancy/maternity into the male norm.  She 
suggests that employers could implement a mandatory leave policy, whereby all 
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employees are required to take a period of leave for a year in any seven year period.  With 
a shorter period of leave reserved exclusively for mothers, such a drastic measure would 
seem unnecessary.  I also question whether it is practicable or would have the desired 
effect. whilst men would only be required to take leave once in every seven years’, women 
having children might take maternity leave more frequently than this.  It would also have 
the difficulty of either the employer needing to pay the employee for a year when s/he 
was not working or the employee being forced to take an unpaid absence for a year; 
neither seem to be particularly attractive. This approach is also unlikely to address the 
issue of society’s failure to value pregnancy and parenting.  In fact, it could undermine 
this, since arguably taking leave due to the birth of a child could be seen as equivalent to 
another employee taking a year’s leave for no particular reason.  Pregnancy and parenting 
may enable parents to develop skills that are useful in the workplace, including, but not 
limited to change management, multi-tasking, prioritising, etc, but because of the separate 
spheres, it is possible for such skills to be disregarded.  If maternity leave were for a short 
period of time of, for instance, eightweeks (I justify this length of leave at 2.5.20) then it 
might be viewed as being no less inconvenient to employers than the annual leave 
entitlement that all workers have.   
Unencumbered worker 
2.5.9 One of the problems for parents with the current norm, discussed above at 2.2.19, 
is the assumption that an employee will work the employer’s normal working hours at 
such times that the employer has determined (and these have been determined to suit the 
needs of a worker who does not have caring responsibilities).  One way to address this 
issue would be to change current working patterns.  In some roles the working hours that 
are the employer’s standard may never have been given any real consideration – for 
example, many employer’s standard days will be 9am to 5pm simply because that is the 
accepted norm, rather than for any other reason.  These standard hours may not actually 
benefit the employer – workers may be required outside these hours or there may be no 
reason why the work has to be done between these hours.  Allowing a worker flexibility 
over when they actually do the work for their employer may assist in combining work 
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and childcare/parenting.  For example, a worker may start work early in the morning, 
before their children are awake (at home), then take a break for a couple of hours whilst 
they get the children ready for school/nursery/other childcare and then continue 
working until they collect the children from their childcare, but still do a “full” working 
day.  If enough people were to work flexibly, then the potential of flexible working is that 
it could change the norm.  Whilst in GB there is currently a right to request flexible 
working, for reasons set out in Chapter 4, currently that right is not sufficient to achieve 
this change, in part because the right is relatively weak, being only a right to ask for 
flexible working.   
Results only work environment 
2.5.10 An alternative approach to the problems faced by parents is for working patterns 
to be changed entirely (rather than just for those individuals who request flexibility).  One 
way in which this could, theoretically, be achieved is through the use of a results-only 
work environment (“ROWE”), which was co-created by Thompson and Ressler in 2003.  
Essentially the idea behind ROWE is that employees should be free to determine how they 
work (both when and where) so long as they are achieving results.  One study from the 
retailer GAP showed that a pilot of ROWE in part of the head office function increased 
employee engagement scores by 13% (GAP routinely surveyed staff prior to the 
introduction of ROWE to determine employee engagement) and reduced employee 
turnover by 50%, which in turn resulted in significant savings in recruitment costs210.  As 
Moen et al have noted “ROWE differs from more common forms of flexible working in 
that flexibility becomes the standard way of working, not an exception granted by a 
supervisor” 211.  If everybody is working flexibly, then the disadvantages associated with 
it, for example, lower chances of promotion due to failing to comply with the norm, would 
be negated.  It would, therefore, result in a significant shift in the ideal worker norm; no 
longer would it matter where an employee worked or the hours that they worked, so long 
                                                          
210210 GAP Inc. Case Study: Quality and Productivity Through Trust, gorowe.com 
(http://info.gorowe.com/Portals/170696/results_only_work_environment_gap_case_study.pdf) 
211 Phyllis Moen, Erin L Kelly, Eric Tranby, Qinlei Huang “Changing Work, Changing Health: Can Real Work-
Time Flexibility Promote Health Behaviors and Well Being?” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Vol. 52, No. 4 
(December 2011), pp 404-429, at 423 
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as they achieve results.  However, the problem with the literature on ROWE is that it fails 
to explain how “results” can be measured and thus how success by an employee is 
defined.   In many roles without reference to hours worked it may not be clear what 
“result” is expected on a daily, weekly or even monthly basis. 
2.5.11 Grabe has highlighted one significant drawback with ROWE:, “[m]any 
corporations simply do not have the technological means or the nature of the business 
requires personal relations”212.  Finally, in terms of mandating change in the workplace, 
it would seem difficult to legislation to mandate that all employers adopt ROWE, not least 
because, as identified above, not all workplaces will be capable of doing so. 
2.5.12 ROWE, therefore, does not seem to be an option that could be mandated for all 
employers.  The idea does raise an interesting question though: should rights, such as 
flexible working, be available to all workers, or just those with care responsibilities?  The 
advantage of providing universal benefits is that, in theory, the stigma attached to the use 
of a benefit (for example, the loss of face time in the case of working from home) should 
be negated as everyone uses the benefit.  The difficulty, though, is that extending the 
rights to everyone will not result in everyone using them: only those who need to exercise 
the particular right will.  In the case of rights such as flexible working, this is most likely 
to be those with caring responsibilities.  This means that, in practice, there is unlikely to 
be a significant change in who exercises the right in question and therefore little change 
in the negative connotations associated with the particular right.  It is for this reason that 
Clarke has noted that “[u]niversal workplace accommodations may be just as likely as 
care taking accommodations to shift costs onto disadvantaged groups”213.  If employers 
do not employ those with young children because they are concerned that they may wish 
to work part-time or may take time off to care for their child, extending the rights to 
flexible working or to leave, is unlikely to result in any change in this (which is a ‘cost’, 
albeit an indirect one) for parents unless in practice others were also to use these rights.   
                                                          
212 Erin Grabe “Gradual Return to Work: Maximising Benefits to Corporations and their Caregiving 
Employees”, 37 Iowa J Corp L 699 
213 Jessica Clarke, “Beyond Equality?  Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protection”, 86 Ind LJ (2011) 
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2.5.13 There is also the difficulty of dilution; if everyone can use a particular right, the 
reason that parents need the right can be overlooked.  This can be seen in relation to the 
extended right to request flexible working where there is no provision in the legislation 
requiring an employee to explain the reason for the request.  This means, in theory, that 
if two competing requests (i.e. a situation where an employer can only grant one request 
and has two), the employer does not need to determine the requests on the basis of which 
worker has the greater need.  By way of example, it is possible to have one employee 
requesting to work from home one day per week to be able to collect a child from childcare 
arrangements (with the consequence that if she cannot, she cannot continue in her role) 
with another employee’s competing request being because s/he wants to be able to play 
golf.  Employers are likely to be reluctant to be seen to be making value judgements about 
the value of parenting or caring as compared to other activities, such as, for example, an 
employee choosing to stand for political office.   This means that the value of these rights 
to parents can be lost.  Another difficulty is that universal protections ignore the reason 
why protection is needed in the first place; in the context of parental rights in the 
workplace, this is because of the gendered nature of family responsibilities and the fact 
that parents who care are disadvantaged by the workplace.  It is for this reason that in 
Chapter 7, I argue that there should be a duty to accommodate care responsibilities, rather 
than a duty for all employers to restructure the workplace to suit the general needs/wants 
of their workers.     
2.5.14 The idea of a worker being unencumbered is unlikely to be resolved solely by 
changing working hours or the location where work takes place.  The other issue that 
faces those with childcare responsibilities is an occasional need for time off.  Parents may 
need time off to deal with emergencies relating to a child’s care (for example, if a child is 
sick or if a school is closed).  Equally, they may also need time off for more routine 
childcare needs – such as care during the school holidays.  Rather than having a set 
amount of leave that can be taken by each parent, it would be preferable for employers to 
have to make reasonable accommodation of this type of need.  Just as with working 
patterns, this would assist with dispelling the idea that the home and work spheres are 
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separate.  Further, employers need to appreciate that, as set out in Chapter 1, there is an 
increasing number of workers who need to combine both work and family 
responsibilities.  The norm, therefore, needs to change to recognise this. As Herring has 
recognised, “[i]f we started with the norm of the family-committed worker, there would 
be no special treatment on offer”214. This would significantly help with the way that family 
responsibilities are perceived by those workers who either have none, or who have 
someone else who deals with these (and who can often resent the “special” treatment that 
is afforded to those with a need to reconcile work and family) and also would remove the 
disincentive from employers engaging those workers who have these needs.   
Deconstruction of separate spheres 
2.5.15 One of the difficulties with the current workplace is the fact that care 
responsibilities are seen as private and therefore do not need to be taken into 
consideration.  This needs to change.  Wynn has suggested that "[t]ackling equality issues 
in this wider context will help to redraw the boundaries between public and private 
spheres by creating a more supportive environment at work"215. Whilst I agree that it is 
necessary to tackle equality issues in the wider context of the norm, I am not convinced 
that there is a need to redraw the boundaries, so much as to abandon them altogether.  
The boundaries of the separate spheres are already being redrawn, but by work beginning 
to impinge on the domestic sphere through new technology.    One research study 
suggests that office workers spend an additional 1.2 hours per day sending emails or 
making work calls whilst not in working hours216 and there is increasing concern about 
workers becoming addicted to checking their hand held devices217.   This shows that the 
idea of the two spheres as separate is an illusion.  One way to begin to deconstruct the 
concept of the separate spheres would be for there to be a requirement for employers to 
consider what impact their practices will have on workers’ care responsibilities.  It is for 
                                                          
214 Herring (n54), p254  
215 Michael Wynn (1999) ‘Pregnancy Discrimination: Equality, Protection or Reconciliation?’, Modern Law 
Review, 62(3): 435-447, 447 
216 Reported in the Telegraph, 31 October 2012, “Smartphones and tablets add two hours to the working day” 
217 Mark Taylor, a consultant adult psychiatrist had developed a screening test for pathological addiction – 
“Are you addicted to your ‘crackberry’, BMJ, vol. 334, No. 7587, Feb 3, 2007 
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this reason that, in Chapter 7, I argue that there should be a duty to accommodate care 
responsibilities.     
Is an ethic of care necessary? 
2.5.16 Above I have argued that, in order to break down the barriers between the 
supposedly separate private and public spheres, there should be a duty to accommodate 
care responsibilities.  However, some, including Herring, have argued that there needs to 
be a more fundamental change to the way that we deal with issues relating to care.  The 
purpose of such a change would be to change the very way that we think about rights and 
responsibilities so that, rather than seeing rights as being attached to individuals, rights 
and responsibilities would be derived from relationships.  This would entail a recognition 
of the fact that “… we all have needs and that caring for others in meeting these needs is 
a universal experience”218. Under an ethic of care, there would be a right to care, as well 
as a right to be cared for.  This is somewhat wider than the scope of the accommodation 
that I am advocating.  Busby has noted that under such a model, “…because responsibility 
for the provision of such support rests with the wider society, it is logical to assume that 
all areas of law and policy that are in some way related to the social and economic life of 
an individual should be appropriated in order to give it expression"219. This would not, 
therefore, only affect employment law, but all areas of law.  Whilst it is certainly arguable 
that an ethic of care could improve the situation of those with caring responsibilities, it is 
not, I would argue, necessary to undertake such a radical overhaul of the legal system just 
to allow the reconciliation of family and work responsibilities.   
Commitment to the value of care of children 
2.5.17 As set out in Chapter 1, childcare is a vital social function and it is on this basis 
that we should value the time that parents spend with their children for the purposes of 
caring for them.  As Fredman has stated "[a]ny programme of reform must start with an 
acknowledgement of the pivotal role played by parenting in society.  The traditional 
relegation of parenting and child-care to the 'private' sphere has been a pretext for 
                                                          
218 Herring (n54), p49  
219 Busby (n51), p49  
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undervaluing and stigmatising what ought to be recognised as a key social function"220. 
The value of parenting (and not the privileging of the mother-child relationship) must 
underpin any rights for parents.  This means providing rights for parents, not basing 
fathers’ entitlements on the eligibility of mothers which, as set out in Chapter 3 in relation 
to APL and Chapter 4 in relation to SPL, is the position in relation to some of the current 
rights.  MacKinnon has said that “Feminism seeks to empower women on our own terms.  
To value what women have always done as well as to allow us to do everything else.  We 
seek not only to be valued as who we are, but to have access to the process of the definition 
of value itself”221. The care of children has historically been done by women; it still needs 
to continue to be done by someone.  As set out below, the answer to the difficulty faced 
by women in reconciling work and family is not to outsource childcare. 
2.5.18 Busby argues that fully outsourcing care, for example, by employing a nanny 
during the day and a night nanny so that it becomes fully commoditised is not possible 
due to the "...inalienability of certain aspects..." of the care relationship and the 
"...intrinsically intimate nature of the exchange that takes place between a carer and a 
recipient of care...[which] is crucial to the well-being of both parties"222. I agree; I would 
argue that there is value in the time that a parent, who cares for a child on an emotional 
level, undertaking some of the physical tasks of caring for that child and being able to 
develop their bond with that child.  To this end, it is important to value the time that 
parents spend with their children.  As Herring has advocated this means that “…, the 
responsibility and care for children need to be both valued and accommodated within the 
public as much as the public sphere”223. A duty for employers to accommodate parental 
responsibilities would demonstrate the State’s commitment to the value of caring, which 
could, as set out in Chapter 1, influence the views and behaviours of employers and 
society as a whole.   
  
                                                          
220 Fredman (n79), p206  
221 MacKinnon (n49), p22 
222 Busby (n51), p7 
223 Herring (n54), p37 
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Protection for pregnancy 
2.5.19 As well as valuing caring, we also need to value pregnancy and provide it with 
appropriate protection.  But what should the limits of that protection be?  Above, I have 
argued that pregnancy and childcare should be dealt with separately and there should be 
a short period of maternity leave, followed by a longer period of leave, available to either 
parent, for the purpose of caring for a new child.   
2.5.20 In terms of the length of period of time that should be reserved exclusively for the 
mother, there appears to be little published research regarding the period of time that it 
will take for a woman to recover from childbirth, and clearly the amount of time that is 
actually needed will depend on the individual woman’s circumstances.   There is some 
evidence to suggest that physical recovery from childbirth will, for most women, take no 
more than six weeks224 (including where the mother has had a caesarean section225).  Given 
the unpredictability of the date on which a baby will arrive (only 4% of babies are actually 
born on their due dates226), if a pregnant woman stops working on her due date, then 
there is a fair chance that her baby will not be born immediately.  NHS National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (“NICE”) guidelines227 suggest that pregnant women should be 
offered induction of labour between 41 and 42 weeks and that, if unsuccessful, a caesarean 
section should be offered.  As such, the majority228 of pregnant women in GB will have 
given birth within 2 weeks of their due dates.   
2.5.21 On this basis, I would argue that the appropriate period for maternity leave 
would be eight weeks (being the six weeks needed to recover and a further two weeks to 
take account of the unpredictability of the date of childbirth) or such longer period as a 
physician determines is required to enable the mother to physically recover from 
childbirth.   
                                                          
224 Dowd (n96), 703 suggests that for the vast majority of women, the amount of time that it will take to recover 
from childbirth will last for no more than six weeks.   This view is based on answers given by doctors, 
actuaries and insurers giving evidence during congressional hearings on the US Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act. 
225 http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Caesarean-section/Pages/Recovery.aspx  
226 Data from the Perinatal Institute, reported by the BBC (Keith Moore “How accurate are ‘due dates’?, 3 
February 2015 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31046144 
227 “Induction of labour (NICE clinical guideline 70)”, July 2008 
228 Whilst the NICE guidelines recommend that labour is induced by 42 weeks, they are clear that whether 
there is any medical intervention is a matter for the mother.  As such, there may be some women who elect, 
having been informed of the risks associated with pregnancies over 42 weeks (which include an increased 
chance of stillbirth) not to permit medical intervention. 
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2.5.22 The EHRC 2008 report titled “Working Better”229 recommends a change to the 
current maternity leave entitlement along the lines advocated above.  However, this 
report proposes a period of 6 months’ maternity leave with a further period of 12 months’ 
parental leave, 4 months of which are reserved exclusively for the mother and 4 months 
of which are reserved exclusively for the father.  This still results in mothers being entitled 
to more leave than fathers – whilst mothers would be entitled to a minimum of 10 months’ 
leave (6 months’ maternity and the 4 months’ of parental leave that are reserved 
exclusively for them), fathers would be entitled to a minimum of 4 months (the 4 months 
of parental leave reserved exclusively for them) and a maximum of 8 months (4 months 
of parental leave that is reserved exclusively for them and the 4 months that can be used 
by either parent). The report does not explain why mothers should be entitled to a greater 
period of leave, but instead states that the policy acknowledges the existing leave policy 
as the starting point for any change, which seems to be the reason for retaining maternity 
leave.  This would not assist with moving away from the privileging of the mother-child 
relationship to moving to a model where we value the contribution of both parents.  As 
such, it does not seem to be an appropriate model to adopt. 
2.5.23 Having dealt with time off for pregnancy above, below I deal with the issue  of 
reproductive hazards; in short, I argue that these should be considered as part of risk 
assessment and that they should be treated no differently to any other type of hazard to 
workers given that, despite suggestions to the contrary, they affect both male and female 
workers.    
Hazardous workplaces 
2.5.24 There are some workplaces where workers are exposed to biological, chemical 
and other hazards that could cause damage to a foetus.  Once a woman is aware that she 
is pregnant, steps can be taken to minimise her risks of exposure to such hazards.  Some 
would argue that the problem with this approach is that a woman is unlikely to know that 
she is pregnant immediately after conception.  As such, from the point of conception until 
the time that a woman does know that she is pregnant, she may already have been 
                                                          
229 EHRC (n181) 
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exposed to hazards that could harm the foetus.  However, this overlooks the fact that even 
prior to conception, a person may have been exposed to hazards that can  damage human 
germ cells (ie sperm or ova) resulting in damage to any  foetus that develops from those 
germ cells.  Below I argue that there is no need for a sex-specific approach to reproductive 
hazards as the issue of damage to germ cells affects both men and women.  I should note 
before proceeding that there is no evidence of reproductive hazards currently being an 
issue in GB, however, since it does affect the way that we should deal with pregnancy 
(and the period pre-pregnancy), it is appropriate to deal with the issue here. 
2.5.25 Lesley Wiseman has suggested that reproductive health protection policies of 
employers that apply only to women are used to keep women out of the workforce  230.  
The World Health Organisation (“WHO”) acknowledges this on its website, stating that 
“...where such legislation ignores potential reproductive hazards to male workers it is not 
only scientifically unsound but fails to protect men while depriving women of an 
income”231.  The latter is a very good point.  By focussing on female reproductive harm 
and excluding women from the workplace on this basis, employers deny women the 
ability to support themselves and their children financially.  What employers also fail to 
realise is that if they dismiss a pregnant worker, in order to ensure the wellbeing of her 
foetus, the dismissal may itself affect the wellbeing of foetus.  This is because, if the 
woman loses her job, this may impact on the economic situation of her family; if she is the 
only person working, then the family will have no income.  This could result in her not 
being able to afford the right kinds of food that are necessary during pregnancy, thereby 
harming the foetus’ development.  It could also mean that the child, once born, is brought 
up in poverty, which is likely to have an impact on the child’s health and wellbeing232, as 
well as having a cost for society in terms of money that the UK Government spends in 
trying to counter the effects of child poverty, and in the economic costs of children failing 
                                                          
230 Lesley Wiseman, “Place for Maternity in the Global Workplace: International Case Studies and 
Recommendations for International Labor Policy”, 28 Ohio N.U.L. Rev 195 (2001-2002), 225 
231 http://www.who.int/occupational_health/publications/womandoh/en/index.html 
232 See for example, the information on the effects of child poverty on the Campaign to end Child Poverty’s 
website (http://www.endchildpoverty.org.uk/why-end-child -poverty/the-effects). 
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to reach their potential233.  For this reason, the Marmot Review234 recommends that 
parents be provided with paid leave in the first year of life with a minimum income for 
healthy living.   It is also interesting to note that, in several cases, where a male 
reproductive hazard has been identified, rather than men being banned from that 
workplace, the hazardous substance was banned235.  
2.5.26 Research suggests that male reproductive damage may cause miscarriage, low 
birth weight, congenital abnormalities, cancer, neurological problems and other 
childhood health problems236.  The WHO paper “Women and Occupational Health” cites 
the example of high temperatures which can be hazardous to the male reproductive 
system (but which do not appear to have any impact on the female system).    However 
historically there had been little research into this.  It is only very recently that this has 
changed, and as Hoeskma notes is unsettling, “...particularly because even the few studies 
performed on both men and women prove that sometimes the risk to the reproductive 
system is greater for men than for women”237.  
2.5.27 The focus solely on female reproductive damage can be seen as yet another 
example of the privileging of the mother-child (or in this case, potential child) 
relationship.  Because motherhood is seen as a natural state for women (so long as it is 
outside the public sphere) anything that potentially might impact that natural state must 
be avoided.  Fatherhood is not seen in the same way; it is never assumed that all men will 
be (or want to be) fathers.  Further, their role in relation to children had, historically, been 
one of being an economic provider, thus anything that might detract from this function 
(for example, a father losing his job, and therefore ability to provide) must be avoided.     
2.5.28 In order to ensure a safe working environment for all employees, irrespective of 
sex, the employer should attempt to eradicate the hazard or limit exposure to a level 
where it cannot cause damage.  There may, however, be circumstances where it is not 
                                                          
233 See for example, Donald Hirsch, “Estimating the Costs of Child Poverty”, Joseph Rowntree Foundation , 23 
October 2008, which estimates the costs to be £25 billion per year. 
234 Marmot (n130)  
235 Elaine Draper (“Reproductive Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies after Johnson Controls”, 12 Stan L & 
Pol’y Rev. 117 (2001)) noted that DBCP, Kepone and other male reproductive hazards have been banned. 
236 Cynthia Daniels, “Between Fathers and Fetuses: The Social Construction of Male Reproduction and the 
Politics of Fetal Harm”, Signs, Vol.22, No.3 (Spring 1997) pp579-616 
237 Nicola Hoeskma “Regulating risk: reproductive toxins in the workplace in the post-Johnson Controls era”, 
14 S Cal Rev L & Women’s Stud, Spring 2005, 289 
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possible to eliminate a hazard which affects only one sex.  In these circumstances, which 
will be limited, it should be the employer’s responsibility to scientifically prove that the 
hazard affects only the one sex and that it is not practicable to eradicate the hazard.  Only 
then would it be appropriate for special measures to be taken against one sex and not the 
other.  The measures taken should be the same as those that would be taken for non-sex 
specific risks. 
2.5.29 Protection once Pregnant 
2.5.30 The majority of women will not require any special treatment in the workplace 
other than time off to give birth and recover, however, there will be some workplaces 
where there are potential hazards for a pregnant woman and her unborn child.  I consider 
here, from a theoretical perspective, how such issues are best addressed. Workers, 
whether pregnant or not, may face physical hazards in the workplace.  However, physical 
hazards can cause a risk not just for the pregnant worker but also her unborn child.  By 
way of example, a fall on stairs can cause placental abruption238, which is a potentially 
serious condition for both mother and unborn child.  Equally though, any worker, 
whether pregnant or not, could fall on stairs, hit his/her head and end up in a life-
threatening condition. It would be unrealistic to expect no employer to have a set of stairs 
in their premises.  It is impossible to eliminate every risk to every worker.  Nevertheless, 
risks need to be identified and assessed (in terms of frequency and severity of 
consequence), usually by way of a risk assessment.   
2.5.31 Whilst there are some risks which may affect pregnant women differently to 
others, for example stress or working excessive hours, this does not necessarily mean that 
the worker should have an additional risk assessment.  There is no reason that pregnancy-
related risks should not be taken account of during routine risk assessments, irrespective 
of whether, at the relevant time, they have an employee who is pregnant.  Workers do not 
have to inform their employers immediately on becoming pregnant so there is a 
significant risk that, even where an employer has not been informed of a worker being 
                                                          
238 This condition can result in the foetus being deprived of oxygen and nutrients and can be life-threatening 
for the mother (http://www.marchofdimes.com/pnhec/188_1135.asp) 
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pregnant, there will in fact be some pregnant workers within the employer’s organisation.  
Incorporating consideration of pregnant workers into routine risk assessments would also 
have the advantage of incorporating pregnancy within the routine thinking of employers, 
thereby eliminating the invisibility of pregnancy, whereby the norm is a non-pregnant 
individual. 
2.6 Are the current rights sufficient?   
2.6.1 As highlighted throughout this chapter, there are various problems in the 
theoretical ideals underlying the current  workplace parental rights.  I will demonstrate 
in Chapters 3 to 6 that the current rights designed to enable parents to combine work and 
family responsibilities are not fit for purpose and do not achieve this aim and that this is 
because of the ideals underlying these rights and the lack of a coherent approach to the 
difficulties of reconciling work and family responsibilities.  Having done so, in Chapter 7, 
I will argue that an alternative approach needs to be adopted to these issues, one which 
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CHAPTER 3 : GENDER SPECIFIC PARENTAL RIGHTS 
3.1  Introduction  
3.1.1 In this chapter and the two that follow, I will be considering the existing 
legislation which is supposed to enable parents to combine their work and family 
responsibilities, and what changes would be needed to these rights to make them more 
effective.  I will consider not only those rights that apply solely to parents, such as parental 
leave, but also rights which may facilitate work-life balance, such as those provided by 
the Working Time Regulations 1998.  As the legislation in this area is extensive, I have 
divided the various rights into two categories:   
3.1.1.1 Gender specific rights.  These are rights which enable one specified 
parent to combine work and family, for example, maternity leave;  
3.1.1.2 Non-gender specific rights.  These are rights which enable either or both 
parents to combine work and family, for example, parental leave.   
I consider separately in Chapter 6 the issue of how these rights are enforced (including 
the adequacy of any remedies that can be awarded). 
3.1.2 However, before embarking on the analysis of the various rights, it is first 
necessary to consider what we mean when we refer to “employees” and to “workers”.  
This is because some of the rights considered in this and the following chapter apply to 
employees, whereas others apply to workers.  I will also consider the rights in respect of 
unfair dismissal and detriment as these apply to many of the rights that I will be 
considering in this and the next chapter. 
Employment status 
3.1.3 In the workplace, an individual can be an employee, a worker or a self-employed 
contractor.  Some of the workplace parental rights, though, apply only to employees: 
maternity, paternity and parental leave, Emergency Dependant’s Leave (“EDL”) and the 
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right to request flexible working.  As such, many workers will be unprotected as regards 
those rights.     
3.1.4 As employers have begun to look at alternative structures for engaging 
individuals and there has been an increase in the number of self-employed workers in the 
UK, the need for rights which cover not only employees but also workers has become 
more important.  Employers may utilise self-employed workers/temps in an effort to 
avoid such individuals acquiring employment rights, such as unfair dismissal.  There are 
no publicly available statistics on how many individuals in the UK (or GB) are engaged 
as workers, rather than employees239 or how many of those have family responsibilities.  
As such, it is difficult to assess the impact that providing rights only to employees has on 
parents trying to combine work and family responsibilities.   However, it would seem 
likely that, if a right applies only to employees, there will be some parents who are 
workers and thus cannot utilise this right.   
Unfair dismissal and detriment protection 
3.1.5 If an employee is dismissed as a result of exercising one of the parental rights or 
attempting to do so, this will have a significant impact on the employee’s ability to work 
(and therefore to combine work and family responsibilities).   Protection against dismissal 
is therefore a key mechanism for ensuring that parents are able to combine their work and 
family responsibilities.   
3.1.6 Employees enjoy protection against being dismissed if the reason for the 
dismissal is that they have exercised or are seeking to exercise one of the parental rights 
(or have tried to enforce a right)240, if it is connected with pregnancy,241 or if they fail to 
                                                          
239There is data on the numbers of self-employed individuals, some of which will be workers and some will be 
contractors (for example, the Labour Force Survey)  This data shows an increased of 30.3% in the numbers of 
self-employed individuals and an increase of 21% in the numbers of temporary workers (excluding those on 
fixed term contracts) between 1997 and 2015.  Annex 6  sets out the underlying calculations. 
240 This is if the employee: (i) is taking or seeking to take parental leave or time off under section 57A of the 
ERA; (ii) she is taking or seeking to take OML or AML; (iii) is taking or seeking to take paternity leave; (iv) has 
made (or proposed to make) an application to request flexible working under section 80F of the ERA; (v) has 
exercised (or proposed to exercise) a right conferred on him/her under the right to request flexible working; 
(vi) has brought proceedings against the employer under section 80H of the ERA or has alleged the existence 
of any circumstance which would constitute a ground for bringing such proceedings 
241 This is if the employee is pregnant or has given birth to a child. 
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return from maternity leave in circumstances where they did not know that their 
maternity leave had ended242.  In these circumstances there is no qualifying period of 
employment (by contrast, where the employee is unfairly dismissed in other 
circumstances, there is a two year qualifying period).   
3.1.7 Protection against unfair dismissal applies only to employees and not to workers.  
However, workers enjoy equivalent protection because of the detriment provisions in the 
rights described above in 3.1.6.  These provide that it is unlawful to terminate a worker’s 
contract because of that worker has exercised or is seeking to exercise one of the parental 
rights (or have tried to enforce a right) or if the termination is connected with 
pregnancy243.     
CRITIQUE 
3.1.8 The unfair dismissal and detriment provisions are useful but they do not stop an 
employer from dismissing an employee or terminating a worker’s contract.  Instead they 
provide a remedy where this occurs.  The most significant problems with the unfair 
dismissal and detriment rights are the fact that in most cases the remedy awarded is 
financial compensation, which, as discussed in Chapter 6, does not necessarily assist a 
parent or pregnant worker in finding new employment.   
GENDER SPECIFIC RIGHTS 
3.2 Protection during pregnancy 
3.2.1 As discussed in Chapter 1, protection for pregnant workers is important to ensure 
that women are not effectively forced out of the workplace simply as a result of 
pregnancy.   An EOC report in 2005 found that 30,000 women per year were being forced 
out of their jobs as a result of becoming pregnant and that pregnancy discrimination was 
endemic in the workplace, with half of all pregnant workers facing some form of 
                                                          
242 Regulation 19 of the MPLR  
243 s47C ERA  
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disadvantage connected with their pregnancies244.  Whilst, as at 1 March 2015, there are 
no more recent figures on the extent of pregnancy discrimination, there is no reason to 
think that this situation has changed245. 
Outline of existing rights 
3.2.2 At a European level, protection during pregnancy is conferred on workers by the 
Pregnant Workers Directive (“PWD”). The PWD contains a range of measures relating to 
the health and safety not only of pregnant workers, but also of those workers who have 
recently given birth or who are breastfeeding.  In GB, the PWD has been implemented 
through various different pieces of legislation.  Those aspects relating to health and safety 
have been implemented by the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 
1999 (“MHSWR”).  As set out in Chapter 1, it is important that appropriate protection is 
given to pregnant workers given that pregnancy is a social good and that the absence of 
appropriate levels of protection can disadvantage women in the workplace, contributing 
to issues such as the gender pay gap.  Without effective protection, pregnant women and 
new mothers will be driven out of the workplace rendering rights enabling parents to 
combine work and family responsibilities of little practical use.   
Health and Safety 
3.2.3 Before embarking on this issue though, it is important to acknowledge that the 
majority of women will not require any special treatment in the workplace in respect of 
health and safety concerns.    However, there may be some pregnant workers who need 
additional protection because their roles entail certain tasks or working conditions that 
could jeopardise their pregnancies, for example, by disrupting placental attachment246.  I 
                                                          
244 EOC “Greater Expectations: Final Report – EOC’s investigation into pregnancy discrimination”, EOC, June 2005.  
It is notable that this is not a phenomenon that is restricted to the UK and that there is evidence that in other 
countries, employers take extreme measures to ensure that pregnant workers leave the workplace.  For 
example, in Mexico there is evidence of some employers forcing pregnant women to work with toxic 
chemicals or being transferred to jobs that are more strenuous in order to force them to resign.  (Wiseman 
(n230)) 
245 Since 1 March 2015, the EHRC has published its findings on the prevalence and nature of pregnancy 
discrimination and disadvantage in the workplace (Lorna Adams, Mark Winterbotham, Katie Oldfield, Jenny 
McLeish, Alice Large, Alasdair Stuart, Liz Murphy, Helen Rossiter, Sam Selner (IFF Research Limited), 
“Pregnancy and Maternity-Related Discrimination and Disadvantage: Summary of key findings”, HM Government, 
EHRC, 2016).  The findings of this investigation were that 11% of mothers reported that they felt forced to 
leave their jobs.  This was based on a sample of 3,254 mothers and, if scaled up to the general population, this 
would equate to 54,000 mothers each year being forced out of their jobs.   
246 The placenta is the connection between the mother and foetus which provides the foetus with oxygen and 
nutrients allowing it to grow; any disruption of these could have potentially catastrophic consequences. 
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do not propose here to examine these in detail, but rather to consider how they should be 
dealt with in general.   
3.2.4 Workers, whether pregnant or not, may face physical hazards in the workplace.  
However, physical hazards can cause a risk not just for the pregnant worker but also her 
unborn child.  By way of example, a fall on stairs can cause placental abruption247, which 
is a potentially serious condition for both mother and unborn child.  Equally though, any 
worker, whether pregnant or not, could fall on stairs, hit his/her head and end up in a 
life-threatening condition. It would be unrealistic to expect no employer to have a set of 
stairs in their premises.  It is impossible to eliminate every risk to every worker.  
Nevertheless, risks need to be identified and assessed (in terms of frequency and severity 
of consequence), usually by way of a risk assessment.   
3.2.5 The PWD requires that employers assess the nature, degree and duration of the 
exposure of any risks to the pregnant worker.  The UK legislation is worded differently 
to the PWD and provides that ”[w]here (a) the persons working in an undertaking include 
women of child-bearing age248; and (b) the work is of a kind which could involve risk, by 
reason of her condition, to the health and safety of a new or expectant mother, or to that 
of her baby, from any processes or working conditions, or physical, biological or chemical 
agents, …, the assessment required by regulation 3(1) [which is the general requirement 
to carry out a risk assessment for all workers] shall also include an assessment of such 
risk. ”  This seems to suggest that, rather than an employer considering whether there are 
any particular risks for a pregnant worker at the time she informs the employer of her 
pregnancy, the employer must consider this issue as part of its general risk assessment. 
3.2.6 In Madarassy v Nomura International plc249 it was held that an employer need only 
undertake a risk assessment at the time the worker’s pregnancy was announced where 
                                                          
247 This condition can result in the foetus being deprived of oxygen and nutrients and can be life-threatening 
for the mother (http://www.marchofdimes.com/pnhec/188_1135.asp) 
248 Child-bearing age is not a defined term and, given the fact that it is becoming possible for a woman to have 
a child in her sixties, now seems to cover any woman of working age 
249 [2007] EWCA Civ 33 
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the work is of a kind which could involve risk, by reason of the woman's condition, to the 
health and safety of a new or expectant mother, or to that of her baby. 
3.2.7 Madarassy was followed by an Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) decision in 
O’Neill v Buckinghamshire County Council250.  The Appellant in this case was a teacher who 
was seeking to argue that her job was stressful and once her employer was informed of 
her pregnancy, the stressful nature of her job therefore triggered the obligation to conduct 
a risk assessment.  However, the Appellant’s submissions on this point related only to the 
stressful nature of the job in general terms, and the tribunal found (and the EAT agreed) 
that there was insufficient evidence for it to conclude that the kind of work carried out by 
the Appellant involved a risk of harm or danger to her as a pregnant worker as defined 
by the PWD and the MHSWR.  As such, there was no obligation to carry out a risk 
assessment at the time of the pregnancy being announced.  In both Madarassy and O’Neill, 
there was no evidence that the employer had specifically considered pregnant workers 
when carrying out any general risk assessments.   
3.2.8 If an employer has conducted an appropriate risk assessment and a risk to the 
pregnant worker has been identified there is a requirement (under Regulation 16 of the 
MHSWR) the employer is required to make adjustments to the working conditions 
and/or working hours of the employee so as to avoid exposure to the identified risk251.  
Similar obligations exist in relation to agency workers252 but not to other workers.  
However, an employer (or a hirer in the case of an agency worker) is not obliged to take 
any steps to alter a pregnant woman’s role, to offer her alternative work or to suspend 
                                                          
250 [2010] I.R.L.R. 384 
251 HSE guidance on the risks or hazards that could be harmful to new and expectant mothers identifies, 
amongst other things, excessive hours, unusually stressful work, and travelling - 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/mothers/faqs.htm, and New and Expectant Mothers at Work - A guide for 
employers HSG122 ISBN 0 7176 2583 4 
252 Under the Agency Workers Regulations 2010, the hirer of an agency worker is obliged to conduct a risk 
assessment and to make adjustments to the workplace to remove the risks  Where this is not possible, the 
agency that supplied the worker will have to try to find the worker suitable alternative work with another 
hirer or the agency will be required to pay the agency worker at the same rate for the duration (or, where the 
duration is not certain, the likely duration) of the terminated assignment 
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her, until it receives, not only notification, but written notification from the employee that 
she is pregnant253. 
3.2.9 Whilst there are some risks which may affect pregnant women differently to 
others, for example stress or working excessive hours, this does not necessarily mean that 
the worker should have an additional risk assessment.  There is no reason that pregnancy-
related risks should not be taken account of during routine risk assessments, irrespective 
of whether, at the relevant time, they have an employee who is pregnant.  Workers do not 
have to inform their employers immediately on becoming pregnant so there is a 
significant risk that, even where an employer has not been informed of a worker being 
pregnant, there will in fact be some pregnant workers within the employer’s organisation.  
Incorporating consideration of pregnant workers into routine risk assessments would also 
have the advantage of incorporating pregnancy within the routine thinking of employers, 
thereby eliminating the invisibility of pregnancy, whereby the norm is a non-pregnant 
individual.   As argued in Chapter 2, changing the norm is essential to securing effective 
rights to enable parents to reconcile work and family responsibilities. 
3.2.10 The problem with the current legislation is not the theoretical approach but how 
it has been executed in practice.  In particular, where an employer is challenged about risk 
assessments there is little evidence that employers have to demonstrate that they have 
specifically considered pregnancy in the context of any risk assessments that they have 
conducted as shown by both Madarassy and O’Neill254. 
3.2.11 The problem with this approach is that it suggests that the effects of pregnancy 
are not considered as part of the routine risk assessment as, if they had been, there would 
be no need to reconsider simply because a worker announced that she was pregnant, 
thereby reinforcing the norm of the non-pregnant worker.  It is also of note that there was 
no evidence in the case to suggest that any general risk assessment that the employer had 
                                                          
253 Regulation 18 
254 [2010] I.R.L.R. 384 
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conducted of the health and safety risks to all staff had considered whether pregnant 
women would be affected differently to others.   
3.2.12 One particular issue that seems to have been ignored in both the Madarassy and 
O’Neill cases is the effect of long working hours and stress on pregnant workers.  The 
number of hours that a pregnant worker works is, according to a study conducted by the 
Amsterdam Born Children and their Development research group255, likely to affect the 
health of the worker’s unborn child.  This study suggests that working in stressful jobs in 
excess of 32 hours a week can affect the health of a woman's unborn child.  “Normal” full 
time working hours in GB tend to be at least 35 hours per week, which suggests that 
employers are required by the PWD (which provides that employers must assess any risks 
to the safety or health or the worker and any possible effect on her pregnancy) to conduct 
a risk assessment for any woman in a job which where “normal” full time hours are 
worked (as opposed to simply where there is a contractual requirement to work 32 hours 
or more per week256).   This is not a point which appears to have been argued in Madarassy 
or O’Neill; it may be that if this research is presented in future cases, the outcome will be 
quite different.  However, research may not always be widely publicised outside 
academic circles and so those bringing this type of case may not be aware of it.  Where a 
claimant is (and, as discussed in Chapter 6, the majority of claimants will be) 
unrepresented, there is a greater chance that the claimant may not be aware, and so may 
not present to the tribunal/court, the relevant evidence.  Arguably this type of problem 
arises because these rights are enforced for the benefit of individuals, rather than society 
as a whole; this issue is discussed further in Chapter 6 and because, as argued in Chapter 
1, the value to society of someone having a child is not properly recognised.  The failure 
to consider the effect of working hours may also be as a result of the way in which the 
norm is constructed, as discussed in Chapter 2.  Society views full-time work as the norm; 
                                                          
255 Tanja Vrikotte, Manon van Eijsden, Marcel van der Wal, Gouke Bonsel “First trimester working conditions 
and birth weight: a prospective cohort study”, AmJ Public Health 2009:;99;1409-16 
256 The reason for this distinction is that many employees may have contracts which provide for a particular 
number of hours, but the employee may in practice work in excess of their contractual hours (e.g. through 
paid or unpaid overtime).   
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as such we do not question why someone is required to work 35 hours per week or 
whether there are any negative effects of this.     
3.2.13   Effectively employers can disregard the impact of the private sphere, the 
employee’s pregnancy, on the work sphere until the employee complies with the 
requirement for written notification.  This is only possible because of the concept of the 
separate spheres, as critiqued in Chapter 2.   
3.2.14 As noted above, the obligation to find alternative work only applies to employees, 
but an employer must conduct a risk assessment for all workers.  As such, an employer 
could be aware of a risk to a pregnant worker and have no obligation under the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) to find alternative work because she is not an 
employee.  Without an obligation to find alternative work, there is a real danger that 
employers will terminate the contract of the worker; in these circumstances the worker 
would not have a claim under the ERA or MHSWR,although she might have a sex 
discrimination claim, considered in Chapter 5).  This illustrates one of the significant 
problems with the current legislation: the piecemeal approach.  The sheer volume of 
different pieces of legislation makes it difficult for both employers and workers to 
understand their rights and obligations.  One might imagine that if you wanted to check, 
as an employer, what your obligations were in relation to a pregnant worker’s health and 
safety, you could simply go to the relevant health and safety legislation, which does not 
prevent the termination of a worker’s contract in circumstances where it is unsafe to 
continue to engage her in that role, however, doing so could result in the termination 
amounting to unlawful discrimination.   
3.2.15 By limiting GB legislation to employees, one could argue that the UK Government 
has not properly implemented the EU legislation, which applies to workers, thereby 
leaving it open to challenge. The fact that an individual is a worker, rather than an 
employee, should not affect their ability to continue to work in the lead-up to the birth of 
their child; this is a clear failing in the legislation.   
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3.2.16 In the instances where moving the employee is not possible (which are likely to 
be infrequent), the employee is to be granted leave.  Under the ERA257 an employee who 
is suspended from work for this reason is entitled to be paid during her period of 
suspension.  This is one area where GB legislation seems to be more generous than the 
rights under the PWD.   
3.2.17 Under the ERA, for alternative work to be considered to be suitable, the terms 
and conditions on which the role is offered must not be “substantially less favourable” 
and the work must be of a kind which is suitable and appropriate for the employee to do 
in the circumstances.  In British Airways Ltd v Moore258 the EAT ruled that the fact that the 
remuneration for a role offered to a pregnant employee did not include an allowance of 
around £5,500 which the pregnant employee had previously received, meant that the 
terms and conditions on which the alternative role was offered were substantially less 
favourable (and therefore was not a suitable alternative).    
3.2.18 In two CJEU cases considering the payments given whilst an employee was 
suspended because of pregnancy, Gassmayr v Bundesminister fur Wissenschaft und 
Forschung259 and Parviainen v Finnair Oy260, the CJEU held that allowance payments were 
not required to be made.  This was on the basis that the allowances in question were to 
compensate employees for disadvantageous aspects of their jobs which, as a result of 
suspension on maternity grounds, a pregnant worker would not be disadvantaged by.   
Time off 
3.2.19 As well as time off to have the baby, which is discussed below at 3.3, a pregnant 
worker may need time off in order to attend appointments relating to her pregnancy, for 
example, ante-natal appointments.  Currently, as set out below, whilst pregnant workers 
have the right to time off for all those appointments, the father of the unborn child does 
not.     
  
                                                          
257 Section 68 ERA  
258 [2000] IRLR 296 
259 Case C194/08 
260 Case C471/08 
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Rights of fathers 
3.2.20 With effect from 1 October 2014 fathers are able to take time off to attend a limited 
number of what the Government terms "significant" antenatal appointments.  The 
Government estimates that for a first pregnancy the mother will, in a routine pregnancy, 
need to attend 12 ante-natal appointments (10 routine appointments and two scans), 
however, fathers will only be entitled to attend two of these.   
3.2.21 Both parents have an interest in the outcome of these appointments as one of the 
purposes of them is to monitor the health and development of the foetus.  However, there 
is one fundamental difference between the mother and father261: the mother has to attend 
the appointments in order for the foetus to be monitored, whereas the father does not.  
This does not mean that the father’s attendance is not important; there is evidence262 that 
a father's attendance at ante-natal appointments helps early bonding and increases his 
commitment to the pregnancy.  There is also likely to be minimal inconvenience to the 
employer as non-routine ante-natal appointments are likely to be relatively short and 
infrequent.     At any non-routine appointments, there is likely to be additional 
information shared with the parents about the development/health of the foetus.  Both 
parents have an equal interest in such information and, as such, both should be entitled 
to receive this directly from the relevant medical professionals.  This is another example 
of the privileging of the mother-child relationship described in Chapter 2.  Fathers have 
the same interest in the foetus’ development as mothers; if we are to expect fathers to 
participate equally in respect of rearing a child, their equal involvement needs to start in 
utero.   
3.2.22 Where routine ante-natal appointments are concerned, the argument as to 
whether fathers should be entitled to attend is more finely balanced.  There seems to be 
less need for fathers to attend a routine appointment where no significant medical 
information about the foetus is provided.  There is clearly a difference here between the 
                                                          
261 It should be noted that not all parent sets will be female–male, but to ensure that the arguments below are 
as straightforward as possible to comprehend I refer to father, meaning either the father or the mother’s 
partner 
262 Elaine Draper, ‘It was a real good show’: the ultrasound scan, fathers and the power of visual knowledge, 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 24(6) pp. 771–795 (2002).and Jacinta Bronte-Tinkew et al, “Resident fathers’ 
pregnancy intentions, prenatal behaviours and links to involvement with infants”, Journal of Marriage and 
Family, 69(4) pp. 977–990 (2007). 
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father and the pregnant women: the pregnant woman has to attend the appointment as 
she is carrying the foetus.  The father’s attendance is not necessary in the same way.   
Given the need to balance the interests of workers and employers (as well as those who 
workers who do not have children), I would argue that fathers should be entitled only to 
time off for all non-routine appointments. 
 
3.3 MATERNITY LEAVE 
Outline of existing rights 
3.3.1 The current rights afforded to women on maternity leave are summarised below: 
3.3.1.1 All female employees are entitled to a total of 52 weeks’ leave: 26 weeks 
ordinary maternity leave (“OML”), and 26 weeks additional maternity 
leave (“AML”)).   
3.3.1.2 There is a compulsory maternity leave (“CML”) period of two weeks 
from the day on which an employee gives birth. During this period an 
employee is not permitted, and an employer is not allowed to permit the 
employee, to work263.     
3.3.1.3  Women on maternity leave are entitled to benefit from the same terms 
and conditions of employment that they would have enjoyed had they 
not been absent on maternity leave, except for those which relate to 
remuneration264.   
3.3.1.4 Women are entitled, if they meet certain conditions265, to statutory 
maternity pay (“SMP”) for 39 weeks of their maternity leave, subject to 
                                                          
263 This is four weeks where the employee works in a factory (section 205 Public Health Act 1936).   
264 This is the position following the amendments to the SDA by the Sex Discrimination (Amendment  of 
Legislation) Regulations 2008.  These amendments were required after the case of Equal Opportunities 
Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] 2 CMLR 49  in which the High Court ruled that in 
essence the distinctions made between OML and AML (in short, whilst it would have constituted sex 
discrimination to deprive a woman of any term and condition of employment whilst she was on OML, during 
AML depriving a woman of only certain specified non-pay benefits of her terms and conditions would 
constitute sex discrimination –u ie an employer could deprive the woman of some other term and this would 
not be unlawful discrimination) incompatible with the SDA and therefore unlawful.  
265 The relevant conditions are set out in section 164 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. 
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meeting the conditions.  For the first six weeks the SMP is paid at a rate 
of 90% of a woman’s weekly wage and for the remaining 33 weeks, it then 
falls to £138.18 per week. 
3.3.1.5 During the maternity leave period, the woman can carry out up to 10 
days’ work in the form of Keeping in Touch (“KIT” days).  An employer 
is only obliged to pay these at the usual SMP rate. 
3.3.1.6 If a woman returns to work at the end of the period of OML she is entitled 
to return to the same job on the same terms and conditions (or terms and 
conditions no less favourable than those to which she was entitled prior 
to her maternity leave)266.   
3.3.1.7 If a woman returns to work having taken any AML, she is entitled to 
return to the job in which she was employed before her absence unless it 
is not reasonably practicable for her employer to let her do so; in which 
case she is entitled to return to another job which is suitable and 
appropriate for her in the circumstances.     
3.3.1.8 An employee is protected against being dismissed because of her 
pregnancy or because of taking maternity leave. 
CRITIQUE 
3.3.2 Before embarking on a critique of the current maternity provisions, it is important 
to flag here that there is a fundamental issue that needs to be considered when evaluating 
the maternity leave provisions, which is whether maternity leave as a concept (i.e. the idea 
of providing leave only to the mother) is one that is helpful to enabling parents to combine 
their work and family responsibilities.  This issue is highlighted at various points during 
the critique below of the effectiveness of the current maternity leave provisions (i.e. 
                                                          
266 Regulation 18 MPLR  
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whether these enable women to take 12 months’ leave) with the more substantive 
consideration of it being addressed at 3.3.11.   
CML 
3.3.3 CML effectively forces an employer to ensure that a woman takes at least two 
weeks’ maternity leave.  This approach is potentially a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand it is helpful as it prevents women from feeling unable to take a period of leave (for 
example, some women may fear that, despite the legal position permitting them to take 
leave and the employer having an obligation to allow them to return to the same role, if 
they are out of the workplace for any period of time, they will be seen as lacking 
commitment to their role or even that they will be replaced). On the other hand, in no 
other circumstances are criminal sanctions threatened in the event that an employer 
allows an employee to work; thus if a woman genuinely wishes to work (rather than 
feeling forced to do so), she is unable to do so.   
3.3.4 Given that the male norm is an employee who works continuously and deviations 
from this are often seen as demonstrating a lack of commitment to an employee’s role, 
properly facilitating an absence from the workplace to allow recovery from childbirth 
seems to be an important and desirable aim.  Because of the criminal sanctions associated 
with CML, a woman who does not attend work (and who does not respond to 
emails/calls) can be seen as simply complying with the rules around CML, rather than 
making a choice not to be involved in work responsibilities.  The potential downside of 
the CML provisions are outweighed by the benefits whilst the period of CML remains 
short.  However, any increase in this period would be potentially damaging as it would 
reinforce the idea that primary responsibility for a child should rest with the mother.  
Whilst the period remains short (ie two weeks), it seems clear that the rationale for the 
provision is to allow a woman to recover from childbirth, rather than necessarily simply 
to allow her to care for her child.   
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Low level of SMP 
3.3.5 Women are not entitled to full pay during any period of maternity leave, even the 
two weeks’ of CML during which the woman is prohibited from working.   
3.3.6 The rate at which SMP is paid for the majority of the maternity leave period is 
relatively low.  For 33 weeks of the leave267, the rate is £138.18 per week268.  Providing 
women with such a low level of pay for the majority of their maternity leave “fails to 
provide a real choice for many women who do not have another source of income … to 
support them during the period of unpaid leave”269.   This is exacerbated by the fact that 
the first year of a child’s life can be extremely costly for a parent.  Research conducted for 
LV estimates the cost in 2015 to be £11,224270.  So, at a time when a family’s expenditure 
may increase significantly, if the woman opts to take maternity leave the family’s income 
may drop significantly.  Research conducted when the whole period of AML was unpaid 
showed that many women had to return to work after their period of OML due to 
economic reasons, rather than taking the additional period of leave to which they were 
entitled271.  This demonstrates the fact that whether leave is paid or unpaid has a real 
impact on the length of time that women take off as maternity leave.   
3.3.7 Providing twelve months’ maternity leave where most of the leave is paid at low 
levels does not allow women to take time away from the workplace to be with their new 
child.  Instead it provides lip-service to the value of mothering and parenting.  As 
Fredman has noted “[t]he central manifestation of the low priority given to maternity and 
parenthood within the market order is the low level of statutory maternity pay”272.  Only 
those with sufficient wealth will be able to afford to take leave paid at these levels as 
demonstrated by the fact that, according to research, just 13% of women on maternity 
leave take their full entitlement to leave (52 weeks).  This figure falls to just 5% amongst 
                                                          
267 For the first 6 weeks the rate is calculated by reference to the employee’s normal earnings and is 90% of this. 
268 This is the rate that applies from 6 April 2014 to 4 April 2015.  From 5 April 2015, the rate is £139.58 
269 DTI Work and Families – Choice and Flexibility: a consultation document (February 2005), p16 
270 “Cost of a Child: From cradle to college, 2015 report”, LV, January 2015 
(http://lv.com/lifeassets/assets/documents/coac-report-final.pdf) 
271 Maria Hudson, Stephen Lissenburgh and Melahat Sahin-Dikmen ‘Maternity and Parental Rights in Britain 
2002: Survey of Parents’, PSI, 2004 
272 Fredman (n79), p199  
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very low earners and is highest (27%) amongst those whose partners have gross weekly 
earnings of £770 or more273, presumably because these households are more able, from an 
economic perspective, to survive on a single wage.  The right to maternity leave, therefore, 
is a right which would only be effective if employees were sufficiently compensated to be 
able to afford to utilise the leave – only 45% of those who are eligible for maternity leave 
took 40 weeks or more (which is the period that is unpaid), with this falling to 36% of 
those who have the lowest earnings (less than £5 per hour).  The failure to provide a higher 
level of maternity pay means that the right to maternity leave is not as effective as it could 
be.  As discussed in Chapter 1, providing appropriate rights to enable women to have 
children, whilst also retaining their job, is crucial to equality and social justice.  If 
maternity leave is not paid at an appropriate level, then although women may have the 
right to take time off, many will not be able to afford to do so.   It also reaffirms pregnancy 
and the care of a child as an issue for the individual, rather than something of concern for 
all of society. 
3.3.8 James has made some interesting observations in relation to the KIT day 
provisions.  As set out above, the employer is only required to pay for these at the usual 
SMP rate, although the employer can agree to pay the employee’s normal contractual rate 
if it so chooses.  This means that “..a woman is financially penalised for work she 
undertakes for her employer during her leave period and law legitimises this devaluation 
of her performance…”274.  This demonstrates the way in which a worker’s value can 
change once she no longer conforms to the unencumbered worker norm, discussed in 
Chapter 2; her labour is suddenly less valuable simply by having a care responsibility.   
Right to return – unfair distinction between OML and AML 
3.3.9 The difference in treatment in relation to a woman’s entitlement to continue 
(following her maternity leave) in the job in which she worked prior to her maternity 
                                                          
273 Jenny Chanfreau, Sally Gowland, Zoe Lancaster, Eloise Poole, Sarah Tipping and Mari Toomse “DWP 
Research Report No 777, Maternity and Paternity Rights Survey and Women Returners Survey 2009/2010”, 
DWP, 2011  
274 James (n10), p279 
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leave between those women that take AML and those that simply take the period of OML 
(which is set out above at 3.3.1.5 and 3.3.1.7) was identified by the EOC as being an area 
where the law fails to provide adequate protection against pregnancy discrimination275.   
Given that there has been no change in the law since the EOC’s report in 2005, the issues 
identified by the EOC must remain276.  The distinction between the two periods of leave 
is capable of discouraging women from exercising their full period of maternity leave.  If 
a woman fears that her employer will view her maternity absence unfavourably (in 
particular because she will no longer comply with the norm in respect of being an 
unencumbered worker), she may feel forced to return after just six months to minimise 
the employer’s ability to change her role.  An absence of more than 26 weeks does not 
seem to be any more difficult to find cover for than a period of 26 weeks, given that the 
employer is provided with advance notice of maternity leave (since a woman must notify 
her employer of the date when she intends to start her maternity leave and is assumed to 
return at the end of her full entitlement to leave277) and a woman can only elect to return 
early if she provides sufficient notice of this to their employer.  It is also noteworthy that, 
under earlier legislation, women were only required to provide four weeks’ notice, rather 
than the current eight weeks’.  The rationale for increasing this was to allow an employer 
“... to plan ahead and adapt the business to take account of these changing 
circumstances”278.  The approach to the right to return reflects the fact that, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, the norm is a male unencumbered worker, who never needs to take a long 
period of leave.  It also reflects the fact that caring for a child is not valued by society.  If 
the norm had been developed around those with caregiving responsibilities, it is difficult 
to imagine that a worker would be discouraged from taking her full entitlement of leave. 
  
                                                          
275 EOC (n244)  
276 As mentioned in FN 245, since 1 March 2015, the EHRC has published more recent figures on the extent of 
pregnancy discrimination and disadvantage.  This shows no change in the situation (indeed, given that the 
figures suggest that 54,000 mothers may be forced out of their jobs each year, it is arguably worse than the 
position set out in the EOC report, which suggested a figure of 30,000 per year). 
277 Either 26 weeks in the case of OML or an additional 26 in the case of those entitled to take AML 
278 DTI ‘Work and Families Consultation: Government Response to Public Consultation’, October 2005 
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Right to return – too wide a definition of “job” 
3.3.10 Although those that return to work during OML currently enjoy superior 
protection to those who return during AML, the legislation on the former is still not 
perfect and a woman returning from OML may not always be permitted to return to 
exactly the same role that she did prior to her leave.  This is due to the wide definition of 
“job” adopted by the Maternity and Parental Leave, etc Regulations 1999 (“MPLR”) 
which provides that “in relation to an employee returning after additional maternity leave 
or parental leave, [job] means the nature of the work which she is employed to do in 
accordance with her contract and the capacity and place in which she is so employed”.  
There are few reported cases on this issue, the only appellate case being Blundell v 
Governing Body of St Andrew’s Catholic Primary School279.  (Kelly v Secretary of State for 
Justice280 also considered the MPLR in the context of the right to return but in that case the 
focus was not on the definition of “job” but whether the role that the Respondent 
proposed that the Claimant should return to was suitable and appropriate employment.)  
In Blundell the EAT held that the specificity of “nature”, “capacity” and “place” were 
questions of fact which were for the tribunal at first instance to determine.   On the facts, 
the EAT held that a reception teacher who returned to a role as a year two teacher was 
returning to the same job.  Part of the rationale for this decision was the fact that the 
Respondent had a policy of rotating teachers through the different year groups, so that 
no teacher held a particular role permanently.  On this basis, no teacher was guaranteed 
to have a particular role from one year to the next and therefore the claimant was not 
treated less favourably than any other individual.  This demonstrates a problem with the 
current regime that was highlighted in Chapter 2: the need for assimilation with the 
current norm.  The law fails to recognise that a woman returning from maternity leave 
has greater need of stability than most other employees281.  As such, the way in which 
other employees are treated is irrelevant.  An employee should have the right to return to 
the same duties as they had prior to their maternity leave save where there are truly 
                                                          
279 [2007] ICR 1451 
280 UKEAT/0227/13/JOJ 
281 Some other employees may also have an increased need for stability, for example, those who are returning 
to work after serious illness. 
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exceptional circumstances (for example, where there is a redundancy situation affecting 
the whole team/department/division in which the employee works).  
Maternity leave as a concept 
3.3.11 The danger of providing long periods of leave that are exclusively available for 
mothers to exercise, or where a father’s entitlement to leave is entirely dependent upon 
the mother’s, is that it privileges the mother-child relationship at the expense of the 
parent-child relationship.  This means that fathers are seen as having a secondary role, 
which in turn means that the male norm is someone who is capable of fully dedicating 
himself to the workplace without distraction. McGlynn recognises this:  "...while 
maternity leave is essential, if it is not complemented by changes in the role of men, it 
cements women's relationship to the home"282.  There is, therefore, a need to encourage 
more equal participation in childcare by fathers and one way of achieving this would be 
to allow fathers to take an equal amount of time off as women currently enjoy to spend 
with a new baby.   
3.3.12 One argument that is often cited in support of longer periods of maternity leave 
is the need for women to breastfeed their babies.  It is not strictly necessary for a child to 
be breastfed as there are substitutes (ie formula) that are available.  However, the evidence 
suggests that breastfeeding is better both for the baby and for the mother283.  As such, the 
Innocenti Declaration 2005 on Infant and Young Child Feeding284 recommends that 
countries adopt maternity protection legislation and other measures that facilitate six 
months of exclusive breastfeeding for women employed in all sectors285.   However, this 
does not necessarily justify a long period of maternity leave.  It is, for example, possible 
                                                          
282 McGlynn (n205), 257  
283 Rona Cohen, Marsha Mrtek, Robert Mrtek “Comparison of maternal absenteeism and infant illness rates 
among breastfeeding and formula-feeding women in two corporations”, Am J Health Promot 1995 Nov-Dec 
10(2), 148-153, whose study suggests that breastfed babies have fewer illnesses than formula-fed infants and 
that women that breastfeed their babies are absent from work less often.  See also data from UNICEF which 
shows that breastfed infants are much less likely to die from diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and other 
diseases, as well as helping protect from chronic conditions later in life such as obesity and diabetes. 
(http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_breastfeeding.html)283 There is evidence that long term, 
breastfeeding reduces type 2 diabetes and breast, uterine and ovarian cancer.   
[www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_24824.html] 
284 UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/programme/breastfeeding/innocenti.htm 
285 This recommendation is not without controversy.  A recent study published in the BMJ suggests that there 
is some benefit to early weaning (at around 4 months); Mary Fewtrell, Alan Lucas, David Wilson and Ian 
Booth “When to wean?  How good is the evidence for six months’ exclusive breastfeeding”, BMJ 342 (7790), 
209-212  
 114 
for women to return to work and continue to breastfeed, subject to there being measures 
in place to facilitate breastfeeding.  These measures should be guaranteed by law so as to 
avoid the situation in the US, where there is evidence286 that suggests that hourly workers 
are treated less favourably in terms of being allowed breaks for lactation and being 
provided with the necessary facilities to enable them to express milk than professional 
workers.  There are also benefits to employers in allowing these measures as there is 
evidence to suggest that women who breastfeed their babies are absent from work less 
often287, as well as benefits to society because “...optimal breastfeeding and 
complementary feeding are essential to achieving the long-term physical, intellectual and 
emotional health of all populations...”288.  Given the social importance of breastfeeding, 
we should view this as “…of equal importance to women’s workplace contributions”289. 
3.3.13 I am not arguing here that there should not be any provision of maternity leave, 
just that it should be a short period and that this should be limited to the period that is 
necessary to allow women to recover from childbirth (which, in Chapter 2, I argued would 
be 6 weeks).  Only if we do so can we move away from the privileging of the mother-child 
relationship to a situation where we acknowledge the importance of the contribution of 
both parents.   
3.4 PATERNITY LEAVE (PATERNITY AND ADOPTION LEAVE REGULATIONS 2002, SI 
2002/2788) 
3.4.1 Having discussed maternity leave and pay, which applies only to women, I now 
consider paternity leave, which applies predominantly to men.  I will consider ordinary 
paternity leave (“OPL”), and APL together as they are complementary. 
  
                                                          
286 Lisa Hansen (“A Comprehensive Framework for Accommodating Nursing Mothers in the Workplace”, 59 
Rutgers I Rev 885 2006-2007) suggests that in the US there is a divide between professional and hourly workers 
whereby professional workers are provided with lactation rooms, breast pumping equipment and generous 
break time, but hourly workers are not, and do not have the same ability to structure their work lives. 
287 Cohen et al (n283) 
288 Innocenti Declaration (n284)  
289 Reiter (n69), 17 
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Outline of rights 
OPL 
3.4.2 The right to OPL is summarised below: 
3.4.2.1 A prospective father (or a person whose wife or partner is expecting a 
child) is entitled to up to two weeks’ paternity leave if he290 satisfies 
certain conditions, including a requirement that he has been 
continuously employed for 26 weeks291.   
3.4.2.2 Paternity leave can only be taken from the date on which the child is born 
until 56 days after that date, (or if a child is born earlier than the expected 
week, 56 days after the date of the first day of the expected week of its 
birth)292.  
3.4.2.3 There are certain circumstances in which a prospective father may293 and 
others in which he must294 change the date of the start of his OPL. 
3.4.2.4 There are provisions allowing an employer to require written notice of a 
prospective father’s intention to take OPL295. 
                                                          
290 As paternity leave is a right predominantly used by men, throughout this chapter I will refer to “he” for 
convenience, although I acknowledge that a woman who is the partner of a pregnant woman will also be 
entitled to paternity leave.  Similarly references to a prospective father should be read as including the 
mother’s partner (irrespective of the sex of that person).   
291 These are that he had been continuously employed for at least 26 weeks at the fifteenth week before the 
child is expected to be born and that he has, or expects to have responsibility for the upbringing of the child.   
In the case of a man whose wife or partner is expecting a child that is not his, the legislation expressly states 
that the man must have the main responsibility (apart from that of the mother) for the upbringing of the child.  
(Paternity and Adoption Leave Regulations 2002 (the “PALR”)) 
292 Regulation 5(2) PALR  
293 A prospective father may change the date that he chooses to take paternity leave if he provides his 
employer with notice of this.  The amount of notice that is required depends upon the circumstances of the 
change, but is generally 28 days before the proposed date unless it is not reasonably practicable to provide this 
period of notice. 
294 If an employee chooses to begin his period of leave on a particular predetermined date, but the child is not 
born on or before that date, the employee must change the date of his period of leave.  This can be done by 
substituting a later predetermined date or by specifying that his leave will begin on the date on which the 
child is born, or a date falling a certain number of days after the date on which the child is born.  He must give 
his employer notice of the change as soon as is reasonably practicable, and must do so in writing if the 
employer so requests. 
295 An employer can require the employee to give written notice (in or before the fifteenth week before the 
expected birth of the child, or if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, as soon as it would be reasonably 
practicable) of his intention to take paternity leave.  This notice must specify (a) the expected week of the 
child’s birth, (b) the length of period of paternity leave that he has chosen to take (as he may choose to take 
either one week’s leave or two consecutive weeks ) and (c) the date on which the employee has chosen that his 
period of leave shall begin.  An employer may also request that an employee provide the employer with a 
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3.4.2.5 An employee must inform his employer as soon as is reasonably 
practicable after the child’s birth, of the date on which the child was 
born296.   The employer can require that this notice is given in writing. 
3.4.2.6 An employee may only exercise his entitlement to paternity leave once 
for each pregnancy, thus if his wife, partner or mother of his child has a 
multiple birth, he is still only entitled to two weeks’ leave297.  
3.4.2.7 Those on OPL will be entitled to receive Statutory Paternity Pay (“SPP”) 
subject to their earnings not falling below the Lower Earnings Limit for 
National Insurance purposes (the “LEL”)298.   
APL 
3.4.3 The provisions relating to APL and the right to Additional Statutory Paternity 
Pay (“ASPP”) are summarised below: 
3.4.3.1 Fathers and the partners or spouses of a woman having a baby may be 
eligible for APL subject to meeting certain eligibility requirements299 and 
certain notification requirements300.  
3.4.3.2 In order for an employee to be eligible for APL, the mother must be 
entitled to maternity leave, statutory maternity pay or maternity 
allowance in respect of the child to whom the employee’s application for 
                                                          
signed declaration to the effect that the purpose of his absence from work is to care for a child or to support 
the child’s mother and that he satisfies the conditions of entitlement . 
296 Regulation 6(7) PALR 2002 
297 Regulation 4(6) PALR 2002 
298 The LEL for 2014/2015 is £111 
299 The employee must be either the child’s father or married to, or the civil partner of the mother of the child, 
and must have or expect to have the main responsibility (apart from that of the mother of the child) for the 
upbringing of the child.  The employee does not have to provide documentary evidence of these facts 
(although the employer can request a copy of the child’s birth certificate) but as part of the notice 
requirements, the employee is required to provide a declaration that he satisfies these conditions (referred to 
in the legislation as an “employee declaration”).   
300 In order to take leave, an employee must provide the following documents to his employer: 
(1)  a notice specifying the child’s expected week of birth, the child’s date of birth and the dates that the 
employee wishes to take as leave (referred to in the legislation as a “leave notice”),  
(2) an employee declaration, and  
(3) a mother declaration. 
In addition to these documents, an employee’s employer may, within 28 days of receiving an employee’s 
request for additional paternity leave, request a copy of the birth certificate of the child to whom the request 
relates and/or the name and address of the mother of the child’s employer.   
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APL relates, and the mother must have returned, or for the purposes of 
the legislation be treated as having returned, to work301.  In addition, the 
employee must have 26 weeks’ continuous service with his employer as 
at the week immediately preceding the 14th week before his child’s 
expected week of birth (ie a total of 40 weeks’ service at the expected date 
of the child’s birth).    
3.4.3.3 Eligible employees can take a period of up to 26 weeks’ leave as APL 
subject to the mother of the child having returned (or being deemed to 
have returned302) to work.  This leave can be taken after the 20th week 
after the child is born and within 12 months of the date of the birth.    
3.4.3.4 Leave must be taken in complete weeks (with a period of two weeks’ 
being the minimum amount that can be taken) and must be taken as one 
continuous period (much like maternity leave)303.   
3.4.3.5 Where an employee is eligible for APL, they will also be eligible to receive 
ASPP, subject to their earnings meeting the LEL.  The weekly rate of 
ASPP will be the lower of the following amounts:  £138.18 or 90% of the 
employee’s normal weekly earnings. 
  
                                                          
301 The employee will have to provide his employer with a written declaration by the mother of the child to 
demonstrate that she satisfies these requirements (referred to in the legislation as a “mother declaration”) 
302 Essentially this is where a woman’s statutory maternity leave has ended and her entitlement to statutory 
maternity pay has ceased because she has returned to work 
303 The legislation also provides for certain administrative requirements for leave to be taken, such as requiring 
an  employee to notify his employer of the dates when he wishes to take APL, and allows the dates of APL to 
be varied by the employee prior to the period of leave commencing and by providing his employer with at 
least six weeks’ notice of the change.  Similarly once an employee is on APL he can also give notice to return to 
leave earlier than his intended return date by providing his employer with at least six weeks’ notice of the new 
date.  If an employee fails to provide this amount of notice, an employer can postpone his return to work so 
that the employer has six weeks’ notice of the return date, which is similar to the maternity leave provisions.  
The new legislation also contains provisions modifying the entitlement to APL in the event of the mother’s 
death, so that, in summary, the employee will be able to take a maximum of 12 months’ leave, and this can be 
taken at any time from the date of the mother’s death and the date which is 12 months after the date of the 




3.4.4 All mothers are entitled to maternity leave, irrespective of how long they have 
worked for their current employer.  However, in order for a father to be eligible for 
paternity leave, he must have 26 weeks’ continuous service.   James correctly observes 
that “[b]y constructing paternity but not maternity leave as a right to be earned, available 
only once commitment to the workplace, albeit tokenistic, is demonstrated, further 
legitimises a father’s role as breadwinner first and father, or ‘supporter of’ partner, 
second”304.  This is problematic because it reinforces the ideologies of motherhood and  
fatherhood: a mother’s role is to care; a father’s is to contribute to the workplace..   
3.4.5 A father’s entitlement to APL is entirely dependent on the mother being eligible 
for maternity leave.  If the mother is not eligible for maternity leave, irrespective of 
whether the father fulfils all the other eligibility criteria, he will not be eligible for APL.  
This seems entirely unfair and, following the CJEU case of Roca Alverez v Sesa Start Expana 
ETT SA,305 may not be permissible under the Equal Treatment Directive.  Roca Alverez 
concerned a Spanish law which allowed parents to take time off in order to feed a baby.  
Both parents were entitled to the same amount of time off, however a father’s eligibility 
for the right was conditional upon the mother being an employee.  The CJEU found that 
this was contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive and was liable to reinforce gender 
stereotypes by keeping the father’s role as secondary to that of the mother’s.  However, 
the situation is far from clear cut.  The case of Betriu Montull v Instituto Nacional de la 
Seguridad Social306 concerned a Spanish law which provided that maternity benefits could 
be voluntarily transferred to a father but only so long as the mother qualified for such 
benefits (ie the father's benefit was contingent upon the mother's eligibility but not vice 
versa).  Mr Betriu Montull was not entitled to maternity benefit because his wife was self-
employed and thus not eligible and he challenged thus on the basis that it amounted to 
                                                          
304 James (n15), p44  
305 C-109/09, [2011] 1 CMLR 28 
306 Case C5/12, [2013] ICR 1323 
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unlawful discrimination against men.  The CJEU disagreed on the basis that this was 
"maternity" related and therefore was designed to protect the mother's health and safety 
by ensuring she had time to recover from birth, but also to protect "...the special 
relationship between the mother and her child in the period following the birth."  The 
only difference between the Roca Alverez case and that of Betriu Montull appears to be the 
label that attached to the leave – Roca Alverez concerned breastfeeding leave, whilst Betriu 
Montull concerned maternity leave.  In the latter case, the matter seems to have been 
viewed differently simply because the CJEU wanted to preserve the concept of maternity 
leave being distinct from everything else.  This lack of clarity means that it is entirely 
unclear whether a challenge to the APL provisions, on the basis that a father’s leave is 
dependent upon a mother’s entitlement would be successful.   This is yet another example 
of the privileging of the mother-child relationship; only if the mother is entitled to leave 
can the father be, thereby emphasising the primacy of the mother’s role, whilst relegating 
the father to the status of secondary carer.     
Length of leave 
3.4.6 One of the most obvious differences between maternity leave and paternity leave 
is the length of leave that each parent is entitled to.  Whilst women are entitled to one 
year, until 2012 men were entitled to just two weeks.  They are now eligible for a further 
26 weeks’ leave as APL (and, as set out in Chapter 4, for those babies due on or after 5 
April 2015, parents (of both sexes) will be able to share up to 50 weeks’ Shared Parental 
Leave (“SPL”)).   This demonstrates the fact that the legislation envisages that the mother 
will take primary responsibility for the care of the child, thereby privileging the mother-
child relationship. 
3.4.7 The maternity leave provisions operate on the assumption that an employee will 
take her full leave entitlement.  By contrast, the APL provisions do not make this 
assumption, instead an employee taking APL will have to inform his employer of when 
he intends to return.  This suggests that there is an assumption that fathers will take a 
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shorter period of leave than mothers thereby reinforcing the traditional ideology of 
motherhood and the division of domestic responsibilities.   
3.4.8 It is also noteworthy that the way that APL currently operates, only one parent 
can be out of the labour market on either maternity or paternity leave307.  This does not 
provide parents with flexibility as some may prefer to both spend the first six months of 
their new child’s life bonding with the child.     
Low rates of pay 
3.4.9 One of the main problems with paternity leave is the low level of pay that an 
employee will receive whilst on leave.  The level of SPP is fairly low, being £138.18 per 
week, or 90% of the father’s earnings if this is a lower figure.  This is far less than an 
employee on minimum wage, working a 35 hours week, would receive after tax and 
national insurance deductions.  Results from the Maternity and Paternity Rights Survey 
and Women Returners Survey 2009/2010308  reveal that, of those fathers who took time 
off after the birth of their child, 27% did not use paternity leave, but chose instead to rely 
upon annual leave or some other form of leave. It is interesting that this figure has not 
changed since a similar survey in 2005309 which showed that one fifth of those fathers 
taking leave after the birth of their child did not use paternity leave.   No research appears 
to have been done as to why these fathers chose not to use paternity leave.  It would seem 
likely that the reason for fathers using  annual leave rather than paternity leave is that, 
whilst on annual leave, an employee is entitled to the same weekly wage as he would 
have received had he been at work.  The low level of pay for paternity leave demonstrates 
the low value that society places on caring for a child.  That value seems to be even lower 
where a father, rather than a mother, undertakes the care.   Mothers receive 90% of their 
usual wage for the first six weeks of maternity leave, yet fathers always receive the very 
                                                          
307 The Government consultation on the Working Families Bill explicitly says this.  It states  that “...the 
intention behind the Additional Paternity Leave and Pay scheme is to allow a mother to return to work early, 
if she so chooses, and provide a mechanism for a father to take time off instead to care for the child.  It is not 
the intention to encourage both parents to be out of the labour market at the same time for a long period of 
time.” 
308 Chanfreau et al (n273), which included findings that 91% of fathers took some time off after the birth of 
their baby but only 73% took paternity leave 
309 Deborah Smeaton and Alan Marsh ‘Maternity and Paternity Rights Survey, Employment Relations Research 
Series No. 50’, March 2006 
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low level of £138.18.  This seems most likely to be because a father taking time out of the 
workplace to care contravenes the ideology of fatherhood, which places greatest 
importance on a father’s financial contribution.   
3.4.10 The low level of pay for paternity leave is a disincentive to those considering 
utilising their right to leave, particularly in the context of men typically having higher 
earnings than women, as discussed in Chapter 1.  The Government appears to have 
understood that the low level of pay would act as a deterrent for employees exercising 
their rights to APL; it estimated, prior to the implementation of the right to APL, that the 
uptake of APL would be between 4 and 8% of eligible fathers (10-20,000) and that the 
amount of time taken was unlikely to be greater than 13 weeks but could be considerably 
less310.  Due to the fact that the right to leave was only implemented in April 2010, there 
is limited statistical data regarding the uptake of the leave311. However, analysis by the 
TUC suggests that approximately 0.6% of those eligible to APL exercise their right to the 
leave312. 
3.4.11 De Silva de Alwis has noted that men are often shut out of the caregiving benefits 
afforded to women workers313.  This can be seen in relation to the relatively low number 
of employers that appear to offer enhanced APP compared to the numbers that offer 
enhanced maternity pay.  An IDS survey314 found that approximately 60% of companies 
offered enhanced maternity pay.  A survey of employers in relation to APL found that 
less than half this number, only 26.2%, offered enhanced pay for APL315.  Employers 
themselves appear to appreciate that the lack of pay is a reason for the low take-up of 
APL.  One respondent noted that: “paternity leave is rarely used – most use holiday to 
cover as they can’t afford to take the drop in pay”.   
                                                          
310 Final Impact Assessment - Additional Paternity Leave and Pay - January 2010 
311 The BIS consultation document “Modern Workplaces: Shared Parental Leave and Pay Administration 
Consultation – Impact Assessment” acknowledges this noting that there is no reliable data regarding the take 
up of APL. 
312 TUC press release dated 13 June 2013 (embargoed to 16 June 2013) – “Just one in 172 fathers taking 
Additional Paternity Leave”. 
313 De Silva de Alwis (n23)  
314 IDS, “IDS Survey of Maternity and Paternity Leave 2011”, 2011 
315 Rachel Sharp “XpertHR maternity and paternity pay survey 2011: paternity pay” IRS, 28 April 2011 
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3.5 Conclusion on gender specific rights 
3.5.1 Gender specific rights do not seem to enable all parents to combine work with 
their family responsibilities; they retain the emphasis on women being the primary care-
takers because women receive significantly greater periods of leave than men and are 
treated more favourably in respect of pay (receiving 90% of usual earnings during the first 
six weeks of leave, whereas if men elect to use the leave available to them, they  only 
receive the flat rate of £138.18).  In light of this, non-gender specific rights might better 
address the issue of reconciling work and family responsibilities.   
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CHAPTER 4 : NON-GENDER SPECIFIC PARENTAL RIGHTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 In this chapter I will be considering non-gender specific workplace rights that 
enable parents to combine work and family: Shared Parental Leave (“SPL”), parental 
leave and Emergency Dependant’s Leave (“EDL”), the right to request flexible working, 
the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
(“PtWR”) and the rights under the Working Time Regulations 1998 (“WTR”) to holiday 
and in relation to the maximum working week.   
4.2 SHARED PARENTAL LEAVE 
4.2.1 In the previous chapter I concluded that the gender-specific rights to leave were 
not necessarily helpful in enabling parents, rather than just mothers, to reconcile work 
and family responsibilities because they retain the emphasis on mothers as primary 
carers.  SPL, introduced from 2015, has the potential to change this as it is a gender neutral 
form of leave.  In order to consider whether this is likely to have the desired effect, I 
outline below the way in which the legislation will operate.   
4.2.2 Where a parent is expecting a child whose expected date of birth falls on or after 
5 April 2015, the parent will be eligible for SPL if s/he meets the eligibility requirements 
set out at 4.2.5 to 4.2.6 below.  Parents do not automatically qualify for SPL – the mother 
must first opt out of the maternity leave regime.  This can be done by the mother either 
returning to work or serving a curtailment notice. 
4.2.3 The amount of SPL that can be taken is 50 weeks316 less the amount of maternity 
leave taken by the mother.  Leave has to be taken in multiples of complete weeks317 and 
the minimum period that can be taken is one week318 although both parents can take leave 
                                                          
316 Except for those who work in a factory where compulsory maternity leave is 4 weeks rather than 2.  The 
amount of SPL that can be taken in these circumstances is 48 weeks.   
317 Regulation 36(2) of the SPL regulations 
318 Regulation 36(4) 
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concurrently.  A parent has a right to take a period of continuous leave and may request 
a discontinuous period of leave (but there is no right to take leave discontinuously).   
4.2.4 In order to exercise the right to SPL, a parent must provide certain notices and 
declarations to his/her employer.  I do not propose to set out further detail about this as, 
for the purposes of considering whether the leave will be effective in securing the ability 
of parents to combine work and family, the procedural aspects are largely irrelevant, save 
to note that the process is fairly complex.   
4.2.5 To be eligible for SPL, a mother has to have at least 26 weeks’ continuous service 
(the “duration of employment test”), be eligible for statutory maternity leave and have 
curtailed her maternity leave (or have returned to work).  She also has to, as set out above, 
have provided certain notices and declarations (both by her and her partner) to her 
employer.  Finally, she must have, or expect to have, the main responsibility for the care 
of the child.  In addition, for the mother to be eligible for SPL, the father/her partner must: 
have been employed in any part of the week of at least 26 out of the 66 week period 
immediately preceding the expected week of childbirth and have weekly average 
earnings of at least the lower earnings limit (the “employment and earnings test”) and 
have or expect to have (together with the mother of the child) the main responsibility for 
care of the child. 
4.2.6 For the father/mother's partner, the conditions of eligibility are that s/he satisfies 
the duration of employment test and has or expects to have (together with the other of the 
child) the main responsibility for care of the child.  As for eligibility of mothers, the 
father/mother’s partner must have provided the employer with the required notices and 
declarations.  In addition, for the father/mother’s partner to be eligible, the mother must 
be eligible for statutory maternity leave or statutory maternity pay/maternity allowance, 
must satisfy the employment and earnings test and any maternity leave or pay must have 
been curtailed.   
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CRITIQUE   
Eligibility 
4.2.7 As set out above, the right to SPL is only triggered by the mother opting out of 
the maternity leave regime.  The father’s entitlement to SPL is therefore conditional upon 
the mother surrendering part of her leave; as with APL, this is another example of the 
privileging of the mother-child relationship which is hardly consistent with the message 
of “shared parenting”.  In a similar vein, if the mother is not eligible for SPL then the 
father/her partner can never qualify for the leave because under regulation 5(3) of the 
SPL regulations his/her eligibility is conditional upon the mother being eligible for 
maternity leave and statutory maternity pay or maternity allowance and satisfying the 
employment and earnings test. 
Discontinuous leave 
4.2.8 The offer of discontinuous leave is undermined by the fact that an employer can 
simply fail to respond to this type of request.  In those circumstances the employee is left 
with two options: to withdraw their notice of leave or to take the leave that was notified 
in a continuous period.  Unlike, for example, the right to request flexible working, there 
is no process by which the employer even has to consider the request for discontinuous 
leave.  It would seem to be open to employers simply to have a policy of always refusing 
such requests, thereby reducing the usefulness of this provision.  Discontinuous leave 
could, if used by fathers as well as mothers, have the effect of modifying the norm as it 
would change the pattern of continuous work.  However, as it seems likely that take up 
by men will be very low (see further below for the reasons for this), in practice, this 
provision is unlikely to have this effect.  
Pay 
4.2.9 Pay is also likely to be an issue.  SPL will be paid at the same flat rate as SMP 
(currently £138.18 per week).   This is the case even in the first six weeks of leave; in 
contrast during the first six weeks of maternity leave an employee receives 90% of her 
 126 
usual pay (falling to the flat rate thereafter).  There is no obvious reason for this distinction 
other than the fact that maternity leave seems to be valued more highly than SPL.  This 
shows privileging of the mother-child relationship, rather than the parent-child 
relationship.  Where a mother takes time off in the form of maternity leave, she is paid 
more highly than when a parent (father) takes SPL because the mother could always opt 
to take maternity leave, rather than SPL.  As discussed at 3.4.11, there is a disparity 
between the enhanced pay that employers offer for maternity leave and for paternity 
leave.  It is not clear whether employers will offer enhanced payments for SPL.  It is worth 
noting that the arguments that apply in respect of whether a failure to offer enhanced pay 
in respect of APL when enhanced pay is offered for maternity leave amounts to sex 
discrimination, discussed in Chapter 5, are equally applicable in respect of SPL.  Indeed, 
some of the comments made in the Shuter v Ford Motor Company case discussed in that 
context could be particularly helpful in a challenge to a failure to offer enhanced pay for 
SPL where this is offered for maternity leave.  The ET accepted that if a claimant was able 
to show that maternity leave had become detached from what was necessary to protect 
health and safety arising from the biological condition of pregnancy, then this would 
provide a basis on which someone could argue that the situation of a man taking SPL and 
a woman taking maternity leave were comparable.  It is certainly arguable that the 
introduction of SPL has result in the decoupling of a large period of maternity leave from 
the purpose of preventing the disadvantage connected with the biological condition of 
pregnancy.   James has suggested in the context of APL that “[e]arnings-related leave of a 
reasonable period, with no eligibility hurdles, to be taken during the first year following 
birth would better mirror the earning-related leave currently available to mothers…and 
provide a symbolic challenge to the view that mothers intrinsically and naturally make 
better parents”319.   This comment applies equally in respect of SPL – a better option would 
be for all parents, irrespective of length of service, to be able to take a period of leave that 
is paid at an appropriate rate.  This is  most likely to be the best way of encouraging both 
                                                          
319 James (n10 ), p276 
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mothers and fathers to use this leave, and also change the privileging of the mother-child 
relationship by society to society  valuing parenting.   
4.2.10 SPL does not seem to take us much further than the existing APL provisions.  It 
retains the emphasis on the mother as the primary care-taker, which is one of the most 
significant problems identified in Chapter 2.  The major advantages of SPL are that 
women can surrender their entitlement to maternity leave much earlier, giving fathers the 
option of taking up to 50 weeks’ leave, and that leave can be taken by parents 
concurrently.   As set out above, the statutory pay provisions are unlikely to encourage 
fathers to use their entitlement, though as employers may enhance this, the uptake of 
leave may depend in part on the degree to which employers offer enhanced payment for 
SPL.   The provisions on SPL do not, however, remedy some of the underlying theoretical 
problems with the current parental rights regime.  There is no valuing of parenting as 
evidenced by the low levels of pay, which are even lower than for maternity leave.  
Mothering, rather than parenting is given priority as demonstrated by the father’s 
entitlement being contingent on the mother choosing to use SPL (rather than staying on 
maternity leave).  There is no change to the norm, which remains a male unencumbered 
worker with the worker with childcare responsibilities being the deviation from this.   
4.3 PARENTAL LEAVE AND EDL 
4.3.1 Parents may need time off from work at times other than a child’s birth.  Parental 
leave and EDL are intended to address this.  In this section, I consider both rights together 
as they are complementary.  Below, I outline the individual rights first, before considering 
whether in practice they allow parents to take time off from work when they need to.   
Parental Leave 
4.3.2 Parental leave is unpaid.  It can currently only be taken up until the child’s fifth 
birthday320 (or eighteenth birthday if the child is disabled321), although from 5 April 2015, 
                                                          
320 Regulation 15(1), MPLR  
321 Regulation 15(3), MPLR  
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it can be taken up to the child’s eighteenth birthday.   In order to be eligible to take parental 
leave, an employee must have been continuously employed for a period of not less than 
a year322 and must either be a parent to, or have parental responsibility for, the child in 
respect of whom they wish to take leave.   Parental responsibility is defined with reference 
to the Children Act 1989 (the “CA”) and is discussed further below at 4.3.12.     
4.3.3   Employees who return to work after a period of up to four weeks are entitled to 
return to the job in which they were employed before their absence323.  By contrast, where 
an employee takes more than four weeks’ parental leave, the employer can prevent 
him/her from returning to the same job if it is not reasonably practicable to allow this.  In 
these circumstances the employer must allow the parent to return to another job which is 
suitable and appropriate for him/her to do in the circumstances324.   
4.3.4 The manner in which the entitlement to parental leave is conferred on employees 
is particularly complex and likely to be confusing to both employees and employers.  
However, in essence, unless the employer and employee reach an agreement325, then the 
default provisions contained in Schedule 2 of the Maternity and Parental Leave, etc 
Regulations 1999 (the “MPLR”) (the “default provisions”) will apply.  These are outlined 
below at 4.3.7. 
4.3.5 Employees that exercise their rights to parental leave, or seek to do so, are entitled 
not to be subjected to any detriment by their employer as a result.  Similarly, if an 
                                                          
322 Regulation 13, MPLR  
323 Regulation 18, MPLR  
324 Regulation 18,(2) MPLR  
325 This agreement can be through an individual agreement with an employer, a collective agreement, a 
workforce agreement, however, even where an employer and employee conclude an agreement (whether that 
is an individual, collective or workforce agreement) on parental leave, there are certain rights that the 
employer must provide (essentially those which deal with questions of entitlement, the amount of leave that 
an employee is entitled to and the detriment provisions.  The workforce agreement is a relatively new concept.  
It enables an employer to agree with the workforce collectively, even in a non-unionised workplace.  In order 
to implement a workforce agreement, certain conditions must be satisfied.  These include that the agreement 
(i) is in writing; (ii) has effect for a specified period (which cannot be more than 5 years); (iii) applies to either 
all the members of the workforce or to all the members of the workforce who belong to a particular group (e.g. 
catering staff); and (iv) is signed by the representatives of the workforce (who have been elected in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 of the MPLR).  If less than 20 people are employed by the employer, then the 
agreement may be signed by either the representatives or the majority of the employees employed by the 
employer. 
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employee is dismissed for a reason connected with the fact that the employee took (or 
sought to take) parental leave, this dismissal will be unfair. 
Default Provisions 
4.3.6 The default provisions limit the amount of leave that an employee can take per 
child to four weeks during any given year. They also limit the way in which leave can be 
taken (other than where the leave is taken for a disabled child) such that leave can only 
be taken in blocks of a week (the “minimum period”) or a multiple of a week.   
4.3.7 The default provisions provide that an employer may postpone an employee’s 
period of parental leave if it considers that the operation of its business would be unduly 
disrupted if the employee took the leave specified in the notice326 (subject to the 
restrictions below).  If the leave is postponed the employer must agree to allow the 
employee to take a period of leave at a later date327.   
4.3.8 However, an employer cannot postpone the period of leave where the father is 
taking this on the date on which the child is born, subject to him complying with certain 
requirements.  These are that the employee gives notice to his employer of his intention 
to take parental leave specifying the expected week of childbirth and the duration of the 
period of leave and that this notice is given to the employer at least 21 days before the 
beginning of the expected week of childbirth328.   
EDL 
4.3.9 The right to EDL329 entitles employees to take a reasonable amount of time off 
during working hours in certain prescribed circumstances.  There are 3 which may be of 
use to parents: (i) if a dependant (including a child) falls ill or is injured or assaulted, (ii) 
if the employee needs to make arrangements for the provision of care for a dependant 
                                                          
326 Paragraph 6, Schedule 2 MPLR  
327 The leave must be of the same duration as requested and must begin on a date determined by the employer 
(following consultation with the employee) that is no later than six months after the commencement of the 
requested date. 
328 Schedule 2, MPLR  
329 Section 57A ERA  
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who is ill or injured because of the unexpected disruption or termination of arrangements 
for the care of a dependant, or (iii) to deal with an incident which involves a child of the 
employee and which occurs unexpectedly in a period during which an educational 
establishment which the child attends is responsible for him330.  
Remedies – EDL and parental leave 
4.3.10 In the event that an employer refuses to allow an employee to exercise his/her 
right to parental leave or to EDL, the employee may present a complaint to an 
employment tribunal.  S/he must do so within three months of the date when the refusal 
occurred, or within such further period as the employment tribunal considers reasonable 
if it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the employee to present his/her 
complaint within 3 months.  The remedy for breach of the right is the same; an 
employment tribunal (“ET”) is required to make a declaration to the effect and may make 
an award of compensation to be paid by the employer to the employee.  This shall be such 
amount as the ET considers to be just and equitable in all the circumstances.   
CRITIQUE 
 “Parental Responsibility” 
4.3.11 As set out above, only those who have “parental responsibility” for a child are 
entitled to take parental leave.  The difficulty with this family law definition, though, is 
that whilst a mother always automatically acquires parental responsibility for her child, 
there are various circumstances in which the father of the child does not331.   This is not, 
of itself, necessarily problematic as an employee may still qualify for parental leave if he 
is registered as the child’s father under s10(1) or s10A(1) of the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 1953332 but it does again suggest the privileging of the mother-child 
relationship, rather than the parent-child relationship.   
                                                          
330 The other grounds, which are unlikely to be of use in this context are: to provide assistance on an occasion 
when a dependant gives birth or in consequence of the death of a dependant. 
331 Under the CA a father married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth, automatically acquires 
parental responsibility but an unmarried father does not.  An employee may also qualify for parental leave if 
he is registered as the child’s father under s10(1) or s10A(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 
332 Or in Scotland s18(1) or (2) of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 
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4.3.12 Another difficulty may arise where the relationship between the biological 
parents of a child breaks down (or alternatively if there was no such relationship in the 
first place) and one parent (who is likely to be the mother333) is left to look after the child 
by herself.  If this woman then meets a new partner who cares for that child, the new 
partner is unlikely to have parental responsibility for that child as defined by the MPLR334.  
Thus the new partner will not qualify for parental leave.  In such circumstances it may be 
that the only parent wishing, or able (under the legislation), to take parental leave will be 
the mother335.  The legislation fails to alleviate the disproportionate responsibility women 
(especially as sole parents) bear for children.  It also prevents those men who do not have 
"parental responsibility" as defined by the law but in practice care for a child from playing 
a fuller role in the lives of the children who they care for.  Eligibility for parental leave 
should simply require that the person who wishes to exercise the leave is either the 
primary carer or the person who, other than the primary carer, has the main responsibility 
for the upbringing of the child.  The issues described above do not arise in relation to EDL, 
where the right is to time off for "dependants" with this including a child or a person who 
lives in the same house as the employee, other than a lodger, tenant, boarder or employee.  
Given that the rights to EDL and to parental leave should be complementary, this 
misalignment in scope is surprising. 
Limiting the number of parents able to exercise the leave 
4.3.13 A number of the criteria that employees must satisfy in order to qualify for leave 
unjustifiably limit the number of parents who will be eligible for parental leave.  The 
requirement that the parent taking leave has been continuously employed for a year (the 
“service requirement”) seems to be particularly unjustifiable.   The imposition of a service 
requirement suggests that time off to spend with a child is a right to be earned and a 
                                                          
333 22% of children live in lone-mother households, whilst only 2% of children live in lone-father households – 
Office for National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1163) 
334 This is because s/he will not have been married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth and he will not 
be registered as the father of the child on the birth certificate, since he is not the child’s biological father.   
335 The biological father may not be able to take leave if he and the mother were unmarried at the time the 
child was born and if he was not registered as the child’s father (because in such circumstances he would not 
have parental responsibility) or alternatively he may not wish to take parental leave because he has no contact 
with his child.    
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matter for an individual, rather than time spent with children being something that 
benefits society as a whole. 
4.3.14 A Government white paper, published at around the time of the introduction of 
parental leave, stated that it believed that the qualifying periods for AML and parental 
leave should be aligned as far as practicable336.  However, whilst all female employees are 
now entitled to maternity leave without any qualifying period, the qualifying period for 
parental leave remains at a year and there seems to be no justification for the retention of 
this.  Similar issues do not arise in relation to EDL as there is no service requirement for 
employees to be able to exercise this right.   
Unpaid Leave 
4.3.15   Another characteristic that limits the usefulness of parental leave, by restricting 
the number of parents who are able to take the leave (rather than limiting the number 
who are eligible), is the fact that the period of leave is unpaid.  This may account for the 
very low uptake. 
4.3.16 There appears to be little difference in uptake between men and women.  The 
most recent statistics on this are contained in the Fourth Work-Life Balance Employee 
Survey from 2012337, which suggest that 10% of women with children aged under 6 have 
taken parental leave in the last 12 months compared to 12% of fathers.  Uptake for both 
parents is low and it may be that men’s uptake is higher because they use parental leave 
during the first year of a child’s life, whereas a mother can use maternity leave during this 
period.  The difficulty with the leave being unpaid is in part due to the gender pay gap, 
discussed in Chapter 1.  As Weldon-Johns has noted, the findings from European research 
indicate  "... that the payment of [parental] leave is closely linked with male utilisation 
rates, as shown in the findings of the 2004 Eurobarometer survey of men throughout 
Europe"338.   The lack of pay for parental leave shows that society does not value the time 
                                                          
336 White Paper ‘Fairness at Work’, May 1998, para 5.19 
337 Sarah Tipping, Jenny Chanfreau, Jane Perry and Clare Tait, “Employment Relations Research Series 122: The 
Fourth Work-Life Balance Employee Survey”, BIS, July 2012 
338 Michelle Weldon-Johns (2013) ‘EU work–family policies: challenging parental roles or reinforcing gendered 
stereotypes?’ European Law Journal, 19 (5), 662-681, 670  
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that parents spend with their children, but instead sees it as a choice for the individual.  
We need to move away from this model to one where parenting is valued for the 
important social contribution that it is.   
4.3.17 The default provisions impose a requirement that the minimum period of leave 
that may be taken is one week.  This means that the unpaid nature of the leave is likely to 
have a greater impact on whether parents use their entitlement than if there was no 
minimum period (or this was a day).  This is because loss of a week’s wages is a greater 
financial penalty than loss of a single day’s pay.  Thus, if a parent needs to take only a 
single day’s leave but they have to take an entire week’s unpaid leave, some parents may 
be unable to afford to take this, and may choose instead, for example, to take a day out of 
their (paid) annual leave entitlement.  
4.3.18 EDL is also a right to unpaid leave and since, by the very nature of the leave it is 
unplanned, parents may not have budgeted to be able to take unpaid time off work.  The 
position regarding EDL can be contrasted with that of an employee taking sick leave.  If 
an employee takes a minimum of four days off work as a result of illness s/he will be 
entitled to statutory sick pay (subject to, in certain cases, providing evidence of the illness).  
If a parent needed to take four days off work as a result of an unexpected event concerning 
his/her child, s/he would be entitled to nothing. In both cases the leave is unexpected 
and unplanned, in both there is no fault attached to the need to take time off work and in 
both if the leave is not paid the employee will have no income.  Ultimately this is means 
that the risk of an employee’s child being ill falls solely on the employee.  For the reasons 
set out in Chapter 1, it would be more equitable if this burden were to be spread more 
widely than on individual employees. 
4.3.19 Whilst the right to EDL is a right to unpaid leave, some employers appear to go 
beyond the statutory right and offer full pay for this leave.  The statistics show that women 
are slightly more likely than men to use EDL where this is unpaid (as opposed to in 
situations where employers voluntarily offer paid leave).  According to research reported 
 134 
in the Maternity and Paternity Rights and Women Returners Survey 2009/2010339, 9% of 
mothers had used unpaid EDL compared to 7% of fathers.  The statistics also show that 
employers seem to be more willing to allow this time off to be paid for men than for 
women, with the same survey showing that 45% of mothers had access to fully paid time 
off for family emergencies, compared to 55% of fathers.  This disparity is surprising – if 
an employer were to openly offer paid leave for male employees but only allow women 
to take unpaid leave, this would amount to direct sex discrimination (which is discussed 
in Chapter 5).  As such, it seems more likely that the disparity is due to the fact that there 
is gender segregation in the workplace and therefore that some employers (who may 
employ greater numbers of men) may offer fully paid EDL whilst others (who may 
employ greater numbers of women) may offer unpaid EDL. 
The Minimum Period of Leave 
4.3.20 An example of the problems with the minimum period can be seen in Rodway v 
New Southern Railways Ltd340.  In this case a father needed to take a day off work to look 
after his son (because his former partner, who normally looked after his son, needed to 
visit her disabled sister on this day), and applied for parental leave in order to do so.  His 
employer rejected his request however Mr Rodway failed to turn up to work on that day 
and consequently was given a warning for non-attendance. 
4.3.21 Mr Rodway brought an employment tribunal (“ET”) claim alleging that he had 
been subjected to detriment contrary to section 48 of the ERA in not being allowed to take 
the day off.   He had argued that, despite the minimum period of a week’s leave, an 
employee should be allowed to take one day's parental leave so long as that is deemed to 
be taking a week's leave for the calculation of the employee's entitlement to parental leave.  
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and, in doing so, found that there was no 
valid request for parental leave and thus the warning Mr Rodway had been given was 
lawful. 
                                                          
339 Chanfreau et al (n273) 
340 [2005] ICR 1162 
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Requirement that disruption be unexpected 
4.3.22   The right of EDL was also of no use to Mr Rodway due to the requirement that 
the childcare disruption is “unexpected”.  The ET ruled that Mr Rodway’s circumstances 
could not fall within section 57A of the ERA; in its view this was not an “unexpected 
disruption or termination of arrangements” as Mr Rodway had been informed by his 
former partner that she would be unable to look after his son 6 weeks before the event. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) upheld this decision.  The issue of whether 
an event was “unexpected” was also considered in Royal Bank of Scotland v Harrison341, an 
EAT case.  This case took a slightly more pragmatic view of the term “unexpected” and it 
is interesting that the Rodway case did not appear to have been cited in argument despite 
the cases clearly being very similar.  In Harrison, the Claimant’s childminder was 
unavailable to care for the Claimant’s child on 22 December 2006.  The Claimant was only 
informed of this on 8 December 2006 and made a request for EDL in respect of 22 
December 2006.  This request was denied and, when the Claimant did not attend work on 
that day, she received a written warning.  The ET held that the disruption to the 
Claimant’s childcare arrangements was “unexpected”; a decision which was upheld by 
the EAT.  The EAT noted that, in its view the word “unexpected” did not involve a time 
element – this is clearly at odds with the decision in Rodway and given that both are 
decisions of the EAT, until this issue is appealed to a higher court, it is uncertain what the 
state of the law is in respect of this issue.  This is clearly highly unsatisfactory.    
Requirement for time off to be necessary 
4.3.23 Caracciolo Di Torella is concerned that “…[t]he judicial interpretation [of the 
right to EDL] has made it clear that the right is not there to care for a child or a dependant 
but simply to arrange alternative care…”342.  This is true in relation to how  the courts have 
interpreted the the requirement in the EDL provisions that the time off is “necessary”.  In 
Qua v John Ford Morrison Solicitors343 the Claimant was dismissed for taking time off 
                                                          
341 [2009] I.C.R. 116 
342 Caracciolo Di Torella (n27), 321  
343 [2003] ICR 482 
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repeatedly to look after her son who had a recurring illness.  The EAT held that EDL did 
not enable employees to take time off in order themselves to care for a sick child, except 
to the extent necessary to deal with an immediate crisis.  The EAT also suggested that 
leave to provide longer-term care for a child would be covered by an employee’s parental 
leave entitlement (subject obviously to the employee satisfying the qualification 
requirements for this).    This therefore affirms the concerns raised by Caracciolo Di 
Torella: the right has been interpreted as not enabling the care of a child on a longer term 
basis, however, it would allow a parent to take a day or two as EDL to deal with a shorter 
illness. The difficulty with this position is that parents will not always have alternative 
childcare accessible to them or may not have childcare that they can arrange in 
circumstances where a child is unwell.  Considering the latter first, even if a child has, for 
example, a nursery place, that nursery may not allow sick children to attend the nursery.  
Equally, if an employee works part-time during school hours, she344 may not have any 
other childcare arrangements because she would not ordinarily need these.  If her child is 
then sick and unable to go to school for a period of time, following the logic in Qua, she 
would not be able to take this time off as EDL because, arguably, it would not be necessary 
to do so to deal with an immediate crisis.  In both the circumstances described above, the 
parent would seem to need to take time off to care for the child, but the comments in Qua 
suggest that this is not permitted by EDL.  The assumption by the EAT that parents would 
be able to take parental leave is not necessarily correct – an employee might not qualify 
for parental leave; she might have previously exhausted her entitlement to this right; or 
her employer may elect to postpone the leave.  This issue illustrates the problem in 
developing distinct workplace parental rights rather than a single right to leave – there 
can be many situations in which an employee falls through the cracks and has no right to 
time off, despite clearly needing it to accommodate his/her childcare responsibilities.   
  
                                                          
344 Whilst it is possible that the part-time worker could be a man, given the statistics on part-time working 
discussed later in this chapter, it is more likely than not that a part-time worker would be a woman.   
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The right of postponement 
4.3.24 The employer’s right of postponement may frustrate the exercise of the right to 
parental leave.  It is for that reason that Caracciolo Di Torella has suggested that 
postponement means that effectively “…employees can be denied [parental] leave at a 
time which they deem crucial and this does not make it particularly family friendly”345. 
For example, if Mr Rodway had applied to his employer for a week’s parental leave and 
his employer had chosen to exercise its right of postponement, Mr Rodway would have 
been unable to take this week off, and still would not have had anyone to care for his child 
on the one day that he needed to.   
4.3.25 Parental leave should enable parents to combine work and family by allowing 
parents to take leave when they need to in order to deal with a problem with their child 
(or children).  The right of postponement means that employers can prevent employees 
from taking parental leave at the time the parents need time off.   This is only possible 
because of the division between the private and public spheres, which enables the 
workplace to ignore the demands and needs of the private sphere (the family).   
Conclusion on parental leave and EDL 
4.3.26 One of the main indicators that the right to parental leave is not particularly 
helpful for parents is the relatively low numbers of parents exercising their right to unpaid 
parental leave.  As set out above, figures suggest that only 10% of women and 12% of men 
with children aged under 6 have used parental leave at all within the last 12 months.    The 
parental leave uptake figures for the UK can be contrasted with those of Sweden, where 
45% of parental leave is taken by fathers346 and 72.1% of fathers take parental leave within 
the first two years of their child’s life347.  Parental leave in Sweden is very different from 
the leave of the same name in the UK.  In essence, it combines the UK idea of maternity, 
paternity and parental leave into one entitlement which is shared between parents.   Leave 
                                                          
345 Caracciolo Di Torella (n27), 325  
346 Eurofound (2015), “Promoting uptake of parental and paternity leave among fathers in the European Union”, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
347 Tobias Axelsson, “Men’s parental leave in Sweden:  policies, attitudes, and practices”, Joanneum Research, April 
2014 
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is paid at up to 85% of current earnings348.   Providing a period of paid parental leave 
could increase its uptake, thereby increasing its effectiveness as a right to allow parents 
to combine work and family.    
4.3.27 One question not yet addressed in this chapter is whether this type of right to 
leave is even necessary for working parents.  Caracciolo Di Torella and Masselot have 
suggested that “…parental leave has the potential to re-conceptualise the relationships 
between the state, the market and the family in terms of extended leave arrangements.  It 
shifts the emphasis, at least on paper, from the health and safety, non-discrimination and 
employment rights of the mother to embrace the social rights of both parents”349.  I agree 
that parental leave should be helpful in recognising the importance of parenting, as 
opposed to privileging of the mother-child relationship.  However, the fact that parental 
leave is unpaid means that, in practice, there is a low level of uptake and, in practice it is 
“…certainly not one which promotes the involvement of the father”350.  Further, as the 
leave is unpaid it reinforces the idea that the cost of parenting should be borne by the 
individual, rather than by society.  As highlighted in Chapter 3, one of the difficulties for 
parents trying to combine work and childcare responsibilities is the way in which the 
workplace is structured.  The right to time off is unlikely to assist parents with this type 
of issue.  However, where it may assist is where an employee’s usual childcare 
arrangements are not appropriate in the particular instance (for example, where the usual 
childcare arrangements are based on the child being at school, childcare during the school 
holidays) and the employee needs to care for the child himself/herself.   The other 
situation where leave may be appropriate is where childcare arrangements fail; this is 
where the right to EDL may assist.  However, for the reasons set out above, there may be 
occasions on which parents’ needs are not met by either parental leave or EDL.    It is 
important to note, though, that whilst the rights to leave are helpful to parents in 
                                                          
348 Compensation during the month of parental leave used exclusively by the mother or the father is 85%. 300 
days of parental leave are compensated at 75 percent of wage and 90 days at the minimum rate (which is fixed 
rate, similar to the lower level of SMP/SPP that is paid in the UK). 
Temporary parental allowance and pregnancy benefit is reduced to 75 percent of wage. 
349 Caracciolo Di Torella and Massick (n1), 73 
350 ibid, 327 
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combining work and family responsibilities, these alone (even if they are entirely 
effective), are not the only right that parents will need.   An arguably more important area 
is how parents can combine their normal working day with their childcare 
responsibilities.  The rights that may enable parents to do so are considered below.    
4.4 EMPLOYMENT ACT 2002: RIGHT TO REQUEST FLEXIBLE WORKING 
Outline of existing right 
4.4.1 In addition to rights to time off work to look after children, the law also provides 
a right for all employees to request flexible working, subject to having 26 weeks’ 
continuous service.  Originally, this right only applied to parents who were requesting to 
work flexibly to allow them to care for a child.  However, with effect from 6 April 2014, 
the right was extended to all employees.  Agency workers are expressly excluded from 
the right to request flexible working, as are employee shareholders, save where they are 
returning from a period of parental leave.   
4.4.2 The types of change to their terms and conditions of employment that an 
employee may request are restricted, although, since the Secretary of State has the power 
to make regulations to extend these, in future there may be a wider range of changes that 
an employee may request.  Currently an employee may request (i) a change in the number 
of hours that s/he is required to work, (ii) a change to the times when s/he is required to 
work or (iii) to work at home for some or all of the time.   There are also some formalities 
that employees must comply with when lodging their application351.   
4.4.3 Just as the types of changes that may be requested are limited to those specified 
by the statute, so too are the reasons that an employer may lawfully refuse an application. 
These are the burden of additional costs, detrimental effect on ability to meet customer 
demand, inability to reorganise work among existing staff, inability to recruit additional 
                                                          
351 Under section 80F of the ERA the application must be in writing, state whether a previous application has 
been made by the employee (and if so, when), be dated and state that it is such an application.   
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staff, detrimental impact on quality, detrimental impact on performance and insufficiency 
of work during the periods the employee proposes to work.     
4.4.4 There is no longer a set process that has to be adhered to when an employer 
receives a request for flexible working.  Instead, the employer is obliged to deal with the 
request in a reasonable manner and to notify the employee of its decision within three 
months of the date of the request.   
CRITIQUE 
4.4.5 One of the problems for parents with the current norm, discussed in Chapter 2, is 
the assumption that an employee will work the employer’s normal working hours at such 
times that the employer has determined (and these have been determined to suit the needs 
of a worker who does not have caring responsibilities).  One way to address this issue 
would be to change current working patterns.  This might be achieved through employees 
having greater flexibility over their working patterns.  Flexible working encompasses a 
whole range of different options, including working from a location other than the office, 
working at different times than the employer’s usual working hours, and working part-
time.  It includes, for example, allow some workers to work remotely from home.  
Workers in London spend on average 74.2 minutes each day travelling to and from work 
(with the national average being 52.6 minutes per day352).  Not needing to travel in this 
way would be a significant time saving and could enable parents to spend more time with 
children.  Flexible working, if used by large numbers of workers, could alter the norm by 
changing not only the hours when people work, but also the locations from which they 
are expected to carry out that work.  During the recession, many employers asked 
employees to work part-time as a way of avoiding redundancies353.  Presumably the 
employees who volunteered (or were required) to work part-time were not viewed as 
being somehow less dedicated to their careers or jobs.  As a result of this, part-time or 
                                                          
352 Analysis by the TUC of official statistics from the ONS (http://www. 
http://www.tuc.org.uk/work_life/tuc-17223-f0.cfm) 
353 BT, British Airways, KPMG, and several City law firms,, including Norton Rose, Addleshaw Goddard, CMS 
Cameron McKenna and Pinsent Masons asked workers to work part-time hours with Ford, Honda and JCB 
being amongst some of the employers that asked their employees to work reduced hours.  
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reduced hours working patterns can gain more credibility both amongst employers and, 
more generally, in society.   
4.4.6 Studies have also shown that working from home increases productivity354 and 
that home workers are less likely to leave their employer355, so there is also a potential 
benefit to employers where workers choose to utilise this type of arrangement.   However, 
there can be downsides to working from home for the individual worker: there tend to be 
lower levels of promotion as a result of workers’ lower level of presence in the office 
together with feelings of loneliness and boredom356.  It is likely that the negative impact 
of working from home increases with the amount of time that a particular worker spends 
out of the office, in comparison to their peers.  As such, a single worker choosing to work 
from home on a full-time basis is likely to fare far worse, than, for example, a worker who 
works from home one day per week where his or her colleagues have similar 
arrangements.  Travis357 has raised concerns that some employers use home working for 
clerical staff to reduce their costs by reducing pay and benefits for the affected roles.  This 
is not a flaw per se with flexible working – some employers will always try to reduce their 
costs by making adverse changes to their workers’ working conditions.  A worker could, 
for example, be engaged on a zero hours contract and have less security than other 
workers – this worker could equally be engaged to work at home or at the employer’s 
premises.   
4.4.7 However, working from home is not a solution for all the issues that parents face, 
not least because it will not be possible to work from home for all roles, for example, 
teachers, nurses, retail assistants and roles where there needs to be in-person interaction.   
4.4.8 Crompton has suggested that “…one impact of flexible working is that the time 
boundary between ‘work’ and ‘non-work’ becomes increasingly blurred and 
                                                          
354 Christine Siegwarth Meyer, Swati Mukerjee, Ann Sestero,“Work-Family Benefits:  Which Ones Maximise 
Profits”, Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol.13, No.1 (Spring 2011) pp28-44 
355Magid Igbaria, Tor Guimaraes,“Exploring Differences in Employee Turnover Intentions and the 
Determinants among Telecommuters and Non-Telecommuters”, Journal of Managerial Information Systems, 
Vol.16, No.1 (Summer 1999) pp147-164 
356 ibid; also S Tietze “When ‘Work’ Comes ‘Home’: Coping Strategies of Teleworkers and Their Families, 
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.41, No.4 (Dec 2002), pp 385-396 
357 Michelle Travis “Equality in the Workplace”, 24 Berkeley J Empl & Lab L 285 
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contested”358.  This would seem to be a possible downside to flexible working.  However, 
it is not clear that flexible working has this effect because, as described above, flexible 
working encompasses a whole range of different options, from working different hours 
to “the norm”, to working less hours than the standard working week. In neither case 
does this necessarily seem to result in a blurring of the boundaries between work and 
non-work.   Further, as discussed below, with mobile technology, workers can be expected 
to respond to emails and calls even during non-work time, so even without a flexible 
working arrangement, there seems to be an increased blurring of the work and non-work 
boundaries.  The problem, as I highlight below, is that this blurring is very one-sided: 
whilst employers expect workers to be available even in non-work time, the worker’s 
family responsibilities are still not expected to impinge on the work sphere.     
4.4.9 Another aspect of flexible working which may be of use to parents in combining 
work and family responsibilities is the ability to request part-time arrangements.   De Silva 
de Alwis has suggested that we should veer away from this option and secure better 
childcare provision noting that “…in contrast to part-time work availability, which 
marginalises women and prevents them from fully participating in the market, publicly 
provided childcare is more likely to foster women’s labor market inclusion by providing 
real or symbolic support to all working parents, both men and women”359.  I disagree.  
Part-time work that is low-paid and low-skill is an issue for working mothers, but this is 
not an intrinsic feature of part-time work.  The right to request flexible working can, if it 
is effective, assist in enabling people to secure high quality, highly paid part-time work 
as it requires employers to consider (once a request has been made) whether a role is 
capable of being fulfilled on a part-time basis.   
Continuous service requirement 
4.4.10 It seems unfair that, in order to be able to work flexibly, an employee must have 
worked continuously for his/her employer for 26 weeks, particularly given that the 
                                                          
358 Crompton (n7), p99  
359 De Silva de Alwis (n23)  
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employer has a number of grounds on which it can refuse the employee’s request.  This 
suggests that the right to request flexible working is a right to be earned by an individual, 
rather than recognising that parents’ ability to reconcile work and family responsibilities 
is important for society as a whole.  Further, there is a possibility that an employee who 
has left a previous employer because of discrimination over the fact that the employee has 
a child or the previous employer’s refusal of a flexible work application could be applying 
for jobs with new employers and may wish to ask about the possibility of working 
flexibly.  In such circumstances, the applicant has no protection whatsoever, and there is 
absolutely no obligation on the employer to even consider the possibility of flexible 
working under the right to request flexible working (although this may amount to indirect 
discrimination, which is considered in Chapter 5).  For this reason, the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (“EHRC”)’s recommendation in its report, “Working 
Better”360 that the requirement that an employee has continuously worked for 26 weeks’ 
be abolished seems sensible and fair.   
Grounds for refusal 
4.4.11 The Fourth Flexible Working Employee Survey361 showed that the number of 
applications that were accepted was 79% (of which 61% were accepted without 
negotiation, compromise or an appeal) and the number of requests that had been declined 
was 13%.   Whilst this is a relatively high success rate, it does not necessarily mean that 
the right is effective; it may be that employers would have voluntarily permitted 
employees to amend their working patterns or it may be that employees are less likely to 
submit requests in circumstances where they may not be accepted.  Each of these 
possibilities is explored below.   
4.4.12 The right to request flexible working initially appeared to increase the number of 
applications that were accepted.  Figures from the First Flexible Working Employee 
Survey362 showed that 86% of applications were accepted as opposed to the 77% 
                                                          
360 EHRC (n181)  
361 Tipping et al (n337)  
362 Tom Palmer , “Employment Relations Occasional Papers - Results of the first flexible working employee survey”, 
Department of Trade and Industry, April 2004 
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acceptance rate which existed prior to the right to request flexible working being 
introduced363.  However, in the Fourth Flexible Working Employee Survey, this figure 
had fallen to 79%, which is not much greater than the percentage of requests that were 
accepted prior to the right to request flexible working being introduced.  There do, 
though, seem to be a greater number of employees working flexibly, which shows that 
the right to request flexible working may have had some success.  According to figures 
from the Fourth Flexible Working Employee Survey in 2012, 60% of employees have 
worked flexibly in the last 12 months; this can be contrasted with the figures from the 
Second Flexible Working Survey in 2003 (there were no comparable figures for this from 
the First Flexible Working Employee Survey), which showed that 51% of employees had 
had some type of flexible working arrangement in the previous 12 months.  These figures 
suggest that the right to request flexible working has had a positive impact on working 
patterns.  However, as the same survey noted the increase is, in part, due to an increase 
in the numbers of employees regularly working from home which might be as a result of 
improvements in technology.   
4.4.13 If the right to request flexible working was entirely successful, one would imagine 
that employees would generally be satisfied with their working arrangements and have 
no desire to make a flexible working request for this reason.  However, research suggests 
that for a significant minority (12%) the reason that they have not made a flexible working 
request within the last two years is for a “business related” reason, such as it not being 
appropriate for that employee’s job, concern about the negative impact that flexible 
working might have on career progression or a perception that their employer would be 
unlikely to accept the request.   
Reasonableness of any refusal 
4.4.14 Under the regime on flexible working in force until 30 June 2014, it was clear that 
the right to request flexible working was very process driven, rather than looking at the 
                                                          
363 Jane Stevens, Juliet Brown and Caroline Lee “Employment Relations Research Series No. 27 - The Second Work-
Life Balance Study: Results from the Employees’ Survey”, DTI, April 2004 
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reasonableness of the decision.  However, the extended right to flexible working which 
applied from 1 July 2014 is less prescriptive about process, instead requiring an employer 
to deal with a request in a reasonable manner.  The relevant ACAS Code of Practice364 
suggests that this involves carefully considering a request and weighing the requested 
changes against any adverse business impact that the proposed flexible working 
arrangement might have.  This would suggest that there may be more scope under the 
extended right to consider the reasonableness of the decision; although this is only likely 
to become clear once tested in litigation and, so far, there have been no such cases.   
4.4.15 In addition, the case of Ayodele v Compass Group plc365 may offer some hope that 
the legislation could be applied in such a way as to prevent employers using the 
application process as simply a tick-box exercise.  Ayodele did not concern the right to 
request flexible working, but the right to request work beyond retirement.  However it is 
potentially of interest because in this case an ET held that the statutory obligation to 
consider an application must be performed in good faith and genuinely consider whether 
it should be accepted.  Much like the legislation on the right to request flexible working, 
the legislation on the right to request to work beyond retirement consists of only 
procedural requirements.   James366 has argued that there should be a right of appeal to 
the ET where a request for flexible working is unreasonably refused.  This would be a 
significant improvement on the current legislation.   
Men are less likely to make a request for flexible working 
4.4.16 Another concern in relation to the right to request flexible working relates to the 
vast difference between the numbers of women and the numbers of men choosing to make 
requests.  The Fourth Flexible Working Employee Survey found that whilst 28% of 
women had made requests in the last 2 years, just 17% of men had367.  Given that these 
figures are percentages of all workers (i.e. not just those working full time) they will 
                                                          
364 “ACAS Code of Practice No. 5: Handling in a reasonable manner requests to work flexibly”, ACAS, June 2014 
365 [2011] IRLR 802 
366 James (n10)  
367 Tipping et al (n337)  
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include part-time workers, the majority of which are women, who are already working 
flexibly, and thus may be less likely to utilise this right. It should be noted that, to the 
extent that an employee feels that a decision is discriminatory, s/he may be able to bring 
a sex discrimination claim; I consider this separately in Chapter 5.   
4.4.17 Past research368 into why some employees are reluctant to request flexible 
working patterns suggests that there are a number of factors, the main being perceived 
impact on career prospects.   Given the ideology of fatherhood, discussed in Chapter 1, 
which places greatest importance on a father’s financial contribution to his family, this 
type of detriment is likely to have a deterrent effect, in particular, on men.  Other factors 
include incompatible organisational cultures, such as entrenched long hours’ culture, 
heavy workloads, impact on earnings and infrastructure and technology not being in 
place.   More recent evidence suggests that there has been no change in the perception by 
employees that working part-time will damage their career prospects.  When asked how 
they felt about the statement: "People who work flexibly are less likely to get promoted", 
38% of employees working full time with no flexible working agreed or strongly agreed 
with it369.  There is clearly concern amongst employees that part-time working can 
damage career prospects.  In order to dispel any such concerns that employees may have 
about part-time working, there needs to be evidence that working part-time will not affect 
career prospects.  There is already a prohibition on discriminating against part-time 
workers in the form of the PtWR, and yet the concern that career progression may be 
affected by part-time working is still voiced.  This may be because it would be relatively 
difficult for an employee to show that his/her career progression had been adversely 
affected by working part-time.   Any effect is not likely to be apparent for a number of 
years, and finding another employee who is, and has been, in a comparable situation to 
the employee for a number of years to act as a comparator may prove impossible.   
  
                                                          
368 Jenny Kodz, Heather Harper, Sally Dench “Work-Life Balance: Beyond the Rhetoric”, Institute for Employment 
Studies, 2002 
369 Tipping et al (n337)  
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Difference in outcomes depending on the sex of the applicant 
4.4.18 A further problem is the fact that a higher number of requests made by men are 
declined than the number made by women that are declined: 10% of requests by women 
are declined compared to 18% of men370.  There are two possible reasons for the difference 
in the figures (assuming that the male employees are being no less reasonable in their 
requests than female employees): 
4.4.18.1 employers are acting in an overtly discriminatory manner and are 
deciding that they should prioritise requests of women over those of men 
because, for example, they believe that women should have greater 
responsibility for childcare 
4.4.18.2 there is gender segregation in the workplace and, as a result, men are 
more likely to hold positions that  employers believe are not suitable for 
flexible working and so decline applications from those in such roles.   
4.4.19 The former reason is clearly discriminatory, but so is the latter, albeit less overtly.  
Employers should not make blanket judgements about the suitability of roles for flexible 
working.  Each position should be considered individually, and most should be able to 
accommodate some sort of flexible working.  The problem is often that the role has always 
been done on a full-time basis and so the employer is not open to the possibility of part-
time or other flexible working.  
Conclusion 
4.4.20 The right to request flexible working is supposed to address the problem of part-
time jobs being low-paid and low-skill, as, if this right worked effectively, it would allow 
those working full-time to change to part-time hours.  Whilst the right to request flexible 
working appears to have had some positive impact on the number of employees working 
flexibly, there remain some issues.  Of greatest concern is the fact that men seem to be less 
willing to make requests and seem more likely to have requests refused.  In part, the 
former is related to concern about detrimental treatment arising from flexible working.  I 
                                                          
370 Tipping et al (n337)  
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consider below the PtWR which are intended to address this in relation to part-time 
working.  
  
4.5 PART TIME WORKERS (PREVENTION OF LESS FAVOURABLE TREATMENT) REGULATIONS 
2000 
4.5.1 Consideration was given above to how employees may request a change to their 
working hours or conditions to allow them to combine work and family.  Employees are 
unlikely to request these changes unless they are protected against less favourable 
treatment as a result of their new working patterns.  The PtWR endeavour to ensure that 
part-time workers will not be treated less favourably.  Part-time working is often used by 
mothers to combine work and family; in one study371 42% of female part-time workers 
cited their childcare responsibilities as the reason for working part-time.   
4.5.2 The following is a summary of the provisions of the PtWR.  The regulations apply 
to workers, rather than just employees372.  Part-time work is defined by reference to the 
employer’s definition of what constitutes full time work373.  By way of example, an 
employee who works 35 hours per week will be a part-time worker if the employer 
usually requires workers to work 37 hours per week, but not if it usually requires workers 
to work 35 hours per week.  Essentially the PtWR provide that a part-time worker should 
not be treated less favourably by his or her employer than the employer treats a 
comparable full-time worker unless such treatment can be objectively justified.    In 
determining whether a part-time worker has been treated less favourably than a 
comparable full-time worker, the pro rata principle is applied, unless it is inappropriate374.  
A comparable full-time worker is someone who is employed by the same employer as the 
                                                          
371 Walby and Olsen (n66)  
372 For a discussion of the differences between these terms see 3.1.3   
373 Under regulation 2 of the PtWR, the definition is a worker who is "paid wholly or in part by reference to the 
time they work and, having regard to the custom and practice of the employer in relation to workers 
employed by the worker’s employer under the same type of contract, are not identifiable as full-time workers".  
A full time worker is defined as is a worker who is paid wholly or in part by reference to the time he works 
and, having regard to the custom and practice of the employer in relation to workers employed under the 
same type of contract. 
374 Regulation 5(3) 
 149 
part-time worker under the same type of contract; both the part-time worker and the 
comparable full-time worker must also be engaged in the same or broadly similar work 
4.5.3 There is one exception where a comparator is not required; where a worker has 
ceased to be a full-time worker and become a part-time worker, the worker can rely on a 
hypothetical worker who is employed on the contract which the worker was employed 
prior to becoming a part-time worker.  This applies even where a worker has had a period 
of absence of up to 12 months between being a full-time worker and returning as a part-
time worker375.   
CRITIQUE 
4.5.4 It may seem self-evident, but the PtWR only offer protection to workers who 
work fewer hours than the employer’s norm; they do not provide any protection for those 
workers who work from home or who work the normal number of hours but in a non-
standard way.   By way of example, in the case of Gill Switalski v F&C Asset Management376  
the Claimant worked from home on a Friday to spend more time with her children, but 
found that she was questioned about why she was not in the office on these days.  As she 
was not a part-time worker, the Claimant would not be able to bring a claim under the 
PtWR.  As, in this case, there was a male comparator who also worked from home and 
was not quizzed about his flexible working arrangements, the Claimant could bring a 
direct sex discrimination claim, but in many cases the reasons that a parent who chooses 
to work flexibly will be subject to detriment (which in some cases maybe by being subject 
to additional scrutiny of their work in comparison to other workers) will not be as a result 
of his/her sex but simply the fact that they are working flexibly.  Similarly, the fact that a 
parent cannot attend work during particular hours due to his or her childcare 
responsibilities will not result in that worker being a part-time worker, and thus the 
worker enjoys no protection under the PtWR for any detriment that follows for not being 
                                                          
375 There is one exception to this, where the employer can show that had the returning worker continued to 
work under the above contract, a variation would have been made to its terms during the period of absence, 
the contract on which the hypothetical worker will be employed will be a contract including that variation. 
376 UKEAT/0423/08 
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able to work those hours377.  It thus does nothing to address the fact that the norm is a 
male unencumbered worker and that there is a need for assimilation under the current 
theoretical framework.  The lack of protection for working parents in these circumstances 
is clearly a failing in the current legislative regime.  This particular problem again 
highlights the difficulties in using a piecemeal approach to providing rights to allow 
parents to combine work and family.   
The comparator requirement 
4.5.5 The requirement that the comparator be engaged on the same type of contract is 
problematic.  As Fredman has noted378 employers may avoid their responsibilities under 
the PtWR by using agency workers to fill part-time roles.  In this way full time workers 
and part-time workers would be employed under different types of contracts, and thus 
no comparator would be available379.  This particular issue is of great concern in relation 
to zero hours contracts in light of the CJEU decision in Wippel v Peek380 that the contract of 
a zero hours’ worker was not comparable to the contract that a full-time worker would be 
employed on.   This leaves zero hours workers with very little protection – they work less 
hours than a full-time worker (and therefore, for the purposes of the PtWR, would be part-
time workers) but enjoy no protection under the PtWR as there is no comparator.  There 
are currently no statistics available on the number of working parents who are engaged 
on this type of contract and so it is difficult to assess whether these issues will have a 
disproportionate impact on parents.  Unlike sex discrimination legislation, it is not 
possible for there to be a hypothetical comparator in PtWR cases381 (other than, as set out 
at 4.5.3 where the part-time worker has transferred from full-time work for the same 
                                                          
377 This was the issue in Chief Constable of West Midlands v Blackburn [2008] EWCA Civ 1208.  The Claimants 
were full time employees who were unable to work a 24/7 rotating shift pattern due to childcare 
responsibilities.  Those employees working a 24/7 rotating shift pattern received additional remuneration.  As 
the number of hours worked by the Claimants was the same as “normal”, they would not have qualified for 
protection under the PtWR.  (In this case, instead the Claimants brought an equal pay claim in respect of this 
matter.) 
378 Fredman (n127)  
379 This might be an attractive proposition to employers as agency workers also enjoy less rights and 
protections under the law.  For example, they are not entitled to parental leave or EDL, and they have no 
protection under the unfair dismissal provisions in the ERA.   
380 C313/02, [2004] ECR I-9483 
381 Tyson v Concurrent Systems Incorporated Limited, unreported, EAT0028/03 but note that this case is useful 
from a practical point of view, since it suggests that as well as considering the comparator proposed by the 
Claimant, if the tribunal finds that the proposed comparator is not a comparator for the purposes of the 
PTWR, the tribunal is obliged to consider whether anyone else is a comparator. 
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employer).  The Summary of Regulatory Impact Assessment on the PtWR382 estimated 
that of the 6 million part-time employees in Great Britain, only 1 million had a comparable 
full-time employee.  This means that for those 5 million part-time employees without a 
comparable full-time employee, there is no protection, even where it is obvious that part-
time employees are treated less favourably than full-time employees.    
4.5.6  However, the requirement for a comparator on the same type of contract as the 
part-time worker is another illustration of the need for assimilation under the current 
theoretical framework.  This clearly limits the PtWR’s ability effectively to prevent all 
part-time workers (irrespective of the form of part-time working that they are engaged 
on) from being treated less favourably than full-time workers.   
Gender divide  
4.5.7 Almost three quarters of part-time workers are women383 and a considerably 
greater proportion (37%) of mothers with dependent children work part-time as 
compared to fathers with dependent children (6%)384.  As such, one would expect that the 
overwhelming majority of reported cases would involve female claimants – however, of 
the reported decisions on the PtWR only 13 of 24 reported cases385 were brought by female 
claimants.  This is because, just as MacKinnon has noted in the context of sex 
discrimination cases “[a]s applied, the sameness standard has mostly gotten men the 
benefit of those few things women have historically had...”386.  Assimilation does not help 
in the parenting context because no-one already has the rights that are needed. 
Do the provisions assist parents? 
4.5.8 It is interesting that, whilst the PtWR have the capability of assisting parents in 
combining work and family, there are very few reported cases on the PtWR where this 
                                                          
382 http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/ptriasum.htm 
383 Between October and December 2014, there were 8.29 million in part-time employment , of which 2.15 
million were men and 6.14 million were women.  Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin, UK Labour 
Market, February 2015,  18 February 2015   
384Labour Force Statistics (ONS) ‘Gender Working Patterns’ http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/what-
we-do/publication-scheme/published-ad-hoc-data/pre-june-2012/gender/index.html.  These statistics are in 
respect of the second quarter of 2011; currently no later statistics are available.   
385 See Annex 3 for details of the cases 
386 MacKinnon (n49), p35  
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was the reason for the litigation.  Of 27 reported cases, only three387 were clearly brought 
by parents attempting to secure rights as part-time workers388.  It is noteworthy that in all 
of these cases the claimants also brought indirect sex discrimination claims in tandem.  
This seems to suggest that the existing provisions prohibiting indirect sex discrimination 
may already have addressed the problems that the PtWR were designed to solve.  (This 
might potentially explain why a disproportionate number of reported claims on the PtWR 
have been brought by men and why so few have been brought by claimants who are 
working parents).  Further, there are also a number of cases which relate to parents 
working part-time and which have been brought under the indirect sex discrimination 
provisions rather than the PtWR and where the PtWR would not seem to have been 
capable of assisting the parents to combine their work and family responsibilities.   
4.5.9 There is no protection in the PtWR that guarantees part-time workers the right to 
part-time working if they change role, for example if they are successful in applying for a 
more senior position.  This occurred in the case of Aviance UK Ltd v Garcia-Bello389.  Ms 
Garcia-Bello worked part-time.  She successfully applied for a new job but her employer 
required her to work on a rotational roster basis (which she could not do due to her 
childcare responsibilities).  There was no claim under the PtWR as Ms Garcia-Bello was 
not treated differently (or less favourably) than full time employees, all of whom would 
be required to work on a rotational roster basis.  (The Claimant was successful in her 
indirect discrimination claim as she was able to show that women with childcare 
responsibilities suffered detriment through the use of fixed rotational shifts and the 
Respondent was not able to show that its practice of imposing these was objectively 
justified.)  This issue is particularly important in light of the critique above which suggests 
                                                          
387 Herbert Smith Solicitors v Langton UKEAT/0242/05 and UKEAT/0437/05, Ms C Short (Appeal No 2) v P J 
Hayman & Co Ltd UKEAT/0379/08/CEA, DR Simpson (Chilled Foods Ltd) v Stafford EAT/440/01 
388 There are a further seven cases where the claimants may have been parents, but it is not apparent from the 
facts stated in the judgement to determine this either way.  Sharma v Manchester City Council [2008] ICR 623 (in 
this case there were multiple claimants, some of whom may have been parents trying to combine work and 
family responsibilities), McMenemy v Capita Business Services Ltd [2006] IRLR 761 (no information is provided 
as to why the Claimant was working part-time), England v Turnford School Governing Body EAT/438/02 (no 
information is provided as to why the Claimant was working part-time), Hendrickson Europe Ltd v Pipe 
EAT/0272/02 (no information as to why the Claimant was working part-time),  Royal Mail Group plc v Lynch 
EAT/0426/03 (no information as to why the Claimant was working part-time),  James v Great North Eastern 
Railway UKEAT/0496/04 (no information as to why the Claimants were working part-time) and Carl v the 
University of Sheffield [2009] 3 CMLR 21 
389 UKEAT/0044/07/DA 
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that currently part-time work seems to be limited to low-value roles.  Where a part-time 
worker demonstrates the necessary skills and experience to be promoted, the fact that an 
employer can require them to undertake the new role on a full-time basis and the PtWR 
provides no protection in these circumstances, means that effectively they allow 
employees to continue to restrict part-time work to low-value roles and does not 
guarantee the right to work part-time.   
4.5.10 The other problem with the comparator approach is that it only guarantees equal 
treatment to that already received by full-time workers, yet there may be some aspects of 
a role that a part-time worker cannot adhere to because of the reasons for their working 
part-time.  In these circumstances there is no protection under the PtWR.  For example, in 
Rollinson v P&B Baldwin390 the Claimant had needed to work part-time in order to 
accommodate her childcare responsibilities.  She had agreed with her employer that she 
would work on Tuesdays and Wednesdays and other shifts where her partner was 
available to look after their daughter.  However, the employer’s policy was that workers 
had to cover the shifts of others who were ill.  The Claimant was unable to comply with 
this (due to needing to care for her child).  Given that the policy applied to all workers, 
and not just part-time workers, there could be no claim under the PtWR as there was no 
less favourable treatment.  However, this type of practice clearly significantly 
disadvantages those that are working part-time in order to care for a child (or any other 
dependent).  Similarly, in Banner Business Supplies Ltd v Greaves391 the Claimant was a part-
time worker who worked part-time because of her childcare responsibilities.  Her contract 
(and that of all other employees) provided that she had to assist with the employer’s 
annual stocktake.  The Claimant was unable to do so as she had no-one else to care for her 
child (and in this case, very little notice of the stocktake appears to have been given to 
allow workers to find any cover for this type of issue).  Again, as there was no less 
favourable treatment, there could be no claim under the PtWR, despite the fact that the 
only reason that the Claimant worked part-time was to allow her to combine her job and 




childcare responsibilities and requiring this type of flexibility/additional hours would 
clearly undermine this.    
4.5.11 One of the difficulties with part-time work highlighted in Chapter 1 is the fact 
that many of the roles that are available on a part-time basis have low pay (and 
accordingly low prospects and status).  The pay gap between full-time and part-time work 
is 38%392.  The PtWR seem to do little to address this issue; the issue with part-time work 
does not tend to be direct or deliberate discrimination, such that a full-time worker doing 
the same role is treated more favourably, but rather is the fact that part-time working 
arrangements are often only available for particular (low-paid) types of work.  The PtWR 
do not assist with this, given the requirement to find a comparable full-time worker who 
is doing the same role.  In fact, the equal pay provisions in the EqA 2010 may often be of 
greater assistance since they allow the worker to compare their terms and conditions not 
only with someone who is doing the same role as them but who is doing a different role, 
but one of equal value to the organisation.  However, even these provisions do not address 
the problem of part-time workers being herded into low-value roles.   They also do 
nothing to change the norm – which remains a full-time worker.  This is the reason why 
those working part-time are often disadvantaged, because they can never comply with 
this standard.   
 
4.6 WORKING TIME REGULATIONS 
4.6.1 Although, the WTR are not specifically directly at enabling parents to combine 
work and family responsibilities, they may assist working parents in doing so.  This is 
through the limitation of the number of hours that an employee may spend at work and 
by providing an entitlement to paid holiday.  The WTR apply to workers, rather than just 
employees and, unlike the legislation discussed above in this chapter, they expressly 
                                                          
392 See n41 for details of how this is calculated 
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include agency workers within their remit (save for one minor carve out393). The main 
provisions of the relevant sections of the WTR are summarised below.   
Working time 
4.6.2 A worker’s working time, which includes overtime, is limited to 48 hours in a 
week.  This 48 hour period is averaged over a reference period which is 17 weeks unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties394.     However, employees can elect to opt out of the 48 
hour working week subject to complying with certain requirements395.   Where they do 
so, the employer must maintain lists of those who have opted out. There are no other 
requirements under the WTR 1998 that the employer keep any record of any other 
information. 
Entitlement to Paid Holiday 
4.6.3 Workers are entitled to 5.6 weeks’ leave396 up to a maximum of 28 days (which is 
pro-rated if they work part-time).  In order to take leave under the WTR the worker must 
give at least twice as many days’ notice as the number of days the worker wishes to take 
leave.  An employer is able to refuse the worker’s request for leave so long as the worker 
is allowed to take holiday later in the year397.  If the employer refuses the request for leave, 
it must give at least as many days’ notice as the number of days’ holiday requested by the 
worker398. 
4.6.4 An employer can specify particular dates on which workers have to take some or 
all of their leave399 subject to providing the employee with at least twice as many days’ 
notice as the number of days involved400. 
                                                          
393 This is where they are a party to the contract under which their services are provided and the status of that 
contract is not client/customer 
394 The period can be altered by a workforce agreement, a collective agreement if this forms part of the contract 
between the worker and the employer, or any other agreement in writing between the worker and the 
employer so long as this agreement is enforceable as between the worker and the employer. 
395 The agreement must be in writing and must be terminable on no more than 3 months’ notice,  
396 Regulation 13(12) WTR  
397 Regulation 15(1), (3) and (4) 
398 Regulation 15(2)(b), (3) and (4) 
399 Regulation 15(2)(a) 




4.6.5 Crompton has suggested “…controls over working hours would make a major 
contribution to a reconfiguration of employment and family life.  If working hours were 
shorter, men would be enabled to increase their contribution to the work of caring, and 
women would be better enables to avoid the ‘mummy tract’ of part-time work…”401.  It 
seems likely that limiting the number of hours that employees are obliged to work may 
better enable both parents (rather than just mothers) to care for their children.  This would 
be consistent with a move towards valuing parenting.  Research has shown that fathers 
are likely to regularly work over 48 hours per week402.  As such, the responsibility for 
childcare is more likely to fall to the other parent in the household, the mother. Given that 
men are likely to earn more than women, if one parent has to work fewer hours than the 
other in order to care for children, thereby reducing that parent’s (and the household’s) 
income, it is more likely to be the parent earning the smaller income who will reduce her 
hours.  However, controls over working hours will only make a difference where those 
are effective and the WTR 1998 seems    to have had little impact on the number of hours 
that UK workers spend at work.  Analysis carried out by the Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills suggests "that the introduction of the WTRs had little discernible 
impact on total hours worked across the economy..."403. 
4.6.6 The opt out is frequently criticised by those who believe its inclusion undermines 
the legislation.  There is also some scope for questioning the validity of the opt-out. In the 
High Court decision of Oakley v Animal404 the defendant argued that the transitional 
provisions of the Registered Design Regulations (which was to implement Council 
Directive (EC) 98/71 (the “Registered Design Directive”)) were ultra vires.  Under the 
Registered Design Directive Member States were permitted, by use of a derogation, to 
                                                          
401 Crompton (n7), p218 
402 According to one report over a third of fathers regularly work 48 hours or more.   Laura Biggart and 
Margaret O’Brien, “Fathers’ working hours: parental analysis from the third work-life balance employee survey”, 
November 2009 
403 Ciaran Devlin, Alex Shirvani, "BIS Analysis Paper Number 5: The Impact of the Working Time Regulations on the 
UK market: A review of evidence", BIS, December 2014, p7 
404 [2005] EWHC 419 (Pat)  
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retain existing legislation for designs registered prior to the implementation of the 
Registered Design Directive.  The UK chose to utilise this derogation by way of Statutory 
Instrument.  The defendant successfully argued that, where a Directive contains a 
derogation, the Member State is not obliged to implement it but has the choice whether 
to do so or not.  The defendant further argued that section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (the “ECA”) only allowed the Secretary of State to implement 
European legislation which the UK is obliged to enact, and not that which it is permitted 
to.  As such any attempt to implement a derogation through the use of section 2(2) of the 
ECA would be ultra vires.   
4.6.7 This decision in Oakley v Animal was the subject of a successful appeal to the Court 
of Appeal.  In reaching their decision to allow the appeal, both Lord Justice Waller and 
Lord Justice May appear to have determined the case on the basis that these were 
transitional provisions allowing a former law to be retained. Since the opt out in the WTR 
is not a transitional provision, any comments by the Court of Appeal on this are not 
relevant to the validity of the opt out under English law following Oakley.   
4.6.8 To the extent that Lord Justice Waller and Lord Justice May made comments 
relating to section 2(2)(b) of the ECA, these were  general, and therefore of little practical 
use.    Only Lord Justice Jacob refers to the application of section 2(2)(a) to derogations 
rather than transitional provisions, and it is arguable his remarks fail to appreciate the 
nature of derogations contained in regulations such as WTR. Lord Justice Jacob rejected 
the High Court’s decision as he found it to be “a non-purposive and irrational 
construction of s2(2)(a)” suggesting that in most cases implementing directives would 
involve making the choice of how to exercise an option specifically conferred by the 
directive.  Whilst it is true that many directives do confer such choices upon the 
legislature, it must also be acknowledged that some of these choices are more significant 
than others, and for this reason should be enacted by primary rather than secondary 
legislation.  As the Secretary of State in Oakley recognised, secondary legislation cannot 
be amended by either the House of Commons or the House of Lords and, as such, if the 
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legislation is unacceptable to members of either House the only course open to them 
would be to defeat the secondary legislation as a whole.  In the case of the WTR, the 
decision to include the opt out (which is included permanently unlike the legislation in 
question in Oakley) was a very significant policy choice, since, for the reasons outlined 
below, it was made in order to reduce the efficacy of this legislation.   
4.6.9 The reason for the legislator’s attempt to minimise the impact of the WTR stems 
from the circumstances surrounding its enactment.  The Working Time Directive had 
been implemented by the European Council under article 118A of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community.  The UK Government (which was Conservative at the time) 
mounted a challenge to the legal basis of the Directive in March 1994 and sought to argue 
that it had been incorrectly implemented under article 118A as it did not relate to health 
and safety.  The CJEU confirmed that the directive had been correctly implemented under 
article 118A of the treaty.  The UK Government was thus forced to implement the Working 
Time Directive and so sought to minimise its effect through the use of the derogation. 
4.6.10 By virtue of the fact that the derogation permitted by the Working Time Directive 
involved a significant policy decision, the derogation in the WTR can be distinguished 
from that contained within the Registered Designs Regulations.  Lord Justice May’s 
comments appear to relate to those derogations which are less significant which would 
exclude those, such as the one in the WTR, which have the effect of undermining the 
European legislation being implemented.  The derogation in Oakley was less significant – 
it ensured that the new European legislation did not affect those designs that had been 
registered under the old regime.  It is fairly common in English law for this to be done.  
For example, vast sections of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) do not apply to 
companies registered before the CA 2006 became effective.  These companies continue to 
be governed by the earlier legislation which has been superseded for new companies by 
the CA 2006.   The derogation in the WTR is of a completely different character.  It has the 
effect of undermining the European legislation rendering it less effective.  It can therefore 
be argued that, notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeal in Oakley v Animal, 
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the opt out in the WTR is ultra vires because it was implemented by a Statutory Instrument, 
section 2(2) of the ECA405 not allowing such implementation because there was no 
obligation upon the UK to allow the opt out.  
4.6.11   In addition to the constitutional arguments relating to whether the opt out is 
ultra vires the ECA, it may also be argued that the UK has not properly implemented the 
Directive as a matter of European law.  The Directive provides that a Member State has 
the option not to implement the provisions limiting the working week to 48 hours while 
respecting the general principles of the protection of the safety and health of workers.  It 
further requires that employers keep records of all employees who have opted out and 
that such records are available to the competent authorities which may prohibit or restrict 
the employer from allowing its employees to exceed the 48 hour week.  However, whilst 
Regulation 9 WTR requires an employer to keep records on compliance with the WTR, 
this only applies “in the case of each worker employed by him in relation to whom they 
[the limits] apply”.  As such, there is no requirement on UK employers to maintain records 
of the number of hours that an employee who has opted out of the 48 hour working week 
has worked, since the limits in the WTR will not apply to him/her.   
4.6.12 A challenge might be made to GB legislation on the basis that the UK has not 
taken adequate measures to ensure the general principle of the protection of the safety 
and health of workers. In the House of Commons the Minster for Science (Lord Sainsbury 
of Turville) stated that  “… if someone is considered to be at risk, the health and safety 
authorities will be able to obtain any further information, including the keeping of records 
necessary to protect the health and safety of workers through the use of existing safety 
law”.   However, as at 1 March 2015 there were no records of any enforcement actions or 
prosecutions in the HSE database concerning employees that had opted out of the WTR. 
                                                          
405 This section provides that “...any designated Minister or department may by order, rules, regulations or 
scheme, make provision—(a) for the purpose of implementing any EU obligation of the United Kingdom, or 
enabling any such obligation to be implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed by the 
United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or 
(b)for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or rights or the 
coming into force, or the operation from time to time, of subsection (1) above;...” 
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4.6.13 Finally, past research has suggested that those that enter into the opt out do not 
do so willingly; research conducted on behalf of the DTI in 2003406 showed that 44% of 
those that have signed an opt-out say that it was a condition of their employment407.  
Further, the same research suggested that some employers may flagrantly be breaching 
the WTR by pressurising workers who have not signed the opt out to work hours in excess 
of the 48 hour working week.  There is no reason to suspect that there has been any change 
in this position.  Labour Force Survey figures from 2013408 show that 58% of employees 
that usually work more than 48 hours per week they would prefer fewer hours, with the 
same survey showing that 13% of that group would prefer to work fewer hours even if it 
meant less pay.  This suggests that not all workers who work long hours do so voluntarily.  
4.6.14 There appears to be no effective mechanism for external monitoring of how many 
hours workers are working409 – as with the other “family-friendly” rights, the emphasis 
is upon an individual taking action against his/her employer.  For the reasons set out in 
Chapter 6 this is far from ideal.   
Annual Leave 
4.6.15 Unlike the other rights to time off from work (i.e. maternity leave, paternity leave, 
EDL) the right to leave under the WTR is to leave paid at the employee’s usual wage.  
Therefore, none of the difficulties highlighted in respect of unpaid leave apply here.     This 
also demonstrates that society as a whole recognises the importance of workers having 
time off.   
4.6.16 The right to annual leave may have the effect of slightly modifying the norm.  No 
longer is a worker expected to be available to work continuously; he is entitled to time off.  
This can be helpful for parents who might need the occasional day or week off to look 
                                                          
406 A Survey of Workers Experiences of the Working Time Regulations, DTI Employment Relation Series No 
31, 2004 
407 There is no update to this research. 
408 ONS, 2013 
409 Under the WTR, where an employer utilises the opt out, s/he is obliged to keep records showing the 
number of hours worked, however, there is no obligation to do so where the employer does not utilise the opt 
out – and these records are only required to be made available to an inspector appointed by the Health and 
Safety Executive or any other authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the WTR – there is no 
requirement to disclose this information to the employees (or their employee representatives, such as the trade 
unions) or to make it publicly available 
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after their child.  However, the impact on the norm is reduced by the fact that employers 
are able to require workers to take their annual leave on particular dates.  The case of 
Sumsion v BBC410 is of concern in this regard.  In that case, the worker, who was contracted 
to be available for work six days per week (including Saturdays) for a period of six months 
was required to take his annual leave in single days on every other Saturday rather than 
(as he wished) in a block at the end of the six-month period.  The EAT found that this was 
permissible under the legislation.   
Conclusion 
4.6.17 The WTR should enable parents to combine work and family in two ways: by 
limiting the number of hours that parents have to spend at work (and thereby increasing 
the number of hours that they have to spend with their children), and by allowing parents 
to have paid time off from work.  Unfortunately, the WTR seems to have had little impact 
on the former, and one of the key reasons for this seems to be the fact that the UK 
legislation includes an opt out from the 48 hour working week. 
4.6.18 The opt out, is not the only derogation from the maximum working week.  There 
is a further derogation in regulation 20 of the WTR which applies in relation to workers 
where their “working time is not measured or predetermined or can be determined by 
the worker himself”.  Research suggests that currently employers tend to use the opt out 
“in preference to other derogations, as the most convenient and effective mechanism for 
avoiding the 48-hour limit on weekly working time”411.  The same research notes that the 
scope of the unmeasured working time derogation was “highly uncertain” but that this 
was rectified by amending the WTR to broaden the range of workers that it applied to 
and include those whose working time was partly unmeasured or partly determined by 
the worker, by adding regulation 20(2).  On this basis the research found that even without 
the opt out, many workers would still not be covered by the maximum working week as 
they would be covered by the unmeasured time derogation.  However, in EC Commission 
                                                          
410 UKEATS/0042/06 
411 Richard Hobbs, Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, “Opting out of the 48-hour week: employer necessity 
or individual choice? an empirical study of the operation of article 18(1)(b) of the Working Time Directive in 
the UK”, ILJ 2003, 32(4), 223-252 
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v UK412 the CJEU found that regulation 20(2) meant that the UK had failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the Working Time Directive.  Regulation 20(2) was repealed with effect 
from 6 April 2006413.  This significantly limits the application of the unmeasured working 
time derogation and, as noted, the prior position means that its application is “highly 
uncertain”.  Whilst there is no doubt that, as noted by commentators such as Kenner414 
that employers would seek to make more use of the unmeasured working time 
derogation, given it only relates to workers whose time is unmeasured or determined by 
the worker, it would seem unlikely that it would allow the same number of workers to 
opt out.    However, there are no statistics to show how many workers who opt out would 
be covered by the unmeasured time derogation.  The inclusion of the opt out was a 
deliberate choice of the Government who wanted to limit the effect of the WTR, and it is 
this choice which undermines the effectiveness of the legislation and results in the 
maximum working week, failing to enable parents to combine work and family. 
4.6.19 The requirement for workers to be provided with 5.6 weeks’ paid holiday can be 
of assistance to parents, but only where employers do not exercise their right to determine 
what days must be taken as holiday.  Thus the effectiveness of this right as a tool for 
enabling parents to combine work and family responsibilities is questionable.   
4.7 Conclusion on non-gender specific rights 
4.7.1 In the preceding chapter, I concluded that the gender specific rights were 
fundamentally flawed because they retained the emphasis on mothers as the primary 
carers of children, rather than enabling parents to share childcare responsibilities.  The 
non-gender specific rights do not share this flaw, however because there are separate 
rights, which have different rules attached, the law on parental rights becomes quite 
complex and this can result in the legislation not operating as a coherent whole.  In most 
cases they do little to change the norm, which remains an unencumbered worker.  Further, 
                                                          
412 Case C-484/04, [2006] ECR I-7471 
413 The Working Time (Amendment) Regulations 2006, SI2006/99 
414 Jeff Kenner “Working Time, Jaeger and the Seven Year Itch”, 11 Colum J Eur L 53 (2004-2005) 
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the rights themselves simply are not fit for purpose and in many cases an employee’s most 
effective claim will be under the sex discrimination provisions.  As such, in the next 
chapter, I consider to what degree the discrimination provisions are effective in enabling 
parents to combine their work and family responsibilities.     
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CHAPTER 5 :  DISCRIMINATION  
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the discrimination legislation 
can be used to assist parents in combining work and family.  I intend to follow the 
approach adopted so far and to consider the issues relating to pregnancy separately from 
those relating to childcare.   
5.1.2 As only women can become pregnant, any detrimental (or different treatment) on 
the basis of pregnancy is connected to a person’s sex.  However, as outlined below, there 
have historically been some significant problems in applying the sex discrimination 
model to pregnancy related issues, not least the issue of who should be the appropriate 
comparator (discussed further below at 5.2.2). 
5.1.3 Unlike pregnancy, detriment or differential treatment as a result of childcare 
responsibilities can be experienced by workers and employees of both sex.  Often the 
reason for an employee or worker experiencing a detriment (or differential treatment) will 
not be because of the employee’s sex but because the employee’s attention is seen by the 
employer to be diverted from the workplace.  This is because they are no longer able to 
comply with the norm of the unencumbered worker.  As such, it may not immediately be 
apparent how sex discrimination legislation can assist.  Indirect discrimination legislation 
has often been used for these types of issue, based on the fact that mothers typically have 
primary responsibility for childcare.   There have also been some legal developments 
through the introduction of the idea of associative discrimination, which may mean that 
the prohibition on direct discrimination may also be of use for childcare type issues 
(further analysis of this is set out below at 5.2.21).  It might also be of use if employers 
exhibit gender stereotyping behaviour by, for example, refusing to allow men flexibility 
in circumstances where they allow this for women.   
5.1.4 Before analysing the effectiveness of the current sex discrimination provisions in 
enabling parents to combine work and family responsibilities, I outline the way in which 
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the prohibition on sex discrimination operates.  The relevant provisions can be found in 
the Equality Act 2010 (the “EqA”) (previously these were contained in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 (the “SDA”)).  Under the EqA there are two relevant forms of 
discrimination: direct and indirect.  (It should be noted that, for disability discrimination, 
there are additional forms of discrimination, including the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments.)  The definitions of both refer to “protected characteristics”.  For the 
purposes of analysing the provisions that may be of assistance to parents, I will focus on 
the following “protected characteristics”: (i) sex, (ii) marriage or civil partnership and (iii) 
pregnancy and maternity415.  However, in interpreting the definitions of direct and 
indirect discrimination the case law relating to the other protected characteristics may be 
of assistance.  Given that direct and indirect discrimination are two very distinct concepts, 
I will consider each separately, starting first with direct discrimination.   
5.2 Direct Discrimination 
5.2.1 It is important to understand how the concept of direct discrimination has 
evolved.   As such, I will first consider some of the difficulties that have at one time 
prevented the prohibition on direct discrimination from assisting parents in combining 
work and family responsibilities and how these have been overcome, before then moving 
on to consider the current law on direct discrimination in relation to sex, maternity and 
pregnancy and marriage or civil partnership.   
Historical issues 
5.2.2 Prior to the EqA, the prohibition on direct sex discrimination was contained in 
the SDA.  Subsection 1(1)(a) of the SDA provided that “…a person discriminates against 
a woman if on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or would 
treat a man”.  This provision was interpreted with reference to subsection 5(3) of the SDA 
which provided that where there was a comparison of the cases of persons of different 
sex under section 1(1) or (2), the comparison must be such that the relevant circumstances 
                                                          
415 The other protected characteristics are: age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief and 
sexual orientation. 
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in the one case were the same, or not materially different, in the other.  This demonstrates 
the way that direct discrimination is underpinned by the assimilation model.  Similarly, 
section 3 of the SDA provides that there was discrimination if a person who was married 
or in a civil partnership was treated less favourably than someone who was not married 
or in a civil partnership.   
5.2.3 A significant problem that women faced in seeking to rely on the prohibition on 
sex discrimination in connection with pregnancy was the requirement for a comparator.  
This was because in cases of pregnancy Employment Tribunals (“ETs”) initially insisted 
on including pregnancy (as distinct from the need for time off) as a relevant characteristic, 
which meant that it was impossible to find a man who had the same relevant 
circumstances (on the basis that a man can never be pregnant).  In Turley v Allders 
Department Stores Ltd416, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that dismissing 
a woman because she was pregnant did not amount to direct discrimination under the 
SDA.  In Hayes v Malleable Working Men’s Club417, the EAT approached the issue slightly 
differently, focussing on the reason for dismissal as being the need for time off by way of 
maternity leave.   In Webb v Air Cargo (UK) Ltd418, the Claimant had been employed to 
cover a maternity absence, but found out that she was pregnant, shortly after her 
employment commenced.  The Respondent dismissed her on the basis that she was not 
available to do the job for which she had been engaged.  The Court of Appeal held that 
there was no sex discrimination as she had been dismissed on the basis that she was not 
available to do the job she had been employed to do, rather than because of her sex.  The 
domestic cases illustrated the problems, discussed in Chapter 2, with using a male (non-
pregnant) norm as the reference point.  The House of Lords referred the case to the CJEU 
as previous European decisions had not indicated whether in these circumstances it was 
possible to distinguish between not being available to do a job and pregnancy.   The CJEU 
held that it was not. 
                                                          
416 [1980] ICR 66 
417 [1985] ICR 703 
418 [1992] ICR 445 in the Court of Appeal; [1993] ICR 175 
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5.2.4 Following the intervention of the CJEU in Webb419, the English courts were forced 
to recognise that pregnancy discrimination constituted direct sex discrimination and 
removed the need for a comparator in relation to pregnancy discrimination claims.  
However, the need for a comparator still existed in relation to other types of 
discrimination and, outside of the pregnancy sphere, parents still had to find a 
comparator (whether real or hypothetical) of the other sex in order to bring their 
discrimination claim.  The legislation recognised that often it would be impossible to 
identify a comparator with the same relevant circumstances as the claimant and permitted 
the use of a hypothetical comparator420.  This was a rather circular construction – in 
determining the characteristics that the hypothetical comparator was to have, the Tribunal 
had to reach a determination of the reason for the treatment of the Claimant.  This issue 
was largely resolved by of the House of Lords in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary421.  In this case, the Claimant was a female chief inspector who had 
had her counselling responsibilities in respect of staff appraisals removed after 
complaints were made against her.  The House of Lords noted that sometimes it was 
impossible to separate the question of (i) whether a claimant had received less favourable 
treatment than the relevant comparator and (ii) whether the less favourable treatment was 
on the grounds of sex.  On this basis, it held that Tribunals could avoid the issue of 
identifying the appropriate comparator and instead concentrate on the reason for the 
treatment.  The reason for Ms Shamoon’s treatment was the fact that complaints had been 
made against her and not her sex.  Later cases, for example, Cordell v Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office422 have followed a similar approach noting that “…it is the reason 
why question that is in truth fundamental”.   
                                                          
419 [1994] ECR I-03567 
420 There was contradictory case law on whether there was an obligation on Tribunals to consider a 
hypothetical comparator even where this was not pleaded – in Bahl v Law Society [2003] IRLR 640 , the Court of 
Appeal held that an Employment Tribunal is not required to construct a hypothetical comparator but in some 
cases it would be prudent to do so, whereas in Balamoody v United Kingdon Central Council for Nursing 
Midwifery and Health Visiting [2003] IRLR 640 the Court of Appeal held that in circumstances where there was 
no actual comparator, the Tribunal had a duty to construct a hypothetical one.  These issues are now irrelevant 
given that, following Shamoon, tribunals no longer are required to consider the comparator question in the 
same way that they had previously. 
421 [2003] UKHL 11 
422 [2012] I.C.R. 280 
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Current issues 
5.2.5 Section 13 of the EqA sets out the definition of direct discrimination.  This 
provides that a person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected 
characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.  This is a 
different from the SDA, where the test required less favourable treatment on the ground 
of B’s sex.  The change in language from “on the ground of” to “because of” may not be 
significant, however, the removal of the reference to B’s sex, opens up the possibility of 
associative and perceived discrimination (for further discussion see 5.2.21 below).   
5.2.6 There is an exception related to pregnancy and childbirth; where the person 
complaining of alleged discrimination is a man, no account is to be taken of special 
treatment afforded to a woman in connection with pregnancy or childbirth423.   
Less favourable treatment 
5.2.7 There is a fundamental issue with the test for direct discrimination for those who 
wish to use it in the context of securing rights for parents: the idea that treatment must be 
“less favourable” (the position in relation to maternity/pregnancy discrimination where 
the test is different is discussed further below at 5.2.9).  This necessarily entails a 
comparison of the treatment of the claimant (most frequently a woman) with that of those 
of the opposite sex.  As argued in Chapter 2, this type of comparative approach is not the 
best way to secure equality for parents; it relies on a male unencumbered worker as the 
reference point   
5.2.8 One of the significant difficulties with any type of comparison is that it means 
that it is only possible, through the direct discrimination route, to secure the same 
treatment for women that is currently experienced by men.   Direct discrimination cannot 
address issues around poor treatment where poor treatment is given to all (rather than 
one group with a protected characteristic being singled out for poor treatment) as when 
an employer runs the defence that their unreasonable treatment of the claimant was not 
                                                          
423 section 13(6)(b), EqA  
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discriminatory because they behaved equally badly to all employees424.  Further, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the normal working day and work patterns in general (for 
example, in terms of the expectation that employees will be physically located in their 
employer’s premises, irrespective of whether this is actually necessary) are structured 
around a male norm which does not allow for any caring responsibilities.  For this reason, 
securing the same treatment as is currently experienced by men does not assist 
employees/workers in combining childcare responsibilities with work.   The situation is 
somewhat different in relation to pregnancy/maternity issues because, as highlighted 
above, the test for pregnancy/maternity discrimination is “unfavourable treatment” 
(rather than less favourable treatment) and thus, no comparator is required.   
A different test for pregnancy/maternity discrimination 
5.2.9 Sub-section 18(2) of the EqA provides that there is pregnancy/maternity 
discrimination where a person (A) discriminates against a woman if, in the protected 
period in relation to a pregnancy of hers, A treats her unfavourably because of the 
pregnancy, or because of illness suffered by her as a result of it.  As such, unlike the test 
for direct sex discrimination, there is no comparative exercise.   
5.2.10 There is little reported case law on what is meant by unfavourable treatment and 
none in relation to section 18 of the EqA425.  In Equant Integration Services Ltd t/a Orange 
Business Services v Mr A Blitz426, which concerned various issues of disability 
discrimination and constructive unfair dismissal, the EAT noted that there was a 
distinction between unfavourable treatment and detriment.   It stated that the two were 
distinct concepts and that there could be unfavourable treatment which did not lead to 
detriment (for example if no loss or injury were to be caused).  However, on the facts of 
                                                          
424 For example, in Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1998] IRLR 36.  There have been attempts to row back from 
this position – for example, Anya v University of Oxford and another [2001] IRLR 377 (CA), where Court of 
Appeal stated that there would need to be evidence of the equally bad treatment to all employees, rather than 
simply an assertion by the employer that this was the case.  In Bahl v Law Society and others [2004] IRLR 799 
(CA) the Court of Appeal interpreted Anya as showing that "discrimination may be inferred if there is no 
explanation for unreasonable treatment. This is not an inference from unreasonable treatment itself but from 
the absence of any explanation for it."  This was subsequently approved in Igen Ltd and others v Wong and other 
cases [2005] IRLR 258. 
425 There are two reported cases on s18 EqA: Maksymiuk v Bar Roma Partnership, UKEATS/0017/12 and Hair 
Division Ltd v Macmillan, UKEATS/0033/12 but neither deal with what is meant by the term “less favourable” 
treatment 
426 UKEAT/0259/07, UKEAT/0276/07, UKEAT/0500/07 
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this particular case427, the EAT felt that the two issues (detriment and unfavourable 
treatment) could be dealt with together.  On the basis of these comments, it would appear 
that “unfavourable treatment” may be wider than “detriment”428 since there is no need to 
show that the claimant has suffered any loss or injury as a result of the employer’s 
treatment, just that the treatment occurred.  That said, discrimination will only be 
unlawful if the relevant act falls within the scope of the legislation.  In relation to 
employees, this is set out in s39 of the EqA.  This provides that it must relate to the terms 
of employment, the manner in which an employee is afforded access to benefits, facilities 
and services, dismissal or any other detriment.   
5.2.11 Detriment itself seems to have a relatively wide definition.  In Shamoon the House 
of Lords held that there was no need to demonstrate some physical or economic 
consequence in order to show detriment but that “…the court or tribunal must find that 
by reason of the act or acts complained of a reasonable worker would or might take the 
view that he had thereby been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which he had 
thereafter to work”.  As such, the broad interpretation of unfavourable treatment would 
seem to be helpful for those bringing a direct discrimination claim. It is interesting, 
however, that the need for a comparator still applies in all other instances.  This 
significantly limits the usefulness of the direct discrimination provisions in trying to 
secure rights for parents because it relies on the assimilation model. 
 “Because of” 
5.2.12 In order to show direct sex discrimination, the claimant must show that the less 
favourable/unfavourable treatment is because of sex.  The early cases, where the test 
                                                          
427 Mr Blitz was employed in a role akin to that of an accountant and resigned in response to what he felt to be 
discriminatory treatment.  He brought claims for constructive unfair dismissal, various forms of disability 
discrimination (direct, failure to make reasonable adjustments, harassment, victimisation), indirect and direct 
discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, detriment/dismissal as a result of trade union activities and a 
claim in respect of annual leave accrued during sick leave.  One of the allegations relating to disability 
discrimination relating to the fact that his bonus has been reduced as a result of his absence and it was in this 
context that the EAT considered the issues of “detriment” and “unfavourable treatment” but felt that in any 
event, reduction of a bonus would have obvious consequences for an individual and therefore there was no 
basis on which to argue that it was not a detriment or unfavourable treatment.   
428 Paragraph 34 of the judgement states “Plainly there can be unfavourable treatment which does not lead to 
detriment, if there is nothing which can be described as loss or injury caused, or even emotional damage 
suffered to or by the victim”  
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under the SDA was “on grounds of” the claimant’s sex applied a “but for” test429 (ie but 
for the claimant’s sex s/he would not have been treated less favourably).   Later cases 
have focussed instead on the reason (or the ground) for the treatment430, which seems to 
be narrower than a “but for” test431.  It is easy to see how a woman who was subjected to 
unfavourable treatment on the basis that she was pregnant would be able to show that 
this was because of her sex (as pregnancy is invariably connected to sex, given that only 
women can become pregnant).  There is no longer any need to link pregnancy to sex now 
as pregnancy is a protected characteristic in its own right under the direct discrimination 
provisions.  Often though discriminatory behaviour does not manifest itself in such an 
obvious way.  
5.2.13 For women who are absent from work on maternity leave, a significant concern 
will be whether they will be able to return to the role that they held prior to their absence.  
The provisions on sex discrimination could assist in these circumstances if the only reason 
for the woman’s roles being changed was because she was pregnant or on maternity leave.  
This would amount to direct sex discrimination.  The difficulty, though, would be in 
showing that the treatment was because of the employee’s sex/pregnancy/maternity 
leave rather than, for example, because of a financial reason or a restructuring which 
happens to occur during the employee’s leave.  This can be seen in the case of S G Petch 
Ltd v Mrs S English-Stewart432.   
                                                          
429 For example, in James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 1 QB 61, which concerned a practice by a council-
run swimming pool of allowing free admittance for those of pensionable age.  This meant that women aged 60 
and above were admitted for free, but men had to be aged 65 and above to qualify for free admittance.  The 
Court of Appeal had held that this did not amount to unlawful direct discrimination on the basis that the 
reason for the differential treatment was not the individual’s sex but was because of the difference in 
pensionable age and therefore was not “on the grounds of” sex.  The House of Lords overturned this, holding 
that “but for” Mr James’ sex, he would have been given free admittance to the swimming pool.   
430 For example, in Amnesty International v Ahmed [2009] I.C.R. 1450, the EAT stated that the “but for” test used 
in relation to causation was not appropriate in discrimination cases and that “[t]he fact that a claimant's sex or 
race is a part of the circumstances in which the treatment complained of occurred, or of the sequence of events 
leading up to it, does not necessarily mean that it formed part of the ground, or reason, for that treatment”. 
431 By way of example, in the case of Martin v Lancehawk Ltd t/a European Telcom Solutions [2004] UKEAT 
0525/03/2203, which concerned a female employee who was dismissed after the end of an affair with the 
managing director at her employer, the claimant argued that “but for” her sex she would not have been in a 
relationship with her manager and therefore would not have been dismissed.  The EAT rejected this argument, 
finding that her dismissal was not “on the grounds of” her sex.  Whilst this is a sensible decision (on the basis 
that the claimant was disadvantaged because she had had a relationship with her manager, rather than 
because she was a woman) it illustrates the fact that the “but for” test is wider than the current test. 
432 UKEAT/0213/12 
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5.2.14 The Claimant, Mrs English-Stewart, worked on a part-time basis (3 days per 
week) as a manager in S G Petch’s sales and marketing department.  When she went on 
maternity leave, S G Petch did not appoint anyone as temporary maternity cover for the 
role, instead electing to allow its existing staff to take on the various tasks that comprised 
the Claimant’s role.  Because it was possible to cover the Claimant’s role without bringing 
in additional staff, S G Petch determined that her role was no longer required.  As such, 
the employer believed that there was a redundancy situation433 and ultimately dismissed 
the Claimant by reason of redundancy.  The termination was not discriminatory because 
the reason for the employee’s dismissal was a redundancy situation (the EAT referred 
back to the tribunal the question of whether this redundancy situation also applied to 
other employees, in which case the Claimant could challenge her selection for dismissal).  
However, it would seem that the only reason that the employer was able to identify the 
fact that it could restructure its sales and marketing department was because Mrs English-
Stewart was on leave.   
5.2.15 The EAT noted that “if in fact it [a dismissal which is only identified during an 
employee’s maternity leave] is not connected with maternity leave, then there is a real 
problem for a woman taking maternity leave that it may turn out in her absence not 
simply that someone else is better at the job than she but that her job itself is unnecessary, 
because it does not need to be carried on by anybody in her absence, thus revealing a 
redundancy situation, such as was the case here.  It appears to us that it must be that such 
a position falls within the rubric ‘connected with maternity leave’.” The EAT seems here 
to acknowledge that the redundancy situation might only have arisen because of Mrs 
English-Stewart’s maternity leave (hence the fact that it was “connected with maternity 
leave”). However, the ET was directed to consider whether the employer was in breach 
of the Maternity and Parental Leave, etc Regulations 1999 (“MPLR”); the effect of this 
                                                          
433 It should be noted that there is a separate issue in this case as to whether the redundancy situation applied 
only to Mrs English-Stewart’s role or also to others as regulation 20 of the MPLR provides that where the 
employment of an employee on maternity leave is terminated and there are other employees who held 
positions similar to that employee who were not selected and the reason for this was connected with the fact 
that the employee had taken maternity leave, then this will be an automatically unfair dismissal.  This would 
also almost invariably amount to direct discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy/maternity leave (as the 
selection will be tainted by reason of pregnancy/maternity).     
 173 
would be that her dismissal was unfair, but it would not have amounted to unlawful 
discrimination (because the reason for her dismissal was the redundancy situation and 
not her sex/pregnancy/maternity leave).   
5.2.16 It may well have been the case that, had one of the juniors in the department434 
been out on leave, her role (rather than the Claimant’s) would have been felt to be 
superfluous.  Indeed, this would seem to be the reason why the Tribunal was directed to 
consider whether other employees were in a similar situation to Mrs English Stewart (and 
therefore whether the relevant employees should have been pooled and appropriate 
selection criteria applied).  In these circumstances, it is possible that the Claimant could 
have tried to argue that the decision not to pool amounted to sex discrimination, however, 
the EAT did not direct the Tribunal to consider this issue.  
5.2.17  In Petch the only reason that Mrs English Stewart’s role was precarious was the 
fact that she was on maternity leave, allowing the employer to identify potential 
efficiencies.  Whilst ultimately the reason for the dismissal (redundancy) may not directly 
have been because of the Claimants’ maternity leave, there was an indisputable 
connection between the two.   
5.2.18 The prohibition on direct discrimination may also be of no assistance to women 
who are disadvantaged by their employer’s actions, where this disadvantage only occurs 
because they are on maternity leave or have childcare commitments, but where the reason 
for the employer’s actions is unconnected to their sex /pregnancy/maternity status.  The 
case of Chief Constable of Hampshire v Haque435 illustrates this point.  The Claimant, Ms 
Haque, was subjected to a disciplinary process which related to events that had occurred 
in August 2006 (prior to her maternity leave which had started by April 2008).  However, 
there was a delay in disciplining Ms Haque in relation to these issues and the disciplinary 
hearing was scheduled during her maternity leave.  The fact that the disciplinary hearing 
was conducted during the Claimant’s maternity leave placed her, as a new mother, at a 
                                                          
434 The sales and marketing team was comprised of Mrs English-Stewart (manager), Mr Smith (graphic design 
specialist), Ms Anderson (junior member of the team) and Ms Eavans (junior member of the team). 
435 [2012] Eq. L.R. 113 
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profound disadvantage: she was unable to properly prepare her case as she was caring 
for her new baby; she had to leave the hearing, when it took place, to attend her child; and 
she had to travel to and from the misconduct hearing, disrupting her young baby’s 
routine.  The EAT appeared to accept that the Claimant had suffered unfavourable 
treatment.  However, it found against the Claimant in relation to direct sex discrimination 
as the reason for the unfavourable treatment was not her sex (or the fact she was on 
maternity leave).  This appears to be an example of a case in which the employer should 
have been required to make adjustments to its usual process to accommodate the 
employee’s maternity leave and her associated childcare needs.  There was, however, no 
direct discrimination because the employer did not treat Ms Haque in the way that it did 
as a result of her sex or the fact that she was on maternity leave436; the issue was that it 
had failed to accommodate her needs as a new parent. 
5.2.19 Often the issues that parents (and particularly working mothers) face are not as a 
direct result of their sex but are related to the fact that they have children.  Women are 
currently particularly disadvantaged by this because of the sex-differentiated roles 
concerning childcare.  However, parental rights need to be based on more than just 
prohibitions on sex discrimination because if the aim (as explored in Chapter 1) is to 
encourage both parents to take equal responsibility for childcare, then only securing 
rights for women will be counterproductive in the long-run.  The Cordell case mentioned 
above at 5.2.2 is interesting in this context as it shows the limitations of direct 
discrimination where an employee requires an accommodation.  Ms Cordell was a deaf 
employee whom had been provided with a lipspeaker for previous roles with the same 
employer.  She was offered a role in Astana, Kazakhstan, subject to an assessment of 
whether accommodation of her disability could be made and the cost of this.  Her 
employer determined that the costs (which after various modifications to the length of the 
                                                          
436 British Telecommunications plc v Roberts and another [1996] I.C.R. 625 is another case where this issue can be 
seen.  Here, the EAT held that a refusal to allow two female employees, who were returning from maternity 
leave, to be employed on a job-share (previously both had been full time) could not be said to be “on the 
grounds of sex”.  Although the request was connected with pregnancy insofar as the pregnancy had resulted 
in the women having childcare responsibilities, the refusal was not “on the grounds of sex”.  In fact the EAT 
found that “[t]here was no evidence…to suggest that a man would have fared any better” again 
demonstrating the fact that direct discrimination is of little use in securing rights for mothers (with the 
possible exception of providing protection where there is a very direct link to pregnancy/maternity). 
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assignment and its scope were assessed to be £606,397 over a two year period) were such 
that the accommodation of her disability was not reasonable.  The EAT held that the 
reason why Ms Cordell was not given the role in Astana was the cost of the adjustment, 
not her disability.   Applying this logic to the issues facing parents in the workplace, it is 
likely that employers will be able to show that it is not the fact that an employee is, for 
example, a mother, that causes the disadvantage, but rather her need for time off or 
reduced hours. 
5.2.20 As such, direct discrimination is unlikely to enable parents to combine work and 
families as it only helps to secure rights that those conforming to the male norm (ie those 
who do not have caring responsibilities) already have.   
Associative discrimination 
5.2.21 Associative discrimination is a relatively newly utilised437 concept in English 
discrimination law438.   In Coleman v Attridge439 the Claimant, Ms Attridge, brought a direct 
disability discrimination claim on the basis that she had been treated less favourably 
because of her disabled son.  Whilst being a child per se is not a protected characteristic, 
age is.  As such, it may be possible for those with childcare responsibilities440 to construct 
an argument that less favourable treatment of them, on the grounds of these 
responsibilities, is direct age discrimination.  Before we examine this further, it is worth 
noting that there is one drawback to using age rather than any other protected 
characteristic: age is the only protected characteristic which includes a justification 
                                                          
437 Arguably it is not a new concept.  There is no reference in the legislation to “associative discrimination” 
rather it is the interpretation of the phrase “on the grounds of” / “because of” that gives rise to the possibility 
of discrimination by association.   
438 Although Coleman v Attridge Law ([2008] All E.R. (EC) 1105) has been attributed as developing the concept, 
arguably there were a few cases prior to this which laid the foundation for the possibility of this type of 
discrimination.  These include: Showboat Entertainment Centre Ltd v Owens [1984] 1 WLR 384, where the 
Claimant was successful in showing that he had been discriminated on racial grounds after he (a white male) 
refused to comply with his employer’s instructions not to admit young black people into an arcade and was 
dismissed for this; Weathersfield Ltd v Sargent [1999] ICR 425, where the claimant (a white woman) resigned 
from her role at a car hire company after being told that if persons of particular race/ethnicity phoned to hire 
cars, she should tell them that no vehicles were available – the Court of Appeal held that this constituted 
discrimination on racial grounds; and Saini v All Saints Hague Centre [2009] IRLR 74, where an employer was 
found to be trying to get rid of the claimant’s manager on account of his religious belief and bullied the 
claimant into giving evidence against his manager – the claimant was found to have been discriminated 
against on the grounds of religious belief.   
439 UKEAT/0071/09 
440 This argument could also be used by those with caring responsibilities, for example, for the elderly. 
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defence in relation to direct discrimination441.  I consider the issues relating to the current 
test of justification below at 5.3.27.   
The age discrimination argument 
5.2.22 A parent who is treated less favourably as a result of his/her status as a parent 
(or his/her childcare responsibilities) would be able to argue that the reason for his/her 
treatment was related to the age of his/her child and, as such, that this was “because of” 
age.  However, in order to even begin to argue this, the parent will need to show that there 
was less favourable treatment.  This will necessarily entail a comparative exercise with 
another employee without such childcare responsibilities.  Often442 employers will not 
object to the fact that an employee has children (or childcare responsibilities) but instead 
will object to any impact that this will have on the employee’s ability to conform with the 
employer’s normal working arrangements.  As such, any employee who, for example was 
unable to travel on business at short notice, required time off or was unable to work at 
particular times of the day would be treated equally poorly.  This point was illustrated in 
the Employment Tribunal judgement in Perrott v Department of Work and Pensions443.  The 
Claimant, who was the carer for her disabled sister, tried to argue that the fact that the 
Respondent’s special leave policy provided that, amongst other things, annual leave did 
not accrue during special leave amounted to unlawful discrimination.  The Tribunal held 
that there was no less favourable treatment of the Claimant (whether on the basis of her 
association with her sister or otherwise) as all employees who exercised the right to 
special leave were treated in the same way.  
5.2.23 In Kulikaoskas v Macduff Shellfish444 the Claimant tried to extend the concept in 
Coleman v Attridge to pregnancy.  He was a man working for the same employer as his 
pregnant partner and had assisted his partner by lifting heavy items for her, but this had 
                                                          
441 Section 13(2) of the EqA  
442 Although often this will be the case, there will be some examples of employers treating those with children 
less favourably.  On Ms Coleman’s argued case, there appeared to be some evidence of direct discrimination 
on the basis of the fact that she had a disabled son: she had not been able to return to her role after maternity 
leave whereas others had and had been denied flexible working arrangements that were given to other 
colleagues with non-disabled children.   
443 1600205/2011 – there are no official reports of this case, however the judgement and a summary of the case 
were published on plc.com 
444 [2011] I.C.R. 48 
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meant that he was not as productive in his own role.  As such, the employer dismissed 
him.  The case was brought under the SDA as the EqA was not in force at the relevant 
time.  The difference between the provisions of the SDA and the EqA is that, under the 
SDA, sex discrimination had to be on the grounds of the Claimant’s sex.   In this case, the 
Claimant unsuccessfully tried to argue that the treatment was on the grounds of, or 
because of, his partner’s pregnancy (which was not his own nor did it relate it any way to 
his sex).  The EAT also threw doubt on whether the EqA would have provided him with 
protection, stating that this “…was not entirely clear”445.   
5.2.24 The question mark over the applicability of associative discrimination to the type 
of fact pattern in Kulikaoskas could be as a result of sub-section 13(6)(b) of the EqA.  This 
provides that “…no account is to be taken of special treatment afforded to a woman in 
connection with pregnancy”.  There will be some occasions where women do need to be 
treated differently as a result of their pregnancy, for example, if an employer applies a 
requirement which pregnant women cannot comply with as a result of their pregnancy 
or maternity leave446 or where a special payment is made to women on maternity leave447 
(including, for example, a return to work bonus).  However, it is difficult to see how the 
type of behaviour by the employer in Kulikaoskas could fall within sub-section 13(6)(b).  
The Claimant in Kulikaoskas was not seeking to argue that he should be given time off 
work or any other special treatment that a pregnant employee should enjoy.  He was 
simply trying to argue that he should not be penalised for assisting his partner who was 
                                                          
445 As the EqA was not in force at the relevant times, these comments are obiter but it is interesting that the EAT 
believed that there was some uncertainty when the Explanatory Notes to the EqA  2010 state that “[d]irect 
discrimination occurs where the reason for a person being treated less favourably than another is a protected 
characteristic listed in section 4. This definition is broad enough to cover cases where the less favourable 
treatment is because of the victim’s association with someone who has that characteristic (for example, is 
disabled).”  It may be that sub-section 13(6)(b) of the EqA is the reason why the EAT felt that there was any 
doubt about whether the EqA would prohibit the type of conduct in Kulikaoskas as this provides that if the 
Claimant is a man, then no account is to be taken of special treatment afforded to a woman in connection with 
pregnancy or childbirth. 
446 Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse des Travailleurs Salaries v Thibault, (Case 136/95) – in order to be 
considered for promotion an employee had to be at work for at least six months in any year – the CJEU held 
that this constituted direct discrimination against employees on maternity leave.  As such, any maternity leave 
would need to be disregarded for the purposes of assessing how long an employee had been at work in order 
to be promoted.   
447 Abdoulaye v Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA447, Case 218/98, [1999] ECR I-5723- employees who were 
on maternity leave received a lump sum payment in addition to ordinary remuneration – the CJEU held that 
this was not a breach of the equal pay principle (the male employees had complained that, as they were not 
entitled to maternity leave, they would never be entitled to such a payment).   
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pregnant.  There was some connection between his treatment and the fact that he was 
associated with someone who was pregnant.  However, the problem in proving this at an 
ET would be that the employer could argue that the treatment was not because Mr 
Kulikaoskas was associated with a pregnant woman, but because he had not met its 
standards in relation to productivity and that any other worker would be treated in the 
same way.  Had he been able to show that he would have been treated differently for 
helping a non-pregnant worker, then the treatment would have amounted to direct 
discrimination, but there was no indication in the arguments presented by Mr 
Kulikaoskas that this was the case. As such, associative discrimination is unlikely in most 
cases to assist parents in securing the rights that they need to combine childcare and work 
because it is less likely that employers will discriminate against parents simply because 
they are parents but more because they have responsibilities which can be seen to impinge 
on their work responsibilities as a result of the norm being an unencumbered worker.  
That said, there may be occasional instances of direct discrimination against parents 
where associative discrimination might be of some use (for example, if an employer did 
not promote those employees who were parents simply because they were parents, rather 
than for any other reason).        
Special treatment for pregnancy and maternity 
5.2.25 The EqA prevents a man from bringing a claim on the basis of special treatment 
that is afforded to a woman in connection with pregnancy or childbirth448.  The SDA 
contained similar provisions449.  The purpose of this provision is relatively clear – it 
recognises that there will be circumstances where treating women in the same way as men 
would result in inequality.  For example, requiring an employee to have continuously 
been at work for a minimum period of six months in any year in order to be promoted 
would disadvantage women on maternity leave450.  Equally the requirement that a 
woman who is on maternity leave and whose post is made redundant be offered any role 
which amounts to suitable alternative employment in preference to other employees is an 
                                                          
448Sub-section 13(6)(b) of the EqA  
449 Sub-section 2(2) of the SDA  
450 Thibault 
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example of more favourable treatment that is afforded to a woman in connection with 
pregnancy or childbirth.   
5.2.26 In the case of Eversheds v De Belin451, the Claimant, a man, challenged the “special 
treatment” that was given to his colleague, Ms Reinholz, who was on maternity leave at 
the time of a redundancy exercise.  The selection criteria were applied whilst Ms Reinholz 
was on maternity leave and, as the Respondent felt that Ms Reinholz would be 
disadvantaged by the fact she was on leave in relation to one of the selection criteria (lock-
up), it awarded her the maximum score for this criterion.  The Claimant’s total score was 
27; Ms Reinholz’s score was 27.5.  The Claimant had received 0.5 (out of a maximum of 2) 
for lock up whereas Ms Reinholz had scored 2.  The EAT held that the obligation to afford 
women with special treatment could not extend to favouring pregnant employees beyond 
what was reasonably necessary to compensate them for disadvantages occasioned by 
their condition.  In this instance, the treatment that had been afforded to Ms Reinholz by 
the Respondent went beyond what was necessary to compensate her for the disadvantage 
she suffered by the lock up selection criterion being applied and therefore the Claimant 
had been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his sex.  Arguably, however, this is 
wrong.  The reason for the way that Ms Reinholz was treated was not because she was a 
woman but because she was on maternity leave.  As such, a woman who had not been on 
maternity leave would have been treated in exactly the same was as Mr De Belin.  This 
does not, therefore, seem to be direct discrimination.      
Requirement for changes to paternity leave and paternity pay? 
5.2.27 It would seem that the direct discrimination provisions might be used to launch 
a challenge to the current model of Additional Paternity Leave (“APL”).  Under the 
legislation, a father is only entitled to APL where the child’s mother is entitled to 
maternity leave, statutory maternity pay or maternity allowance.  However, a mother’s 
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eligibility for leave is not conditional upon the father being able to meet similar 
requirements.   
5.2.28 As set out above, sub-section 13(6) of the EqA prevents a male employee/worker 
from claiming that special treatment that a woman receives as a result of her pregnancy 
amounts to sex discrimination.  However, on the basis of De Belin this seems to be limited 
to treatment that compensates women for disadvantages occasioned by pregnancy.  The 
question here would be whether the special treatment that a woman receives by virtue of 
taking Additional Maternity Leave (“AML”) rather than APL is designed to protect her 
status as a pregnant women/new mother.   
5.2.29 In Roca Alvarez, the CJEU held that there was sex discrimination where a father 
was only entitled to take leave if the child’s mother was employed, but the mother’s 
entitlement to this parental leave was not conditional on the father’s employment status.  
The leave that the Claimant was trying to take was a form of parental leave which had 
originally been designed to encourage and facilitate breastfeeding, but which had 
changed over time such that its purpose was to allow either parent to spend time with 
his/her new child.  As such, there was no way in which this could amount to leave that 
was need to protect a woman’s biological condition.  However, the situation is far from 
clear cut.  Whilst the CJEU made helpful comments in the Roca Alvarez case 
acknowledging the importance of both parents' roles in caring for a child (for example 
"...the positions of a male and female worker, mother and father of a young child are 
comparable with regard to their possible need...to look after the child"452) , it adopted an 
apparently contradictory position in the case of Betriu Montull case (discussed in 3.4.5) 
and again reverted to the mantra of women having a special relationship with a newborn 
baby.  There is no substantive consideration of the decision in Roca Alverez or the 
arguments which led the CJEU (that because the purpose of "breastfeeding" leave had 
become decoupled from its original purpose of protecting a woman's unique biological 
ability, leave could no longer be provided only to women) yet similar arguments would 
                                                          
452 Paragraph 24 of the decision 
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seem to apply in Mr Betriu Montull's situation.  If his wife had been eligible for maternity 
benefits, then she could have chosen to transfer these to him, other than the compulsory 
period of maternity leave which was for the purpose of allowing her to recover from 
childbirth (thereby ensuring her health and safety).  The benefits provided were not, 
therefore, solely for the benefit of women, they could be transferred to fathers in certain 
circumstances.   
5.2.30 Although maternity leave was originally designed to allow women to combine 
their responsibilities as a mother with their work responsibilities (by allowing them time 
out of the workplace to have a child), with the introduction of APL and the transferability 
of AML to a father, the leave has become detached from its original purpose and now is 
designed simply to allow a parent (irrespective of their sex) to take time off to care for a 
child.   As such, applying the decision in De Belin, sub-section 13(6) of the EqA should not 
apply in these circumstances.  Arguments similar to the above were considered by the 
Employment Tribunal in Shuter v Ford Motor Company453.  There the Tribunal found that 
there was no direct discrimination because it found that the appropriate comparator was 
a woman wishing to take APL (in her capacity as the partner of the child’s mother) as 
opposed to a woman seeking to take AML.  There was, therefore, no less favourable 
treatment because a woman in the same circumstances would be treated in the same way.    
5.2.31 This is only a first instance decision, so it will not be binding on any future 
consideration of the issues.  There is an argument that the Tribunal in Shuter was wrong 
on the comparator issue.  Section 23(1) of the EqA provides some guidance as to how to 
determine who is the appropriate comparator (who may be real or hypothetical) – it 
provides that there must be no material difference between the circumstances of the 
claimant and the comparator.  The case law suggests that there is no need for the 
comparator to be a clone of the claimant in every respect454 so there can be some 
differences between the circumstances of the comparator and the claimant.  The key issue 
here would be whether the label attached to the type of leave (that is, that it was AML as 
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454 Madden v Preferred Technical Group CHA Limited [2005] IRLR 46   
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opposed to APL) means that the comparator’s circumstances are materially different from 
a claimant who is exercising his right to APL.  Arguably the distinction between APL and 
AML is a discriminatory characteristic (on the basis that men can never take AML, but 
both men and women can take APL). In James v Eastleigh455, the House of Lords suggested 
that circumstances should not be ascribed to a comparator if those circumstances were 
discriminatory.  There is a slight difference between the situation in James where the issue 
was that those over retirement age, which was itself a discriminatory criteria, were 
entitled to free admittance but those below it were not, given that retirement ages were 
different for men and for women.  However, on the basis of the fact that, as set out above, 
the AML provisions could be argued to go further than is necessary to alleviate the 
disadvantages suffered by virtue of pregnancy, this can be seen as a discriminatory 
characteristic and therefore should be discounted. On this basis, the appropriate 
comparator would be a woman exercising her right to AML.   
5.2.32 As the argument above is based on comparing a father on APL with a mother on 
AML, there is a further limitation to it.  Many employers that offer enhanced maternity 
pay will offer this only for a limited period of time, rather than for the full duration of the 
maternity leave.  As such, if an employer was to offer enhanced maternity leave for a 
period of six months or less (this being the duration of the OML period), no enhanced 
payment would be made during the AML period and thus this would not secure any 
additional right to payment for a father taking APL.  It should be noted that the 
Government consultation paper that was published prior to the introduction of APL 
suggested that the new APL provisions would not result in an obligation on employers to 
offer enhanced paternity pay where enhanced maternity pay was offered to female 
employees.  For the reasons set out above, this advice would seem to be questionable.     
5.2.33 Whilst the type of challenge described above might have the effect of increasing 
the amount of time that men take off to care for their children, there is a risk that it might 
have an unintended negative effect on working mothers.   Employers might decide that a 
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ruling that they were required to offer enhanced paternity pay would increase their costs 
significantly and, if they wished to avoid this increased cost, might reduce (or eliminate 
altogether) their enhanced maternity pay.  This would clearly have a negative impact on 
the individual women who worked for that organisation and who were on (or who 
planned to go on) maternity leave since they would no longer receive enhanced maternity 
pay.  Where enhanced/occupational maternity pay is a contractual entitlement, this may 
be a future problem, however, where this is expressed to be non-contractual or 
discretionary, employers might seek to withdraw immediately.   (There would, of course, 
in these circumstances be the possibility for an employee to challenge the designation of 
“non-contractual” or “discretionary” on the basis that the payment had become a 
contractual term as a result of the custom and practice of the employer.)   This is a problem 
with the assimilation model: there is nothing to prevent an employer removing a right 
that currently benefits one group so that assimilation is not necessary. 
Conclusion on direct discrimination 
5.2.34 For the reasons set out above, the provisions on direct discrimination have limited 
scope for assisting parents in the workplace; however, what has been identified is that 
often the issue is around a neutral practice (which applies to all employees) which 
disadvantages working parents (or more usually working mothers).   
5.3 Indirect Discrimination 
5.3.1 As identified above, parents often face problems in trying to combine their family 
responsibilities with their employer’s working practices, for example, because the 
employer’s “usual” working day affects their ability to collect their children from 
school/childcare.  Protection against direct discrimination is less useful in this context as 
it only outlaws those practices which apply solely to one sex (usually women). Indirect 
discrimination essentially makes those practices that disadvantage groups defined by 
reference to one or more relevant protected characteristics (these are: age, disability, 
gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex and 
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sexual orientation), unlawful unless the relevant practice can be justified.  Under the EqA, 
there is unlawful indirect discrimination where: 
 B (in the employment context, an employee, worker or applicant) has a relevant 
protected characteristic. 
 A (in the employment context, an employer) applies to B a provision, criterion or 
practice (“PCP”). 
 A also applies (or would apply) that PCP to persons who do not share B's 
protected characteristic. 
 The PCP puts or would put persons with whom B shares the protected 
characteristic at a particular disadvantage compared to others. 
 The PCP puts or would put B at that disadvantage. 
 A cannot show the PCP to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim. 
5.3.2 I consider below the various elements of the test for indirect discrimination and 
the extent to which they may be of use in securing the rights that parents need to 
successfully combine work and family. 
PCP 
5.3.3 In order to show indirect discrimination, a claimant must first show that a PCP 
was applied to him/her.  However, to fully understand what this means, it is necessarily 
to take a step back and consider what preceded the requirement for a PCP.  The previous 
test required a claimant to show that a 'requirement or condition' had been applied. 
5.3.4 The terminology “condition or requirement” was thought to be a bigger hurdle 
than “PCP” as a result of Perera v Civil Service Commission456, however, as set out below, it 
is not clear that it necessarily needed to be.  In Perera the Court of Appeal interpreted 
“condition or requirement” as not including a mere preference457.  This was a departure 
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457 The case involved a claimant who was applying for a role where the selection criteria included the 
following preference: “candidates with a good command of English language, experience in the UK and with 
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from the approach that the courts had previously adopted in relation to this issue458.  The 
approach in Perera proved to be particularly problematic in the context of indirect sex 
discrimination claims brought by women whose requests to work part-time had been 
refused. In Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority459 the CJEU appeared to suggest that the 
UK’s definition of indirect discrimination, in particular the limitations of the “condition 
or requirement” test imposed by Perera, breached EU law.  This problem was rectified by 
the Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations 2001, 
by which GB implemented the European Burden of Proof Directive460.  The Regulations 
adopted the “PCP” test set out in the Directive.  The change from “condition or 
requirement” to “PCP” was felt to be a welcome one, which represented “arguably a more 
flexible approach”461.  However, it is far from clear that the interpretation of “condition or 
requirement” in the cases of Perera and Clymo was correct.  As Michael Connolly has noted 
in relation to the former there was no particular reason why the Court of Appeal could 
not have held that there was a "requirement" to have a good command of English and that 
the Australian courts, when considering similarly worded legislation "took a purposive 
approach and refused to follow Perera"462. He also noted that "[n]o distinction between 
'absolute bar' and a 'mere preference' has ever entered the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the 
American courts ..., or the Canadian courts..."463. 
5.3.5 Even if PCP is a lesser test than that of “condition or requirement”, there still 
seems to be no reason why there is a need for a PCP (or a condition or requirement) at all.  
This additional hurdle seems to narrow the scope of the legislative protection more than 
is necessary.  There would seem to be no reason why any action (whether it is a PCP or 
not) that an employer undertakes in relation to its employees that has a disparate impact 
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458 For example, Watches of Switzerland v. Savell [1983] IRLR 141 
459 C-127/92,  
460 Council Directive of 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based 
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461 Isabel Manley Ba Llm “The Burden of Proof in Discrimination Law – the United Kingdom Experience”, 23 
Indus LJ (Juta) 1156 (2002) 
462 Michael Connolly, “The Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations 2001 
(SI 2001 No 2260)”, I.L.J. 2001, 30(4), 375-380, 378 
463 ibid 
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on those with a particular protected characteristic and which cannot be justified should 
not amount to indirect discrimination.  The PCP approach is set out in EU law: article 2 of 
the Equal Treatment Directive464  includes a definition of indirect discrimination which 
includes the term PCP.  
5.3.6 Whilst the definition of PCP is relatively wide, some actions by employers will 
fall outside the definition and can never amount to indirect discrimination.  In Nottingham 
City Transport Ltd v Mr A Harvey465, for example, the EAT held that a one-off flawed 
disciplinary process could not be said to amount to or involve the application of a PCP.  
In this instance the Claimant had conceded at the Employment Tribunal that the flawed 
disciplinary process could not be a provision or a criterion, so the remaining question was 
whether this could amount to a practice.  The EAT held that it could not on the basis that 
for something to be a practice it must have an element of repetition.  In considering the 
claim, the EAT commented that it is not sufficient merely to identify that an employee has 
been disadvantaged and that they would not have been so disadvantaged if they did not 
have the relevant protected characteristic; a PCP must have been applied.    
5.3.7 It would seem that not all unfair treatment involves the application of a PCP.  
However, what is not clear (either from this case or the legislation itself) is why there is a 
requirement for a PCP in order to show indirect discrimination.   
Disadvantage 
5.3.8 In order to show indirect discrimination a claimant will have to show that the 
employer’s PCP puts or would put persons with whom the claimant shares the protected 
characteristic at a particular disadvantage compared to others.  This inevitably involves a 
comparison between those with the particular protected characteristic and those without.  
The starting point for this exercise is to look at the impact of the PCP on a particular pool 
of individuals.  Before considering the current position under the EqA, it may be helpful 
to understand how the concept of disadvantage has developed.  The original definition of 
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indirect sex discrimination included a requirement that the claimant show that the 
“condition or requirement” applied to her was to her detriment because she could not 
comply with it.  The requirement to show that a claimant could not comply with a particular 
condition or requirement was not initially a problem for claimants because of the way in 
which this was dealt with by the courts.   
5.3.9 In Price v Civil Service Commission466 the EAT held that “can comply” should not 
be narrowly construed to mean theoretically possible, but that the ET should have 
considered whether it was possible to comply with the condition or requirement in 
practice.   In the subsequent case of Mandla (Sewa Singh) v. Dowell Lee467 the House of Lords 
held that “can comply” does not mean “can physically” comply, but means that the 
individual “can comply consistently with the customs and cultural conditions of the racial 
group”.  This approach was also adopted in Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton468. 
5.3.10 The need to show that a claimant could not comply with a particular condition or 
requirement became a significant hurdle for claimants trying to challenge decisions not 
to allow part-time working following the case of Clymo v Wandsworth Borough Council469.  
There an ET had held that the Claimant had not shown that she could not comply with 
the requirement to work full-time as she had access to childminding services, she and her 
husband were earning over £24,000 per year and the childminding would be required 
only for three days per week.  The ET further held that the fact that the fact that the 
Claimant wanted to be able to care for her child herself, or for her husband to be able to 
do so, was a “personal preference”.  This approach to the issue of “cannot comply” is 
difficult for any parent who theoretically can afford and has access to some form of 
childcare (irrespective of the fact that the parent may feel it is beneficial for them or their 
partner to be the primary care-giver). 
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5.3.11 However, the Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) 
Regulations 2001470 amended the definition of indirect discrimination in the SDA, 
including by removing of the requirement that the claimant needed to show that the PCP 
was to her detriment because she could not comply with it.  At the time, it was felt that the 
removal of the “cannot comply” requirement would widen the scope for part-time 
working claims.   
5.3.12 JL Atkinson has suggested that the change in the wording of the indirect 
discrimination test did not alleviate the difficulties facing claimants.  He suggests that the 
old requirement of ‘can comply’  “…is implicitly referred to in the case of Sinclair Roche & 
Temperley v. Heard and another471, which went to the EAT. ... The EAT criticised the 
tribunal’s conclusion that it was indisputable that substantially more women than men 
would be disadvantaged by a requirement to work full-time given women’s greater 
provision of childcare, as the context of the case concerned ‘men and women solicitors or 
men and women working in high-powered and highly paid jobs in the City’472. Its implicit 
assumption is that women who are high-earners can afford childcare and are thus able to 
work full-time”473.   
5.3.13  Looking now at the current test under the EqA and the issue of “disadvantage”; 
there is no definition of this term in the EqA.  The Equality Act 2010: Statutory Code of 
Practice – Employment474 (the “Code”) provides guidance on the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions in the EqA.  This states that disadvantage could include the “…denial 
of an opportunity or choice, deterrence, rejection or exclusion”475.    
5.3.14 Disadvantage replaced the concept of disparate impact, on which there was much 
case law about how great the disparity had to be in order for a claimant to be successful 
in a claim of indirect discrimination.  In most cases since the modification to the test, it 
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seems that the focus has been on establishing what caused the disadvantage476, rather than 
whether there was any disadvantage.  However, in the cases below, the issue of what 
might constitute disadvantage was considered. In Eweida v British Airways477, a case 
regarding religious discrimination, the EAT suggested that a claimant might be able to 
show disadvantage if s/he had reluctantly complied with a PCP in order to avoid losing 
his/her job.  (The Claimant was ultimately unsuccessful in her claim when it reached the 
Court of Appeal478 because she was unable to show that there was group disadvantage, 
but there was no suggestion that the Claimant had not suffered a disadvantage.)  This is 
exactly the type of scenario which could affect parents.  A parent might want to work 
part-time and so submit a request for flexible working which is declined by the employer.  
In these circumstances, the parent might continue to work because she needs to, but might 
seek to bring a claim to try to force the employer to reconsider.  The case of Hacking & 
Paterson, Hacking & Paterson Management Services Ltd v Mrs L M Wilson479 might be 
problematic in this regard.  In this case Lady Smith noted that - “…[w]here the effect is 
on an employee who is able to work full time but does not wish to do so, it is difficult to 
see that it would be correct to talk in terms of that employee being disadvantaged.”  
However, the Hacking case is contrary to many of the cases on this subject and it would 
seem that this case is likely to have been wrongly decided480.  There are also currently no 
reported appellate decisions that have considered this case though the decision in Hacking 
& Paterson was considered in the ET case of Cooper v House of Fraser (Stores) Ltd481.  This 
was also a case about a woman who wished to work part-time in circumstances where 
she could have found full-time childcare. By contrast with Hacking, an ET found that there 
was a disadvantage; it was reasonable for the Claimant to believe that it was inappropriate 
for her child to be in someone else’s care for such a long period of time.  
                                                          
476 For example in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2012] UKSC 15, the issue was not whether there 
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481 [2012] EqLR 991 
 190 
Pools 
5.3.15 Not only must there be a disadvantage but that disadvantage must be shared by 
other persons with whom the claimant shares the protected characteristic. ETs can use a 
variety of methods to determine whether there has been any group disadvantage.  This 
includes using their general knowledge in determining whether a PCP will affect a group 
with the relevant protected characteristic, using expert evidence to determine the impact 
on a group with the relevant protected characteristic, and doing a statistical analysis of 
the “pool”.   
5.3.16 As set out above, in order to bring a successful indirect sex discrimination claim, 
a claimant will need to show that the PCP puts or would put persons with whom the 
claimant shares the protected characteristic (here, sex) at a particular disadvantage 
compared to others.  As has been identified in the preceding chapters, women tend to 
have primary responsibility for childcare.  This means that, subject to the issues set out in 
this chapter, it should be possible for them to establish that a PCP which impacts on their 
ability to care for a child (for example, a requirement to work full-time) puts women at a 
particular disadvantage compared to men.  However, it also means that it is likely to be 
significantly more difficult for men to be able to show the group disadvantage necessary 
to succeed in an indirect discrimination claim.  This is where a combination of direct and 
indirect discrimination may be helpful – to the extent that a female employee is able to 
show that a provision is indirectly discriminatory, an employer could not disapply this 
provision only from women (on the basis that this would amount to direct 
discrimination).  As such, if a mother is successful in a claim of indirect discrimination, 
which results in the employer changing its policy, this can benefit not only mothers, but 
also fathers.   
5.3.17 The composition of the pool is a critical issue and the selection of the pool can 
determine that outcome of a case: a very wide pool can mean that it is more difficult to 
establish disadvantage to the group with a particular protected characteristic 
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5.3.18 The case law has demonstrated  that the pool should include only those people 
who are affected or potentially affected by the PCP – people with no interest in the 
advantage or disadvantage/working practice should not be included482.  There are cases 
where the pool might consist of the entire workforce (for example if an employer is 
introducing a new practice that will affect everyone, as with the new roster system that 
was introduced in London Underground v Edwards483, or imposing a requirement that only 
those who provide full time services will be employed, with all others being terminated 
and re-engaged through a third party, as in Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College484). 
In other cases it will consist in a smaller section of the workforce.  However, this does not 
mean that only those who are adversely affected by the PCP should be in the pool.  The 
ET made this mistake in London Underground v Edwards (which was overturned on appeal) 
and held, in a case involving the imposition of a new roster on all staff which had a 
negative impact only on single parents, that the pool consisted single parent train 
operators.  On appeal, this approach was held to be wrong; all employees were affected 
by the new roster, so the correct pool was the entire workforce.   
5.3.19 In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Rutherford (No 2)485 the House of Lords 
suggested that, in most cases, it would be appropriate to look at which individuals in the 
pool could comply with the PCP, rather than those who could not.  However, it did not 
rule out the possibility that in some cases, the disadvantage-led approach might be 
appropriate.   
5.3.20 An ET has a great deal of discretion in determining the pool – and more generally 
in relation to its approach to discrimination claims.  In Shamoon Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead noted that “[t]he most convenient and appropriate way to tackle the issues 
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arising on any discrimination application must always depend upon the nature of the 
issues and all the circumstances of the case”486.   Similarly in Grundy v British Airways487 
Lord Justice Sedley noted that “… one of the striking things about both the race and sex 
discrimination legislation is that, contrary to early expectations, three decades of litigation 
have failed to produce any universal formula for locating the correct pool, driving courts 
and tribunals alike to the conclusion that there is none.” 
5.3.21 In the childcare/parenting context, most ETs seem to accept that any provision 
which affects those working on a part-time basis only will place women at a disadvantage 
given their childcare responsibilities – but there are also occasional decisions showing that 
this approach is not followed in every case.  For example, in Kidd v D.R.G. (UK) Ltd488 the 
EAT noted (in 1985) that the tribunal “…did not regard it as appropriate any longer, given 
the changing conditions of modern life, to assume that when opportunities of full-time 
employment have to be given up for the sake of providing home care for young children, 
the burden still falls to any considerable extent more heavily upon women than upon 
men”.  A similar approach to that in Kidd was adopted in Hacking & Paterson, Hacking & 
Paterson Management Services Ltd v Mrs L M Wilson489 (described further below) – however, 
between these two cases there were a number of cases that did not follow the approach of 
Kidd.  In British Airways Plc v Starmer490 the EAT held that statistics in relation to the 
workplace in question were not of particular use in this case and felt able to rely on 
generalised statistics which showed that women were more likely than men to work part-
time and a survey by the Equal Opportunities Commission which evidenced the fact that 
women tend to choose part-time working in order to accommodate their childcare 
responsibilities.    Similarly in Aviance UK Ltd v Mrs M L Garcia-Bello491 the EAT held that 
ETs should be able to use not only statistical information, but also their intrinsic 
knowledge – in this case, the fact that women were more likely to be the primary carers 
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of children and so less likely to be able to meet the employer’s requirement to work 
different hours on different days of the week. 
5.3.22 In Hacking Lady Smith was reluctant to accept that women would inevitably be 
disproportionately adversely affected by a refusal to grant flexible working.  However the 
approach in Kidd and in Hacking does not seem to have been widely followed.  In Cooper 
v House of Fraser (Stores) Ltd492, in which an ET considered the decision in Hacking & 
Paterson, it went on to conclude “…both from statistics and from our own observations of 
how society operates, that it is still women who in the main have the burden of the care 
of very young children.”   
5.3.23 The difficulty for claimants is the fact that they will not know whether the 
particular ET that will hear their case will take the view that provisions affecting part-
time workers will place women at a disadvantage given their childcare responsibilities or 
whether they will need to adduce evidence of this.  Clearly the safest course for any 
claimant would be to be ready to provide the relevant evidence, however, it can be 
difficult to do so and, in most cases, the evidence that is required can only be determined 
once the pool is known.   
5.3.24 Taking the last of these issues first, the case of Kidd v Drg provides a helpful 
illustration of the difficulties in determining the pool.  In Kidd there was a redundancy 
situation such that the Respondent needed to reduce the number of its employees in its 
clean rooms.  It decided to do so by first selecting those who worked part-time.  Mrs Kidd, 
who was one of the part-time workers made redundant, brought an indirect 
discrimination claim on grounds of marital status or sex.  She argued that the pool should 
consist of the whole population; the Respondent argued that it should include only those 
who worked in the clean rooms of the Respondent (who were those directly affected by 
the redundancy decision).  The ET chose an entirely different pool: those with a need to 
provide home care for children to an extent that would normally be incompatible with 
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full-time employment.    Whilst the Claimant may have come armed with evidence to 
support her pool or perhaps even that of the Respondent, it would seem impossible for 
her to have been able to present evidence on a pool which neither party had proposed.  It 
is also unclear how the Claimant could have obtained the required evidence on this pool; 
no publicly available statistics are compiled on this group of individuals.   
5.3.25 Showing group disadvantage may become more difficult in relation to childcare 
difficulties if men start to take on greater responsibilities in this regard.  Women will have 
to provide figures showing that they are still disadvantaged by PCPs incompatible with 
the provision of childcare, which may prove difficult.  The impact of this could be 
substantial.  If women are no longer able to rely on indirect sex discrimination to provide 
them with substantive rights to enable them to combine work and family, then they will 
need to fall back on the leave rights outlined earlier in this thesis.  These are often 
inadequate and do not fully address the types of issues that working parents face, 
particularly regarding the availability of flexible working.  Without effective rights 
guaranteeing parents equality with other workers, there is a real risk that working parents 
will find themselves side-lined with no legal recourse.  This illustrates the fact that there 
is a real problem with trying to fit the childcare/parenting issue into the sex 
discrimination provisions; whilst originally the childcare issue may have been largely 
confined to women it no longer is and, as such, needs additional protection outside the 
sex discrimination sphere.   
5.3.26 The selection of the pool is a critical issue in any discrimination claim yet, from 
the analysis above, it is apparent that there are no clear principles to determine which 
pool is appropriate in any given case.  As noted by the Court of Appeal in Grundy, 
Tribunals “…have no principle which tells them what is a legally correct or defensible 
pool”493. However, neither do claimants or respondents, which makes bringing or 
defending a case very difficult.  There is one potential glimmer of hope for parents who 
are looking to bring indirect discrimination claims on the basis of childcare 
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responsibilities.  Comments made in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire494 suggest 
that there may be circumstances in which ETs may be able to effectively ignore the pool 
question.  The Supreme Court there noted that the new formulation of the concept of 
indirect discrimination “…was intended to do away with the need for statistical 
comparisons where no statistics might exist”495.  This was relied on by a Tribunal in Crosse-
Scrutton v Atos IT Services UK Ltd496 which accepted that women are disadvantaged 
because they tend to take primary responsibility for childcare.   However, as identified 
above, this does little to help fathers who are disadvantaged in the workplace and, given 
the wide discretion of an ET in relation to the pool question, there is no guarantee that 
any ET will follow the same approach as adopted in Crosse-Scrutton.   
Justification 
5.3.27 Unlike direct discrimination (other than age discrimination), indirect 
discrimination can be justified; why is this?  Monaghan and Gill suggest that the reason 
for allowing justification in relation to indirect discrimination is the fact that indirect 
discrimination is not treatment which is aimed at a particular section of society based on 
their personal characteristics (which direct discrimination is) but is instead treatment 
which incidentally adversely affects the particular section of society by reason of those 
characteristics497.  This seems to be a sensible and pragmatic reason for differentiating 
between direct and indirect discrimination.  Employers operate as economic entities, 
rather than social entities existing solely to provide jobs.  There are some business 
decisions which will result in a disparate impact on those with protected characteristics 
(in circumstances where that impact is not intentional but arises because of neutral 
treatment) but which are made as a result of a genuine business need.   Underpinning the 
indirect discrimination legislation appears to be a recognition of the need to balance the 
interests of the employer, as an economic entity, with the interests of the employee.   This 
                                                          
494 [2012] IRLR 601 
495 [2012] UKSC 15 
496 [2012] EqLR 840 
497 Tess Gill and Karon Monaghan, “Justification in direct sex discrimination law: taboo”,.  I.L.J. 2003, 32(2), 
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concept, of itself, does not seem to be particularly controversial.  The issue arises as to 
how to strike the balance and the test that should be applied.  
5.3.28 The key case in the CJEU in relation to the test to be applied in respect of 
justification is Bilka-Kaufhas GmbH v Weber von Hartz498.  Here it was held that the tests to 
be applied were (i) whether the PCP met a genuine need of the enterprise, (ii) whether it 
was suitable for attaining the objective pursued and (iii) whether it was necessary for that 
purpose.   The emphasis on “genuine” or “real” need of the employer is important – as a 
matter of principle an employer should only be able to apply a discriminatory 
requirement or condition  (which was the test at the relevant time, but has now changed 
to PCP) where it needs to do so, rather than just because it would be helpful or convenient.  
The requirement that the PCP be necessary for achieving the aim is also important – 
because without this requirement, an employer might be able to show a perfectly 
legitimate aim (for example, needing to reduce headcount) but the means used to achieve 
that aim might go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim (for example, making 
those who are part-time redundant in preference to those who are full-time499).  
Genuine need 
5.3.29 It is of note that the requirement for a “genuine” or “real” need is not reflected in 
the EqA, which provides that indirect discrimination can be justified if the employer can 
show that it is a “proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”500  However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the test applied under UK law is any different, particularly 
as UK law must be interpreted in accordance with European law wherever reasonably 
possible501.   
                                                          
498 [1986] E.C.R. 1607 
499 This situation arose in the case of Kidd v Drg (UK) Limited [1985] ICR 405, a case heard before the decision in 
Bilka Kaufhaus.  Here the employer decided to make part-time workers redundant in preference to full-time 
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justified, particularly as it was an all-female workforce and therefore no man could be advantaged by the 
practice (which meant that the practice was “capable of being justified on the slightest grounds”).  Arguably 
the decision would have been different had it been heard after Bilka-Kaufhaus.   
500 s19(2)(d) EqA  
501 By way of example, in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [case ref], the [ ] held that although UK 
law refers to the employer showing that the PCP is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, this 
had to be read in light of EU requirements.   
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5.3.30 GB cases following Bilka-Kaufhaus referred to the question for ETs/the courts 
being whether the PCP served a real need.  In Hampson v Department of Education and 
Science502, the Court of Appeal noted that for a condition or requirement to meet a real 
need it must fall “…somewhere between being necessary and being merely 
convenient.”503  (It should be noted that the test at issue was whether the “condition or 
requirement” was justified, however, the change in terminology to “PCP” is not material 
to the justification question).   What will be a “real need” will depend on the facts of a 
particular case, but the following have been found to be sufficient: a need to save money 
and introduce budgetary control (Allonby), to reward those employees who work nights 
(Chief Constable of West Midlands v Blackburn504) and to manage the risk of undue influence 
or favouritism, or the perception of the same (in relation to a policy that those in a 
relationship should not work together as manager/subordinate – Faulkner v Chief 
Constable of Hampshire505). 
5.3.31 Historically there was also a problem with the requirement to show a “real” need.  
In Barry v Midland Bank506 the House of Lords held that an employer’s aim in applying a 
requirement or condition (as the law then required) only had to be legitimate.  This was a 
far lower hurdle for an employer to overcome than the “real” need test.  An employer 
would, for example, have been able to show that it would be more convenient to adopt a 
particular PCP under the test in Barry.   This was rectified in Allonby where the Court of 
Appeal held that there had to be a “real” need for a requirement or condition (as the law 
then required) to be applied – a sound objective business reason alone was not sufficient.  
However, it is interesting that this interpretation was only adopted after a reference to the 
CJEU.   
5.3.32 It is clear from CJEU case law that the real need cannot be just about saving 
costs507.  However, costs together with another rationale (the costs-plus approach) can 
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amount to a sufficient justification of a prima facie case of discrimination.  As can be seen 
from Woodcock v Primary Care Trust,508 the distinction between a cost only and a cost-plus 
justification may not be entirely clear.  It is for this reason that Lane has expressed concern 
that this decision  ".. may now encourage employers, wishing to save costs, to find some 
other, additional 'justification' for what would otherwise be an unlawful act of 
discrimination"509. As set out further below, this concern seems to be warranted, 
particularly as the Court of Appeal gave no guidance on what would be sufficient to show 
the “plus” element in a costs-plus justification. 
5.3.33 Woodcock was a case concerning the justification of direct age discrimination (as 
set out above at 5.2.21, the age discrimination provisions are unusual as even direct 
discrimination is capable of justification).  The Respondent underwent a reorganisation 
which resulted in the Claimant being put at risk of redundancy.  The Claimant was 
entitled to enhanced retirement benefits if he remained employed at 50 and had notice 
period of a year.   The Claimant’s role ceased to exist and he was given an interim role to 
enable him to look for suitable alternative employment.  The Respondent tried to arrange 
a redundancy consultation meeting but was unable to do so prior to the Claimant's 49th 
birthday.  As such, it terminated his employment, on notice, prior to any formal 
redundancy meeting taking place.  The ET found that there was a prima facie case of age 
discrimination: the only reason for the timing of the dismissal notice was the Claimant's 
age, but held that this was objectively justified.  The legitimate aim of the Respondent was 
to give effect to the Respondent's decision to terminate the Claimant's employment by 
reason of redundancy as well as saving significant costs for the Respondent (on the basis 
that the enhanced retirement benefits would not be payable).   
5.3.34 The Court of Appeal noted the artificiality of the costs plus approach, quoting Mr 
Justice Elias in Redcar v Cleveland Borough Council510 ("Almost every decision taken by an 
employer is going to have regard to costs."). However to a degree, the Court of Appeal 
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dodged the question by finding that this was a case where there was a “costs plus” 
rationale. The types of PCP that are likely to disadvantage parents relate to working 
hours, place of work and the need for time off.  The costs associated with these is likely to 
be relatively low and it would seem difficult, in most situations, for an employer to be 
able to rely solely on costs to objectively justify a potentially discriminatory PCP.  As such, 
this rule would only be problematic for parents if the courts were not to take a robust 
approach to proportionality.   
Proportionality 
5.3.35 Proportionality encompasses the second and third strands of the test under Bilka-
Kaufhaus: whether the PCP is suitable for attaining the objective pursued and whether it 
is necessary for that purpose.   
5.3.36 Historically, GB law seemed to enable employers to, relatively easily, justify a 
prima facie case of indirect discrimination.  As such, Watson511 suggested in 1995 that any 
derogation arising from the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States in the sphere of employment seemed to be more tightly 
controlled than any derogation from the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
sex (i.e. the justification defence).  As set out below, CJEU and UK case law now takes a 
far more robust approach to justification than previously so this critique would seem no 
longer to be appropriate.  
5.3.37 In Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund v Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet512 the CJEU 
rejected the objective justification offered by the Respondent on the basis that “… the 
legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue in the main proceedings may be 
attained by less restrictive, but equally appropriate, measures…”513 and finding that the 
PCP went “beyond what is necessary to ensure the objectives pursued.”   The Attorney 
General’s opinion in this case echoed this sentiment, noting that “[a] measure is 
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“necessary” where the legitimate aim pursued cannot be achieved by an equally suitable 
but more benign means”514.   
5.3.38 This interpretation is concerning and has led Bell to suggest that GB legislation 
"...is less clear in conveying the 'necessity' requirement contained within the Directive; 
that is, there must be no suitable alternative means that could achieve the same aim 
without having the discriminatory effect” (my emphasis added)515.  This is a fair criticism; 
in many of the reported decisions on indirect discrimination, there appears to have been 
no consideration of whether there was an alternative way to achieve aim at which the 
respondent’s stated PCP is supposed to achieve.  Barry v Midland Bank is often cited as 
demonstrating that, for an employer to show that its actions are proportionate, it does not 
need to show that it had no alternative course of action but only that the PCP was 
"reasonably necessary" in order to achieve a legitimate aim.  This encompasses two 
separate issues (i) whether the PCP serves a real need and (ii) whether the PCP is 
reasonably necessary to achieve that real need.  The Respondent operated an enhanced 
redundancy payment scheme which was based upon an employee's salary on the date on 
which his/her employment terminated and number of years' service.  At the time of the 
Claimant's redundancy she was employed on a part-time basis.  She had previously also 
been employed on a full-time basis.  The Claimant sought to argue that the redundancy 
payment scheme amounted to indirect sex discrimination in that it disadvantaged those 
who had done some period of full-time work but subsequently changed to part-time 
hours, and that this group would comprise a greater number of women than men due to 
caring responsibilities falling predominantly on women.  The Claimant argued that there 
was an alternative, less discriminatory way of calculating her redundancy payment so 
that it reflected her full-time, as well as her part-time, service.  This could be done by 
converting her part-time service into full-time equivalent (ie as she was working 17.5 
hours per week instead of 35, to credit her with 0.5 years' service in respect of every year 
where she had been part-time) but still basing her payment on a full-time wage.  The 
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Court of Appeal rejected this, noting that it was wrong to say "...that an employer can 
never justify indirect discrimination in a redundancy payment scheme unless the form of 
the scheme is shown to be necessary as the only possible scheme"516.    
5.3.39 In Chief Constable of West Midlands Police v Blackburn517 a gloss was added to the 
Court of Appeal's comments in Barry.  The EAT, in reconciling Barry with CJEU case law 
such as Kutz-Bauer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg518, noted that it would not “…be 
possible for the employer to demonstrate that the means are appropriate or reasonably 
necessary if there is evidence that less discriminatory means could be used to achieve the 
same objective.”519  The issue in some cases may be that, as there is no reference to this 
test in the legislation, the point is not raised in argument by either party and thus the ET 
does not consider it.   
Conclusion on indirect discrimination 
5.3.40 The most significant problem with the indirect discrimination provisions is the 
fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty as to what the correct pool may be in any given 
scenario.  This has meant that courts have reached contrary conclusions on cases which 
appear to be extremely similar.   There is also the theoretical difficulty that basing 
protections on sex ignores the fact that parenting should be done by both mothers and 
fathers.  On this basis, rights should be derived from parental status, not sex.   
5.4 Positive action 
5.4.1 The EqA does not only prohibit direct and indirect sex discrimination, it also 
contains some positive action provisions.  Could these be of any use to parents?  The 
provisions permit positive action in certain circumstances where people who share a 
particular protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage, have particular needs or are 
disproportionately under-represented.  In these circumstances an employer can take 
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proportionate measures to enable or encourage persons with the particular protected 
characteristic to overcome the relevant disadvantage, meet their needs or enable or 
encourage their increased participation (this is referred to as “general positive action”) 
or, in relation to recruitment and promotion, can treat a person with the relevant protected 
characteristic more favourably than others so long as the individual is “as qualified as” 
those others.  For the reasons set out below, the positive action provisions are of little use 
to parents.  An employer who offered more favourable treatment to parents would not be 
in breach of the EqA if the more favourable treatment was offered irrespective of the sex 
of the parent.  There would clearly be no direct sex discrimination and the risk of an 
indirect sex discrimination claim would seem relatively low if the favourable treatment 
were offered to parents of dependent children, rather than, for example, the person with 
primary responsibility for a child.  There might, however, be a risk of an indirect age 
discrimination claim – on the basis that those in particular age brackets are less likely to 
have dependent children but could potentially have similar needs in relation to time off 
if they care for grandchildren, which is becoming increasingly common520.  With an 
indirect discrimination claim, the employer could provide an objective justification for the 
differential in treatment and it would seem likely that any objective justification would be 
similar to the positive action provisions (that is, the employer might argue that parents 
are disadvantaged by a particular provision in a way that other employees are not and 
therefore that the more favourable treatment is justified; a similar argument would apply 
in relation to the positive action provisions).    
Can the sex discrimination provisions be of any use to parents in their current form? 
5.4.2 Although there are some aspects of the discrimination provisions that could be 
improved in order to make them more effective at securing the rights that parents need 
in order to properly combine work and family responsibilities, the sex discrimination 
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legislation has some significant positive aspects which make it appealing for claimants to 
use.  These are outlined below: 
5.4.2.1 It applies to workers and applicants, in contrast to many of the 
employment rights (such as unfair dismissal) which apply only to 
employees. 
5.4.2.2 There is no qualifying period of employment required to bring a claim521. 
5.4.2.3 The possibility of forum shopping where an employee can show a 
connection with another jurisdiction in which damages may be higher 
than those that would be recovered in the UK522 (for example, the US523). 
5.4.2.4 Compensation is uncapped, unlike other ET claims such as unfair 
dismissal.     
5.4.3 The direct sex discrimination provisions are of limited use to parents as in most 
cases the problems that parents face are not connected to their sex or even their parental 
status.  This is because the direct discrimination provisions still have a male 
unencumbered worker as the reference point.  The reason that parents are disadvantaged 
in the workplace is the fact that they do not/cannot comply with the norm of the ideal 
worker and, for example, need time off or to work differently (whether in relation to 
where or when they work).   
5.4.4 The indirect sex discrimination provisions may have greater use for parents, 
however, even these are unlikely to secure the accommodations that parents need to be 
on an equal footing with others in the workplace.  As set out above at 5.3.16, it is 
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considerably easier for mothers to bring indirect sex discrimination claims than fathers, 
and, if fathers become more actively involved in caring for children, it may become 
impossible for either parent to seek to bring an indirect sex discrimination claim.  The 
major difficulty for anyone seeking to bring an indirect discrimination claim relates to the 
unpredictability of the composition of the pool (as discussed above), which seems 
unlikely to be resolved.  Whilst the courts have recognised this issue – for example, see 
comments in Grundy relating to the issues faced by Tribunals in determining the pool 
(discussed above at 5.3.15 to 5.3.26), they have still failed to provide any real guidance to 
Tribunals as to how to determine this difficult issue.   The flexibility of the concept of 
indirect discrimination can be seen as both a strength and a weakness.  Whilst it is true 
that, because of the nature of the types of dispute, they will also be very fact specific, the 
extent of the flexibility means that claimants and potential claimants have no certainty 
over whether a particular practice operated by an employer will be found to be 
discriminatory, irrespective of the significance of the impact that that practice has on the 
particular employee.  As the EAT noted in Kidd, this means that it is impossible to draw 
“generalised conclusions” from decided cases and that sometimes cases “in apparently 
similar contexts … [arrive] at opposite results”.   This means that it may be impossible for 
a claimant (or his/her lawyers) to determine the likely outcome of a claim against an 
employer until the matter has been litigated and, as will be examined in more detail in 




CHAPTER 6 : ENFORCEMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
6.1  Introduction 
6.1.1 As set out in Chapter 1, for there to be effective reconciliation of work and family 
responsibilities, the law must provide the relevant rights, and society (and employers) in 
particular, need to understand the importance of these rights.  This is more likely to be 
the case where there are serious consequences in the event of a breach of the relevant 
rights and there are effective enforcement mechanisms.  John Purcell suggests that 
“…statutory regulation is more likely to influence managerial conduct in employment … 
when enforcement processes are effective”524.  This is very important as the aim would be 
for employers to abide by the rights set out in the legislation, rather than them flouting 
them and workers then needing to bring litigation to enforce them.  The mechanisms that 
are available for the enforcement of those rights will therefore be crucial to the overall 
effectiveness of the rights.  In this chapter I argue that the current methods of enforcement 
(in respect of the rights described in Chapters 3 and 4 and the sex discrimination 
provisions described in Chapter 5) are not fit for purpose.   The analysis that follows is 
not a critique of employment rights generally but is instead focussed on the rights 
described in the foregoing chapters.   
6.2 Process by which claims are brought 
6.2.1 As well as the problems in relation to the specific remedy that can be awarded in 
respect of each of the parental rights, there are also some difficulties for parents in 
enforcing their rights.  Employment claims, whether brought under the unfair dismissal 
provisions described at 3.1.6 or in relation to the enforcement of the rights set out in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, are brought in an Employment Tribunal (“ET”), rather than a court.  
Originally the ET (which at the time was called the Industrial Tribunal) was designed to 
be a less formal setting, but the process has developed such that there is a greater 
emphasis on rules and procedure and it has become much more formal and rigid.  There 
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are a number of aspects, in particular, of the ET rules that are likely to impact upon parents 
bringing claims to enforce one of the parental rights. 
Time limits 
6.2.2 A potential claimant must bring his/her claim within the relevant limitation 
period525; if s/he fails to do so, the claim will generally be time barred526.   James suggests 
that the standard in respect of time limits “...caters for the needs of a stereotypical ideal 
unencumbered worker… whose only, or main priority is to deal with the matter as swiftly 
as possible”527.   It is true that where an individual has childcare responsibilities, which 
take time to deal with, or is adjusting to a new child, imposing the same standard on them 
as for an unencumbered worker causes real difficulties and places them at a profound 
disadvantage.   However, there is some merit in these issues being dealt with swiftly, 
particularly where a worker remains employed by the employer.  As such, requiring a 
potential claimant to bring a claim relatively quickly is not necessarily a bad thing.  The 
problem with the time limits, though, is the consequence of missing them.  This is  so 
severe that it effectively denies justice to those who have genuine difficulty in complying 
with the time limits.   The ET may grant an extension to the time limit for filing a claim.  
(In relation to unfair dismissal and detriment claims in respect of parental rights, this can 
be done where the ET is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be 
brought within the usual limitation period528 and in relation to discrimination claims, this 
can be done where the ET considers it to be just and equitable to do so529).  However, as 
this is a discretionary ability, a claimant in a particular case will not know, in advance of 
the expiry of the time limit, whether the ET would consider that it was not reasonably 
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practicable for the claimant to have brought the claim earlier (and there is no process by 
which a claimant can apply for a ruling on this issue in advance of the relevant deadline).   
6.2.3 Given the unequal division of childcare responsibilities, this is more likely to have 
a greater impact on women (as they are more likely to have such responsibilities and so 
face greater difficulties in bringing a claim).   Ignoring the effect of having a child, or 
having to care for a child, reinforces the ideology of motherhood, discussed earlier in 
Chapter 2, as being something that is natural and does not need to be taken into account 
in the workplace, thereby also reinforcing the idea of the separate spheres.  As I have 
argued in Chapter 2, we need to replace the current model for family-friendly rights with 
one that, rather than requiring assimilation, accommodates and values the responsibilities 
for childcare that parents have.  In doing so, the enforcement mechanisms would need to 
change to recognise that some claimants, including those with childcare responsibilities, 
may be less able to comply with relatively short time limits.      
Accessibility of the tribunal system 
6.2.4 As set out above, there are specific time limits that prospective claimants need to 
comply with to bring a claim.  There are also prescribed forms530 that they must use in 
doing so.  Claimants in general may find the tribunal system difficult to understand. A 
pilot study carried out by Busby and McDermont in relation to “…perceptions and 
experiences of vulnerable employees who attempted to use the … ET system to resolve 
disputes…”531 found that unrepresented claimants had difficulty understanding their 
employment rights and the process, itself.  In Genn’s study she also found that there was 
a “… profound need for knowledge and advice about obligations, rights, remedies and 
procedures for resolving justiciable problems”532.  The difficulties facing parents and 
pregnant workers are made worse by the fact that the legislation designed to facilitate the 
reconciliation of work and family responsibilities is so difficult to understand, particularly 
                                                          
530 Rule 1(1) Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 
531 Morag McDermont and Nicola Busby (2012) ‘Workers, marginalised voices and the employment tribunal 
system: some preliminary findings’ Industrial Law Journal Vol. 41(2) 2012 166-184 
532 Hazel Genn (1999) Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, p255 
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for unrepresented claimants.  Where the rights are as complex as those discussed in 
Chapter 3, 4 and 5, potential claimants may struggle to even determine whether they have 
a legal claim; formulating this into a claim form, setting out the legal basis of that claim, 
may prove to be very difficult.    Engaging a professional representative could assist 
prospective claimants in both determining the strength of their claims and the process of 
bringing these.  However, as set out below, the costs associated with professional 
representation are likely to deter many from using them. 
Professional Representation 
6.2.5 Given the complexities of formulating and bringing a claim, many prospective 
claimants will want or need to take legal advice in order to bring a claim.  However, in 
England and Wales legal aid is not available for representation in the ET533.  The average 
(median) cost of professional advice and representation for an employee to bring an unfair 
dismissal claim in an ET increased from £1,400534 to £2,000 in the ten year period from 
2003535 to 2013536.  Few employees will be able to afford these legal fees and as a result 
many claimants will represent themselves at an ET hearing.  Whilst 67 per cent of 
employers had legal representation at an ET hearing, only 33 per cent of claimants were 
legally represented537.  This seems contrary to the principle of natural justice that requires 
that proceedings be conducted in such a way as to be fair to all parties.   
6.2.6 This is particularly important because professional representation appears to 
make a profound difference to the outcome of a case.  The study carried out by Genn538, 
referred to above at 6.2.4, found that where a litigant is trying to deal with a legal problem 
themselves, they are less likely to be successful in obtaining a resolution, particularly 
                                                          
533 Under paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Access to Justice Act 1999, the ET is not listed as one of the types of 
proceedings in which legal aid can provide advocacy.  Those that are, are proceedings in: the Supreme Court, 
the Court of Appeal, the High Court, any county court, the EAT, any Mental Health Review Tribunal,  
Immigration Tribunal, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and the Proscribed Organisations 
Appeal Commission. 
534 Bruce Hayward, Mark Peters, Nicola Rousseau, and Ken Seeds ‘Employment Relations Research Series No. 33 
Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications 2003’   
535 Mark Peters, Ken Seeds, Carrie Harding and Erica Garnett, ‘Employment Relations Research Series No. 107,  
Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications 2008’, March 2010,  
536 Genn (n532)  
537 Carrie Harding, Shadi Ghezelayagh, Amy Busby and Nick Coleman, “Findings from the Survey of 
Employment Tribunal Applications 2013”, BIS, June 2014  
538 Genn (n532), p204  
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where the problem is employment related (as opposed to, for example, being a consumer 
issue).  In relation to pregnancy issues, James has noted that “[s]tatistical analysis of the 
tribunal study data strongly suggests that where claimants are professionally represented 
in these pregnancy-related unfair dismissal cases they are more likely to succeed…”539.  It 
would seem likely that one of the significant reasons behind this is that this area of law is 
so complex, with various overlapping rights, that it makes it difficult for an unrepresented 
claimant to understand what her rights are, let alone apply those rights to her factual 
matrix.   
6.2.7 By way of an illustration of the difficulties facing unrepresented claimants, let us 
consider the issue of how a claim is pleaded.  In order for a claim to be successful, the 
claimant must fully set out the grounds for the claim.  As an illustration, in discrimination 
claims, the claimant must state what s/he believes to have been the less favourable 
treatment; the claimant cannot subsequently in the hearing rely on another unpleaded 
action by the respondent as constituting less favourable treatment.  For example, in the 
EAT case of United Learning Trust v Miss H E Rose540, the Claimant’s pleadings stated that 
various actions by the Respondent regarding unfair observation and criticism of her 
teaching by a particular individual constituted less favourable treatment.  She did not 
state in her pleadings that the Respondent’s failure to respond to an email that she sent 
constituted less favourable treatment, but at the hearing sought to rely on this as being 
less favourable treatment.  The EAT found that the Tribunal should not have considered 
this aspect of her case as it had not been pleaded.  It noted that  “[i]f justice is to be done 
to both sides, it must be clear by the time of the Tribunal hearing which specific allegations 
are said to be instances of direct discrimination. … Fairness requires that those who face 
allegations of … discrimination know what they are. Precision is necessary if the parties 
are to make informed decisions on questions of evidence and submissions and if the 
Tribunal is to deal with the issues properly”541.   
                                                          
539 James (n15), p99  
540 UKEAT/0220/12/LA 
541 Paragraph 32 of the Judgement 
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6.2.8 McDermont and Busby have suggested that there are also other important 
differences in the social spaces in which unrepresented claimants have to conduct their 
cases as compared to professional representatives.  They contrast "…the solicitor in her 
well-ordered office, probably with a secretary to answer the phone, … with the 
grandmother surrounded by the everyday noise and chaos of any household with young 
children…” noting that this “…creates an unseen, but nevertheless felt, power dynamic 
between employer and claimant"542.  In litigation there are often numerous deadlines, for 
example, disclosure and the exchange of witness statements; the consequences for failing 
to meet these deadlines can be severe, and include the possibility of the claim being struck 
out in its entirety.  For the unrepresented claimant with caring responsibilities, a lack of a 
dedicated space in which she can prepare and store relevant documents without these 
being disturbed by other people (for example, children) means that there is a real risk that 
relevant (and perhaps crucial) documents could be overlooked or deadlines missed. (It 
should, of course, be noted that there will be other unrepresented claimants who may also 
be in living conditions that make it difficult to conduct litigation from their homes).  
Because of the ideology of motherhood, discussed in Chapter 2, which suggests that 
motherhood and caring are an entirely natural state for women, rather than something 
deserving of special consideration, no accommodation of these is necessary (and indeed 
providing them would, as a result, be perceived as giving mothers in these situations an 
unfair advantage).   
6.2.9 To ensure fairness, in the enforcement of workplace parental rights claims, there 
needs to be a rebalancing between the interests of those entities that can afford legal 
representation (generally employers) and those that cannot (generally employees).  This 
means that either it needs to be relatively easy for a claim to be brought (by the tribunal 
process being made as straightforward as possible and the law being as easy to 
understand as possible) or access to free/affordable legal advice should be provided for 
those claimants that cannot otherwise afford this.  The latter seems unlikely to happen at 
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a time when legal aid is being heavily restricted, so the only real option is to make the 
system and the law more accessible.  In addition, abandoning the ideology of motherhood 
and moving to a model where we value parenting, as advocated in Chapter 2, would 
mean that the ET system could more readily take account of the responsibilities that those 
with children have and accordingly could adapt the rules to accommodate these.       
The Costs Position 
6.2.10 A further deterring factor for potential claimants may be the costs involved in 
litigation.  I argue here that the current position whereby an individual claimant not only 
has to bear the costs of bringing an ET claim in order to defend the right to reconcile 
his/her work and family situations, but also may, without any prior warning, be required 
to contribute potentially tens of thousands of pounds in respect of the costs of the 
employer against whom s/he is litigating, is inequitable.   
6.2.11 The general rule in ET proceedings is that each party bears its own costs.  
However, there are exceptions to this where: there is vexatious, abusive, disruptive or 
otherwise unreasonable conduct in the proceedings; a claim has no reasonable prospect 
of success; or if a party causes an adjournment or postponement of a hearing or fails to 
comply with an order or practice direction of the ET.   
6.2.12 In practice, costs awards remain the exception rather than the rule.  ET statistics 
show that only 889 costs awards were made in the period from 1 April 2013 to 31 March 
2014543.  (In the same period, there were a total of 105,803 claims accepted by the ET.)  The 
vast majority of costs award (72.7%544) were made against claimants.   Whilst costs awards 
may still be relatively unusual, the awards that can be made against claimants can be a 
very significant amount particularly for an individual.  In Vaughan v London Borough of 
Lewisham545, an employee who had been paid around £30,000 per year in her role at the 
Respondent, was ordered to pay a third of the respondent’s costs.  These were to be 
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544 Of the 889 costs awards, 647 were against claimants (ibid) 
545UKEAT/0533/12 
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assessed in the County Court, but on the basis of the respondent’s claim to have incurred 
approximately £260,000, could have been as high as £87,000.  Whilst there are instances of 
large awards (in the 2013/2014 period, the highest award was £58,022546, the median 
award is relatively modest (in the same period it was £1,000).   
6.2.13 Although it may not seem unreasonable for the ET system to seek to deter 
unreasonable claims or conduct, the difficulty is that, as set out below, a claimant may be 
unaware that there is a risk of a costs award in respect of the claim being brought.  This is 
particularly an issue for unrepresented claimants and, for the reasons set out below, for 
those seeking to enforce one of the rights discussed in Chapters 3 to 5.   
Whilst the ET may give a party a costs warning, it does not need to do so in order to 
subsequently make a costs award.  Similarly, the other party to the litigation does not 
need to have given any indication that it intends to seek such an award.  There are no 
statistics available on the frequency of costs warnings being given by the ET, however, an 
analysis of the reported cases in relation to costs shows an alarming picture.  In cases 
where a costs award was made by an ET, a costs warning was only made in 11.6% of 
reported cases547.  In the remaining 88.4% of cases either there was an express statement 
that a costs warning was not given (17.4% of cases)548 or there was no reference at all to a 
costs warning (71% of cases)549.  In view of the case law discussed above, which has held 
that there is no obligation upon the ET to provide a costs warning but that it may be a 
relevant factor in favour of making such an order, it would seem likely that where there 
is no reference to a costs warning this is because one was not made.   
6.2.14 One of the reasons for the apparent lack of costs warnings given in cases where 
costs are eventually awarded may be the fact that an ET may be subject to criticism by the 
appellate courts if they do so in circumstances where an award in less likely.  In Gee v Shell 
UK Limited550, the Court of Appeal criticised the ET for issuing a costs warning to the 
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547 See Annex 4.  In 16 out of 138 cases  
548 See Annex 4.  In 24 out of 138 cases. 
549 98 out of 138 cases 
550 [2002] EWCA Civ 1479  
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Claimant who withdrew her claim after the warning.  The EAT and Court of Appeal both 
felt that there was no realistic prospect that a costs warning would actually be issued and 
so it had been oppressive and caused her to withdraw the claim.   In Salinas v Bear 
Stearns551, which was a case where costs were awarded despite a costs warning not having 
been made, the EAT stated “…we are far from clear…that a costs warning is a necessary 
or indeed desirable pre-condition…”.  In Iqbal v Metropolitan Police Service552, the ET was 
criticised for having given a costs warning at the start of a hearing and the EAT stated 
that “[t]he start of the hearing is a particularly sensitive and difficult time for a possible 
future application for substantial costs to be raised; we think that discussion of such a 
matter in open Tribunal at that point … is usually best avoided.”  In view of the above, 
there is little incentive for an ET to issue a costs warning – if it does so, it risks being seen 
to have pressurised the Claimant to cease pursuing a claim, whereas if it does not, it is 
still able to issue a costs order at the end of the proceedings.   
6.2.15 Costs are likely to be a greater issue for parents because of the complexity of the 
legislation.  It can be difficult for an unrepresented claimant to assess their claims chances 
of success (or whether there is any legal basis for a claim – an employer can have done 
something that is morally wrong but for which there is no recourse in law) or to know 
how to conduct litigation.  As such, there would seem to be a greater risk that an 
unrepresented claimant would conduct their litigation in what the ET considers to be an 
unreasonable manner or would bring a claim, which an ET subsequently finds was 
misconceived. 
6.2.16 The other issue in respect of costs is the apparent use of the threat of costs by 
employer’s lawyers to dissuade claimants from pursuing their claims.  The Government 
implied, in its consultation document on changing the ET process, that it had anecdotal 
evidence of this type of threat553. This is clearly of concern.  If a claimant is unrepresented 
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and is told that they might be liable for hundreds of thousands of pounds in costs554, they 
may feel unable to continue the litigation, even in a case in which the prospect of such a 
costs order is low555. 
6.2.17 One solution to the issues above would be for greater information and 
transparency around the risks of costs to be available at the outset of a claim and for an 
ET to be required to give an early indication if it believed that there was a danger of costs 
being awarded against the claimant for any reason.  However, this is unlikely to resolve 
the difficulties that are caused by the costs that the claimant has to bear in respect of 
his/her own litigation costs.  It is for this reason that the current model of enforcement, 
which so heavily relies upon individual enforcement, seems not to be fit for purpose.  I 
look at this issue further below at 6.3. 
Obtaining information to determine whether there are grounds for a claim 
6.2.18 As mentioned above, sometimes it can be difficult for a potential claimant to 
determine whether or not s/he has a valid legal claim.  This is because the employer is 
likely to hold much of the relevant evidence and is unlikely to voluntarily provide this to 
the worker, particularly where it shows wrongdoing on the part of the employer.  
Although during the disclosure process this evidence has to be provided, by that time the 
claim is relatively progressed and both parties will have expended time and money in 
respect of it.  It used to be the case that where a discrimination claim was contemplated, 
a prospective claimant could obtain information in order to determine whether they have 
grounds for a claim before launching proceedings.  Under the process, questions could be 
asked about why the prospective claimant had been treated in the way that they were, 
and about general background information about the composition of the respondent’s 
workforce (for example, the percentage of women in senior roles).    
                                                          
554 Doyle v North West London Hospitals NHS Trust [2012] ICR D21 where bills of £95,000 had been presented by 
the Respondent to the ET, is used as the basis for respondent’s lawyers claiming that claimants may be 
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UKEAT/0533/12, the EAT upheld a costs order of £87,000 against an unrepresented claimant. 
555 Gee v Shell UK Ltd [2003] IRLR 82 – the Court of Appeal stated that costs awards were the exception rather 
than the rule. 
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6.2.19 The abolition of the questionnaire process (effective from 6 April 2014) is likely to 
have an adverse impact on employees' ability to bring tribunal proceedings.  Without the 
questionnaire process, employees are being asked to decide whether to bring claims in 
the absence of little, or any, information to be able to evaluate their chances of success.  
Further, with the introduction of fees, they are effectively being asked to weigh up the 
value and merits of their case (which may be unknown due to a lack of information) 
against the fee which they will be charged (and which is not recoverable if they are then 
given information which shows their case is weak and they therefore abandon it) and the 
risk of costs, for example, if a claim is subsequently found to be misconceived.  Where the 
right that the claimant is trying to enforce is one that would allow the claimant to carry 
out a socially useful function, which, as set out in Chapter 1, both pregnancy and caring 
for a child are, this places an unfair burden on the individual claimant.  Again, this is a 
problem of the model of individual enforcement of these rights, which is discussed below 
at 6.3.   
Burden of proof 
6.2.20 There are also issues regarding the burden of proof.  As discussed earlier, often, 
the employer, rather than the claimant, will have much of the pertinent information, for 
example, the reason for the claimant’s treatment and, as such, is in the best position to 
gather all the relevant evidence.  James has argued that where a dismissal occurs during 
pregnancy, the ET should acknowledge that such dismissals “…are often, given the 
potentially negative attitudes pregnancy can provoke and given the social construction of 
motherhood and its distance from the ideal unencumbered worker, motivated by the 
pregnancy unless there is strong evidence to the contrary”556.  This would lead to a 
presumption that the dismissal was unfair, which could be rebutted by the employer 
providing appropriate evidence to the contrary.  The advantage of such an approach is 
that the employer, in most cases, is likely to have the greater resources to be able to 
undertake the necessary searches to find evidence, but more importantly, the employer is 
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likely to be in possession of the key evidence.  Without such a presumption, the employer 
can easily assert that it was not aware of the worker’s pregnancy and, if the ET accepts 
that, the claim will fail.   
6.2.21 The other difficulty is that the ET can only determine the outcome of the case on 
the basis of the evidence that each party presents to it.  It is not the ET’s role to formulate 
the claimant’s case or to act in an inquisitorial manner.  This means that, if a claimant fails 
to properly formulate his/her case, the ET cannot amend the claimant’s case to correct 
this.  It also cannot consider a claim that has not been raised.  In respect of workplace 
parental rights, where there is significant potential overlap between the different rights, 
such that a claimant could easily bring a claim on the basis of a single right (for example, 
a refusal to allow flexible working could be brought under the right to request flexible 
working) and fail to consider whether they also have a claim under another overlapping 
right (in the same example, an indirect sex discrimination claim).  The facts might be such 
that the first claim (in the example above, the right to request flexible working) has to fail, 
but the second (in the example above, indirect sex discrimination) could have succeeded 
had such a claim been brought.    
Levels of compensation 
6.2.22 As both parenting and pregnancy are social goods, there is merit in an argument 
that where a person is dismissed as a result of his/her childcare responsibilities, there 
should be a minimum basic award that s/he will receive irrespective of his/her length of 
service.  (I would also argue that a minimum basic award should also apply where the 
reason for any dismissal was unlawful discrimination, contrary to the Equality Act 2010 
(“EqA”).  However, such arguments are outside the scope of this thesis.)  Such a concept 
already exists in UK law in respect of terminations because an employee was carrying out 
health and safety activities557or where the employee was dismissed for being: a health and 
safety representative558, an employee representative for the purposes of the Working Time 
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Regulations559 or for the purposes of collective consultation560 or a trustee of an 
occupational pension scheme561.  This minimum also applies where the principal reason 
for the dismissal was the employee's trade union activities562.  In such cases, there is a 
minimum basic award of £5,676.  For the reasons set out in Chapters 1 and 2, pregnancy 
and parenting are important to society and employees should not be penalised for 
exercising rights that allow them to combine these responsibilities with work.  A 
minimum basic award acts as a disincentive from employers dismissing employees, and 
also provides an additional element of compensation for the employee.  This is why it 
only applies in respect of certain types of dismissal that the legislator has determined to 
be of particular concern.  Dismissals in connection with pregnancy and parenting should, 
for the reasons set out in Chapters 1 and 2, be of concern to society as a whole and, 
therefore, should be subject to a minimum basic award.   
Fees 
6.2.23 Since 29 July 2013, a claimant bringing a claim in an ET is required to pay a fee in 
order to issue a claim and also in respect of a hearing; the amount of such fee being 
determined by the type of claim being brought, (claims will either fall within level 1 (the 
most straightforward) or level 2 (more complex claims) with the highest being £250563 in 
respect of issuing a claim and £950564 in respect of the hearing.  Unfair dismissal, 
discrimination and equal pay claims are all charged at the higher rate.  As such, the types 
of claim that will be brought by those seeking to enforce any of the parental rights are 
those that will be charged at the higher rate.  Fees seem to have a direct impact on the 
number of claims brought.  In 2012/2013 (fees were brought in during this period), there 
were 191,541 claims accepted by the Employment Tribunal Service, in 2013/2014, this had 
dropped to 105,803.  This is a decrease of around 44.8%565.  This is of concern because there 
is evidence that generally people are reluctant anyway to bring employment claims, even 
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without the introduction of fees.   Purcell cites research “…that only a quarter (24 per cent) 
of those who experienced a problem at work put their concern in writing to their 
employer, and just three per cent brought a tribunal case as a result of their complaints”566.  
This is supported by the findings of the study conducted by Genn, referred to above at 
6.2.4, which found that there could be “…a  reluctance to be seen to be causing 
trouble…”567 in relation to employment disputes.   This is problematic in relation to 
workplace parental rights because in most cases where an employer denies a worker the 
opportunity to use such a right, there will be an ongoing employment relationship, rather 
than a termination.  Caring for a child is not yet seen as the vital social function that it is, 
in part because of the ideologies of motherhood and fatherhood.  These view the rearing 
of children as natural for mothers and therefore not requiring any accommodation and 
fathers’ main role as being that of an economic provider and therefore they should not do 
anything to put their employment at risk.  This means that parents would seem even less 
likely than other workers to bring ET claims.   
6.3 Emphasis on individual enforcement 
6.3.1 McCrudden suggests that our current approach “… leaves it too much up to 
individuals to enforce their rights”.  Whilst McCrudden is concerned generally with the 
need for individual enforcement, this is an even greater issue in relation to pregnancy and 
workplace parental rights.  Individual enforcement suggests that pregnancy is an issue 
only for the mother and that a parent’s inability to combine work and family 
responsibilities is an issue only for that parent.  For the reasons set out in Chapter 1, this 
is incorrect.  The emphasis on individual enforcement is entirely inappropriate in 
circumstances where we recognise that parents spending time engaged in childcare and 
women becoming pregnant is important for society and should be valued, as argued in 
Chapter 2.   There is also the question of whether individual claimants can ever bring 
about the structural change that is necessary to better facilitate the reconcilaiton of work 
and family responsibilities.  As noted above, tribunal cases do not always seem to change 
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the behaviour of employers in respect of whether they adhere to the provisions of 
employment law.  This is particularly important in the sphere of workplace parental 
rights, where compensation is unlikely to be a particularly useful remedy (see further 
below at 6.4.4) because if a parent requires time off, for example, and is denied this, money 
is unlikely to make up for missing a child’s Christmas play or having to place a child into 
a childcare setting that a parent is not happy with (perhaps because the usual childcare 
provider is unable to provide the service on a particular day).   
6.3.2 The ideology of motherhood, discussed in Chapter 2, may also dissuade women 
from bringing litigation.  James suggests that “…the manifestation of the dominant 
ideology of motherhood in this context may prevent women from taking legal action 
because it shifts their emotional, financial and practical priorities”568.   It is difficult to 
establish whether this does act as a disincentive from bringing litigation as it is impossible 
to know how many potential claimants do not bring claims.  However, research by the 
EOC in 2005 suggested that 30,000 women per year were being forced out of their jobs as 
a result of their pregnancies.  This would amount to unlawful pregnancy discrimination 
and, you might expect to see approximately this many pregnancy discrimination claims 
brought in any year.  Yet in the period from 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014, only 1,248 
claims were brought in respect of detriment or unfair dismissal arising from pregnancy569.  
This suggests that there is a large number of women who think that they have been 
discriminated against, or subjected to detriment, because of their pregnancies, yet whom 
do not bring claims.   One possible explanation of this is the dominant ideology of 
motherhood, as suggested by James above. 
6.3.3 Morris argues that in other areas of regulation of employment there is “…a more 
proactive approach to enforcement has been adopted…”570 than in respect of cases that 
go through the ET system, such as though relating to workplace parental rights.   She cites 
the examples of the licensing of gangmasters, health and safety executive and HMRC in 
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respect of the national minimum wage noting that “…the NMW is one area where, to 
date, a proactive model of enforcement appears to have met with some success”571.   
Applying a similar model to the workplace parental rights would demonstrate that these 
are viewed as rights that are crucial to the wellbeing of workers and are valuable for 
society, in the same way that regulation of gangmasters and ensuring that people are 
being paid above a minimal rate are572.   
6.3.4 There was scope in the EqA for a move away from individual enforcement.  The 
extension of tribunal's powers on recommendations to allow them to make 
recommendations in discrimination claims which benefit the whole workforce could ,for 
example, have resulted in coordinated campaigns against a particular employer, where 
an organization (or even a coordinated group of employees) campaigning for parents or 
equality could support an individual claimant (for example, financially, allowing the 
employee to bring a claim with appropriate legal representation) in order to secure a 
recommendation that would benefit the whole, or part, of the workforce573.  However, 
this provision is due to be abolished with effect from 1 October 2015.   Whilst the 
Government’s view was that this power was unnecessary, the few cases574 where the 
power to make wider recommendations was utilized suggest otherwise.  In Crisp v Iceland 
Foods Ltd575, which was a case involving disability discrimination and constructive 
dismissal, an ET made a recommendation that the Respondent should, within one year, 
train all members of the HR function on disability discrimination matters and train all 
managers at the Claimant’s line manager’s level in disability discrimination matters.  The 
Claimant was no longer employed and therefore these recommendations would not affect 
her.  This case was decided when the ET had a wider power to make recommendations; 
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this power allows them to make recommendations which benefits the whole workforce, 
whereas from 1 October 2015, the ET will only be able to make a recommendation which 
obviates or reduces the adverse effect on the complainant (that is the individual who 
brings the claim). It is difficult to understand how an ET could legitimately, without the 
wider power, make the recommendation which it did in Crisp; given that, as the Claimant 
had left the employer’s employment, it clearly would not benefit her but had the potential 
to benefit the wider workforce and to avoid similar situations in the future576.    
6.3.5 There is also no collective/representative action mechanism in the EqA or the 
ERA.  This is despite the finding in the Civil Justice Council’s report, Improving Access to 
Justice through Collective Action577 that “...there is a strong case for concluding that there is 
an unmet need for a collective action mechanism to enable the effective prosecution of 
claims arising out of discriminatory conduct and a clear need for such a mechanism to be 
introduced”.   The right not to be unfairly dismissed, the right not to suffer detriment as 
a result of exercising a parental right and the unlawful discrimination provisions all place 
the emphasis on individual enforcement.  The conduct that an employer may be engaging 
in may cause harm to many employees, for example, an employer may refuse employ 
mothers in a particular role.  Research suggests that an individual bringing a claim, even 
when that claim is successful, has little or no positive impact on the conditions of others 
within the organisation578.   As such, individual employment rights may not secure the 
aim of ensuring equality for all, but instead only offer the hope of compensation for the 
particular individual who has brought the claim.   Even if multiple or group claims were 
permitted under the legislation, the aforementioned research would suggest that this 
might have limited value in securing the rights of those who were not part of the group 
action.    
  
                                                          
576 Similarly in the case of Stone v Ramsay Health Care UK Operations Ltd (ET/1400762/11), which related to 
pregnancy discrimination and constructive dismissal, the Tribunal made recommendations regarding training 
(on the issue of maternity leave) and the amendment of the equal opportunities policy.  Again, the Claimant 
was no longer employed and thus these recommendations would not affect her. 
577 John Sorabji, Michael Napier and Robert Musgrove ‘Improving Access to Justice through Collective Action: Final 
Report’, November 2008 
578 Evelyn Collins and Elizabeth Meehan, Women’s Rights in Employment and Related Areas, in Christopher 
McCrudden and Gerry Chambers in “Individual Rights and the Law in Britain”, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994 
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The role of trade unions / collective bargaining 
6.3.6 Given that individuals have to prosecute their own claims against employers, 
trade unions can play a vital report in supporting union members in doing so.    (Although 
it should be noted that the majority of employees are not trade union members579, so trade 
union involvement will not affect all workers.)  Research carried out by Colling580 
provides two examples of cases that have been supported by trade unions for strategic 
reasons, in an effort to set precedents (Cadman v the Health and Safety Executive581, where 
the Claimant was supported by Prospect, and Allonby and Accrington and Rossendale 
College582, where the Claimant was supported by the NAFTHE).  However, Colling’s 
research also suggests that trade unions feel that individual claims are a drain on their 
resources.  This would indicate that they are  probably less likely to support claims in this 
way.  This may in part also be because, as Colling’s research also indicates,  the 
relationship that trade unions have with an employer may allow them to resolve these 
types of issue more effectively.  This could be a more effective method of 
enforcement/remedy that tribunal proceedings as litigation invariably is expensive and 
time-consuming, as well as draining for the individual employee involved.  The only 
downside of this mechanism for securing rights is the fact that, unlike litigation, there is 
no binding precedent on other employers.  A precedent may persuade other employers 
that their current practices are outside the bounds of what is permitted by law and may 
ensure a wider effect than just on the employer that was directly involved in the litigation.   
6.3.7 The other difficulty is that, whilst a trade union can act as a focal point for 
employee’s complaints about their treatment by their employers, and can collate data on 
how many employees are suffering detriment as a result of exercising parental rights in 
the workplace, they cannot bring a case on behalf of an employee or group of employees.  
This means that an individual will still need to commence the proceedings and, thus, be 
                                                          
579 According to the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills’ Statistical Bulletin on Trade Union 
Membership 2013 (May 2014), between 1995 and 2013, trade union membership has decreased from 32.4 to 
25.6 per cent.   
580 Trevor Colling ‘What space for unions on the floor of rights?  Trade unions and the enforcement of 
statutory individual employment rights’  ILJ 2006, 35(2), 140 - 160 
581 [2004] EWCA Civ 1317 
582 [2004] ECR I-873 
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seen to be enforcing his/her rights against the employer.   Given the reluctance of 
employees to bring a claim where they remain employed by the employer, this inability 
can result in claims not being brought.  Further, trade unions only have limited resources.  
As such, they are unlikely to be in a position to fight each and every case relating to the 
enforcement of the parental rights, but will have to be selective in relation to the cases that 
they fight.   
6.3.8 Despite the difficulties noted above, trade unions have an important role to play 
in the sphere of workplace employment rights in those organisations where unions are 
recognised.   Colling has noted that “[a]wareness of statutory rights is highest amongst 
union members…Union members are also more likely to report dissatisfaction with their 
workplace and to pursue grievances…”  He also found that union presence played a 
critical role in ensuring that any procedures that employers had to resolve disputes were 
actually effective.  This can be seen in the statistics gathered by Colling: “[o]verall, union 
members are almost seven times more likely to report that their grievances are addressed 
effectively within the workplace…”583.  This is supported by Purcell’s research where he 
has found that “…unionised firms tend to have fewer ET cases…it is not unionisation per 
se which leads to a lower number of cases but the existence of procedures giving 
employees a relatively risk-free avenue of redress and access to representation”584.  This 
is important because if workers feel that they can raise issues and that these will be 
listened to, and action taken to remedy the issue, they are more likely to raise these.  In 
the sphere of workplace parental rights this is particularly important because most issues 
will arise in the context of continuing employment (rather than the worker’s dismissal).   
6.4 Remedies for specific rights 
6.4.1 Having considered above the issues that apply to all ET claims, below I examine 
the remedies available where the specific rights discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 are 
infringed.  I argue that the remedies that are currently available are inadequate and mean 
                                                          
583 Trevor Colling ‘Trade Union Roles in Making Employment Rights Effective’ in Linda Dickens (ed) Making 
Employment Rights More Effective: Issues of Enforcement and Compliance Hart Publishing, Oxford, p196 
584 Purcell (n524), p178  
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that there is no disincentive for employers to ignore the legal provisions (other than 
perhaps the adverse publicity arising from an ET case).   
Unfair dismissal and detriment 
6.4.2 The possible remedies in respect of unfair dismissal are:  
6.4.2.1 an order for reengagement or reinstatement. 
Reinstatement requires the employer to treat the employee as if s/he 
had never been dismissed (i.e. s/he is re-employed on the same terms 
and conditions of employment and with no loss of continuity of 
service).  Reinstatement is slightly different in that the employer is 
required to re-engage the employee in comparable employment.   
However, there is no right to an order for reengagement or 
reinstatement, the tribunal has a wide discretion in deciding whether to 
award either of these remedies, and must consider the three factors set 
out in the legislation: 
(i) the employee’s wishes;  
 (ii) whether it is practicable for the employer to comply with the 
order;  
 (iii)  whether there has been any contributory action by the 
employee.   
6.4.2.2 a basic award 
The basic award is calculated using a formula based on length of 
service, age and a week’s pay and is effectively capped at £13,920585. 
6.4.2.3 a compensatory award.   
                                                          
585 There is no cap per se but the maximum amount of a week’s pay is £464 and the maximum number of weeks 
that can be awarded is 30. 
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The compensatory award is supposed to fully compensate the employee 
for any loss suffered586.  There is a statutory cap587 of the lesser of (i) 
£76,574 or 52 week’s pay. 
6.4.3 The possible remedies in respect of a detriment claim are:  
6.4.3.1 a declaration that the worker has been subject to detriment; and/or  
6.4.3.2 an award of compensation of such amount that the ET considers just and 
equitable in all the circumstances.   
CRITIQUE 
6.4.4 For the reasons set out below, it is also questionable whether the remedies for 
unfair dismissal and detriment are sufficient in circumstances where a parent is effectively 
being disadvantaged for having a child/children or some reason connected with this.  As 
set out in Chapter 3, where parents are subject to detriment as a result of either their caring 
responsibilities or parental status, this can have potentially significant damaging effects 
for society as a whole.   
Low levels of compensation 
6.4.5 Compensation for unfair dismissal is set at relatively low levels.  Awards in 
respect of unfair dismissal are capped at £13,920588 in respect of the basic award and 
£76,574589 in respect of the compensatory award590.  However, in the majority of cases, 
employees recover significantly less than these maximum levels; between 1 April 2014 
and 30 June 2014 the average (median591) award was just £5,016592.   This causes several 
                                                          
586 Norton Tool v Tewson [1972] ICR 501 
587587 The cap does not apply where the reason for dismissal was that the claimant was carrying out health and 
safety activities, had made a protected disclosure or was selected for redundancy for one of these reasons.  
These are unlikely to be of assistance to parents seeking to enforce one of the rights outlined in Chapters 3 to 5.   
588 This is calculated by multiplying the employee’s weekly wage (which is limited to £464 for the purposes of 
the calculation (s227(1) ERA in respect of those dismissals that occur after 6 April 2014) by the employee’s 
number of years continuous employment with the employer (which is also limited to 20 for the purposes of 
the calculation (s119(3) ERA) and multiplied by an age factor, the maximum being 1.5.   
589 s124(1) ERA, as amended by Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2014 (SI 2014/382). 
590 Where a claim also includes a claim relating to discrimination, compensation is unlimited. 
591 Throughout this chapter references to average are reference to the median.  This is because it is less likely to 
be affected by a single large award in the way that the mean would be.   
592 Tribunal Statistics: April to June 2014, MOJ, 11 September 2014 
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problems for all potential claimants considering bringing unfair dismissal claims.  
However, they have a great impact on parents/prospective parents for the reasons set out 
below.    
6.4.6 The first is related to the lack of free/state aided legal advice and representation 
that is available, discussed above.  The average cost of professional advice and 
representation for an employee to bring an unfair dismissal claim in an ET is relatively 
high (£2,000593) in comparison to the average amount of compensation awarded for an 
unfair dismissal claim (£5,016594).  In most circumstances even if a claimant is successful 
in ET proceedings,  s/he will have to bear his/her own costs.  This means that legal 
representation will reduce the amount of the award that the claimant actually receives; by 
39.9% if the average fee is charged and the average amount is awarded595.  Whilst this is 
an issue for all claimants bringing unfair dismissal claims, it has a more acute effect on 
parents who have been dismissed in connection with their parental status or childcare 
responsibilities.  As outlined in the previous chapters, the legislation in this area is 
horrendously complex.  This makes it more difficult to properly formulate an unfair 
dismissal claim relating to a breach of one of these parental rights than if the employee 
was bringing a more straightforward unfair dismissal claim.   
6.4.7 A further problem with low levels of compensation is that they are unlikely to 
deter employers from acting in the same way in future; it seems logical that if an employer 
knows that a particular practice will cost it a great deal of money, it is less likely to do it.  
This is a particular problem because, in unfair dismissal proceedings596, an ET cannot 
recommend or require that an employer change a policy which an ET considers to be 
unfair.   
  
                                                          
593 Harding et al (n537) 
594 Harding et al (n537) 
595 This is calculated as follows:, [5,016 – 2,000] 3,016/5,016 = 0.60.1; 60.1%– so reduced by 39.9%  
596 S124(2)(c) of the EqA allows employment tribunals to make recommendations (that within a specified 
period the respondent takes specified steps for the purpose of obviating or reducing the adverse effect of any 
matter to which the proceedings relate (a) on the complainant; (b) on any other person) in discrimination cases  
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Is compensation an effective remedy? 
6.4.8 As set out above at 6.4.2, compensation is not the only remedy for an unfair 
dismissal claim.  Reinstatement or re-engagement may be a more effective remedy for 
those parents who are dismissed as a result of their parental status or childcare 
responsibilities, particularly for new mothers who may face additional difficulties that 
others do not.     
New mothers 
6.4.9 New mothers may have additional difficulties in applying for jobs and attending 
interviews as compared to other claimants due to the practical problems of combining 
childcare with their job hunt.  A new mother may find, for example, that because she is 
out of work, and therefore not earning, she is unable to afford to place her child in a 
nursery, and thus has to spend time looking after her child.  Whilst she may be eligible 
for social security benefits such as jobseekers allowance and income support, the low level 
of these benefits (the maximum jobseekers weekly rate for a lone parent is just £72.40597) 
and the high cost of childcare (in 2014, the typical weekly cost of a nursery place for a 
child under two years of age for 50 hours per week was £212.09 per week, rising to £283.66 
in London598) may prevent her from applying for jobs as her childcare responsibilities may 
take up the majority of her time, and  she may have no-one to look after the child while 
she attends interviews..  This may impact on whether the claimant can be seen to have 
mitigated her loss, and without evidence of mitigation, any compensatory award may be 
reduced to take this failure into account.     
6.4.10 With a lack of affordable childcare and often long waiting lists for nursery places, 
mothers who are out of work may be left in a catch-22 position.  If they do manage to find 
a suitable job, they may not be able to commence employment immediately because they 
need to find appropriate childcare (and they may be placed on a waiting list); they may 
not be able to find childcare prior to finding a job because of the high level of costs 
                                                          
597 Jobseekers’ allowance is: £72.40 for a person who is over 25; £57.35 for those between 18 and 24. 
598 Jill Rutter, “Childcare costs survey 2015”,  Family and Childcare Trust, February 2015 
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associated with childcare (which they cannot afford because they are out of work).   There 
is little case law on this area and any cases tend to be very fact specific as the decision as 
to what steps a claimant should have taken will depend upon their personal 
circumstances.   In Ministry of Defence v Cannock599, it was suggested that six months after 
the birth of a child (which at the time was the maximum period of maternity leave to 
which women were entitled under the legislation) a woman who had been dismissed was 
expected to be “actively looking for work and applying for jobs”600.  This fails to 
appreciate the difficulties described above that mothers may have in finding and paying 
for childcare to enable them to be in a position to commence employment.   
6.4.11 Other research has shown that, the longer that a woman is out of work, the less 
she is likely to earn on returning to work601.  In view of all this, the question arises of 
whether a more appropriate remedy for those who lose their jobs as a result of pregnancy 
might be reinstatement or reengagement602; both of which are remedies which are seldom 
used:  of the 3,858 successful unfair dismissal claims in the year 2013-14, in only 13 (0.03%) 
was reinstatement or reengagement ordered603.    
6.4.12 Mothers of young children may also find difficulties in finding a job because 
whilst, in theory, the law prevents an employer from refusing to take on an employee who 
is the primary carer of a young child (as this would constitute sex discrimination), in 
reality employers may be unwilling to take on an employee with a very young child.  This 
view is supported by the findings of an EOC report which found that some employers 
“deliberately steer clear of taking on women of childbearing age”604.  If these employers 
will avoid employing all women who are merely of childbearing age, it is likely that the 
                                                          
599 [1995] 2 All ER 449 
600 At 480.  The judge in this case also stated that in this situation a claimant “was not entitled both to stay at 
home, applying for any suitable job that might have ‘presented itself’ (whatever that might mean), to rear the 
children and to receive compensation.” (468) 
601 According to the British Household Panel Survey women who return to employment after a 1 year absence 
receive a wage which is on average 16.1% less than the one they had before and women and men that return to 
employment after an absence of 6 months or more experience a 13.6% drop in wages. 
602 An order for reinstatement is an order that an employee be employed on the same terms and conditions as 
prior to their dismissal, whilst an order for re-engagement is an order that an employee be re-employed on 
such terms and conditions as the employment tribunal considers to be comparable either to the job in which 
the employee was previously employed or other suitable employment. 
603 Employment and EAT Tribunal Statistics (n543) 
604 EOC (n244), p2 
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same employers will avoid employing women with young children.  As such, a woman 
who has been unfairly dismissed because of her pregnancy may take longer than the 
average person who has been dismissed to find subsequent employment and, when she 
finds new employment, it may be at a wage lower than that she was previously paid.  The 
cause of the woman’s dismissal will have been the prejudice of her employer towards 
women who are/have been pregnant.  As a society we generally acknowledge that 
prejudice and discrimination are not to be tolerated, hence the plethora of legislation on 
the issue.  It would not seem unreasonable then that the woman should be placed in the 
position that she would have been in had she not been discriminated against – namely 
employed with her previous employer in the same job as she had prior to her maternity 
leave.  This occurs in many other European jurisdictions, such as Austria, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Turkey.    (For the same reason, I would argue that there should be 
greater use of reinstatement and reengagement in circumstances where a claimant has 
been unlawfully discriminated against and this has resulted in their dismissal.  However, 
such arguments are outside the scope of this thesis.) 
Parents 
6.4.13 The issues set out above in relation to women on maternity leave arguably justify 
reinstatement/re-engagement being the preferred remedy in relation to dismissals which 
are as a result of pregnancy/maternity leave.  Working parents may have similar issues 
and they may find it difficult to find employment which is sufficiently flexible to allow 
them to combine their work and family responsibilities.  The right to request flexible 
working only applies after an employee has six months’ continuous service with the 
employer.  As such, the employee who is applying for a new job has no right to request 
flexible working (although s/he may be able to rely upon the provisions on sex 
discrimination, subject to the issues with this discussed in Chapter 5).  It may, therefore, 
be more difficult for a parent with childcare responsibilities to find subsequent suitable 
employment.  As parenting/childcare is important for society, it is unfair that parents 
should be disadvantaged in their search for roles which accommodate such 
responsibilities after they have been unfairly dismissed in connection with those 
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responsibilities.  The easiest way to prevent this is to increase the extent to which 
reinstatement/reengagement is utilised in cases where parents are dismissed in 
connection with their parental responsibilities.    
Failure to allow a parent to exercise a parental right 
6.4.14 The remedy for failing to allow a parent to exercise a right to maternity, paternity 
or parental leave or EDL is a declaration and/or such compensation as the ET considers 
is just and equitable.   There are no reported appellate cases on the matter of how to 
determine the appropriate level of compensation in these cases.  It is therefore difficult to 
assess how significant the level of compensation might be.  Further, for the same reasons 
as are set out above, it is questionable whether compensation is the most effective remedy.  
A better option might be for an ET to be able to require an employer to allow a parent to 
exercise one of these rights.  However, this would be impossible to do within the current 
tribunal system as, based on the statistics regarding how long it takes for a case to reach 
a hearing (discussed below in 6.5.1), in most instances, it would be likely that the case 
would only be heard after the date when the parent wished to take leave had already 
passed.   
6.4.15 If an employee is successful in challenging his/her employer’s decision not to 
accept his/her request for flexible working, there are only limited remedies available and 
the amount of compensation that the tribunal is able to award being restricted to a 
maximum of 8 weeks’ pay605 with the amount of a weeks’ pay itself limited to the 
maximum provided under section 227 of the ERA, currently £464606. The ET may also 
order that the employer reconsider the application, although it has no power to compel 
the employer to change its decision and there is no guidance as to what happens should 
an employer fail or refuse to do so607.   Given that there is no power for an ET to be able 
to compel an employer to change its decision, and the maximum amount that may be 
                                                          
605 Regulation 7 of SI 2002/3236 (Flexible Working (Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) Regulations 2002) 
606 Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2014 (SI 2014/382) 
607 The tribunal also has the power to make a declaration that a complaint to it is well-founded, although this 
seems to provide the employee with no actual benefit 
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awarded is £3,712608, an employee is unlikely to risk souring the employment relationship 
for a relatively small sum. 
Sex discrimination 
6.4.16 Large awards may be useful in the discrimination arena as they can effectively 
force employers to take action on an issue.  No business wants to be hit with an award for 
several millions for something which was preventable and, as such, large awards can 
concentrate employers' minds on potentially discriminatory practices. However, whilst 
there is the potential for large awards to be made in respect of sex discrimination claims, 
it is rare for an ET to make such awards for the reasons set out below.   
6.4.17 Some609 have expressed concern that reports of large awards of compensation 
lead to unrealistic expectations when the average award for sex discrimination in GB is 
relatively low by comparison.  One way that such concerns could be eliminated would be 
to provide more information (perhaps through the Ministry of Justice website) to potential 
claimants on how discrimination claims is calculated.  This way it would be clear that 
there is a correlation between the salary of the employee (or ex-employee) and the level 
of compensation awarded.   
6.4.18 The purpose of the compensatory element of the award is to place the claimant in 
the position that s/he would have been but for the discriminatory act.  In addition to this 
element, an ET may also award exemplary damages and injury to feelings (which can 
incorporate an element in respect of aggravated damages).   
6.4.19 Exemplary damages may be available in discrimination claims, although this is 
an area of uncertainty.  In Deane v The London Borough of Ealing610, a race discrimination 
case, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) found, based on an earlier court of appeal 
decision (Gibbons v South West Water Services611) that exemplary damages could only be 
awarded in respect of torts for which exemplary damages had been awarded prior to the 
                                                          
608 8 x £464 
609 Keith Potter, “Does shopping around to get the best payout really benefit the employee", Personnel Today, 6 
June 2006 
610 [1993] IRLR 209 
611 Unreported, 16 November 1992, CA 
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House of Lords decision in Rookes v Barnard612.  The basis of this reasoning seems to have 
been undermined by Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicester Constabulary613, which, although 
not an employment case, found that there was no requirement that, as a matter of 
principle, a claim for exemplary damages should constitute a cause of action which had 
been accepted before 1964 as grounding such a claim.  In a subsequent EAT case (Virgo 
Fidelis Senior School v Boyle614) whilst the employee’s cross appeal from the ET’s refusal to 
order payment of exemplary damages was dismissed, the EAT suggested that there was 
no reason in principled why exemplary damages should not be awarded in discrimination 
cases if the conditions in Rookes v Barnard were met.  These are that either there was 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government, or that 
the respondent’s conduct was calculated by him to make a profit for himself.  It is likely 
to be difficult to argue that an employer’s conduct in acting in a discriminatory manner 
was calculated by him to make a profit for himself, and the majority of claims brought 
under this head have been libel and defamation cases where publications have been seen 
to have profited from libellous/defamatory stories about celebrities (for example, Douglas 
and others v Hello! Ltd and others (No. 3)615). However, it is possible that the other head, 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government, may be 
of use to public sector workers as these workers may be able to show that the action of 
their superiors (who may be servants of the Government) are oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional.  This occurred in Michalak v Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust616 where 
the Employment Tribunal made an award of exemplary damages based on the fact that 
one of the discriminatory decisions that had taken place was to suspend the Claimant and 
the suspension had been expressed to be pursuant to and under the provisions of a policy 
document prescribed by the Government.  As such, the Respondents’ actions amounted 
to oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government.  The 
                                                          
612 [1964] AC 1129 
613 [2001] UKHL 29 
614 [2004] ICR 1210 
615 [2003] EWHC 786 
616 ET/1810815/2008 
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scope for exemplary damages, however is limited and exemplary damages are seldom 
awarded.  
6.4.20 Aggravated damages are made where the conduct of the employer has 
aggravated the situation, perhaps through the conduct of an investigation of a complaint 
of discrimination,(for example, as in Armitage, Marsden & HM Prison Service v Johnson617 
where the employer attributed the problems that the Claimant was experiencing with 
other employees (which the ET found to be on the grounds of the Claimant’s race) to a 
defect in the Claimant's personality.  The ET awarded aggravated damages of £7,500), 
because the employer treated a complaint about harassment as a trivial matter (HM Prison 
Service v Salmon618) or because of the way the employer (or its representatives) conducted 
the defence of a claim of discrimination (Zaiwalla & Co v Walia619).  However, whilst earlier 
cases suggested that aggravated damages could be a separate head of compensation, the 
EAT in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Mr H Shaw620 suggested that this might 
not be the most appropriate method of dealing with this and that instead they should be 
included as a sub-heading of injury to feelings.  This approach was followed in Michalak 
and no separate aggravated damages award was made.   
6.4.21 Further, the injury to feelings award is effectively capped at £30,000.  Section 
119(4) of the EqA expressly provides for compensation to be awarded for the injury to 
feelings suffered by the employee and does not provide for a cap on the amount of this 
award.  However, the amount of any award for injury to feelings is calculated according 
to the principles in the case of Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police621, (as revised 
by Da'Bell v NSPCC622).  These set out three bands of award: (i) awards for injury to 
feelings of the most serious kind, such as a lengthy campaign of discriminatory 
harassment, should normally lie between £18,000 to £30,000; the middle band, where 
awards lie between £6,000 to £18,000, is reserved for serious cases which do not merit an 
award in the highest band; and (iii) awards for less serious cases such as where there is 
                                                          
617 [1997] IRLR 162 
618 [2001] IRLR 425 
619 [2002] IRLR 697 
620 UKEAT/0125/11 
621 [2002] EWCA Civ 1871 
622 UKEAT/0227/09 
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an isolated or one off occurrence should lie between £500 to £6,000.  There seemed to be 
scope, following the decision in Simmons v Castle623, for the injury feelings bands to be 
subject to a further 10% increase.  In that case, the Court of Appeal held that the level of 
general damages in certain types of claims should be increased after 1 April 2013 to reflect 
the fact that claimants were no longer able to recover success fees and after the event 
insurance premiums from respondents due to a change in the law.  However, in Chawla v 
Hewlett Packard Limited624, the EAT held that the 10% uplift did not apply to injury to 
feelings awards in the employment tribunal.   
6.4.22 The court in Vento also stated that only in exceptional cases should awards for 
injury to feelings exceed the top band.  However, even awards of the upper limit are rare 
and are awarded only in extreme circumstances.  Despite sex discrimination claims being 
uncapped, between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014, the median award for a sex 
discrimination case was £8.039, in only 6% of successful cases were awards made of 
£50,000 or more, with the largest award being £168,957625.  The Vento principles seem to 
have effectively limited the level of awards in sex discrimination cases.  In the year prior 
to the decision in Vento the largest award made was for £1,414,620626.  In the year in which 
Vento was decided this fell to £91,496627.   
6.4.23 Even in cases where the acts of sex discrimination have been extreme, ETs have 
not made injury to feelings in excess of the upper Vento limit.  For example, in Miles v 
Gilbank628 an ET found that the acts of the employer and its director towards the employee 
who was pregnant constituted "an inhumane and sustained campaign of bullying and 
discrimination" that was "targeted, deliberate, repeated and consciously inflicted".  The 
ET further found that the acts had shown "a callous disregard or concern for the life of 
[the employee's] unborn child."  The ET stated that it had no hesitation in awarding the 
employee the maximum possible amount for her feelings, and awarded £25,000 (the 
upper Vento limit at the time).  The court in Vento did not suggest that £25,000 should be 
                                                          
623 [2012] EWCA Civ 1039 
624 UKEAT/0280/13/BA 
625 Employment and EAT Tribunal Statistics (n543) 
626 ETS Annual Report 2001/02 
627 ETS Annual Report 2002/03 
628 [2006] EWCA Civ 543 
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an absolute maximum.  What it did say was that only in exceptional circumstances should 
awards exceed this.  The facts of Miles v Gilbank are so exceptional and unusual that an ET 
could have awarded in excess of £25,000 for injury to feelings.  Similarly in Michalak, 
despite a sustained period of victimisation after the Claimant raised concerns about 
unjustified payments made to her colleagues, the ET awarded only the upper 
Vento/Da’Bell limit of £30,000.   
6.4.24 Since compensation for injury to feelings is effectively limited to £30,000, large 
awards will only be possible where there is a large award for loss.  Cases of this type are 
unusual and tend to be limited to those who are relatively high earners and/or those who 
can show that they are unlikely to be able to work for a significant period of time.  For 
example, in the case of Michalak, the Tribunal awarded a total of £4,452,202.60 to the 
Claimant who had been earning £117,764.50 per year629 and who was unlikely to ever be 
able to work as a doctor again.  This, however, is an unusual case in that the discrimination 
suffered by the Claimant was so severe that it resulted in her suffering a severe psychiatric 
injury.  For most claimants, even where there is a sustained campaign of discrimination, 
unless this has such a catastrophic effect that the claimant will never work again, it is more 
likely that s/he will be expected to find work within around 12 to 18 months of the 
tribunal hearing and will need to show that s/he has made reasonable attempts to 
mitigate loss.  As set out in 6.4.9 a new mother may also have difficulty in finding a new 
job and in mitigating her loss if the employment tribunal holds her to standards with 
which a man without caring responsibilities could comply (which are the standards that 
were applied in Ministry of Defence v Cannock).   
6.4.25 As the Vento bands have been set by the courts, rather than the legislature, there 
is no mechanism for upward review.  Until NSPCC v Da’Bell the amounts that could be 
awarded under each of the Vento bands had not been increased to take account of 
inflation, and it is not clear when the tribunals or courts will next increase the bands. 
  
                                                          
629 This was comprised of her basic salary and additional allowances/payments. 
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Less favourable treatment of part-time workers 
6.4.26 An ET can award such amount as is just and equitable in respect of any less 
favourable treatment which is not objectively justified, having regard to the infringement 
of the Part-time Workers Regulations 2000 (“PtWR”) and the loss suffered by the worker.  
Unlike the EqA which prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain protected 
characteristics, including sex, there is no separate injury to feelings component of any 
award of compensation.  However similar to the EqA, there is no maximum award that 
an ET can make.   Separate to a claim for less favourable treatment, an employee can also 
bring an unfair dismissal claim if s/he is dismissed (or selected for dismissal) as a result 
of part-time status.   
6.4.27 No statistics are available on the average awards made in claims brought under 
the PtWR.  However, given that no injury to feelings award is possible, it is likely that the 
average would be less than that for claims brought under the sex discrimination 
provisions of the EqA.   
6.5 Solutions 
Interim relief – a possible solution? 
6.5.1 One of the barriers confronting most claimants bringing unfair dismissal claims 
will be how to afford the costs of running the litigation in circumstances where they have 
no income (as a result of having lost their jobs).  Interim relief, whereby an ET can order 
reinstatement/reengagement pending final determination or, if the employer refuses to 
reinstate/reengage the employee, continuation of the employment contract, effectively 
removes this barrier.  It is also particularly helpful in this regard given the speed with 
which an interim hearing is supposed to occur.  According to Tribunal Statistics630, it takes 
an average of 38 weeks for the ET to resolve case involving a single claimant.  In contrast, 
once a claimant has validly lodged an application for interim relief631, an ET has to hold a 
hearing as soon as practicable, subject to giving the respondent at least seven days’ notice 
of this.  There are no official statistics on how quickly the ET hears interim applications.  
                                                          
630 Tribunal Statistics (n592)  
631 To do so, the application must be lodged within seven days of the termination date. 
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However, the reported cases on this suggest that it is significantly quicker than other types 
of claim.  Many of the reported cases do not specify the date of termination or the date on 
which the claimant applied to the ET for interim relief.  However, of those that do, 43.8%632 
were heard within a month of the termination date and 81.3% were heard within two 
months of the termination633.  The remaining cases were all heard within three months of 
the termination date.   
6.5.2 Interim relief is currently only available where the reason for the employee’s 
dismissal is for trade union membership or activity; making a protected disclosure; or 
undertaking activities in particular employee-representative type roles634.  Morris has 
suggested it is likely “… that if interim relief were more widely available the effectiveness 
of the unfair dismissal jurisdiction in preserving employment would be much greater in 
that the tribunal would be ordering the continuation of the existing position rather than 
reintroducing the claimant to a workplace he or she has left”635.  This argument is 
supported by the fact that, as noted at 6.4.11, reinstatement or reengagement is very 
infrequently ordered. One of the reasons for this is likely to be the fact that, by the time 
the claimant’s claim is decided, the employer will have had time to fill the  claimant’s role, 
thus making reinstatement impractical.  Interim relief would prevent this situation from 
arising as the claimant would remain in his/her role throughout the proceedings.  This 
woud thereby provide a more effective remedy, preserving the claimant’s employment. 
Alternative mechanisms for enforcement 
6.5.3 Dickens has noted that “…too little weight is placed on state agency inspection, 
monitoring and enforcement, and on other levers which would require or encourage 
proactive employer action to deliver fairer workplaces by addressing structural, systemic 
and organisational issues, going beyond the individual cases of rights infringement”636.  
                                                          
632 7 out of 16 cases, see Annex 5 
633 13 out of 16 cases, see Annex 5 
634 Health and safety rep, working time rep, pension scheme trustee or employee rep for the purposes of TUPE 
or collective redundancies. 
635 Morris (n570), p20  
636 Linda Dickens, Fairer Workplaces: Making Employment Rights Effective in Linda Dickens (ed) Making 
Employment Rights More Effective: Issues of Enforcement and Compliance Hart Publishing, Oxford, p206, 
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What alternative mechanisms for enforcement could be applied in respect of workplace 
parental rights?  In some European countries, for example, France, Greece, Hungary and 
Italy, employment rights are monitored and enforced not only through the courts but also 
through the use of labour inspectorates.  The UK has ratified ILO Convention 81, save for 
part II of this, which relates to Labour Inspection in Commerce.      The advantage of a 
labour inspectorate that considers the compliance of an employer with its obligations 
towards parents is that there is no need for an employee to take any action in relation to 
the employer.  This means that there is no reason for an employer to take retaliatory action 
against the employee – the employee cannot be seen as being disloyal or, indeed, for 
taking any active stance in relation to the enforcement.  It is entirely for the labour 
inspectorate to determine if there is any issue which gives rise to concern.   This would 
move the emphasis on enforcement away from the individual and would also 
demonstrate the importance of the parental workplace rights. 
6.6 Conclusion 
6.6.1 The current enforcement mechanisms are, as demonstrated, throughout this 
Chapter, inadequate.  A more proactive approach to enforcement, with less emphasis on 
the individual needing to take action against his/her employer, would be more likely to 
prove effective.  As discussed above at 6.5.3, other jurisdictions adopt a different 
approach, using labour inspectorates, rather than relying on enforcement by individuals.   
Dickens has suggested an alternative to this, within the confines of the existing GB system.  
She suggests that “[a] provision could be introduced to enable ETs to require such 
employers [who had been found to be in violation of the law] to take a ‘health check’, 
conducted by Acas for example, with a requirement to act on any deficiencies 
revealed…”637.  The advantage of this would be that, once a claim had successfully been 
brought, the employer’s practices would continue to be monitored in an attempt to ensure 
that there was an ongoing positive outcome as a result of the litigation.  The disadvantage 
of this is that it relies on an individual bringing a claim in the first place, and, for the 
reasons set out in this Chapter, there are significant difficulties for parents and pregnant 
                                                          
637 ibid, p214  
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workers in bringing such claims.  For this reason, agency enforcement, whereby a third 
party (other than the worker) enforces the rights would seem to be the most effective 
method of enforcement.   
6.6.2 The current mechanisms for enforcement are not fit for purpose.  They can 
discourage workers from bringing claims by the amounts of compensation recovered 
being relatively low, the costs of bringing claims being relatively high and the fact that, 
although an a claim may be in the interest of the wider workforce or society as a whole 
(because, as set out in earlier chapters, it is in society’s interest that men and women are 
able to combine work and family), the employee is the only person able to bring such a 
claim.   Further, the fact that a worker has brought a claim often appears to have limited 
impact on the working conditions of other workers.   
6.6.3 A further limitation is the fact that often the only remedy available is 
compensation.  In many cases a more appropriate remedy might be some form of 
injunctive relief to require the employer to allow the worker to exercise the relevant right, 
or an order for reinstatement or reengagement where the employee has been unfairly 
dismissed in connection with her pregnancy or his/her childcare responsibilities.  This 
would not necessarily require a significant overhaul of the existing tribunal system given 








CHAPTER 7 : Discrimination against Parents 
 
7.1.1 In this chapter I will consider the best way to secure rights for parents in the 
workplace.  This includes the need for time off, as well as provisions to prevent 
discrimination against, and detrimental treatment of, parents.   As set out in the preceding 
chapters, there are already some employment rights which may assist parents.  However, 
for the reasons set out previously, these are not sufficient to alleviate the disadvantage 
that parents face in the workplace when they attempt to combine work and childcare.   
7.2 Leave to care for a new baby 
7.2.1 If SPL does not resolve the issues facing parents in the first year of a child’s life, 
what would? In Chapter 2 I proposed splitting leave for pregnancy and the physical 
recovery from any leave that is necessary to bond with or care for the new baby.  I also 
proposed that any period of maternity leave should be relatively short (eight weeks) and 
that this should be accompanied by a longer period of “new child leave” which could be 
used by either parent.   Here I will consider how such leave would operate.  As set out in 
Chapter 4, the problem with the current SPL provisions is that these retain the emphasis 
on the mother as primary carer because the father’s entitlement is conditional upon the 
mother’s entitlement and whether she uses her full entitlement of maternity leave .  This 
needs to change. 
7.2.2 There are alternative options to this approach.  These include: (i) providing each 
parent with a block of leave, (ii) providing each family with a block of leave, which it can 
then choose how to distribute between parents, or (iii) a hybrid of the previous two 
suggestions whereby each parent gets a block of leave  with a block of leave for the family.  
The advantage of the first and third options are that, from the experience of other 
countries, having periods of leave that can only be used by fathers seems to result in an 
increase in uptake of leave by them.    
7.2.3 The experience of other countries which have amended their gender neutral 
schemes to gender specific ones seems to support the idea that gender neutral parental 
schemes that include parents, rather than fathers explicitly, do not maximise  take-up by 
fathers.  For example, in Norway, a system of gender neutral parental leave was amended 
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from 1 April 1993 so that 4 weeks’ leave was reserved exclusively for fathers.  Before this 
amendment, less than 3% of fathers used parental leave.  After the change in 1993, use of 
leave increased to 30% of eligible fathers and then to 51% in 1994638.  Similarly in Germany, 
the gender neutral parental leave scheme was amended so that fathers had two months’ 
leave for their exclusive use, and the uptake of fathers taking leave increased rose from 
3.3% of eligible fathers in 2006 to 18.6% in 2009 and has continued to rise since (for 
children born in the third quarter of 2011, the figure is 27.8%)639.  However it is important 
to note that in Germany, at the same time as this change was made, there was a change to 
the way in which leave was paid from a low flat rate to a percentage of earnings.  It is 
therefore impossible to tell whether the increase in uptake of leave was due for the most 
part to either or both of these changes.   
7.2.4 The problem with the first option outlined above is that it does not provide 
flexibility to families.  Some may wish one parent to take a longer amount of leave than 
another.  The third option is supported by the authors of the Demos Home Front report 
who concluded that there should be a “...system of parental leave that encourages shared 
parenting...” and that this should “...involve elements of ‘use it or lose it’ leave for mothers 
and fathers or partners as well as an element of transferable parental leave”640.  In light of 
the fact that I would propose retaining maternity leave albeit for a significantly shorter 
period, I do not suggest that any of the “new child leave” should be reserved for mothers.   
7.2.5 The next issue I consider is whether parents should be entitled to periods of 
discontinuous leave.  One of the criticisms of SPL is that, whilst an employee can request 
discontinuous leave, the employer is not obliged to accede to this request.  With 
workplace parental rights there is often the possibility of tension between the rights that 
parents need/want and the extent to which these might impact upon a business’ ability 
to maximise profits.  I acknowledge that discontinuous leave may not always be 
practicable.  Whether such a request can be accommodated will depend upon a number 
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of factors including the size of the employer, the type of role, and the nature of the request 
from the employee.  However, rather than allowing employers free reign to decide 
whether to grant such requests, it would seem preferable to include a duty for these to be 
properly considered by employers and only refused where there is a genuine business 
ground for doing so.   
7.2.6 Similar issues arise in relation to multiple requests for continuous leave . There is 
a need to balance the interests of parents and the interests of employers.  Automatically 
permitting a large number of “continuous” leave requests would effectively be the same 
as automatically permitting a single discontinuous leave request and the same issues 
outlined above in relation to discontinuous requests would apply.  Equally though, 
parents need to be able to spend time with their new child, so a limited number of requests 
for continuous periods of leave should be permitted.  Given that there was extensive 
consultation on the proposals for SPL and three requests was deemed appropriately to 
balance the needs of both parents and employers, this would seem to be an appropriate 
maximum number of requests that must be automatically granted.  However, as every 
employee’s needs are different, I would propose that, in addition to this, employees be 
permitted to make further requests and there be a duty on employers to consider these in 
a proper manner and refuse only where there are genuine business grounds for doing so.  
7.2.7 In addition to allowing parents to take leave, the EHRC report “Working Better” 
suggests that parents should be able to reduce their working hours during the leave 
period as opposed to taking leave.  This has the advantage of allowing parents to spend 
some time with their new child, whilst continuing to work, and may allow parents to 
share parenting in a way that they have not previously been able to, by for example one 
parent working in the morning and caring for the child in the afternoon and the other 
working in the afternoon and caring for the child in the morning.   This is not really a form 
of leave but rather a temporary change in working pattern.  In paragraph 7.4 below, I 
advocate a new right for parents which would allow such a request to be made.  On this 
basis I would not propose including this type of arrangement within any “new child 
leave”. 
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7.2.8 The final question is how much “new child leave” parents should receive.  Two 
parent families are currently entitled to a total of 54 weeks’ leave (comprising 52 weeks 
maternity leave and two weeks’ paternity leave).  As I have concluded that mothers 
should still receive maternity leave of eight weeks, this leaves 46 weeks’ leave remaining 
(assuming that we do not wish to increase current leave entitlements).  As the purpose of 
amending the maternity leave regime would be to encourage fathers to increase their 
uptake of leave, the amount of leave reserved for fathers would have to be at least their 
current entitlement of two weeks.   There is, however, a tension between reserving leave 
for fathers and allowing families maximum flexibility.  Other jurisdictions, such as 
Germany and Norway, have reserved between 6 weeks and 2 months’ leave for fathers.  
There seems to be no reason to choose any particular length of time and, as such, I would 
suggest that the initial amount of leave reserved for fathers should be 4 weeks to balance 
the need to encourage fathers to take leave, and the need to be flexible for families.  After 
a period of time, this amount could be reviewed depending on the uptake by each parent.  
If fathers have a reserved period of 4 weeks, this would leave 42 weeks remaining for the 
family to take as it chooses. 
7.3 A new concept: parental discrimination 
7.3.1 Even if the amendments proposed above were to be adopted, this would only 
resolve the issues that parents face during the first year of a child’s life.   
7.3.2 As well as parents needing positive rights to enable them to combine work and 
family responsibilities, they may also need protection against discrimination as a result of 
the fact of being a parent.  By way of example, an employer may be reluctant to employ 
anyone with childcare responsibilities because of negative stereotypes about parents in 
the workplace (such as a mistaken belief that parents will take greater periods of sick leave 
to care for their children641).  As identified in Chapter 5, the current protections against 
direct sex discrimination are only of use to parents to the extent that an employer treats 
mothers and fathers differently to each other, as opposed to treating parents differently 
                                                          
641 Statistics from the ONS show that overall women with dependent children had the same rate of sickness 
absence as those with no dependent children.  
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=1577&Pos=1&ColRank=1&Rank=192) 
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to non-parents.  Whilst there may be some arguments that could be constructed on the 
basis of age discrimination to try to address discrimination against parents, it is not 
entirely clear that these would be successful and using the direct age discrimination 
provisions has the disadvantage that age is the only protected characteristic where direct 
discrimination can be objectively justified. Therefore there seems to be a need to provide 
some additional protection to ensure that parents are not discriminated against in the 
workplace as result of their parental responsibilities.  For this, and other reasons, the 
Fawcett Report “Gender Equality in the 21st Century: modernising the legislation” 
recommends the introduction of a new family status protection to assist in the move away 
from “out-dated assumptions about gender roles”642. 
7.3.3 Direct discrimination alone is unlikely to be of much use even if parental status 
is a protected characteristic.  There are plenty of men in the workplace who are fathers 
but who may rely on their wives/partners/someone else to care for their children, and 
whose parental status may not negatively impact on them in the workplace.  In the 
majority of cases, the issue will not be the fact that that someone has children, but that 
they need time off, flexible working arrangements or the like.  In Cordell v Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office643 an accommodation that would allow the Claimant to undertake a 
particular role was refused by her employer on the basis that the costs of this were not 
reasonable.  Ms Cordell brought a claim of direct discrimination which was unsuccessful 
because the reason she had been denied the role was the cost of the adjustment, not her 
disability per se.  Applying this logic to cases where parents require an accommodation to 
do their roles, it is unlikely that a refusal to accommodate (or any disadvantage attached 
to it) would amount to direct discrimination as it would be the accommodation that 
would be the reason for the treatment, not the individual’s parental status per se.  That is 
not to say that there is no need for protection from direct discrimination against 
parentsbut direct discrimination protection alone is likely to be insufficient.  For that 
                                                          
642 Kate Bellamy and Sophie Cameron, “Gender Equality in the 21st Century: modernising the legislation”, Fawcett 
Society, April 2008, p5 
643 [2012] I.C.R. 280 
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reason, any new concept of discrimination should cover not only direct discrimination 
against parents but also discrimination caused by the needs of parents.   
7.3.4 The Government considered whether a concept of parental discrimination was 
required but discounted it in the “Discrimination Law Review – A Framework for 
Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain”644.  This was on the basis 
that “[p]arents already benefit from a number of legal rights including some under 
discrimination law.  In particular, the indirect sex discrimination provisions can be used 
to challenge practices which present more difficulties for women”645 and because “[a] 
broad anti-discrimination provision would cut across the balance achieved by the existing 
provisions, which are widely accepted”646. The first of these statements appears to be 
premised on women being the primary carers, given that it refers to the indirect 
discrimination provisions being used to challenge practices which present more 
difficulties for women, rather than parents.  This appears to be a tacit acceptance of the 
fact that women, and not men, can generally utilise the indirect sex discrimination 
provisions in relation to childcare responsibilities.  For the reasons described in Chapter 
5, the indirect sex discrimination provisions may not always assist parents in their 
attempts to combine their work and family responsibilities so this statement is incorrect.   
7.3.5 The second of these statements suggests that the existing rights for parents 
appropriately balance the interests of parents and employers and that the rights are 
readily accepted.  This thesis has examined the extent to which the existing rights are 
sufficient to provide parents with rights enabling them to combine work and family 
responsibilities and has found that there are significant flaws in the current regime.  The 
suggestion that the rights are widely accepted is also at odds with the research referred 
to in Chapter 1 which suggests that some employers seek to avoid employing women of 
childbearing age.  If the rights of parents were genuinely accepted, then there would be 
no reason for employers to adopt this approach.   Further, as set out in the preceding 
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chapters, parents do not have adequate protection against discrimination and the rights 
provided are far from adequate to guarantee them the ability to combine work and 
childcare responsibilities. There does, therefore, appear to be a need for additional 
protection for parents.  One question is whether this should also include pregnancy (being 
a period of time where a woman is a prospective parent) or whether the existing 
protection of pregnancy is sufficient.    
Should pregnancy be included? 
7.3.6 Pregnancy is both similar to and different from parenting.  On the one hand, it is 
the pre-cursor to parental responsibility and there are aspects of it that affect both parents 
(for example, as discussed in Chapter 2, both parents have an interest in the health and 
well-being of the child647).  On the other hand, it is a condition which directly affects only 
the mother, as the carrier of the child.  It is also different from parenting in that, under the 
Equality Act 2010 (the “EqA”), pregnancy is a separate protected characteristic.  As such, 
unlike other parents seeking to bring claims, pregnant workers do not need to rely on the 
sex discrimination provisions or try to run other creative arguments around the other 
protected characteristics (such as that set out in Chapter 5 regarding age discrimination).    
7.3.7 The difficulty with advocating a change to the current position is that, unlike 
protection of parents, where there are problems with using the existing model to prevent 
discrimination, the provisions in relation to pregnancy are much less vulnerable to 
criticism.  As set out in Chapter 5, in order to bring a pregnancy discrimination under the 
EqA, an employee does not (unlike for claims in respect of the other protected 
characteristics) have to show that she is treated less favourably than a comparator, but 
only that she is treated unfavourably.  This is a significant difference and one that results 
in the discrimination provisions being particularly helpful for pregnant workers.   
7.3.8 Pregnancy can also be differentiated from parenting in that it is sex-specific.  By 
contrast, either parent can have primary childcare responsibilities (indeed, both parents 
could have equal joint responsibility for a child).  As such, there is a far greater need for a 
                                                          
647 For the avoidance of doubt, I am not suggesting here that the father/mother’s partner should in any way be 
able to dictate what medical treatment the mother has in respect of her pregnancy.  Such issues are outside the 
scope of this thesis.  However, in the context of a couple who have decided that they wish to proceed with a 
pregnancy, it is clear that both will have an interest in the health and well-being of the child.   
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separate, non-gender specific provision prohibiting discrimination against parents.  For 
these reasons, there is no need for pregnancy to be included within any prohibition of 
discrimination against parents.   
7.3.9 Whilst the introduction of a prohibition on discrimination against parents would 
be helpful in preventing less favourable treatment of parents relative to other employees, 
this alone is unlikely to resolve all the issues faced by parents in the workplace.  As set 
out above, in many cases the issue is the need to accommodate the particular needs of 
parents, rather than disparate treatment of them and non-parents.  Below I explore a 
possible solution to this – the idea of reasonable accommodation.   
7.4 A right to reasonable accommodation of parental responsibilities? 
7.4.1 In the preceding chapters I have identified failings with the current regime of 
parental rights in the workplace.  The most fundamental issue in combining work and 
family responsibilities is that the workplace has been designed to suit a male norm.  As 
such, it fails to provide an environment in which parents' needs can be accommodated.  
This is not a deliberate act of discrimination by particular employers, but rather is a 
pervasive issue across most, if not all, workplaces.   
7.4.2 One of the difficulties with the current approach is that it "... encourages a 
perception that anti-discrimination law is only concerned with the abnormal behaviour 
of some bigoted individuals, rather than with achieving social transformation"648. In the 
arena of family-friendly rights, the issue tends not to be hostility towards parents, but 
rather a failure to appreciate that the way in which the workplace and its practices are 
structured favour workers without caring responsibilities, with no consideration of 
whether this needs (for rational business reasons) to be the case.  As Smith has noted 
"[t]hose who are struggling to balance work and family commitments face an entrenched 
and persistent conception of the ideal worker as being unencumbered"649.    
The right to request flexible working is an illustration of an attempt to resolve these types 
of issue but, for the reasons set out in Chapter 4, whilst this right is helpful, the grounds 
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649 Belinda Smith “It's about time - for a new regulatory approach to equality”, 36 Fed L Rev 117 (2008),136 
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on which a request can be granted are so wide as to effectively permit most employers to 
find a basis for refusal of requests (if they so wish).  Similarly, the right to request flexible 
working does not appear to have had a significant impact on the way in which workplaces 
are structured in general – whilst it may permit changes to hours, place of work and the 
like to those who feel able to make a request, it may not assist those parents where 
employers are so anti-flexible working that it is obvious that no request would be granted 
or that requests will only granted for workers in particular roles.  However, the issues 
faced by parents do not relate solely to flexible working.  As such, whilst an effective right 
guaranteeing parents flexibility over their working hours or the location where they 
undertake their work would enable some parents to better combine their normal childcare 
responsibilities with work, it would not resolve all the issues faced by parents in the 
workplace.  The other issue frequently faced by parents is a need for time off, which is 
currently addressed through the provisions on emergency dependant’s leave (“EDL”) 
and parental leave. 
7.4.3 The current model of trying to identify particular rights that parents need  has 
meant that the rights have developed in a piecemeal way and do not meet the needs of 
parents.   A different approach is therefore needed; one that can adapt to the needs of the 
individual and his/her family circumstances.  A duty to make reasonable accommodation 
in respect of caring responsibilities may be the solution, in combination with provisions 
preventing discrimination against parents.  
7.4.4 How such a duty would operate is considered further below.  However, there is 
first the issue of whether this approach would be permissible under European law.   
European law issues 
 
7.4.5 One of the reasons presented by the government for not extending the concept of 
reasonable adjustments beyond disability discrimination is that this is not possible 
because of limits placed by European law650 in respect of positive action.  The comments 
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of Baroness Hale in Archibald v Fife651 that reasonable adjustments "...necessarily entails a 
measure of positive discrimination" are  citedby the government in support of its position.   
However, not everyone agrees that reasonable adjustments are a form of positive action. 
Waddington and Bell argue that these are distinct concepts652, in part because “[u]nlike 
most forms of positive action that are aimed at members of socially or economically 
disadvantaged groups, reasonable accommodations generally possess an individualized 
character, and are framed in terms of an individual right”653.  This may be true in the 
employment sphere where the duty to make reasonable adjustments is very much 
focussed on the impact that a particular employer’s practice or policy has on a particular 
disabled person.  But, as will be discussed below, in the context of the provision of services 
a wider duty to make reasonable adjustments exists.  This seems to be more group-
orientated.   
7.4.6 However, a duty to make reasonable adjustments for caring responsibilities 
would provide equal rights to all parents and would not directly discriminate against 
either sex.   I also, below, dispute the argument that providing rights to parents could 
amount to indirect discrimination (on the basis that women would be more likely to utilise 
such rights).   
7.4.7 There are some European rulings in relation to indirectly discriminatory 
measures which might be helpful in establishing that any right to reasonable adjustment 
would be objectively justified under European law.   The case of Julia Schnorbus v Land 
Hessen654 concerned a rule giving priority to a training course, which those wishing to be 
lawyers were required to undertake, to those who had completed compulsory national 
service where the number of applications for the course exceeded the number of places.  
There was no compulsory national service for women, which meant that effectively 
women were excluded from the potential benefit of this rule.  The CJEU ruled that this 
measure did not amount to direct discrimination as it did not overtly refer to the sex of 
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the individual.  It also ruled that the rules were justified insofar as they sought to reduce 
the inequality suffered by men as a result of the obligation to do national service.  
Applying this logic to the issue of parental responsibilities and a duty to accommodate 
these, so long as any requirement did not go beyond what was necessary to reduce the 
inequality suffered by women as a result of childcare obligations, any disparate impact is 
likely to be justified.  Further, in the event that parental responsibilities began to be more 
evenly shared by parents, the potential for successful indirect discrimination claims 
would clearly decrease.       
7.4.8 The case of Lommers v Minister van Landbauw655 is also a helpful illustration of the 
type if issues that might be considered in weighing up the objective justification test, 
although the issue arose in the context of direct, positive, discrimination. This case 
concerned nursery places at a Ministry nursery which were reserved exclusively for 
women because women were underrepresented at the Ministry and a lack of childcare 
was a barrier to women's employment.  Men were only able to access these nursery places 
in an emergency, with the exception of male single parents who could access places on 
the same basis as women.  The CJEU ruled that this provision could be permissible under 
European law.  It acknowledged that the situations of male employees and female 
employees were comparable in relation to the possible need for them to use the 
nursery.  However such treatment would be justified if there was a significant under-
representation of women (both in terms of the number of women working there and their 
occupation of higher grades) and the insufficiency of local nursery places was likely to be 
a factor in this.  This was a matter for the courts of the Member State to determine based 
on the facts before them. 
7.4.9 Even if a duty to accommodate parental responsibilities was to amount on its face 
to direct discrimination (which, for the reasons above, I believe is unlikely), this would 
not necessarily mean that this would contravene European law.  As set out below, 
European law would permit positive discrimination in some circumstances.   
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European legislation 
7.4.10 Article 2 of EU directive 76/207/EEC provides that "...the principle of equal 
treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of 
sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status."  This 
would appear to prohibit any form of positive discrimination, however, article 2(4) of the 
same directive states that "Member States may maintain or adopt measures within the 
meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full equality in practice 
between men and women." 
7.4.11 Article 141(4) (effectively replicated by article 157 TFEU ) States that "[w]ith a 
view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the 
principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to ... Prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages in professional careers."  As such, positive discrimination may be 
permissible so long as it seeks to prevent or compensate for disadvantage caused in the 
workplace.   
7.4.12 The case law of the CJEU has considered what sorts of positive action measures 
might be permissible.  In Kalanke v Freie und Hansestadt Bremen656 the CJEU held that 
automatically prioritising women for promotions in sectors where they were 
underrepresented was not permissible under European law.  The CJEU commented that 
"national rules which guarantee women absolute and unconditional priority for 
appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal opportunities and overstep the 
limits of the exception in article 2(4) of the Directive."  In the same case, the Advocate 
General, whilst dismissing the idea of automatic priority for women, noted that "...what 
is required is measures relating to the organisation of work, in particular working hours, 
and structures for small children and other measures which will enable family and work 
commitments to be reconciled with each other."  He further noted, however, that 
following the ruling in Commission of the European Communities v France657 even these types 
of measures were not permitted by art 2(4).   
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7.4.13 The case of Commission of the European Communities v France concerned rights 
which were given solely to mothers in connection with their caring responsibilities.  
Equivalent rights were not given to men and thus the CJEU held that this violated the 
principle of equal treatment.  In this case, the Advocate General commented that "[a]s far 
as the Commission is concerned, equality could equally well be achieved by a levelling-
up process applying the same benefits to men.  In my view such an approach is in 
accordance with the terms and spirit of the directive, the third recital of which sets out the 
aim of furthering the harmonisation of living and working conditions 'while maintaining 
their improvement'." 
7.4.14 The trend since the cases above, though, has been to find that positive 
discrimination measures are compliant with European law, so long as there is a need for 
the measure, it is proportionate and women do not get automatic preference.  As Burrows 
and Robison have noted “…provided such measures are proportionate, European law 
allows a wide margin of appreciation to member states who wish to use positive action 
measures to provide specific advantages to women in order to assist them in pursuing a 
vocational activity or to prevent or compensate women for disadvantages in their 
professional careers”658.   The advantage of limiting positive action in this way is that, as 
Idris659 has noted, due to intra-group inequality, imposing a blanket rule to achieve a 
numerical target without properly defining the scope of its application is unlikely to 
achieve equality because within that group, some will be disadvantaged more than others.  
This is particularly true in the context of parental rights – securing rights for mothers (and 
parents more generally) cannot always be achieved by simply providing rights to women, 
not least because not all women are mothers and so not all will be disadvantaged by the 
need to accommodate child-rearing and work.     
7.4.15 There have been a number of cases considering positive discrimination, since the 
France case.   The case of Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen660 concerned German law 
provisions in relation to the promotion of teachers.  German law provided that, where 
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there were two equally qualified candidates for promotion and there was a lower 
proportion of women in the relevant role, then the female candidate should be promoted 
unless reasons specific to the male candidate tilted the balance in his favour.  The CJEU 
ruled that this could be permissible under article 2(4).  (Interestingly, according to the 
judgement, the UK government's view was that this was not permissible under European 
law.)   
7.4.16 Badeck v Hessen661, which was determined after Marschall, concerned targets set by 
public administrations in relation to under-represented roles.  These targets included that 
half of vacant positions should be filled by women.  In addition, certain factors were to be 
taken into account in recruitment decisions, including that time spent looking after 
children should be taken into account if relevant for the position.  The CJEU held that 
measures intended to give priority to women in areas where they were under-represented 
were permissible if, in situations where women and men were equally qualified, the 
measures did not give an automatic preference to female candidates, but instead took 
account of the specific situations of all candidates.  
7.4.17 In Abrahamsson v Fogelqvist662 the CJEU found that Swedish regulations gave 
women automatic preference and were not permissible.  The regulations in dispute 
allowed universities to give preference to women for roles in which they were the under-
represented sex so long as they met the minimum requirements for the relevant role 
(rather than being the best candidate or being equally qualified as the male candidates).   
Griesmar v Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie663 concerned pension service 
credits that were paid to mothers (but not fathers) for each child that they had.  The CJEU 
considered that this was a measure designed to protect women in their capacity as 
parents, rather than to alleviate any disadvantage related to childbirth/maternity leave, 
and, as both men and women can be parents and suffer disadvantage associated with this, 
this measure violated European law.  Griesmar was followed by Lommers, in which, as set 
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out above, the CJEU found that prioritising women and male single parents for nursery 
places was permissible.   
7.4.18 For the reasons set out above, it would not appear that there is any prohibition 
under European law in providing additional rights to parents (irrespective of their sex) to 
eliminate the difficulties that they face in attempting to combine work and family 
responsibilities.  As such, the next question to consider is how such a duty might operate.   
7.4.19 My proposal for a duty to make reasonable accommodation of parental 
responsibilities would appear to be very similar to the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments for disabled workers under the EqA.  As set out by the CJEU in HK Danmark 
acting on behalf of Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab664, the concept of reasonable 
adjustment refers to the “…elimination of barriers that hinder the full and effective 
participation of disabled persons in work on an equal basis with others.”  The aim of any 
requirement for employers to take account of childcare responsibilities and adapt the 
relevant worker’s working conditions would be to eliminate the barriers that prevent 
parents from participating in work on an equal basis with others.  As such, the 
requirement that I am proposing seems to aim to achieve a similar outcome, albeit in 
respect of a group with a different protected characteristic.  On this basis, it would be 
prudent to examine how the duty under the EqA in respect of disabled workers operates 
in order to determine whether a similar duty for parents would achieve the desired 
outcome.  In addition there are some other jurisdictions, such as Canada, where a similar 
duty to accommodate parents’ responsibilities already exists.  I will also consider the 
experience of this jurisdiction when evaluating whether my proposal would achieve the 
aim of enabling parents to better combine their work and family responsibilities.   
Duty to make reasonable adjustments for disabled workers under the EqA  
 
7.4.20 Under the EqA, where a PCP applied by or on behalf of an employer places a 
disabled person at a substantial disadvantage, as compared with those who are not 
disabled, there is a duty for that employer to take such steps as are reasonable (often 
referred to as reasonable adjustments) to prevent the PCP from having that effect.   This 
                                                          
664 C335/11, [2013] 3 CMLR 21 
 255 
duty will arise where an employer knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, that 
the employee has a disability and is likely to be placed at a substantial disadvantage.    
PCP 
7.4.21 PCP is not an unfamiliar term; it also appears in the definition of indirect 
discrimination.  The Explanatory Notes to the EqA suggest that PCP was used in relation 
to the duty to make reasonable adjustments to ensure consistency of language across all 
the types of discrimination.  The Statutory Code of Practice – Employment, when considering 
the definition of PCP in the context of reasonable adjustments, cross-refers to the 
discussion of PCP in the context of indirect discrimination.  This suggests that PCP has 
the same meaning as it does under the test for indirect discrimination.     
7.4.22 Examples of things that have been held to be PCP’s in the context of the duty to 
make reasonable adjustments have included: shutting down access to email and internet 
for employees on long-term sickness absence665, insisting on face to face meetings at the 
employer’s office in relation to formal attendance reviews666, a general requirement for 
consistent attendance at work667 and the application of an employer’s sickness absence 
management procedure668.  Given that this is consistent with the use of the term in indirect 
discrimination, which I considered in Chapter 5, I do not propose to further consider this 
here save to note that the definition of PCP is relatively wide and does not seem to 
unnecessarily narrow the scope of the types of action by employers which might fall 
within the remit of the duty to make reasonable adjustments.     
Substantial disadvantage 
 
7.4.23 In order for the duty to make reasonable adjustments to arise, the employer’s PCP 
must place the disabled person at a substantial disadvantage as compared with people 
who are not disabled669.  Section 212(1) of the EqA defines substantial as “more than minor 
or trivial”.  In Hutchison 3G UK Ltd v Edwards670 the EAT stated that there is not a sliding 
scale for this.  If the disadvantage is not minor or trivial, then it is substantial.  As noted 
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in MM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions671 this is not "a particularly high hurdle to 
establish substantial disadvantage."  At least one commentator672 criticised the DDA, 
which used the term “substantial disadvantage” in the same way as the EqA, for the high 
threshold required in order for the duty to operate.  This seems to be due to a 
misunderstanding of what the term “substantial” means.  As such the use of the term 
“substantial” appears to be a little misleading.  One of the problems with the current 
regime of parental rights is that it can be inaccessible to those without specialist legal 
expertise, so there would seem to be some merit in considering whether this terminology 
is appropriate.   
7.4.24 In addition, there is a comparative element to the test for when reasonable 
adjustments are required as the claimant must show that s/he is put at a disadvantage 
compared to those without the disability.  The comparison exercise is different from that 
undertaken in direct discrimination claims; there is no requirement for the comparator’s 
circumstances to not be materially different to those of the claimant.  For example, in 
Archibald v Fife673, the employee became disabled and could not do her role as a road 
sweeper.  Under a direct discrimination claim, the comparator would have been a person 
who was also not able to carry out his/her role.  However, for the purpose of considering 
reasonable adjustments, the comparators in this case were other employees who are not 
disabled, who could carry out their roles and who were not liable to be dismissed on the 
ground of disability.   
7.4.25 The comparison exercise can result in no adjustment being necessary because, 
although there is adverse treatment, this is not experienced solely by those with a 
disability.  In Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions674 the PCP (as pleaded) was 
the operation of the employer’s sickness absence process.  The Employment Tribunal 
(“ET”) considered the Claimant’s situation as compared to a person absent for the same 
period of time but not for a disability-related reason.  There was no disadvantage 
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compared to non-disabled persons; both would equally have been disadvantaged because 
of having been absent from work.  The choice of PCP in this regard would seem to be key 
as other cases, on similar facts, have produced the opposite result (that is, a finding that 
the claimant was at a substantial disadvantage) simply as a result of the pleaded PCP.  
General Dynamics Information Technology Ltd v Carranza675 concerned a similar fact pattern; 
the Claimant had been disadvantaged by the fact that he had been off sick.  However in 
that case, the PCP that was pleaded was the requirement for constant attendance at work 
(rather than the application of the sickness absence process).  The ET considered that this 
PCP did put the Claimant at a disadvantage compared to non-disabled persons.  As such, 
the duty to make reasonable adjustments was triggered.   
7.4.26 In Smith v Churchill's Stairlifts676 , a case decided prior to Griffiths or Carranza the 
Claimant had lumbar spondylosis, which caused him not to be able to carry heavy objects. 
He was offered a role conditional upon him completing a sales course, which required 
him to carry a 25kg radiator cabinet.   The employer withdrew the Claimant's place on the 
sales course, and effectively the job offer, on the basis that it (correctly) concluded that the 
Claimant would not be able to carry the sample radiator cabinet.  At the ET hearing, the 
Claimant was given the opportunity to lift the sample but could not, however neither 
could any of the tribunal members. According to the ET, the comparator was the 
population generally who do not have any disability.  It also concluded that the majority 
of the population would be likely to have difficulty carrying the cabinet.  As such, the 
Claimant was not placed at substantial disadvantage.  On appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
the question of whom was the comparator was decided differently.  The Court of Appeal 
held that the comparator group was the other candidates who were susceptible to 
withdrawal of an offer because of the requirement to carry the cabinet.  This was on the 
basis that the comparator should be identified by reference to the disadvantage that is 
caused by the relevant PCP.  As the majority of the candidates could lift the sample, the 
                                                          
675 [2015] ICR 169 
676 [2006] ICR 524 
 258 
Claimant was placed at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who were 
not disabled. 
7.4.27  There appears to be a difficulty with the comparative exercise in some 
circumstances; as highlighted in Carranza, where the PCP puts everyone at a 
disadvantage, then it may not trigger the duty to make reasonable adjustments.  In 
Griffiths, this difficulty was resolved by using a different PCP (the requirement for 
constant attendance at work, rather than the application of the employer’s absence 
management process).  For parents, most often the types of accommodation that are 
required will be for time away from the workplace (for example, in the form of absence 
or in the form of reduced hours) or a different type of working practice.  In these 
circumstances, as discussed above, any disadvantage that is suffered is likely to be 
experienced equally by parents and non-parents who take time away.  A comparative 
exercise in such circumstances may not result in a duty to accommodate parental 
responsibilities being triggered.  Similar issues used to arise in relation to 
pregnancy/maternity and direct discrimination.  These were resolved by changing the 
test for direct pregnancy/maternity discrimination from “less favourable” treatment (that 
is, a comparative exercise) to “unfavourable” treatment.  That is not to say that there is 
not a need for a threshold to prevent a very minor disadvantage from triggering the duty 
to make reasonable adjustments; just that it should not be one that requires a comparative 
approach.  The threshold could be formulated so that it is triggered once the worker is 
subject to a detriment that is more than trivial or minor and is caused by the employer’s 
PCP.   
Reasonable adjustments 
 
7.4.28 There are two points to consider when looking at “reasonable adjustments” – 
first, what is an adjustment, and second, what is reasonable.  
What is an adjustment 
 
7.4.29 The EqA does not define the term “adjustment”, nor does it contain a list of the 
types of thing that could constitute an adjustment.  It seems to be that any step that an 
employer could take to alleviate the disadvantage caused by a PCP could potentially 
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constitute an adjustment.  The crucial issue therefore becomes whether an adjustment is 
reasonable.     
What is reasonable? 
 
7.4.30 Unlike the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (the “DDA”)677, the EqA does not 
set out a list of the factors which should be used to determine whether a particular 
adjustment would be reasonable.  Instead the Statutory Code of Practice – Employment 
effectively replicates the list of factors.  These include: whether taking any particular step 
would be effective in preventing the substantial disadvantage, the practicability of the 
step, the financial and other costs of making the adjustment and the extent of any 
disruption caused, the extent of the employer’s financial or other resources, the 
availability to the employer of financial or other assistance to help make the adjustment 
and the type and size of the employer.  
7.4.31 It is for an ET to determine whether an adjustment is reasonable678.  This means 
that an ET does not need to consider the thought process that was undertaken by the 
employer679.  It is also an issue that is fact specific and so is for the ET to determine680 
(rather than being a matter of law). 
7.4.32 Notwithstanding the above, there may be occasions where no adjustments are 
possible.  In Dyer v London Ambulance681, the claimant had a life-threatening reaction to the 
use of aerosols and the application of strong perfume.  The employer had no practicable 
way of ensuring that no-one used aerosols or applied perfume in the presence of the 
Claimant because she worked in a large open-plan area, which could also be accessed by 
members of the public.  The ET found that this meant that there was no reasonable 
adjustment could be made.  
7.4.33 Similarly, an adjustment is not reasonable if it would not alleviate the 
disadvantage causes by the PCP.  In Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Wilson682 the 
PCP that applied was the redeployment of the Claimant.  The Claimant argued that 
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allowing her to work from home would be a reasonable adjustment.  However, the 
evidence presented by the employer showed that it was not practicable to allow the 
Claimant to do so.  As such, home working would not enable the Claimant to return to 
work as there was no work available for her to do at home and/or it was not feasible for 
her to do any work from home. 
7.4.34 An adjustment is not unreasonable though simply because there is no certainty 
that it would alleviate the disadvantage, or that it might not be completely effective in 
doing so.  In Noor v Foreign & Commonwealth Office the Claimant had dyslexia and 
dyspraxia.  He responded to a job advert and attended an interview in respect of this.  At 
interview he was asked questions to assess a competency not referred to on the 
advertisement (which had incorrectly listed the competencies required for the role).  At 
first instance the ET found that no adjustment was required because the effect of such 
could not result in the claimant being successful in his application for the role because, 
even if he had received the highest score against the competency not mentioned in the 
advertisement, his other scores were lower than other candidates.  The EAT disagreed; 
the Claimant had been disadvantaged in the interview and, as such, the adjustment, if any 
was required, was to remove that disadvantage.  This did not mean that the Claimant had 
to show that with the adjustment he would have been successful in his application for the 
post, just that the disadvantage suffered (here his inability to deal with a line of 
unexpected, and from his perspective, unforeseeable, questioning) would have been 
ameliorated.  
7.4.35 Similarly, in Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust v Foster683 an ET (in a decision 
upheld by the EAT) held that there needs to be a prospect that adjustment will remove a 
disabled person's disadvantage, rather than a "good" prospect.  In that case, the Claimant 
went off on sick leave due to stress and depression (which was, on the facts of this case, a 
disability) and was unable to return to the role in the security department that he had 
previously done due to his perception that he had been subject to bullying and 
harassment by his manager, although he was fit to return to a role elsewhere.  He was 
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subsequently dismissed on capability grounds (these being that he was unable to carry 
out his role in the security department) and argued that he should have been placed on 
the employer's redeployment register as soon as he was fit to return to work in January 
2008 (rather than at a later date when the employer was considering dismissal).  The 
employer argued that there were no facts to suggest that there would have been a real or 
good prospect of the claimant finding an alternative role by being placed on the 
redeployment register.  The EAT held that the ET had to decide whether, in January 2008, 
there was a chance that a post suitable for the Claimant would have become available, not 
that there had to be a good prospect of the Claimant finding alternative employment.  
Given that the respondent employed a large number of people in the area, it was open for 
the ET to reach this conclusion.   
Employer's knowledge 
 
7.4.36 An employer must have knowledge of the worker’s disability in order to be 
obliged to make reasonable adjustments.  Under the EqA, the issue of employer’s 
knowledge encompasses two points – (i) whether the employer knows of the disability 
(which I have dealt with above) and (ii) whether the employer knows that the disabled 
person is likely to be placed at a substantial disadvantage.   
The Canadian experience 
7.4.37 Canadian law includes a duty to accommodate parental responsibilities.  This 
duty is found in the Canadian Human Rights Act ("CHRA"), which only directly applies 
to federal entities (and so is likely to be of limited use to private sector employees) and in 
provisioncial/territorial legislation, which has developed through case law.     The way in 
which the duty has been implemented varies across provinces but is based on the CHRA 
which contains a requirement to accommodate the needs of all indiviudals except where 
this "would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to accommodate 
those needs, considering health, safety and cost”684.  By way of example, the Manitoba 
human rights code defines discrimination as including a “failure to make reasonable 
accommodation for the special needs of any individual or group” where such arises as a 
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result of the equivalent of a protected characteristic685. By contrast, the right is not 
expressly stated in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, but instead has 
been developed through case law686.   
7.4.38 Although the duty to accommodate does not specify the steps that must be 
followed when considering whether an adjustment is required, case law has developed 
certain principles to be applied.  The complainant must first establish that there is a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  This involves showing that, as a result of his/her parental 
responsibilities and as a result of the employer’s rules and practices, the complainant was 
unable to participate equally and fully in employment with the employer687. 
7.4.39 The next stage is to apply the test established in British Columbia (Public Service 
Employee Relations Comm) v BCGEU688 to determine whether there has been the necessary 
accommodation.  The burden of proof at this stage rests with the employer who must 
demonstrate that: 
(a) it adopted the particular disputed standard for a purpose 
rationally connected to the performance of the job; 
(b) it adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith 
belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate 
work-related purpose; and 
(c) the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of 
that legitimate work-related purpose.  Essentially this allows the 
employer to defeat the claim if it shows that the required 
accommodation would impose undue hardship on it.  The factors 
taken into account include: the financial cost of the possible 
method of accommodation, the relative interchangeability of the 
workforce and facilities and the prospect of substantial 
interference with the rights of other employees689.  
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7.4.40 Below I compare and contrast the duty to make reasonable adjustments under the 
DDA and the duty to accommodate the needs of the individual under Canadian law in 
order to identify how best to formulate any duty to accommodate childcare 
responsibilities. 
7.4.41 The first stage under both the Canaidan and UK tests is to show that the worker 
is disadvantaged by the employer’s policy, practice or other workplace arrangements.  
Under the DDA though, the complainant must show that s/he is disadvantaged as 
compared to a worker without his/her disability.  As set out above, there are some 
difficulties with a comparative approach in the parental rights sphere.  On this basis, I 
would not propose adopting a comparative test for the proposed duty to make reasonable 
accommodation of parental responsibilities. Instead I propose that the duty is triggered 
after the worker establishes that the PCP results in them suffering a detriment.   
7.4.42 The Canadian provisions are also different in a few important respects.  The first 
is that, once a prima facie case has been established (that is, the claimant has shown that 
there is something that puts him/her at a disadvantage), the employer has first to show 
that the thing that is placing the claimant at a disadvantage is required “for a purpose 
rationally connected with the role”.  The advantage of the Canadian approach is that it 
requires employers to actively consider why they have particular requirements.  This 
could be potentially very helpful in the area of parental rights in the workplace, where 
the normative standard of the ideal worker has been developed by taking account of the 
characteristics of a person without caring responsibilities.  Requiring employers to 
consider why they have imposed particular PCP’s (for example, why they require 
workers to work at particular times or at particular locations) could assist in changing 
these norms.   By contrast, under the duty to make reasonable adjustments in UK law, 
once the claimant has established a prima facie case (that is, that s/he is disabled and that 
the employer’s PCP puts him/her at a disadvantage), the court must look at whether an 
adjustment to that PCP would be reasonable.  There is no obligation under the EqA for 
the court to consider why a particular PCP was adopted.   Although there is no reason 
why this might not be considered in the question of whether an adjustment was 
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reasonable, this would seem to have less weight as it would be just one of many aspects 
that a court might consider. 
7.4.43 The other significant difference between the Canadian duty and the UK duty is 
that Canadian law does not include a requirement for the employer to have knowledge 
of the protected characteristic.   Knowledge is more likely to be an issue for disability 
rights than for those for parents, as workers may feel reluctant to disclose the fact that 
they suffer from a disability (perhaps through embarrassment, pride or some other 
reason), whereas there seems to be no such reason why a parent would not wish to inform 
their employer that they had a child.  As such, many of the issues that arise in relation to 
the employer’s knowledge of the worker’s disability are likely not to be relevant to any 
duty to make adjustments for parental responsibilities.  It would seem sensible that, in 
order for any duty to make reasonable adjustments for parental responsibilities to arise, 
the worker is required to inform his/her employer of the fact that s/he has a child.  The 
other aspect to knowledge is a requirement that the employer knows, or ought to know, 
that the PCP places the worker at a disadvantage.  Should a similar requirement apply in 
relation to parenting responsibilities?  In short, the answer is yes, because each parent’s 
circumstances may be different and an employer may not know of the particular needs of 
a particular worker to know that a particular PCP will result in that worker being subject 
to a detriment.  However, as with the test for reasonable adjustments in respect of disabled 
workers, the test should include not just the employer’s actual knowledge but what the 
employer should reasonably know.  For most workers with “normal” (or average) 
childcare needs a reasonable employer should be able to anticipate what types of PCP 
might have an adverse impact on those with parental responsibilities.  This approach 
would also mean that employers would need to think more generally about whether a 
particular policy might disadvantage parents and, if so, the reason that that policy is 
needed. 
7.4.44 There is already, under GB law, a provision that could be seen to achieve this in 
the context of disability; the duty to make reasonable adjustments that applies to the 
provision of services, which is said to be an anticipatory duty.  Unlike in the work sphere, 
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a service provider cannot wait until a disabled person tries to access a particular service 
before it considers reasonable adjustments, it must take steps, so far as reasonably 
practicable, to ensure that all disabled people can access its services690.  As Lawson has 
noted “[t]hese anticipatory duties have a much greater potential to drive systemic change 
than does the reactive employment duty"691.  This is because, where the duty applies, the 
service provider must consider the accessibility of their services for disabled employees 
on a proactive basis, before any actual disadvantage has occurred, rather than simply in 
response to the needs of a particular individual.  (Although until the point that an 
individual service user is subject to an actual difficulty, there will be no cause of action 
against the service provider.) 
7.4.45 As Smith and Allen have noted "[t]he clear benefit of positive duties is that they 
move away from a fault-based, individualised conception of discrimination to an 
anticipatory, action-oriented capacity- based approach"692.  The anticipatory duty to make 
reasonable adjustments would seem to address the issue identified above that the 
employer should be required to consider whether any of its practices or policies might 
impact on those with parental responsibilities, in advance of any particular parent having 
a difficulty with a particular practice or policy.  There would seem to be no reason why, 
if a duty to accommodate parental responsibilities were to be introduced, it could not be 
an anticipatory duty, rather than one which is only triggered at the point at which an 
employer’s particular PCP puts a particular parent at a disadvantage.   
An ongoing duty? 
7.4.46 An ongoing duty would mean that, rather than the duty being extinguished by 
the employer taking a particular step to accommodate the worker’s childcare needs (for 
example, allowing the worker to work part-time), the employer would be required to 
make any further accommodations (for example, time off work due to a child’s school 
                                                          
690 Section 29(7) of EqA  
691 Anna Lawson, “Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010: Opportunities Seized, Lost and 
Generated”, 40 Indus. L.J. 359 (2011) at 369 
692Belinda Smith, Dominique Allen “Whose Fault Is It: Asking the Right Question to Address Discrimination”, 
37 Alternative L.J. 31 2012  
 266 
holidays) that the worker needed. This might reduce the need for parental leave and EDL 
(in respect of those emergencies involving a dependent child).   
7.4.47 As has been noted in paragraph 3.2.6, one of the significant problems with the 
current regime of parental rights is the fact that there are some instances where parents 
require leave but their needs fall outside the remit of both parental leave and EDL.  The 
classic example of this is the case where a parent knows of an impending disruption to 
childcare provision (and so is unable to use EDL) and either the employer postpones 
parental leave (as it is entitled to by up to six months) or refuses to allow the worker to 
take a single day as parental leave.  In these circumstances the worker needs to take time 
off, but has no legal right to do so.  A duty to accommodate a worker’s childcare 
responsibilities might assist with this issue.  As the duty would not be absolute (because 
the employer would only be required to make adjustments where it is reasonable to do 
so), there might still be occasions where a worker might not be permitted to take leave.  It 
is worth considering here why there is an obligation to make “reasonable” adjustments, 
rather than a duty to make any adjustment required by the worker.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, for parental rights in the workplace to be workable, there must be a balance 
between the needs of workers and the needs of employers.  If not, employers may try to 
avoid employing those that might be entitled to such a right; this would have a significant 
adverse impact on parents’ ability to combine work and family.  The duty that I am 
proposing is not dissimilar from the existing rights to parental leave and emergency 
dependent’s leave, except that it allows the employer to look at a whole range of options 
for accommodating parent’s needs, not simply by giving them time off.  This should 
accommodate both employers’ and workers’ needs.   
To whom should it apply? 
7.4.48 Over recent years, there has been a shift in the coverage of parental rights in the 
workplace; previously many of the rights applied only to parents of young children.  By 
way of example, when parental leave was introduced, it could only be taken in respect of 
a child aged five or under, whereas, from 5 April 2015, it can be taken for a child up to the 
age of 18.   
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7.4.49 As noted by Walsh, in her review of the flexible working provisions693, 16 years 
of age seems to be (legally) the age at which a child can be regarded as being old enough 
to look after himself/herself, although it should be noted that the amount of care that a 
child requires is likely to decrease as the child gets older.  This means that the needs of 
parents are likely to change over time, rather than being fixed.  This also supports the idea 
that there should be an ongoing duty.    For the reasons above, the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments for parental responsibility should apply to all parents of children aged 16 or 
younger.   
A separate duty or a type of discrimination? 
7.4.50 It is important to note that, under the EqA, a failure to make reasonable 
adjustments is classed as being discrimination694.   This means that in order to litigate a 
failure to make an adjustment, an employee would need to bring a claim for disability 
discrimination, rather than an action for breach of the duty per se.  The advantage that this 
has is that any claim has the label of discrimination, which carries a certain amount of 
stigma for the employer against whom the claim is brought.  This in turn is likely to lead 
employers to give careful consideration to any actions which might lead to a 
discrimination claim in order to avoid any potential negative publicity that might arise.  
For this reason I would advocate a failure to make reasonable adjustments for parents is 
a form of discrimination because of parental status. 
7.5 Impact on existing legislation. 
7.5.1 As set out above, if a duty to make reasonable adjustments were to exist for 
parents, there would be a reduced need for the right to parental leave or to EDL.  
However, these could not be abolished altogether, particularly as European law provides 
for parental leave of at least four months and requires that workers are entitled to time off 
from work on grounds of force majeure for urgent family reasons.   
  
                                                          
693 Imelda Walsh ‘Flexible Working: A review of how to extend the right to request flexible working to parents of older 
children’, May 2008 
694 originally s5(2) "For the purposes of this Part, an employer also discriminates against a disabled person if—
(a)he fails to comply with a section 6 duty imposed on him in relation to the disabled person"  and s18B(12) - 
This section imposes duties only for the purpose of determining whether an employer has discriminated 
against a disabled person; and accordingly a breach of any such duty is not actionable as such. 
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7.6 Expanding the right to include all caring responsibilities 
7.6.1 In Chapter 3 I concluded that, to the extent that rights for parents were justified 
on the basis of allowing or enabling parents to care for a child, such rights should be 
extended to all carers.  The duty to make reasonable accommodation of parental 
responsibilities proposed above is needed for exactly this reason; as such, carers have a 
need for a similar duty.  
7.6.2 In this thesis I have focused on the difficulties facing parents and I identified, in 
Chapter 6, a number of reasons why the discrimination protections contained in the EqA 
are not sufficient to protect parents.  It was for this reason that above, I proposed that 
parental status should be a protected characteristic in its own right.  Having not 
considered in depth whether the discrimination protections in the EqA are sufficient to 
protect carers it is difficult for me, within the scope of this thesis, to argue definitively for 
status as a carer to be a protected characteristic in its own right.  However, to the extent 
that the same critique of discrimination law set out in Chapter 6 applies equally in respect 
of carers, there would seem good reason for protecting caring status more generally, 
rather than limiting protection to parental status.   
  
 269 
CHAPTER 8 : Conclusion 
 
8.1.1 In Chapter 1 I demonstrated that gender inequality in the work sphere remains a 
real issue which has not fully been addressed despite a raft of long standing legislative 
measures aimed at doing so, such as the Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 (now both subsumed into the EqA).   This can be seen through the low level of female 
participation at board level and the persistence of the gender pay gap.  In relation to the 
latter there is evidence that the difficulty in combining work and family directly 
contributed to the low level of remuneration that some women receive.  There are clear 
reasons for state intervention to address the difficulties facing parents in the workplace, 
including economic reasons (increasing women’s participation in the labour market could 
be worth up to £23bn to the economy695); social justice/gender equality reasons (the UK 
is ranked 60th in the world by the World Economic Forum in terms of equal pay and 71st 
for female participation in the workplace as professional and technical workers696); and 
the UK’s obligations towards the European Union (which requires non-discrimination 
between men and women and the reconciliation of family and professional life).   
8.1.2 In relation to parenting, I examined evidence which suggests that, whilst both 
parents are equally capable of caring for a child, the burden of this predominantly falls 
on women in a way that is often incompatible with full-time work697 with the difficulties 
with the norm discussed in Chapter 2698. 
8.1.3 I argued that pregnancy and childcare are distinct concepts which should be dealt 
with separately.  Pregnancy is a social good699 and, because only women are able to 
become pregnant, any detriment as a result of pregnancy is inevitably linked to gender.  
Parenting, on the other hand, can be done by either parent but tends to fall predominantly 
on women.  In order to ensure gender equality, the workplace must be supportive of 
childcare responsibilities: this will enable both parents to take equal responsibility for 
childcare.  Parenting is a crucial role for society and should be valued as such.  
                                                          
695 See paragraph 1.6.4 
696 See paragraph 1.6.6 
697 See section 1.2 
698 See paragraphs 2.3.2 to 2.3.9 
699 See paragraph 1.5.2 
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8.1.4 In Chapter 2, I examined in more detail the theoretical backdrop to the parental 
rights regime, looking at each of pregnancy and parenting separately.  In relation to 
pregnancy and employees who might become pregnant, I concluded that any “special 
treatment” or exclusion of workers on the basis of potential reproductive harm should 
apply equally to men and women unless there was genuine evidence that the hazard 
applied only in relation to one sex700.  The “equal treatment” approach does not seem to 
be useful in the pregnancy context given that the ability to become pregnant is a 
significant difference between men and women.  The “special treatment” approach also 
does not seem to be helpful because of the way it has been used historically to exclude 
women from the workplace and the fact that it uses the male norm as the reference 
point701.  This means that pregnancy is strange – or different from “normal” – which is 
why “special” treatment is required.  A better model would be to abandon the 
comparative approach and change the existing norm to ensure that women’s needs are 
incorporated.  I concluded that, as pregnancy and parenting are separate concepts, the 
leave associated with a new baby should be divided accordingly702.  This would mean a 
short period of “maternity leave”, reserved exclusively for the mother, together with a 
longer period of “new child leave”, which either parent would be entitled to.   
8.1.5 The problem in relation to childcare responsibilities is the way in which the norm 
of a worker has developed to be someone without any childcare (or other caring 
responsibilities).  I concluded that an effective right to flexible working could assist 
parents, not just simply on an individual basis but also by requiring employers to look at 
their working practices and consider whether those that adversely impact parents are 
genuinely required.  In this context I considered the use of a results-only work 
environment (“ROWE”)703.  Whilst in theory this may sound desirable, it requires cultural 
change which is difficult to mandate through legislation, particularly as there are many 
workplaces where this model would not be viable.  Finally in Chapter 2, I concluded that 
rights available to parents should, where these are necessary to facilitate caring 
                                                          
700 See paragraphs 2.5.24 to 2.5.28 
701 See paragraph 2.2.19 
702 See paragraphs 2.5.4 to 2.5.7 
703 See paragraphs 2.5.10 and 2.5.11 
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responsibilities (as opposed to, for example, recovery from labour or bonding with a 
child) be extended more widely to carers. 
8.1.6 In Chapters 3 to 5 I examined the current range of legislative provisions which 
might enable parents to combine their work and family responsibilities.  I concluded that 
gender specific rights, such as maternity leave and paternity leave in their current form, 
perpetuate the idea that childcare/parenting should fall predominantly to the mother.  
Given that both parents are equally capable of caring for a child, this is undesirable.  In 
the context of non-gender specific rights I concluded that, as a result of the piecemeal 
fashion in which rights have developed, there are often gaps in coverage which mean that 
parents’ needs are not always met.   Further, in respect of Shared Parental Leave, in 
particular, although this is ostensibly a gender-neutral right, in fact it perpetuates the idea 
that caring should first fall to mothers because a father’s entitlement is conditional upon 
the mother’s (both in terms of eligibility and the amount of maternity leave that the 
mother is prepared to surrender).  The right to request flexible working had had some 
impact on parents’ ability to combine work and family but, as it is a right to request flexible 
working, rather than a right to work flexibly, it is not robust enough to help in every case.  
The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
provide some protection for part-time workers, but these only protect “part-time” 
workers and not those that work differently to “normal”, for example, those working 
different hours or from a different location.   
8.1.7 The existing discrimination provisions may assist some, but not all, parents.  Due 
to the way in which childcare responsibilities disproportionately fall on women, the 
indirect sex discrimination provisions may be of use, although the unpredictability of the 
pool makes it difficult for potential claimants and respondents to have any degree of 
certainty of the outcome of litigation.  Further, to the extent that childcare responsibilities 
become more evenly divided between parents, even female claimants will become unable 
to use the indirect sex discrimination provisions.  The discrimination provisions were not 
designed to protect parents because parental status is not a protected characteristic. 
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8.1.8 There is a clear need for parents to be able to combine work and family.  As set 
out above, the existing regime does not achieve this in part because many of the 
provisions which are relied on by parents were not designed to meet their needs (for 
example, the indirect sex discrimination provisions) and because the approach to these 
issues has been piecemeal (for example, the gap in coverage between EDL and parental 
leave).  This is why it is important to start from scratch and redesign the regime for 
parents.  The protection of pregnant workers is, on the whole, adequate so the focus 
should be on redesigning rights from the point at which a child is born.   
8.1.9 One of the major issues is about shifting the emphasis on mothers caring to place 
it on parents caring.  This requires gender neutral rights, such as my proposed “new child 
leave”.  Equally the reliance on the sex discrimination provisions needs to be abandoned 
and replaced with specific protection for parents.  As parents have particular needs, these 
must be accommodated.  The existing rights attempt to do this but are insufficient.  As 
such, I am proposing a duty to accommodate parental responsibilities similar to that 
under the EqA for disabled employees.  However, there are some important differences.  
I am proposing that, where a PCP could result in a real detriment for those with parental 
responsibilities, the employer can only impose such a PCP if it is required for the a rational 
business reason and in such circumstance, the employer must make reasonable 
adjustments to prevent that unfavourable treatment.  This differs from the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments for disabled workers in that it is an anticipatory duty, and there 
is no need for comparison with those without parental responsibilities.   The need for an 
employer to show that there is a rational business reason for a PCP that would 
disadvantage those with parental responsibilities is based on similar provisions in 
Canadian law.  As discussed at paragraph 7.4.42, a requirement for an employer to justify 
the imposition of a PCP that could disadvantage those with parental responsibilities could 
result in changes to workplace norms.  As explained in Chapter 2, this is more desirable 
than, for example, special treatment, as it is more likely to secure fair treatment of parents.  
8.1.10 This new duty to make reasonable adjustments would provide sufficient 
flexibility to meet the needs of parents, all of whom have unique and different 
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requirements dependent upon their particular circumstances, whilst also balancing the 
interests of employers, who may equally have diverse interests depending on their size, 
business model and various other factors.  Once parents’ needs are accommodated, this 
would remove any current hurdles to men participating more fully in childcare and active 
parenting, hopefully leading to a more equal distribution of such responsibilities and 
allowing women to take a greater role in the workplace if they so choose.   
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Table 1: Total births to women aged 40 and over 
Year 
Total births to women 
aged 40 or over   Year 
Total births to women 
aged 40 or over  Year 
Total births to women 
aged 40 or over 
1984 553   1994 488  2004 909 
1985 584   1995 540  2005 1,091 
1986 528   1996 587  2006 1,194 
1987 531   1997 582  2007 1,309 
1988 507   1998 575  2008 1,428 
1989 491   1999 635  2009 1,619 
1990 497   2000 663  2010 1,758 
1991 519   2001 761  2011 1,832 
1992 501   2002 895  2012 1,975 
1993 539   2003 875  2013 2,010 
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Table 2: Births to women aged 40 and over as a percentage of total births 
Year 
Births to women aged 
40 and over as a 
percentage of total 
births  Year 
Births to women aged 40 
and over as a percentage 
of total births  Year 
Births to women aged 40 
and over as a percentage 
of total births 
1984 1.119472125  1994 1.614048495  2004 3.250323188 
1985 1.137386753  1995 1.746387343  2005 3.444533046 
1986 1.143841771  1996 1.863476447  2006 3.540317293 
1987 1.268211371  1997 2.008101447  2007 3.673843826 
1988 1.301513747  1998 2.131621117  2008 3.727753626 
1989 1.357519357  1999 2.29178995  2009 3.819621436 
1990 1.376072733  2000 2.492550969  2010 3.834671202 
1991 1.406573353  2001 2.734455144  2011 4.054354598 
1992 1.478563226  2002 2.908129544  2012 4.110602817 
1993 1.562808571  2003 3.070145092  2013 4.174301945 
 
Statistics taken from ONS (Live Births in England and Wales by Characteristics of Mother 1, 2013, released 16 October 2014), available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-327586  
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ANNEX 2: CALCULATION OF TIME SPENT ON CHILDCARE BY MEN AND WOMEN 
Statistics 
On average women spent 32 minutes per day caring for their own children, whereas men spend 
15 minutes per day.   
Those (both men and women) with dependent children aged up to four, spend 136 minutes per 
day caring for children and 76% of parents participate in this activity. 
(All figures from The Time Use Survey704.) 
Assumptions 
The amount of time that is spent by women as compared to men is a static ratio (that is, there is 
no difference in the division of time spent on childcare for children of different ages). 
The population is evenly divided (50:50) between men and women. 
Calculations 
The amount of time that women spend compared to men on childcare is 32:15. 
This is a ratio of 2.13: 1 
(2.13x + 1x) ÷ 2 = 136 
2.13x + 1x = 136 * 2 
2.13x + 1x = 272 
3.13x = 272 
x = 272  ÷ 3.13 
x = 86.9 
2.13x = 185.1 
Conclusion 
Women with dependent children aged up to four spend 185.1 minutes per day; men spend 86.9 
minutes per day. 
 
                                                          
704 Deborah Lader, Sandra Short, Jonathan Gershuny, “The Time Use Survey: 2005”, ONS, 31 August 2006 
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ANNEX 3 – TABLE OF REPORTED PTWR CASES 
 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 
1 Department of 
Constitutional Affairs v 
O'Brien705 
Supreme Court Male The Claimant was a part-time fee-paid judge.  Whilst full time 
judges and salaried part-time judges were entitled to a pension 
on retirement, fee paid judges were not.  The questions before 
the Supreme Court were whether the Claimant was a worker 
and, if so, whether the treatment of fee-paid judges was 
justified (the ECJ had previously ruled that if judges were 
workers, then the difference in treatment between full-time and 
part-time judges required objective justification). 




Male The Claimant had retired and was doing casual work as a 
driver.  He was free to accept or decline any job (although in 
practice he rarely did the latter).  The comparable full-time 
worker cited by the Claimant was not, for the purposes of the 
PtWR, comparable as he was employed on a different type of 
contract: the Claimant was a worker and the alleged 
comparator was an employee.   
3 Komeng v Sandwell MBC707 Employment 
Appeal Tribunal 
Male The Claimant was a care assistant (part-time covering evening 
shifts).  The employer failed to provide the Claimant with the 
same training opportunities as full time comparator.  The claim 
was remitted to the ET. 
                                                          
705 [2013] UKSC 6 
706 UKEAT/0355/10 
707[2011] Eq. L.R. 1053 
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 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 




Male The Claimant had been employed on a full time fixed term 
contract, but at the contract's expiry, the only role that was 
available was a part-time fixed term position teaching ICT.  
The employer needed to reduce strafing costs so combined two 
subjects, ICT and Maths, into a single role.  The Claimant's 
employment was terminated as a result.  The employer 
selected the Claimant for termination, rather than considering 
terminating a full-time employee's employment and engaging 
the Claimant on a full-time basis.  As such, this amounted to 
less favourable treatment. 




Male The lead Claimant was a part-time worker with the Manchester 
Adult Education Service.  There were various different part-
time arrangements operated by the Respondent; all but one 
claimant was employed on an arrangement whereby each year 
they were guaranteed to be given at least a third of the hours 
worked previously (this arrangement was referred to as 
established part-time).  The employer had decreased staffing 
needs and decided to honour all contractual obligations first.  
This meant that established part-time workers received a third 
of previous year's hours.  The EAT held that the term 
guaranteeing only a third of the previous year's hours 
constituted less favourable treatment under the PtWR.  It did 
                                                          
708 UKEAT/0092/08 
709[2008] I.C.R. 623 
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 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 
not matter that the employer also had some part-time workers 
who were entitled to a guaranteed number of hours each year. 




Male The Claimant was a fee-paid part-time chairman of the 
National Insurance and Social Security Tribunals.  The EAT 
held that not a worker within the meaning of the PtWR.  
7 McMenemy v Capita 
Business Services Ltd711 
 
Court of Session Male The Claimant worked Wednesday to Fridays. Where a public 
holiday fell on a Monday, he did not receive any additional 
time off in lieu of that day's holiday.  The Court of Session held 
that this did not amount to less favourable treatment on the 
basis of his part-time worker status. 
8 Hudson v University of 
Oxford712 
Court of Appeal Male The Claimant was employed on two part-time contracts – one 
of which was an academic role and the other a non academic 
one.  The Claimant sought to argue that in reality he had one 
full time job, but that the employer had employed him on two 
contracts so that it could pay him at a lower rate in respect of 
the non-academic aspects of his single role.   
9 Matthews v Kent and 
Medway Towns Fire 
Authority713 
House of Lords Male The Claimants were retained fire fighters (fire fighters who 
commit themselves to regular weekly attendance of two to 
three hours for training and drill and to being on call for a set 
number of hours per week.  By contrast “whole-timers” 
                                                          
710 [2007] I.C.R. 1553 
711 2007 S.C. 492 
712 [2007] EWCA Civ 336 
713 [2006] UKHL 8 
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 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 
worked a structured shift system of 42 hours per week, plus 
overtime.  The pay arrangements reflected the difference in 
working arrangements – whole timers received a conventional 
salary and overtime payments; retained received a retaining 
fee, payments in respect of the regular drill/training and 
payments for being called out.  The Claimants were 
complaining of less favourable treatment in respect of 
calculating sick pay (which was done differently from whole 
timers), a lower hourly rate for additional duties and their 
exclusion from the pension scheme. 
10 R. (on the application of 
Manson) v Ministry of 
Defence714 
Court of Appeal Male The Claimant was a major in the Territorial Army.  He was 
denied a pension in respect of his service in the Territorial 
Army.  The relevant issues were whether he was entitled to 
bring a claim under the PtWR or whether he was excluded 
from doing so by regulation 13(2) 




Female The Claimant was a part-time lecturer.  She was not paid for 
preparation time, whereas her named comparator, who 
worked under a full-time University Teacher’s contract was.  In 
the alternative, she was treated less favourably than a 
hypothetical comparator employed on a full-time University 
Teacher’s contract.  The ET determined that there were 
significant differences between the work of the Claimant and 
that of the named comparator such that she was not a true 
                                                          
714 [2005] EWCA Civ 1678 
715 [2009] 3 C.M.L.R. 21 
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 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 
comparator – and a hypothetical comparator not possible 
under PtWR, so the Claimant was unsuccessful. 
12 Calder v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions716 
Employment 
Appeal Tribunal 
Female The Claimant wanted time off to attend a health and safety 
course.  Whilst the employer allowed her to attend, it refused 
to pay for her to attend if the course did not take place during 
her normal working hours. 
13 NTL Group Ltd v Difolco717 Court of Appeal Female The Claimant was working part-time due to a disability.  When 
there was a redundancy situation, the Claimant was pooled 
with one other employee and selected for redundancy.  The 
employer attempted to find alternative employment for her – 
there was a full time role which matched some of the 
Claimant’s skills but she was told that she would have to go 
through a selection exercise and might be able to carry out the 
role on a part time basis.  The ET found that the way in which 
the selection criteria had been applied made it almost 
inevitable that the Claimant would be selected as a result of her 
disability and part-time status.  Relevant criteria in respect of 
part-time status was her experience whilst at the Respondent – 
the ET held that this meant that a part-time worker with 
Claimant’s length of service (less than two years at the point of 
the exercise) was likely to score less well than a full time 
worker employed in the position for a similar length of time.   
                                                          
716 UKEAT/512/08 
717 [2006] EWCA Civ 1508 
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 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 




Female The Claimant was working full-time and negotiated a part-
time arrangement for her return to work after maternity leave 
(two days per week, plus 3.5 hours at home responding to 
emails/calls).  For an interim period, she briefly worked full-
time and then from May to September 2003, she worked part-
time (four days per week).  The employer pressurised her to 
increase her hours – the ET found that this was a detriment 
under the PtWR and that this was as a result of being a part-
time worker.  (In addition to a PtWR claim, the Claimant also 
brought an indirect discrimination claim.) 




Female Full time workers worked an average of 40 hour week over an 
8 week cycle.  They were paid for the first 35 hours at basic rate 
– pay for the next 5 hours is paid at 1.25 times basic pay and 
was referred to as “additional hours”.  Any hours in excess of 
the 40 hours per week was paid as overtime (also at 1.25 times 
basic pay).  Part-time employees’ hours were also judged over 
the length of an 8 week cycle and they could be required to 
work overtime (paid at 1.25 times basic pay).  There was no 
equivalent of the additional hours allowance.  The EAT held 
that the additional hours allowance was not overtime and that 
a Tribunal would need to determine whether there was less 
favourable treatment by applying the pro rata principle. 
                                                          
718 UKEAT/0242/05 and UKEAT/0437/05 
719UKEAT/0496/04/SM 
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 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 




Female The Claimant applied for a full time position but because had 
previously worked part-time only appointed to new post on a 
temporary basis (issue, was whether the treatment was 
justified). 




Female The employer wanted to reduce its number of staff.   Her 
employer insisted that the Claimant’s retention was dependent 
on her working full-time.  She was then dismissed when she 
refused to become a full-time worker.   
18 Tyson v Concurrent 








Female As part of a restructuring (following a TUPE transfer), the 
Claimant was told that her role was being absorbed and was 
given the option of applying for the new role (which was full 
time) or taking voluntary redundancy.  The alleged detriments 
were the dismissal, disconnection of the Claimant’s ISDN line 
(which gave her access to the employer’s database) and the 
reallocation of the Claimant’s work to another employee.  As 
the ET had failed to identify whether there was a comparable 
full-time worker, the case was referred back to the ET. 
 





 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 




Female The Claimant was transferred to another employer (within the 
same group); she argued that the reason was as a result of her 
part-time worker status.  The ET (and EAT) held that the 
reason for the transfer was due to a downturn.   




Female  The Claimant worked part-time in the reception of the 
Respondent’s school.  The comparators that she sought to 
compare herself with were also part-time – so could not base a 
claim on their preferable treatment.  
 
21 DR Simpson (Chilled Foods 
Ltd) v Stafford725 
Employment 
Appeal Tribunal 
Female The Claimant was working part-time as a result of childcare 
commitments.  She had brought claims and sought to have the 
claim amended to bring claims under the PtWR as well as 
indirect sex discrimination claims.  The EAT claims concerned 
whether the ET should have allowed the amendment.   
22 Old Buckenham Park 
(Brettenham) Educational 
Trust Ltd (t/a Old 




Female The Claimant was an art teacher.  She was working part-time 
as a result of her disability.  Although not formally appointed, 
she was effectively the Head of Art.  The employer decided 
that it wished to appoint a Head of Art on a full time basis.  
The role was advertised and the Claimant applied for the role 
(despite being of the view that this was her current role).  






 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 
When another individual was appointed to the role, the 
Claimant resigned, claiming that she had been constructively 
dismissed.  The ET found that the reason that she was not 
appointed to the Head of Art role (and was thereby 
constructively dismissed) was because she was a part-time 
worker – and that this amounted to a breach of the PtWR.  EAT 
upheld ET’s decision. 




Male The Claimant was a part-time worker.  He was required to 
work a higher proportion of standby hours than a full-time 
comparator.  The ET held that the reason for the less favourable 
treatment was not because the Claimant was a part-time 
worker, and even if it had been, that it would have been 
objectively justified.   
24 Ms C Short (Appeal No 2) v 
P J Hayman & Co Ltd728 
Employment 
Appeal Tribunal 
Female The Claimant worked part-time (four days per week) after her 
return from maternity leave.  On a redundancy exercise, she 
was selected for redundancy and brought a claim alleging that 
the reason for her selection was because of her part-time status.  
The ET and the EAT found against the Claimant on the basis 
that there was no evidence to support her assertion.  (The 
Claimant also brought an indirect sex discrimination claim.) 




 Case name Court Claimant’s 
sex 
Summary of Case 




Male The Claimant was a part-time judicial officer who was 
excluded from the judicial pension scheme.   




2 male, 1 
female 
The Claimants were fee-paid medical members of Tribunals, 
who were not entitled to participate in a pension scheme.   





Male The Claimant was a part-time security officer.  Full-time 
employees worked for continuous shifts, which entitled them 
to a 30 minute paid break.  Whereas the Claimant worked the 
same amount of time but in 2 separate shifts so was not given a 
30 minute paid break.   
 
  
                                                          
729 UKEAT/0247/14/LA 
730 [2015] IRLR 264 
731 UKEATS/0007/14/SM 
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ANNEX 4: CASES WHERE COSTS AWARDED 
This table sets out only cases where costs have been awarded/considered against a party to the proceedings.  It does not include cases relating to wasted costs or 
where costs have been awarded in relation to review or EAT proceedings. 
Abbreviations used: 
ET – Employment Tribunal 
EAT – EAT 
PHR – Preliminary Hearing 
Costs Not Awarded 
No Costs Warning Given 
Name Court  Factors considered  Costs award decision overturned 
Adecco UK Ltd v 
Aldwinkle732  
EAT N/A Yes; a costs award should have been 
made as the Claimant had conducted 
the proceedings unreasonably.   After 
his lawyers ceased to act for him, the 
Claimant did not respond to any 
letters from the Respondent, did not 
comply with case management 
directions, did not reply to ET’s 
request for information and did not 
notify ET or Respondent that he was 
not going to attend the hearing. 
                                                          
732 [2013] ICR D10 
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AQ Ltd v Holden733  EAT ET did not consider claim to have been misconceived or 
proceedings to have been unreasonably conducted. 
(Appeal to EAT was by Respondent on basis that costs 
award should have been made.) 
No. 
Iqbal v Metropolitan 
Police Service734  
EAT After substantial costs application made by Respondent 
(when it stated that if Claimant withdrew before live 
evidence started, it would not pursue him for costs), the 
following day the Claimant sought an adjournment 
claiming that suffering from stress.  ET refused.  
No costs award; ET’s decision not to 
allow adjournment overturned.   
Addaction v Cheema735 EAT Refused application for costs. 
Disability discrimination may have been misconceived 
but no additional work to defend claim as significant 
overlap between this and race discrimination claim. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Daleside Nursing Home 
Ltd v Mathew736 
EAT Dismissed application for costs.  ET found that the claim 
had been based on a deliberate and cynical lie.  The 
decision on costs was because the Claimants were 
unrepresented and genuinely believed that they had a 
claim, even though they were wrong 
Stark contrast between this and earlier reference in ET 
judgement to claim being based on a lie. 
EAT found that the decision was 
perverse.  Unreasonable remitted to 
ET to determine amount of costs 
award. 
                                                          
733 UKEAT/0021/12 
734 “The start of the hearing is a particularly sensitive and difficult time for a possible future application for substantial costs to be raised; we think that discussion of such a matter in 




Davidson v John Calder 
(Publishers)737 
 
EAT Unfair dismissal claim.  The Claimant applied for costs, 
but application was refused on the basis that the order 
for compensation sufficiently reflected the ET’s view of 
the employer's conduct. 
Appeal upheld - remitted to ET for 
reconsideration.  ET should have 
considered whether conduct of ER 
proceedings was unreasonable in 
order to reach determination; costs 
issues are separate and distinct from 
those relating to compensation. 
ET Marler Limited v 
Robertson738 







Appeal by employer against the decision not to make a 
costs award. 
No 
Governors of St Andrew's 
Catholic Primary School v 
Blundell740  
EAT N/A 
Respondent appealing against decision not to make a 
costs award. 
No 
HCA International Ltd v 
May-Bheemul741 
EAT N/A  
Appeal against decision not to make a costs award 
No 
Henry Wiggins & Co v 
Jenkins742 
EAT Costs not awarded because the Claimant was penniless 
and in prison. 
Appeal dismissed - ET exercised 
discretion correctly. 
                                                          
737 [1985] I.C.R. 143 
738 [1974] ICR 72 




742 [1981] C.L.Y. 837 
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Lemonious v Church 
Commissioners743  
EAT N/A 
ET found that proceedings not conducted unreasonably 
but noted that they believed that the Claimant had been 
untruthful in relation to a central plank of his claim. 
No.  Appeal in relation to costs 
dismissed.  Although ET had made 
finding that Claimant had not been 
truthful, this alone did not necessarily 
amount to unreasonable conduct of 
the proceedings. 
Nicolson Highlandwear 
Ltd v Nicolson744 
EAT 
(Scotland) 
Proceedings not conducted unreasonably – the Claimant 
not legally represented, genuinely believed he had a 
strong case of unfair dismissal.  Although the Claimant 
had lied to the Respondent, he had not lied to the ET.  
Claimants are entitled to bring unfair dismissal claims 
for the purpose of seeking a bare declaration of unfair 
dismissal.   
Yes – should be an award of expenses 
– case remitted to an ET to consider 
the amount. 
ET had taken into account the 
Respondent’s conduct (rather than just 
the Claimant’s) as well as other 
irrelevant factors.  Claimants were not 
entitled to bring unfair dismissal 
claims purely to receive a declaration 
of unfair dismissal.   
Onyx Financial Advisors 
Ltd v Shah745 
EAT The Claimant lost his claims for constructive unfair 
dismissal, whistleblowing detriment and holiday pay 
because he had fraudulently misrepresented his 
employment history, had affirmed the contract and had 
then attempted to blackmail the Respondent.  However, 
there were some findings of inappropriate behaviour of 
the Respondent’s management.  The ET refused to list a 
Yes; the ET should have listed a costs 
hearing or have accepted written 
submissions from the parties on the 
issue of costs.  Remitted to the ET. 
                                                          
743 UKEAT/0253/12 
744 [2010] I.R.L.R. 859 
745 UKEAT/0109/14 
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costs hearing and refused the Respondent’s costs 
application.   
PFMS Ltd (t/a A&A 
Cleaning Specialists) v 
Fleet746 
EAT ET had indicated would have a hearing on issue then 
determined outcome. 
Remitted to ET.  
 
Saiger v North Cumbria 
Acute Hospitals NHS 
Trust747 
EAT Not satisfied that one side had acted vexatiously or 
unreasonably. 
No. 




ET held that the conduct of the case had been 
reasonable, so not appropriate to award costs. 
No. 
Taiwo v Olaigbe749 EAT Appeal - costs not awarded to successful Claimant as 
she had not incurred them herself (represented by law 
centre) 
Matter remitted to ET to consider 
whether costs should be awarded. 
 
Walker v Heathrow 
Refuelling Services Co 
Limited750 
EAT N/A Yes.   Costs of £500 in respect of 
wasted costs of adjournment.  The 
Claimant had sought an adjournment.  
The Respondent did not oppose on 
basis that costs were paid.  
Adjournment was only necessary 
because of unwarranted joining of 




749 [2013] I.C.R. 770 
750 UKEAT/0366/04 
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respondents and late addition of 
disability discrimination claim. 
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Costs Not Awarded 
Costs Warning Given 
Name Court  Factors considered  Costs award decision overturned 
Adese v Coral Racing 
Limited751 
EAT N/A N/A 




Court of Appeal ET dismissed application for costs. Appeal dismissed. 
Gammon v Stoke 
Mandeville Hospital 
NHS Trust753  
EAT N/A 
Settlement sum in excess of what could 
expect to recover. 
No. 
 
Marshall v Law 
Centres Federation754  
EAT N/A N/A 
Npower Yorkshire Ltd 
v Daly755  
EAT Appeal against decision not to make a costs 
order in circumstances where claim struck 
out by the ET as being misconceived, the 
Claimant had previously been warned by 
the ET about his claim being misconceived 
Yes – the fact that the Claimant genuinely believed 
he had a claim at the start of proceedings does not 
mean that costs should not be ordered.  Remitted to 
ET to re-consider. 
                                                          
751 UKEAT/0760/04 





Costs Not Awarded 
Costs Warning Given 
Name Court  Factors considered  Costs award decision overturned 
and the Claimant knew that he was not 
employed by the Respondent. 
Shaw v Cedar Tree 
Hotel756  
EAT No details given. Appeal concerned only substitution of the 
Respondent, not costs. 
  
                                                          
756 UKEAT/0425/12 
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Costs Award Made 
No Costs Warning 
Name Court  Costs award 
made 




Hertfordshire CC757  
EAT £10,000 Claim was misconceived – it had no possible chance of 
success. 
No. 









£10,000 Claim was misconceived and Claimant acted vexatiously 
and unreasonably.  During cross-examination, the Claimant 
(who was unrepresented but had brought previous claims) 
did not suggest to any of the witnesses that they had 
discriminated against him.  The Claimant failed to 
discharge burden of proof and adduce evidence from which 
the ET could conclude that the Respondent had committed 
an act of discrimination.   
In part; amount 
only. 
Cook v Building 
Research 
Establishment Ltd759  
EAT £10,000 Redundancy claim withdrawn during hearing after ET 
informed unrepresented Claimant that would make 
findings of fact that would be binding in relation to any 
Yes. 





County Court claim brought in respect of contractual 
redundancy pay (which was worth £195,000). 
Fariba v Pfizer Ltd760  EAT Costs to be 
assessed 
PHR on 20 March 2010 considering strike out of 
proceedings 




Court of Appeal 
decision in Barnsley 
Metropolitan 
Borough Council v 
Yerrakalva. 




EAT £1,500 Claims misconceived.  The Claimant knew or ought to have 
known that claim hopeless.  The Claimant was 
unrepresented.   
 
Set aside because 
irrelevant 
considerations 
taken into account. 
EAT set aside the 
decision.  The 
Claimant was not 
represented, the 
claims were found 
to be hopeless, but 
subjectively 
excusable for the 
Claimant to carry 
on. 




Growcott v Glaze 
Auto Parts Limited762 
EAT £1,972.50 Unreasonably pursued after 14 June 2000 – letter set out 
reasons why claim was misconceived. 
No. 




Costs threat made by the employer should never have been 
made and constituted unreasonable conduct.  Unreasonable 
conduct in the handling of the case through a failure by the 




Lambeth LBC v 
D'Souza (No.4)764  
EAT £3,000 The proceedings were misconceived.  The Claimant had at 
least 13 years of ET litigation experience.  The claim was 
one that no competent lawyer would have advised to 
pursue.   
Yes; when claims 
were brought, it 
was not possible to 
award costs against 
an individual on 
the basis of a claim 
being 
misconceived. 
Lake v Acro Grating765 EAT £7,500 After costs warning given, a further £24,041.15 costs was 
incurred.  The Claimant acted unreasonably in pursuing 
after offer on 18 March 2004 not to pursue claim against 
him. 
Yes – overturned 
on basis that 
failure to accept an 
offer cannot in 
itself constitute 
unreasonable 
                                                          
762 UKEAT/0419/11 
763 UKEAT/0422/03 
764 EAT/0395/99, EAT/0023/00, EAT/0466/02.  Part of the case was appealed to the Court of Appeal (Lambeth LBC v D'Souza (No.4) [2003] EWCA Civ 1709) but this did not relate to the 
costs award against the Claimant. 
765 UKEAT/0511/04 
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action in pursuing 
claim. 





£4,000 Unreasonable conduct; the case had been significantly 
extended by the conduct of the Claimant. 
Order quashed – 
ET failed to 
quantify what costs 
had been incurred 
by the Claimant’s 
“unreasonable 
conduct”. 




EAT £500 Misconceived disability discrimination claim; the ET ruled 
at preliminary hearing that Claimant not disabled.  The ET 
warned that needed to produce evidence and the Claimant 
failed to do so.  Two costs warning from the Respondent 
No. 
Nouchin v Norfolk 
CC768 




25 day hearing on 8 day withdrew claims (24/11/2010) 
Vexatious, misconceived and abusive - invented and lied 
about having complained about racist behaviour and this 
deceit formed the basis of his case. 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
Peat v Birmingham 
City Council769  
EAT No details of 
quantum. 
ET awarded costs against the Claimants on the basis that 
that they acted unreasonably in the conduct of the case by 
pursuing it after receipt of costs warning letter and claims 
were misconceived. 
EAT upheld ET 
decision. 
                                                          











Claimant’s schedule of loss unrealistic; if had engaged in 
meaningful negotiations, could have avoided the need for a 
7 day hearing. 
No; appeal 
dismissed. 






Claim misconceived and proceedings conducted 
unreasonably: many of the incidents complained about 
either did not happen or not in the way alleged; the 
Claimant was put on notice by the Respondent regarding 
conduct of proceedings and the Claimant was represented. 
No. 
Raggett v John Lewis 
plc772 
EAT £2,655.72 The bringing of unfair dismissal claim was misconceived.  
The Claimant accepted that there had been misuse of 
company discount card and that this was in breach of 
company policy. No appeal against award of costs, just 
quantum. 
In part; costs 
award should not 
have included 
VAT.  
Raveneau v London 
Borough of Brent773 
EAT £500 The Claimant had not made a rational attempt at the outset 
of the case to define relevant issues, so time wasted on 
irrelevancies. 
Yes.  There was no 
evidence to 
support finding 
that bringing and 
conduct of case 
was unreasonable.  
The hearing lasted 
for 9 days; ET had 
scheduled for 10 – 
                                                          
770 UKEAT/0439/04 
771 [2005] ICR 1117 
772 [2012] IRLR 906 
773 UKEAT/1175/96 
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so case completed 
within allotted 
time span.   
Sharma v London 




The claim was misconceived; the Claimant knew that the 
allegations were false or alternatively without obvious 
merit.  Further, the bringing of proceedings was vexatious; 
the Claimant was dishonest and deceitful. 
No. 
Shields Automotive 
Limited v Greig775 
EAT £4,000 ET concluded that the Claimant had lied under oath – on 
this basis, the conduct of the proceedings was unreasonable 
Yes; appeal by 
employer 
regarding the ET’s 
failure to consider 
the employee’s 
capital.  The 
employee was 
ordered to pay the 
whole of expenses 
(£21,460.20) as 
taxed on a party-
party basis by the 
Auditor of the 
Sheriff Court. 
Towu v Lewisham 
Hospital NHS Trust776 
EAT £10,000 The claim had no prospect of success; the Claimant had no 
evidence to support the claim.   Further, the proceedings 
had been conducted unreasonably; the Claimant failed to 
No 





give properly particularised schedule of loss and failed to 
provide witness statement until the last moment.  The 
witness statement contained new allegations not previously 
raised, which only one individual could answer and the 
Claimant knew when preparing the statement that this 
individual could not attend the hearing. 
Turning Point 








Claimant brought National Minimum Wage claim and then 
withdrew the claim after requests for schedule of loss and 
further information.  ET did not consider that it was 
competent to make expense order given withdrawn but not 
dismissed.  It noted that even if it was competent, could not 
hold misconceived or unreasonably conducted – and stated 





Remitted to ET to 
consider quantum 
of expenses award 




Vaughan v Lewisham 
LBC778  
EAT Yes – one 




Claims misconceived - unsustainable and unreasonably 
advanced; the Claimant's interpretation and perception of 
events was illogical or unreasonable.  The Claimant could 
not explain why responses that had been given to her 




                                                          
777 UKEATS/0049/11 
778 [2013] I.R.L.R. 713 
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Weir v Consult Marine 
Ltd779 







Successful at liability hearing, separate remedy hearing 
scheduled.  In the interim period, the Respondent offered to 
pay sum that it calculated to be due.  The Claimant declined 
the offer on the basis that she wanted an apology and 
because she disagreed with amount.  Costs warning from 
the Respondent - sum ultimately awarded by the ET was 
the same as the sum offered by Respondent. 
Appeal also on 
amount awarded 
by ET.  As the 
Claimant was 
successful in part, 
it could not be said 
that no reason for 
the Claimant not to 
have accepted the 
Respondent’s offer. 
 
Wolff v Kingston upon 




Costs warning by the Respondent in May 2007.  The 
Claimant should have accepted offer of £1,000 - nearly 









Costs Award Made 
No Reference to Costs Warning 
Name Court  Costs award 
made 






EAT £10,000 against 
Claimant 
Costs awarded on the basis that Claimant 
failed to beat Calderbank offer of £25,000 
(recovered £18,073.75). 
Set aside by the EAT; the 
rejection of an offer alone 
did not amount to 
unreasonable conduct and 
no indication that the ET 





EAT £10,000 The claim had no reasonable prospect of 
success and strike out successful. 
Reduced to £5,000 - means 
were only partly taken into 
account (did not take into 
account the fact that the 
Claimant was on maternity 
leave so was receiving 
reduced pay). 
Andrew v Eden 
College783 
EAT £3,944 Not stated in judgement. Yes; quantum to be 
reconsidered as ET had 
included time spent at 
hearing which is not 





permissible in respect of 
preparation time orders. 
Aramark Ltd v 
Graham784  
EAT £7,500 to 
Claimant 
The Respondent had acted unreasonably in 
conducting proceedings – it should have been 
clear after exchange of witness statements that 
no reasonable prospect of success and the 
Respondent behaved unreasonably between 
liability and remedies hearing by failing to 
negotiate with the Claimant (Claimant tried on 






Court of Appeal £3,000 Unreasonable conduct - claim based on a series 
of facts that the ET found not to be true. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Ayobiojo v 
Lambeth LBC786  
EAT £2,000 The Claimant had behaved unreasonably in 
failing to attend a hearing after her application 
for postponement was denied. 
No 
Baker v Tote 
Bookmakers Ltd 
(t/a Totesport)787 




Advanced allegations in support of conspiracy 
theory and discrimination which he knew or 
ought to have known were untrue.  Parts of 
evidence were untruthful. 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
                                                          
784 UKEAT/0164/12 






Borough Council v 
Yerrakalva788 
Court of Appeal £92,500 
(subject to 
assessment) 
Set aside by 
EAT 
The Claimant withdrew her claims.   The ET 
felt that she had been untruthful at a PHR in 
relation to the state of her health, her personal 
injury claim and her financial means. 
Yes. 
By EAT (in full). 
Court of Appeal held that 
ET had jurisdiction to 
make a costs order, but 
was wrong on quantum – 
appropriate costs award 
was 50% of the 
Respondent’s costs. 
Beat v Devon 
County Council789 
EAT £10,000 The claim was misconceived and in some areas 
unreasonably conducted.   
In part; reduced to £5,000. 
Bell v Lancaster 
City Council790 
EAT £200791 The Claimant failed to attend a re-scheduled 
hearing (which had been postponed at his 





EAT £250 Hearing day wasted as the Claimant’s 
representative had failed to identify the issues 
in the case.   
Not appealed (appeal on 
different issues but costs 
referred to). 
                                                          
788 [2012] IRLR 78 
789 UKEAT/0534/05 
790 EAT/1380/98 






EAT £5,000 Bringing of the claim misconceived.  Principle 
element of the Claimant’s claim was that the 
Respondent had failed to address her 
grievance.  This was wrong as a matter of fact.  
Claimant was, at all material times, advised.   
Substantive issues of case 
remitted to ET for 
consideration (so issues on 
costs to be reconsidered 




EAT Costs to be 
assessed 
The Claimants’ trade union supported the 
claim and knew or should have known that 
the claim had no reasonable prospect of 
success.  The claims had been pursued with a 
collateral purpose in mind (the recognition of 
the trade union). 
No. 






The claim was misconceived; there was a total 
lack of evidence to support claims.  The 
Claimant had not raised a grievance or 
attended meetings to discuss issues, even 
when invited to do so (although the Claimant 
had a genuine belief in claims.) 
Unreasonable conduct.  The Claimant was able 
to pay (owned two properties). 
No. 
Bouheniche v 
Secretary of State 
EAT £2,000 by 
Claimant to 
Respondent 
Claimant successful and awarded £7,000 in 
respect of race discrimination. 
No. 
                                                          
793 UKEAT/0363/05 
794 [1999] IRLR 700 
795 UKEAT/0523/11 
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for Work and 
Pensions796 
Claimed to have lodged a grievance on claim 
form but had not, so claim could not be 
brought (statutory grievance procedure in 
place at the relevant time of the alleged race 
discrimination). 
Bryant (t/a Bryant 
Hamilton & Co) v 
Weir797 







Various claims but bulk of ET time spent 
dealing with unfair dismissal and breach of 
contract; the ET found these claims 
misconceived.  The letter which Claimant 
sought to rely on as constructively dismissing 
her was reasonably written and there was no 
basis on which to maintain that it amounted to 
a breach of contract. 
However, it was not unreasonable conduct 
simply as a result of a failure to consider 
areasonable settlement offer. 
No reasons as to why £750 
right amount 
Order for referral back to 
ET. 
 








Frivolous and vexatious unfair dismissal 
claim; the Claimant was not a credible witness, 
no prospect of success. 
Appeal - quantum should 
have been £50, should not 
have taken account of trade 
union’s means just because 
the Claimant had been 
assisted by the trade union. 
                                                          
796 UKEATPA/0559/11 
797 UKEAT/0253/04 





EAT Award against 
Respondent.  
Costs to be 
assessed 
Unfair dismissal.  Had the employer 
investigated the matter at the commencement 
of claim, it would have known that it had no 
defence.  Threatened employee with a suit for 







EAT (Scotland) Wasted costs 
in respect of a 




Adjournment had been sought by Respondent 
on third day of hearing.  Deliberate and 
consistent failure to adhere to the case 
management orders of the ET. 
Not appeal in relation to 
costs order. 
Clark v Clark 
Construction 
Initiatives Ltd801  
EAT £1,750 Claim relating to whistleblowing was 
misconceived. 
Remitted to tribunal to 
determine quantum. 
Cooper v Smith802 EAT £5,000 in 
favour of 
Claimant 
Unreasonable conduct of proceedings - failed 
to enter a notice of appearance but attempted 
to intervene in proceedings. 
Not obvious that whole of costs incurred were 
as a result of Respondent's unreasonable 
conduct. 
Remitted to ET. 
 
                                                          









EAT £4,000 Late hour at which adjournment application 
made.  Contacted the Respondent at 2pm the 
day before the hearing and made application 
at 4.15pm that day.  On day of the hearing, 
neither the Claimants nor their representatives 
attended. 
Yes – quantum – award 
was in excess of amounts 
incurred as a result of the 
adjournment (remitted to 
another ET for 
consideration) 
Corus UK Ltd v 
Young804 
EAT Costs awarded 
£1,220.68 
One of tribunal members recognised a 
manager who attended the ET proceedings as 
an observer from the Respondent.    
Application for recusal of member made on 
day two.  Application unopposed.  The 
Claimant applied for costs in relation to 
aborted hearing. 
Costs award set aside - no 
fault of the Respondent, ET 
member should have 
brought connection to ET 
chairman's attention. 
 
Criddle v Epcot 
Leisure Ltd805  
EAT £1,786 Employee had failed to comply with ET’s 
directions and orders.  
Yes; set aside.  The ET had 
considered whether it 
could make a costs award, 
but not whether it should. 
Deman v London 
Business School806 
EAT Costs against 
Claimant. 
Unreasonable conduct of proceedings.  The 
Claimant made an application for adjournment 
on basis that the Respondent had failed to 
comply with case management orders.  The 
Claimant failed to attend hearing.  Application 
to adjourn by Claimant (unwell and out of 
Overturned - failed to take 
account of Respondent's 
conduct.  Had Claimant 
attended, would have 
likely sought 
postponement on basis of 
                                                          
803 [1993] ICR 81 
804 UKEAT/0114/05 
805 UKEAT/0275/05 and 0276/05/ 
806 EAT/0357/99 
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country so unable to travel - medical evidence 
confirmed unwell but did not state unfit to 
attend). 
 
Respondent's failure to 
adhere to orders and 
grounds for costs award 
against Respondent.  
Respondent had failed to 
provide Claimant with 
bundle in advance as per 
order.  On day of hearing 
produced 900 page bundle. 
Deman v Victoria 
University of 
Manchester807 
EAT £8,000 plus 
reimburse 
Secretary of 
State in respect 
of allowances 




Four days of ET time wasted by applications 
and interruptions.  Failure to produce medical 
evidence that had been ordered to produce. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Dhariwal v London 
Borough of 
Greenwich808 
EAT 80% of 
assessed costs, 
subject to a 
cap of £18,000 
Claim misconceived.  Claimant did not accept 
reasonable settlement offer. 
No. 
                                                          
807 EAT/1375/98 
808  EAT/276/96 
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Bringing of claim misconceived and 
unreasonable. 
In part; quantum of award 
to be reconsidered as the 
ET had failed to consider 








EAT £1,050 Reasons not sought for costs (so not clear on 
what basis awarded). 
No 
Duncan v Ministry 
of Defence 811 
EAT £1,440 ET found that claim had no reasonable 
prospect of success so awarded costs.  EAT 
upheld points on appeal, so overturned costs 
decision (on the basis that it could no longer be 
said that the claim had no reasonable prospect 
of success). 
Yes.   
Dyer v Secretary of 
State for 
Employment812 
EAT £450 Unreasonable conduct of proceedings in 
relation to the way in which disclosure was 
conducted. 
No. 
                                                          





Essien v JJ Joyce & 
Son Ltd813 
EAT £4,000 by 
Claimant 
 
Successful in relation to unfair dismissal, 
holiday pay, unauthorised deductions 
Failed to explain how £4,000 related to 
unreasonable conduct of Claimant. 
 
Remitted to ET for 
reconsideration. 
 
Flint v Coventry 
University814 
EAT £9,000 The ET decided that it was relevant to take into 
account the Claimant’s ability to pay, but then 
failed to take into account the fact that the 
Claimant had a history of low-paid temporary 
roles, with periods of unemployment. 
Yes; the ET had failed to 
take into account relevant 
matters or had reached a 
perverse conclusion.   
Francois v Castle 
Rock Properties Ltd 
(t/a Electric 
Ballroom)815  
EAT £250 (Claimant 
successful) 
Unreasonable conduct of representative. Yes 
Gardiner v VAW 
Motorcast816 
EAT £100 by each 
Claimant 
 
ET failed to specify how the Claimants had 





                                                          
813 UKEAT/0137/06 




Ghosh v Nokia 
Siemens Networks 
UK Ltd817 
EAT £5,000 Unreasonable conduct.  Failed to establish any 
less favourable treatment. Testimony 









Costs award against the Respondent. 
Unreasonable conduct of the defence; the 
Respondent denied that the Claimant was an 
employee; it had two legal entities one without 
word “ltd” in its title, one with, Ltd had been 
employer and the claim did not include “ltd” 
in the name of the Respondent.  The 
Respondent tried to rely on this to argue no 
jurisdiction to hear claim, which resulted in an 
adjournment being needed.   ET found that a 
counter claim that was brought was brought 
only to intimidate the Claimant.  An 
aggravating factor was the fact that the 





Agency v Parish819 
EAT £8,519 against 
Respondent to 
Claimant 
The Claimant had asked for reasons for 
dismissal - request refused so had to lodge 
claim, response to claim still did not set out 
rationale for dismissal. 
 
Appeal successful in part; 
ET could not award costs 
incurred prior to 
commencement of 
proceedings. 
                                                          
817 UKEAT/0125/12 
818 UKEAT/0465/11, UKEAT/0466/11, UKEAT/0467/11, UKEAT/0468/11, UKEAT/0575/11 
819 [2004] I.R.L.R. 550 
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Remitted to ET to consider 
amount of costs 
attributable to 
unreasonable conduct.  
 
Hemming v British 
Waterways 
Board820  
EAT £10,000 Claimant did not attend first day of hearing – 
ET informed that she had been taken by 
ambulance and was in A&E.  Husband could 
not comply with ET’s requirement that 
medical corroboration of claim be received by 
2pm. 
Yes – order of costs of 








Unreasonable to resist TUPE claim. 
EAT held that employer could not, on the basis 
of available information, have appreciated the 
fact that the basis of their resistance to the 
claim was bound to fail.   
Yes. 




Unreasonable conduct by the Claimant - 
intimidation of witnesses. 
Unrepresented. 
 
No appeal against award 
of costs. 
                                                          
820 UKEAT/0102/13 
821 UKEAT/0217/10 
822 UKEAT/0799/04, UKEAT/0800/04, UKEAT/0801/04, UKEAT/0860/04 
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Hosie v North 
Ayrshire Leisure 
Ltd823 
EAT Award as 
taxed. 
 
Sex discrimination claim. Proceedings 
misconceived; failure to properly consider 
claims prior to commencement by 
representatives. 
 
Appeal allowed and costs 
decision quashed.  The ET 
had not properly 
considered test for 
proceedings being 
misconceived; there was no 
discussion of prospects of 
success and the conduct of 
the representative 
irrelevant for purpose of 
this test. 
J&R Farragher (t/a 
Potens) v Davies824 




Respondent's defence misconceived but the ET 
did not explain why. 
EAT allowed appeal; it was 
not clear why the ET 
thought misconceived.  
Remitted to the same ET to 
reconsider costs issue. 
 





Unrepresented Claimant but had brought 
previous proceedings against same employer 
with trade union assistance 
Appeal allowed - 
insufficient reasons given 
for costs award 
 
                                                          
823 EATS/0013/03 
824 UKEAT/0249/08 and UKEAT/0250/08 
825 EAT/1377/99 
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Must have been apparent to the Claimant that 










Unreasonable conduct – Claimant failed to 
serve her witness statement, despite extensions 
and failure caused cost and loss of hearing 
time.  One complaint not made in good faith.  
Further, the Claimant changed her evidence.  
The claim was malicious and vexatious and the 
ET found that the Claimant had fabricated the 
allegations. 
Monthly income of £1,500 plus capital of, at 
most, £40,000. 
In part (quantum); the ET 
had failed to take account 








EAT £250.   Costs in favour of the Claimant.  The ET found 
that the Respondent had acted unreasonably.  
Appeal on the basis that the application for 
costs was not made within a reasonable time.   
Appeal dismissed.  
Reasonable for the 
Claimant to wait until 
appeal about amount of 
compensation had been 
dealt with.   
                                                          
826 UKEAT/0584/06 and 0155/07 
827 [1984] I.C.R. 675 
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Jones v Rotherham 
MBC828 




The Claimant failed to prepare a witness 
statement and this meant that an adjournment 
was necessary.  The Respondent had been 
ready to exchange statements.   
No.   
 




EAT (Scotland) £880 Application for an adjournment of hearing on 
a Monday, made at 4.55pm the previous 
Friday. 
No. 






The ET considered that the Claimant had put 
forward false evidence.  Whilst the Claimant 
was unrepresented, the ET noted that she had 
supported an earlier discrimination claim by 
her brother. 
Yes; remitted to another 
ET.  The fact of false 
testimony alone is not 
sufficient to mean that the 




EAT Amount not 
specified 
The Claimant made applications for jobs in 
which had no interest and applied for these in 
order to make money out of discrimination 
claims.  The Claimant had brought claims 
against 21 other respondents. 
No. 
Keskar v 
Governors of All 
EAT £4,000 against 
the Claimant 
Race discrimination with virtually no evidence 
to support the claim. 
No. 






Saints Church of 
England School832 
   
Kew College 











Response to proceedings misconceived.  The 
Respondent acted unreasonably in resisting 
the claim.  There was no reasonable prospect 
of success; evidence in hands of the 
Respondent showed that this clearly was a 
constructive dismissal situation (there had 
been a campaign of conduct orchestrated with 
a view to ensuring that the Claimant left) 
No. 
Khan v Vignette 
Europe Ltd834 
EAT £1,500 Costs on an adjournment.  PHR on whether 
the Claimant had lodged a grievance.  The 
Claimant failed to bring a copy of the 
grievance that was intending to rely upon to 
the hearing, causing the adjournment. 
Yes – the Claimant could 
not have known that 
disclosure had been 
postponed.  The grievance 
would have been within 
the Respondent’s 
disclosure documents. 
Kopel v Safeway 
Stores Plc835  
EAT £5,000 Settlement offer rejected out of hand; refusal to 
engage in meaningful settlement negotiations.  
Claim in relation to Human Rights Act 
seriously misconceived 
No 
                                                          





Kotecha v Insurety 
Plc (t/a Capital 
Healthcare)836 
EAT £10,000 Claimant acted vexatiously and had not been 
honest with the ET; disregarded ET’s 
directions; attempted to mislead the ET; 
attempted to blow out of all proportion any 
perceived failing on the parts of the 
respondent.  Unrepresented.   
No 




Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division) 
£500 The Claimant frequently and repeatedly made 
outrageous allegations against professional 
people employed or engaged by the 
Respondent.  None of the allegations were 
proven before the ET. 
No. 
Ladbroke Racing 
Ltd v Hickey838    
(Previous ET rules)  
 
EAT £150 The Respondent provided the Claimant with a 
large bundle of documents not previously 
disclosed; an adjournment was required so the 
Claimant could review the documents.   
No.  No need for the 
conduct of proceedings to 
have been frivolous or 
vexatious where it relates 
to adjournment.   
Lanzante (t/a Hair 
UK) v Jefferies839 
EAT Amount not 
specified 
Costs award against the Respondent of costs 
from the date of liability hearing.  The 
Claimant put forward a proposal for 




                                                          
836 UKEAT/0461/07 
837 [2002] EWCA Civ 352 
838 [1979] I.C.R. 525 
839 EAT/0702/01 
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Larwood v Earth 
Tronics Inc Ltd840 
EAT £595 against 
the Claimant. 
Failure to instruct solicitors resulted in a late 
application to amend claim. 
 
Appeal allowed.  It was not 
unreasonable to instruct a 
solicitor after proceedings 
commenced. 
Lewald-Jezierska v 
Solicitors in Law841 
EAT Costs of the 
entire 
proceedings. 
The Claimant had acted unreasonably 
throughout and the claims were misconceived.  
The Claimant was successful in relation to four 
of eight claims brought. 





EAT £500 against 
the Claimant. 
Costs awarded for want of prosecution and 
delay.  The ET refused to assess costs on the 
basis that the Claimant did not appear and it 
therefore had no submissions on means.  As 
such, it ordered £500, being the maximum that 
the ET could order at that time without 
assessment.   
Appeal on amount of order by the 
Respondent. 
Appeal successful.  The ET 
did not have to consider 
means, the unreasonable 
conduct of the Claimant 
had caused the Respondent 
unnecessary expense.  






EAT 50% of the 
employee’s 
costs 
The Respondent knew or should have known 
that its defence could not be run by the second 
day of the hearing.   
 
Not frivolous conduct; 
costs award overturned. 




843 [1981] I.R.L.R. 321 
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Regulations 1974) – 






EAT £1,498.89 One of the Respondent’s witnesses was not 
available.  The Respondent had a signed copy 
of the witness’ statement and was prepared to 
rely on this but the Claimant wanted to cross 
examine.  The hearing was adjourned so that 
the witness could give live evidence.  Case 
management order only required exchange of 
statements; it did not require witnesses to give 
live evidence.  Since the Respondent was 
content to rely on statement, the adjournment 
was not truly caused by it. 
 





EAT £7,750 Constructive dismissal claim brought – but 
clear that there was a dismissal by the 
No.  
                                                          
844 UKEAT/0319/08, UKEAT/0320/08 
845 UKEAT/0501/13 
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Respondent.  Unreasonable conduct of 
proceedings. 
McPherson v BNP 
Paribas (No.1)846 
Court of Appeal £90,747.82 
subject to 
assessment 
Unreasonable conduct of proceedings – the 
Claimant had withdrawn ostensibly on 
medical grounds; the Claimant had previously 
sought an adjournment on medical grounds 
and there was evidence that, at time the 
Claimant sought the adjournment, would not 
be fit to go through full hearing. 
In part; on quantum.  
Unreasonable conduct 
started with application to 
adjourn; costs should only 
be awarded that were 
incurred after this point. 
Meadowstone 
(Derbyshire) Ltd v 
Kirk847 
EAT Amount not 
specified 
Proceedings conducted vexatiously and 
unreasonably.  The defence misconceived 
The Respondent was not candid about reason 
for the Claimant’s dismissal and its defence 
was based on a lie. 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
Mirikwe v Wilson 





Outrageous way in which the proceedings had 
been conducted. 
No. 







The Claimant was successful on unfair 
dismissal claim but not disability 
discrimination aspects.  The Claimant had 
Yes – rejection of offer did 
not make the conduct of 
proceedings unreasonable 
in circumstances where 
                                                          







rejected an offer of £1,500; the ET ultimately 
awarded £1,007. 
received £1,007 and offer 
was £1,500. 
Myers v Dunlop 
Latex Foam Ltd850  
EAT £3,600 The Claimant's case was in part misconceived 
and had been conducted unreasonably.  Once 
the medical evidence was in the hands of the 
Claimant’s representative, it should have been 
clear that this case, in respect of the disability 
claim, was misconceived, and that the prospect 
of the Claimant succeeding in an unfair 
dismissal claim — or at least succeeding to any 
material degree resulting in a financial award 
— must be slim. 
No. 
NCP Services Ltd v 
Topliss851  
EAT £3,000 The Respondent acted unreasonably in 
resisting the claim: it should have recognised 
that it had failed to comply with the statutory 
disciplinary procedure and therefore should 
not have resisted the claim of ordinary, unfair 
dismissal.  Further it persisted in arguing that 
the DVLA had requested the Claimant be 
removed from the contract where that was not 
the case. 
Yes – failure to comply 
with the statutory 
disciplinary procedure was 
dealt with through 20% 
uplift and there was some 
evidence that an individual 
at the DVLA had requested 
that the Claimant be 
removed from the contract. 




Newton v Alcohol 
East852 




The Claimant failed to attend hearing and 
contacted ACAS at last minute to try to 
negotiate a settlement. 
Yes – only costs incurred in 
relation to Claimant’s non-





Support Service853  
EAT £10,000 The Claimant was unreasonable in her 
conduct, the claim was misconceived and there 
was no credibility in any of the Claimant's 
allegations. 
No. 
Olatunji v Network 
Rail Infrastructure 
Ltd854 
EAT £10,000 Failing to adhere to orders of the ET; no 
further reasons given. 
On appeal, order set aside 
and costs award of £750 
made. 
 
Omar v Worldwide 
News Inc (t/a 
United Press 
International)855  
EAT Costs to be 
assessed 
The Claimant had, in bringing or conducting 
the proceedings, acted frivolously, vexatiously 
or otherwise unreasonably. This matter could 
have been concluded far sooner if the issues 
had been defined more clearly. The ET found 
that the Claimant fabricated his evidence in 
many respects. 
Yes; the ET’s criticism was 
of the Claimant’s 
representative conduct. 




855 [1998] I.R.L.R. 291 
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Oni v NHS 
Leicester City856 





Unreasonable conduct of proceeding due to 
the unsatisfactory way in which the Claimant 
gave evidence.  The ET found the Claimant not 
to be a credible witness as refused to answer 
questions. 
 
Yes.  Section on conduct of 
proceedings in judgement 
on merits was unnecessary 
– the wording echoed that 
of the threshold tests for 
grant of an order of costs 
and expressed concluded 
views on this – real 
possibility that ET had pre-
judged the question of 
costs.   
Remitted to ET for 
consideration. 
Osonnaya v Queen 
Mary University of 
London857 
EAT £500 Applied for postponement on the day of PHR 
when circumstances giving rise to 
postponement known earlier to the Claimant. 
No. 
Pantry v Home 
Office858  
EAT £423 The ET awarded costs of £423 on basis that the 
claim had no reasonable prospect. 
Application for review – Chairman decided 
that there would be a review.  Three person 
panel upheld original decision.  Costs warning 
had been given to the Claimant. 
EAT overturned – 
Chairman had determined 
that claim had reasonable 
prospect (or would not 
have proceeded to three 
person panel) – 
inconsistent to award costs 





on basis that claim had no 
reasonable prospect. 
Phelan v Rolls 
Royce plc859 







Discussion of costs on 10 September at CMD, 
hearing to take place on 11 September.  
Postponement needed because of the 
Claimant's refusal to exchange witness 
statements. 
Remitted to the ET to 
consider the issue of ability 
to pay. 
 
Purohit v Hospira 
(UK) Ltd861 
EAT In region of 
£8,000 
Misconceived and conduct unreasonable; the 
Claimant had placed a great deal of emphasis 
placed on a diary which the Claimant knew 
not to be contemporaneous . 
Appeal allowed for the ET 







Claim against Bowercross misconceived; the 
Claimant should have known that Bowercross 
was not the employer. 
Allowed in part – as 
solicitor did not have a 
practising certificate, could 
only give a preparation 
time order- only fees after 
18 July 2006 (when 
Bowercross informed 
Claimant that it had never 
employed him). 






Rajguru v Top 
Order Ltd863 
EAT Amount not 
specified. 
Unfair dismissal.  The Respondent raised two 
new allegations against the Claimant and the 
Claimant needed an adjournment to consider 
these.  The adjournment was granted but the 
Claimant was ordered to pay the cost of a 
day’s attendance for the Respondent on the 
basis that the Claimant should have sought 





Richmond v Devon 
Doctors on Call864 
EAT £4,000 Unreasonable conduct of proceedings; 
important aspects of preparation were not 
undertaken promptly in accordance with ET 
instructions plus there was a delay in 
obtaining medical evidence. 
In part; amount to be 
reconsidered (on the basis 
that no explanation of why 
the ET believed £4,000 to 
be the appropriate award). 
Roadbeach Ltd v 
Werner865 
EAT £3,000 (Er to 
ee) 
The Respondent failed to respond to claim, but 
attended a remedy hearing.  The hearing was 
adjourned and the Respondent filed a defence.  
The ET awarded costs occasioned by 
adjournment (£1,500) but also a further £1,500 
on account of unreasonable conduct 
Yes, in respect of quantum 
(reduced to £1,500). 
Saminaden v 
Barnet Enfield and 
EAT Just under 
£4,000 
Misconceived and conduct unreasonable. Yes.  ET’s decision on 
merits was perverse. 
                                                          






Scott v Russell867 Court of Appeal Whole cost of 
proceedings 
 
Failure to follow case management directions, 
no credible evidence to back up primary facts 
of the Claimant’s case, persistently using 
irrelevant evidence in an attempt to discredit 
the Respondent.   
Litigant in person. 
Permission to appeal 
refused. 
Seel Garages v 
Byrne868 
 
EAT Yes in favour 
of Secretary of 
State 
Award of costs against the Respondent to the 
Secretary of State respect of wasted ET time 
caused by an adjournment on application of 
the Respondent.   
EAT held that the ET had 
no jurisdiction to make the 
particular costs award. 
 
Segor v Goodrich 
Actuation Systems 
Ltd869  
EAT £10,000 The Claimant brought a race discrimination 
claim but the only evidence of discrimination 
was that she had not been appointed to roles 
and others had.  The majority of claims 
brought were out of time and the conduct of 
proceedings had been unreasonable (breach of 
confidentiality agreement and the Claimant 
conceded a point late in proceedings). 
Yes; had not conceded 
point, was sufficient 
evidence to shift burden of 
proof and the events 
complained of were part of 
a continuing act. Case 
remitted to the ET to 
reconsider various issues, 
including costs. 
                                                          
866 UKEAT/0018/08 
867 [2013] EWCA Civ 1432 







EAT Amount not 
specified. 
Indirect sex discrimination case.  Multiple 
Claimant were unable to show to the ET that 
the change in their working hours amounted 
to a detriment.  There was no indication by the 
ET at a PHR that the Claimants were behaving 
unreasonably, nor at the interlocutory hearing.  
After the liability hearing, the ET determined 
that there had been unreasonable conduct; the 
Claimants had been legally advised and it was 
difficult to see that they would not have 
known that the chance of successfully showing 
detriment was slim. 
 
Yes.  Not a case where 
costs should properly have 
been awarded.  Losing a 
case alone is not sufficient 
to make costs appropriate.  
Sud v London 
Borough of 
Ealing871 





Disability discrimination claim was successful.  
ET found that proceedings had been 
conducted in an unreasonable manner; the 
Claimant had abandoned sex discrimination 
and race discrimination claims at the last 
minute, had failed to ensure that witnesses 
were available to give evidence and had 
provided late service of expert evidence 
without permission for that evidence.  In 
addition, the Claimant had failed to consider 
No. 
                                                          
870 EAT/0153/01 
871 [2013] EWCA Civ 949 
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generous offers for settlement and had legal 
representation for much of the litigation. 
Sutton v Ranch 
Ltd872  
EAT Just under 
£5,500 (to the 
Claimant) 
The Chairman decided to revoke a costs order 
on review on the basis that the ET did not have 
jurisdiction to make the costs award.  The 
Respondent had not lodged a response so had 
been barred from taking any further part in 
proceedings. 
No. 





Costs for the Claimant being late to attend an 
adjourned hearing (an hour and a half) 
amounted to unreasonable conduct because no 







Initially assessed at £7,000 then reduced to 
£1,500 taking account of the Claimant’s means.  
At an earlier CMD, the ET  had found that 
legally well conceived complaint, but just 
because a claim has a legal basis does not 




                                                          




Unegbu v Newman 
Stone Ltd875 
EAT £500 against 
the Claimant. 
Costs because the claim had been withdrawn 
after the Claimant received an explanation of 
his treatment through the Respondent’s ET3. 
EAT set aside - withdrawal 





Advisory Service876  
EAT Costs award 
£500 (against 
Claimant) 
Unreasonable conduct – the Claimant made 






EAT £10,000 against 
the Claimant 
Unfair dismissal, race discrimination, breach of 
contract and victimisation claims were all 
unsuccessful, except a breach of contract claim 
in relation to holiday pay.  The Claimant was 
unrepresented, but the complaints were 
misconceived and there was unreasonable 
conduct (the Claimant sought to pursue claims 
previously dismissed on withdrawal, made 
allegations of an active conspiracy and 






EAT £100 costs 
against the 
Claimant. 
Race discrimination and victimisation claims 
were false and unreasonable.  Complaint about 
working hours became a race discrimination 
claim with no basis for this.   
Appeal dismissed. 
 
                                                          
875 UKEAT/0157/08 




Waterman v AIT 
Group Plc879 
 
EAT £10,000 against 
the Claimant. 
 
The claim was misconceived and out of time.  
The Claimant had sought to argue about the 
effective date of termination, but any 
reasonable person would have known that the 
correct date was the date as pleaded by the 
Respondent.   
Costs appeal out of time 
 
  
                                                          
879 UKEAT/0358/05 
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Costs Award Made 
Costs Warning Given 
Name Court  Costs award 
made 






Edwards v Marconi 
Corp Plc880 
EAT £10,000 against 
the Claimant. 
Claims were misconceived and had 
no reasonable prospect of success.  
The matter ought to have been 
settled and the costs were out of all 
proportion with the seriousness of 
dispute.  The Claimant had been 
warned by the ET to take advice 
and warned that £10,000 was the 





Esan v Medicines 
Control Agency881 
EAT £1,000 against the 
Claimant. 
The Claimant failed to clarify the 
basis of his claims, included 
spurious allegations, which the ET 
had no jurisdiction to entertain and 
failed to address the issues in the 
case despite clear direction from the 
ET to do so.  The Claimant had 








of costs by the Respondent and by 
the ET. 
 
Garnes v London 
Borough of 
Lambeth882 
EAT Yes, costs of two 
days spent at 
hearing to point 
abandoned 
The Claimant refused to attend the 
hearing; he was warned that if he 
did not do so, his claim would be 
struck out and that he would be at 
risk of costs. 
 
No. N/A 







N/A N/A Yes884 885 
Gwara v Mid Essex 
Primary Care 
Trust886  
EAT £4,500 Adjournment at the Claimant’s 
request; the costs order was in 
respect of the Respondent’s costs 
associated with adjournment 
(£3,000). 
Yes – whole case 
remitted to ET 
Yes – given 
the Claimant 
may not 
have been fit 
to participate 
in the 
                                                          
882 UKEAT/1237/97 
883 [2002] EWCA Civ 1479 
884 “A tribunal should only make costs warnings such as were made in the present case where there is a real risk that an order for costs will be made against an unsuccessful claimant at 
the end of the hearing.   
885 Costs award unfair because “[i]t left [the Claimant] in no doubt…that if she continued and lost she was at a real risk of a substantial order for costs being made against her…She 
simply could not afford to take the risk.  There is no doubt that it was this that caused her to withdraw her claim…”.  In light of the high threshold for costs, the chances of a costs award 
being made was held by the Court of Appeal to have been remote.  However, the ET had thought that there was considerable doubt as to whether Mrs Gee had satisfied the two year 








Howman v Queen 
Elizabeth Hospital 
King’s Lynn887 
EAT £49,052.12 The claim was misconceived as 
there was no reasonable prospect of 
success.  At CMD, the Claimant 
was told to carefully consider his 
position in light of evidence that 
was presented by the 
Respondent888. 
The Claimant’s household income 
was £1,257 per month but the ET 
also took into account the equity 
that the Claimant had in his family 
home when assessing his ability to 
pay. 
In part; the EAT upheld 
the decision that should 
order costs, that these be 
on an indemnity basis 
and that they should be 
assessed.  The issue 
remitted to the ET was 
whether the award 
should be capped.   
N/A 
Igboji v Tesco 
Stores Ltd889  
EAT Yes, £1,710.55 The claim was plainly 
misconceived; the Claimant 
continued to prosecute putting the 
Respondent to unnecessary 
expense to defend the claim.  The 
No. N/A 
                                                          
887 UKEAT/0509/12 
888 A letter purporting to be from the Chief Executive of the Respondent was posted on the Respondent’s intranet.  After investigating, the Respondent discovered that the address from 
which the letter had been posted belonged to the Claimant’s wife.   
889 UKEATPA/1799/10, UKEATPA/0266/11 
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Claimant was given a warning by 
the Respondent that it would 
pursue him for costs. 
Jackson v Walsall 
MBC890  
EAT £10,000 There was no legal basis for the 
claims that the Claimant was 
making. 
The Claimant was a barrister 
specialising in employment law.   
No No 
Kaur v John L 
Brierley Ltd891 
EAT Amount not 
specified 
Unlawful deductions claim which 
was abandoned.  The Claimant 
failed to identify the loss and tried 
to make significant amendment to 
the claim without explaining to the 
ET or the Respondent what the 
effect of amendment would be. 
No. N/A 




80% of £100,000 
costs (subject to 
assessment) 
Unreasonable conduct of 
proceedings; the Claimant refused 
to accept any guidance or direction 
from the ET and made 
complaints/accusations of bias 
against the ET which were the 
cause of a substantial waste of the 
Respondent’s time.  The Claimant 
No.  Application for 
permission to appeal 
refused at CoA 
No 
                                                          
890 UKEATPA/0283/05 
891 EAT/783/00 
892 [2007] EWCA Civ 1342 
893 UKEAT/0383/06, UKEAT/0578/06, UKEAT/0579/06 
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also failed to attend the ET on 
numerous occasions and the ET 
gave several warnings that the 
claim would be struck out.  The ET 
also gave costs warning after an 
earlier failure to attend. 
Khan v Trident 
Safeguards Ltd894  
EAT £10,000 to 
Trident, full costs 
of proceedings in 
respect of the 
other three 
respondents 
In relation to a 
further set of 
proceedings, 
£7,800 to Trident 
No evidence to sustain the 
Claimant’s claims.  In relation to 
further set of proceedings, the 
Claimant had failed to adhere to ET 
case management orders and to 
attend hearing. 
Yes; insufficient reasons 
for the costs award in 
relation to the further 
proceedings. 
N/A 





The Claimant was an experienced 
employment lawyer; as such, it 
must have been known to her that 
her claims were legally 
misconceived and that there was no 
evidence to support them.  
No  
                                                          





EAT £250 Claimant had received a previous 
cost warning in the first set of 
proceedings (against same 
respondent).  All material evidence 
was available to the Claimant 
Yes; it was not 
unreasonable for the 
Claimant to proceed 
with the victimisation 
claim as the employer 
did not give a full 
explanation of its 
actions. 
No 
Pendragon Plc v 
Nota897  
EAT One day’s costs 
(against the 
Respondent) 
The Claimant was successful in 
relation to claims of race 
discrimination, breach of contract 
and unlawful deductions but not 
post-employment victimisation. 
The hearings were unnecessarily 
prolonged by the Respondent 
calling detailed evidence on the 
Claimant’s capability in 
circumstances where those matters 
not been raised with Claimant 
during his employment. 
No. N/A 
Simon v British Gas 
Trading Ltd898  
EAT £7,309 (against 
the Claimant). 
Deposit order (but race claim not 
characterised as having no 
reasonable prospect).  There was an 
offer to pay in full (without 
In part overturned; 
quantum changed to 
£1,500. 
No. 





admission of liability) in respect of 
holiday pay and unpaid wages 
claims.  The Claimant refused 
advice from the ET as to relevance 
of evidence and chose to pursue the 
claim nonetheless.  The offer to 
settle was on the basis that no costs 
were payable; this was made on 
day one of hearing; the EAT felt 
that costs were only appropriate in 
respect of costs incurred after this 
date. 
Verma v Harrogate 
& District NHS 
Foundation Trust899 
EAT Counsel’s fee but 
not solicitors 
costs. 
Case was hopeless; the Claimant 
had previously been told this and 
also warned of costs consequences 
Yes; on quantum.  
Should have been the 
costs of both Counsel 
and solicitors.  Costs to 




                                                          
899 UKEAT/0155/09 
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Costs Award Made 
Unclear whether Costs Warning given 
Name Court  Costs award 
made 




EAT Nearly £14,000 Proceedings were misconceived and there 
was unreasonable conduct of the 
proceedings.  A vast amount of time was 
wasted by the Respondent in responding to 
unreasonable correspondence.  The 
Respondent wasted hours of ET time by 
going into irrelevant points despite warnings 
from ET and had been given at least 10 
warnings about the way in which the case 
was being conducted. 
No. 
Laing v Partnership 
in Care (t/a The 
Spinney)901 
EAT £9,000 No details given. The Respondents did not 
regard the costs of a 
contested hearing on the 
issue as being justified 
relative to the amount 
awarded so did not 
contest the appeal. 
 





ANNEX 5: CASES WHERE INTERIM RELIEF SOUGHT 
Case Name  Court  Date of 
termination 
 Date of 
application 











1 July 1976 1 July 1976 16 July 1976 15 days 15 days 




12 June 1976 Not stated 30 June 1976 18 days N/A 






Not stated 15 December 1978 20 days N/A 





19 January 2010  Not stated Not stated – claim 
dismissed by order 
dated 10 February 
2010 
22 days (NOTE 
1) 
N/A 




29 October 1976 Not stated 23 November 1976 
 
25 days N/A 
                                                          
902 [1976] I.R.L.R. 322 
903 [1976] I.R.L.R. 279 
904 [1978] I.C.R. 1068 
905 UKEAT/0182/11 
906 [1977] I.R.L.R. 243 
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Case Name  Court  Date of 
termination 
 Date of 
application 











1 October 2010 Not stated 28 October 2010 27 days N/A 
Raja v Secretary 






22 December 2008 22 January 2009 1 month 1 month, 3 
days 













Court of Appeal 
(Northern 
Ireland) 
9 February 2007 15 February 2007 21 March 2007 1 month, 12 
days 
 





Court of Session 15 September 
2000 
Not stated 27 October 2000 1 month, 12 
days 
N/A 
                                                          
907 [2011] I.R.L.R. 562 
908 UKEAT/0364/09 
909 UKEAT/0306/09 
910 [2008] I.R.L.R. 51 
911 2002 S.C. 232 
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Case Name  Court  Date of 
termination 
 Date of 
application 






Dowling v Ilic 






20 December 2001 3 February 2003 1 month, 14 
days 
1 month, 19 
days 
Langton v 




31 march 2013 
 
4 April 2013 Not stated - reasons 
promulgated on 23 
may 2013 
1 month, 23 
days (NOTE 1) 
1 month, 19 





28 April 2000 Not stated 19 July 2000 2 months, 21 
days 
N/A 




3 February 1978 Not stated Not clear 
Reserved decision 
given on 4 May 
1978 
2 months, 29 
days 
N/A 
Bewry v Cumbria 
CC916 
Court of Appeal 28 October 1996 1 November 1996 26 February 1997 to 
28 July 1997 (20 
days during this 
period) 
3 months, 25 
days (NOTE 2) 
3 months, 29 
days (NOTE 2) 
                                                          
912 [2004] I.C.R. 1176 
913 [2014] I.C.R. D2 
914 [2002] I.R.L.R. 109 
915 [1978] I.R.L.R. 428 
916 The Times, 17 November 1998 
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Case Name  Court  Date of 
termination 
 Date of 
application 














15 December 2009 5 May 2010 4 months, 28 
days 
4 months, 21 
days 
NOTE 1 – where the date of the hearing is not specified but the date on which reasons were given is, the latter has been used in the calculation of the 
time from termination / application. 
NOTE 2 - the date when the hearing began has been used for the purposes of the calculation.   
  
                                                          
917 UKEAT/0246/13, UKEAT/0250/13, UKEAT/0251/13, UKEAT/0252/13 
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Cases where no details of dates of termination or of application  
Case Name  Court  Date of 
termination 
 Date of 
application 








Housing Ltd918  
Employment 
Appeal Tribunal 


























claim for interim 
relief) 
Not stated 
(reference to claim 













claim for interim 
relief) 
Not stated 
(reference to claim 
for interim relief) 
N/A N/A 




No details given 
(reference to 
interim relief 
No details given 
(reference to 
interim relief 




                                                          
918 UKEATPA/1919/12 
919 [2005] EWCA Civ 1174 
920 [2004] EWCA Civ 964   
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Case Name  Court  Date of 
termination 
 Date of 
application 



















Not stated  Not stated 21 July 2009 N/A N/A 
Langton v 
Secretary of State 
for Health923  
Employment 
Appeal Tribunal 
Not stated Not stated Not stated N/A N/A 
 
 
                                                          
921 UKEAT/1118/05 
922 UKEAT/0408/09, UKEATPA/1284/09, UKEATPA/1285/09, UKEATPA/1391/09 
923 [2014] ICR D2 
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ANNEX 6: CALCULATIONS RELATING TO SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS 




 January to March 1997 January to March 2015 
Self-employed individuals 3,473,000 4,526,000 
 
4,526,000 ÷ 3,473,000 = 1.303 
 




 January to March 1997 January to March 2015 
Agency workers 206,711 328,294 
Casual workers 345,335 326,787 
Seasonal workers 73,532 70,367 
Other 171,279 236,314 
TOTALS 796,857 961,762 
   
Fixed term employees 858,330 670,931 
 
Fixed term workers are excluded from these calculations because the Fixed Term Employees 
(Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 were introduced after the first 
set of data (in 1997).  As a result of these Regulations, some fixed term employees will have 
been converted into permanent employees and this may account for the decrease in the 
numbers in this category of worker.   
 
961,762 ÷ 796,857 = 1.2069 
20.69% increase from 1997 to 2015 
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